Chapter 39: The Actions of the Understanding — Invention, Wit, Judgment, and Speech
Hitherto of the more passive operation of the understanding, which I called reception or knowledge of objects. Now follow the more active; which consist more in the action of reason, than in its apprehension. And they are the actions of invention, of wit, and of judgment. The former of these has two principal parts: the discovering of truth, and the communicating of it. The former only is properly invention; the other a consequent thereof, tradition: but both much making to the honor of the faculty. For the former, I shall forbear any large discourse touching the particular dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in contemplations, practices, dispatches in the maintaining of societies, erecting of laws, government of life; and generally, whatever enterprise a man fastens upon, this one faculty it is, that has been the mother of so many arts; so great beauty and ornament among men, which out of one world of things have raised another of learning.
The corruptions then which I conceive of this part of invention, are,
First, a despair and distrust of a man's own abilities: For as corruption and self-opinion is a main cause of error: so dissidence and fear is on the other side a wrong to nature, in abusing those faculties which she gave for inquiry, with sloth and dullness. Multis rebus inest Magnitudo (says Seneca) non ex natura sua, sed ex debilitate nostra: and so likewise, Multie rebus inest difficultas; non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostra. Many things seem hard and involved, not because they are so, but because our suspicion so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill disposed body, very light weakness is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the constitution is stronger. So with fearful and despairing wits, every inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the object, but according to the disopinion and slender conceit which they have of their own abilities. Non calcant spinas, sed habent. It were but ridiculous for a blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the air, but in the eye.
Another prejudice to this faculty is that which I observed before on another occasion, an over-reverend opinion of those who have gone before us. For when men shall so magnify the gifts of others, that they slight and neglect their own; when out of a prejudiced conceit that the ancients have sufficiently perfected the body of more serious learnings, they shall exercise their wits (capable of greater employments) in degenerate and unuseful studies; knowledge must needs be hindered from attaining that maturity, to which by their own inventions it might be raised. Thus as it falls out among men of thirstless minds in their fortunes: [reconstructed: Divitiarum abundantia inter causas paupertatis est]. Their profuseness out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their estates, draws them quickly beyond their fortunes. Or as it was in the like case among the Romans in those times of public luxury and effeminateness, the valor of their ancestors procuring to them large wealth, and securing them from foreign hostility, did also by the means of that wealth and ease soften and melt their valor, so that their weakness was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their predecessors. So it is in the matter of learning, when we spend our time only in the legacies that our fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our own inventions, the large measures of knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a large measure of ignorance in other inquiries, where in their labors offer greater assistance, than discouragement. There was not I persuade myself among the ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of truth, than the freedom of their own opinions. For notwithstanding this liberty was often the occasion of many prodigious births; yet this disadvantage was [reconstructed: countervailed] with many fruitful and goodly [reconstructed: issues]; all which might haply have been undiscovered, had men labored only in traditions, and contented themselves with learning upon trust. And those more errors being still examined, were less pernicious than fewer believed. And even of them I make no question but there has been good use made by those that have inquired into truth. For first, there are very few errors that have not some way or other truth annexed to them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an error in that man which shall presume of gold hid in his land, to dig and turn it up for no other end, but to find his imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softening of the ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may be made even of errors, when discovered in the inquiry after truth, that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a positive conclusion by a negative knowledge, than a naked ignorance: as he is sooner likely to find out a place, who knows which is not the way, than he that only knows not the way.
The last cause of disability in the invention may be immaturity and unfurniture for want of acquainting a man's self with the body of learning: For learning is a tree or body, which in one continued frame, branches itself into sundry members: So that there is not only in the object of the will, which is the good of things; but in the object of the understanding also, which is their truth, a certain mutual concatenation, whereby every part has some reference to the other. Insomuch that in the handling of particular sciences, there are often such occurrences, as do necessarily require an insight into other learnings. So that of Tully is generally true, [reconstructed: Difficile est pauca esse ei nota, cui non sint, aut pleraque aut omnia]. All that address themselves either to the invention of arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavors on the experiments and knowledge of sundry kinds of learning.
