Chapter 38: Of Errors — Their Causes and the Corruption of Judgment

The other main corruption of knowledge was error, whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falsehood under the show of truth. It is Aristotle's assertion in his Ethics, that one man may conceive himself as certain of his error, as another man of his knowledge: and this indeed is so much the more dangerous aberration from knowledge, by how much it seems most [reconstructed: nearly] to resemble it.

If we inquire after the prime fundamental cause, the gate by which error came first into the world, Syracides will tell us in a word, that error and darkness had their beginning together with sinners: and the reason is, because sin being a partition wall, and a separation of man from God, who is [reconstructed: Pater Luminum], the Father and fountain of all knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principal way by knowledge resemble, cannot choose but bring with it darkness and confusion into the soul. But I shall inquire rather after the more immediate and secondary causes; some of which, among sundry others, I take to be these:

1 A first and most special one is the abuse of principles: for the understanding must have ever something to rest itself upon: and from the conformity of other things, thereto to gather the certainty and evidence of its assents. For it is the nature of man's mind, since it had at first itself a beginning to abhor all manner of infinity, á Parte-Ante (I mean in ascending and resolution) as well of sciences and conclusions, as of entities and natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the understanding is not quieted in philosophical inquiries about created things, till it have according to their several differences ranged them severally within the compass of some finite line, and subordinated the inferiors of every kind, [reconstructed: Sub uno Summo Genere], under one chief; and rests not in the resolution of effects into their causes, till it come to Aliquid primum, in time, in motion, in place, in causality, and essential dependence: so likewise it is in knowledge and truth, notwithstanding á Parte Post, downward, our pursuits of them seem infinite and unlimited, by reason of our own infinities, and Aeviternity that way; yet upward in the resolving of truth into its causes and originals, the understanding is altogether impatient of proceeding in Infinitum, and never rests till it finds a [reconstructed: Non Plus Ultra], an utmost link in the chain of any science, and such a prime, universal, unquestionable, unprovable truth, from where all inferior collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the truth of principles: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceit, misshapes all conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streams have their proportional corruptions.

Now the abuses of principles, is either by falsifying and casting absurd glosses upon them within their own limits; as when philosophical errors are falsely grounded upon philosophical axioms, which is Error Consequentia, or Illationis, an error in the consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the truth of them beyond their own bounds, into the territories (as I may so speak) of another science, making them to encroach and to uphold conclusions contrary to the nature of their subject; which is Error Dependentia, or Subordinationis, an error in the dependence of one on the other. For the former, it has been always either the subtlety or modesty of error to shroud itself under truth; and that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undeniable grounds, and by a strange kind of chemistry, to extract darkness out of light. Fraus sibi ex parvis, (said Fabius Maximus in Livy upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, Error sibi ex principlijs fidem prastruit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat. Unreasonable and groundless fancies always shelter themselves under a plausible pretense of truth and ostentation of reason. As Praxiteles the painter drew the picture of Venus by the face of his minion Cratina, that so by an honorable pretext he might procure adoration to a harlot. Thus as [reconstructed: Plato] is said, when he inveighed chiefly against orators, most of all to have played the [reconstructed: orator] (making a sword of [reconstructed: eloquence] to wound itself:) so they on the contrary, never more wrong knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custom