For the other part of invention, which I call tradition, communication, or diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other creatures, oration, or speech. Wherein I consider a double ministerial reference; the one to the eye; the other to the ear: that is Vox scripta, a visible voice; this Vox viva, an audible voice. To which purpose Scaliger acutely: Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus. The dignities which this particular [reconstructed: faculty bestows] on man, and wherein it gives him a preeminence above other creatures, are taken from the ends or offices thereof; for the worth of every serviceable or ministerial instrument is to be gathered from the regularity of its function, to which it is naturally instituted.
The end to which living and organic speech was principally ordained, is to maintain mutual society among men incorporated into one body. And therefore Tully well calls it, Humana Societatis Vinculum, the ligament and sinew, whereby the body of human conversation is compacted and knit into one.
It would be a long and large labor to speak of the honor which God has bestowed upon our nature in this noble gift of speech, making our tongue [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩], as the poet calls it, the messenger of reason, and as it were the pen of the mind which clothes our conceits with characters, and makes them obvious to others. I shall not engage myself on so great an argument, which has already filled the volumes of so many learned men, who have written some rhetorical, others moral institutions and precepts touching speech. I shall therefore content myself with but naming some few particulars, by consideration of which we may acknowledge the bounty of God, and excellency of our nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.
For the dignity of speech it appears in this, that whereas in other less considerable perfections, other creatures have an exquisiteness above man, yet in this man excels all other inferior creatures, in that he is able to communicate the notions of reason clothed in sensible characters to others of his own kind. For though some melancholy men have believed that elephants and birds, and other creatures have a language whereby they discourse with one another; yet we know that those narrow and poor voices which nature has bestowed on them proceed only from the impression of fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore speech is called [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩], by the name of reason, because it attends only upon reason. And as by this the soul of man differs in excellency from all other creatures: so in two things among many others (both subservient to reason) does his body excel them too. First, in the uprightness of his stature, whereby he is made to look up to heaven, and from his countenance to let shine forth, the impression of that light which dwells within him. For the face is the window of the soul.
Pronáque cum spectent Animalia caetera terram, Os homini sublime [reconstructed: dedit], Caelumque tueri Iussit & erectos, ad Sydera tollere Vultus. While other creatures downward fix their sight, bending to earth an earthly appetite: to man he gave a lofty face; might look up to the heavens; and in that spacious book, so full of shining characters, descry why he was made, and whether he should fly.
Next in the faculty of speech, which is the [reconstructed: Gate] of the soul, through which she passes, and the interpreter of the conceits, and cogitations of the mind, as the philosopher speaks. The uses of speech are to convey and communicate the conceptions of the mind (and by that means to preserve human society) to derive knowledge, to maintain mutual love and supplies; to multiply our delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrows; but above all to honor God, and to edify one another, in which respect our tongue is called our glory (Psalm 16:2; Acts 2:26).
The force and power of speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to express, how suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry captive the affections of men. Caesar with one word quiets the commotion of an army. Menenius Agrippa with one apologue, the sedition of a people. Flavianus the Bishop of Antioch with one oration; the fury of an emperor. Anaximenes with one artifice, the indignation of Alexander; Abigail with one supplication, the revenge of David; Pericles and Pisistratus even then when they spoke against the people's liberty, overruled them by their eloquence, to believe and embrace what they spoke, and by their tongue effected that willingly, which their sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same ends, and yet with clean different success. The one in advancing the same business pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other reason but this, the one had the art of persuasion which the other wanted.
[⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] One spoke the right with a slow tongue, another fluently spoke wrong. He lost, this stole the cause, and got to make you think, what you think not.
And this power of speech over the minds of men is by the poet, in that known passage of his thus elegantly described:
—Magnā in populo cum saepe Coorta est Seditio, saevitque Animus Ignobile vulgus, Iamque faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat. Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si forte virumquem Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant: Ille regit dictis Animos & pectora mulcet. When in a multitude seditions grow, and [reconstructed: ulcerated] minds do overflow with swelling ire; when stones and firebrands fly, (as rage does everywhere weapons supply) then if some aged man, in honor held for piety, and prudence, stand to wield, and moderate this tumult: straightway all rise up with silent reverence, and let fall their angry clamors; his grave words do sway their minds, and all their discontents allay.
The virtues of speech (whereby it works with such force upon the mind) are many, which therefore I will but name: some grammatical, as property, and fitness, and congruity, without solecisms and barbarousness; some rhetorical, as choice, purity, brevity, perspicuity, gravity, pleasantness, vigor, moderate acrimony and vehemency; some logical, as method, order, distribution, demonstration, invention, definition, argumentation, refutation. A right digesting of all the aids of speech; as wit, learning, [reconstructed: proverbs], apologues, emblems, histories, laws, causes, and effects, and all the heads or places which assist us in invention. Some moral, as gravity, truth, seriousness, integrity, authority; when words receive weight from manners, and a man's speech is better believed for his life than for his learning. When it appears, that they arise esulce pectoris, and have their foundation in virtue, and not in fancy. For as a man receives the self-same wine with pleasure in a pure and clean vessel, which he loathes to put to his mouth, from one that is foul and soiled: so the self-same speech adorned with the piety of one man, and disgraced with the pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.
[⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩].
A speech from base men, and men of respect, though it be the same, works not the same effect.
And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected life, an opinion which they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it: that the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his judgment. For we are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill cook did dress it. And therefore it is a very true character which Tully and Quintilian give of a right orator: that he must be Vir bonus dicendi Peritus, as well a good man as a good speaker. Otherwise though he may speak with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their affections. Like a fire made of green wood, which is fed with it as it is fuel, but quenched as it is green.
Lastly, some are civil in causes deliberative, or juridical, as wisdom, pertinency and fitness to the nature and exigence of the end or matter whereupon we speak. For in that case we are to ponder and measure what we say, by the end to which we say it, and to fit it to all the circumstances incident thereto. Paul among the philosophers disputed with them from the inscription of their altar, from the authority of their poets, and from confessed maxims of reason, by these degrees convincing them of idolatry, and leading them to repentance. But among the Jews he disputed out of Scripture. With Felix that looked for money, he disputed of righteousness and judgment to come, but among the Pharisees and Sadducees, of the resurrection, that a dissension among themselves might procure a party for him. It is not wisdom for a man in misery to speak with a high style: or a man in dignity with a creeping. The same speech may be excellent in an umbratile exercitation, which would be too pedantical, and smelling of the lamp in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat in [reconstructed: one] place for the fancy, which in another would be too thin for the conscience. Nature has guarded and compassed in the tongue with the lips, like a folding gate, and with the teeth like a double hedge, that we might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.
These are the principal virtues. And in opposition to these, we may easily collect the principal corruptions of this faculty, which I will content myself with but the naming.
The vices in grammar, are solecisms, barbarisms, obsoleteness, impropriety, incongruity of speech. In rhetoric, sordidness, tediousness, obscurity, flatness of conceit, arguteness, and minutiae, gaudiness, wordiness, and empty ostentation. In morals, the vices may be comprised under these two generals, Multiloquium and Turpiloquium, garrulous and rotten communication. Lastly in civil respects, levity and impertinency, like the advices of Thersites, [illegible] many and to little purpose.
But besides all these, there is one thing which seems to be the most proper corrupter of this ornament of speech, and that is a lie. For [reconstructed: as] every thing is then most regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: so on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, to which it was principally ordained. Thus a picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, cracked, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it bears, be express and lively, we still call it a true picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitful resemblance (be all other adventitious ornaments never so exquisite) we still account it false and corrupt. So it is with the speech of man, which though of never so great weakness and insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping itself to the conceits of the mind, and make level and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not a good) yet in some respect a regular speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution. But be all other excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false image of our intentions, nature is diverted from her prime end, and the faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its original office. And indeed, other moral duties of the tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speak of, without which they are but hypocrisy, and come within the compass of the noted corruption, a lie: for every hypocrite is a liar. I confess there are sins of speech greater than a lie, in the intention and degrees of their own guilt: but herein is the difference: the tongue may in it (whether morally or religiously considered) bear a double irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)
First it may be unconformable to the law of right reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavory speeches. And the corruption which hereby it incurs, is common to it with other faculties, as the disproportion between evil thoughts and reason dictating the contrary, works corruption in the thoughts.
And then secondly it may be disproportioned to the conceits of the mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly [illegible], and this is properly a lie. Which I therefore call the principal corruption of speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousness and guilt, than in any other speeches (because all guilt follows the inconformity and removal from the law of God and reason; and therein other speeches, as blasphemy, and sedition, may have a greater measure of wickedness) but because in a lie I find both the aforementioned irregularities, it being a speech not only uneven to the conceits of the mind; but repugnant also to the will of God, and the law of nature.
The next kind of active operations were those of wit. The use of it is so much the more excellent, by how much the wrestings and abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by showing what it is: for I take not wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of conceit, whether in style or conference, which like [reconstructed: rotten] wood in the dark, have more shine than substance; whose use and ornament are like themselves swift and vanishing; at once both admired and forgotten: but I understand a settled, constant, habitual sufficiency of the Understanding, whereby it is enabled in any kind of learning, theory, or practice, both to sharpness in search, subtlety in expression, and dispatch in execution. As for that other kind seen in panegyrics, declamatory discourses, epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats only and sleights, not duties and ministries of the wit, which serve rather for ostentation than use: and are only the remission of the mind and unbending of the thoughts from more severe knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather exercise than travel, although by the violence of the motion, or length of the way there may ensue sweat and weariness.
Now for the corrupters of the wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and certain as itself, if alone: for wit, though it be swift, yet is often blind. And therefore the faster it hastens in error, the more dangerous it is to itself. And hence it is, that as learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been [reconstructed: eminent] in this faculty, if they swayed it by moderation and prudence: so none have been more pernicious and violent oppugners of truth, than men best furnished with acuteness, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their own fancies, and not submitted it to judgment and examination. As the fattest soils in Greece caused the greatest troubles; and the beauty of Helena, the ruin of Troy. Wit like wine is a good remedy against the poison of the mind; but being itself poisoned, it does kill the sooner. There ought to be, for the right disposing of our inventions, a mutual reference and service between wit and judgment. It is a vexation of mind to discern what is right and profitable, and have no enablement to attain it: and that is judgment without wit. And to have a facility of compassing an end, and a working and restless fancy, without direction to fasten it on a fit object, is the only course to multiply error, and to be still in motion, not as in a path, but as in a maze or circle, where is continual toil, without any proficiency or gain of way; and this is wit without judgment. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutual coadjutors each to other. Wit is the spur to stir up and quicken the Understanding: and judgment is the bridle to sway and moderate wit: wit is the hand and foot for execution and motion; but judgment is the eye for examination and direction. Lastly, wit is the sail and oar to further the progress in any inquiry; but judgment is the [reconstructed: ballast] to poise, and the steer to guide the course to its intended end.
Now the manner of the judgment's operation in directing either our practice or contemplation is by a discourse of the mind, whereby it [reconstructed: reduces] them to certain grounds and principles, to which they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating wits seem oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies: for, says he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any examination; but apud Sapientes est [reconstructed: selectio] & Modus: they first weigh things before they utter them.
The main corruption of judgment in this office, is prejudice and prepossession. The duty of judgment is to discern between obliquities and right actions, and to reduce all to the law of reason. And therefore it is true in this, as in the course of public judgments: that respect of persons, or things, blind the eyes, and makes the Understanding to determine according to affection, and not according to truth. Though indeed some passions there are, which rather hoodwink than distemper or hurt the judgment, so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a mistake, but a lie: of which kind flattery is the principal, when the affections of hope and fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.
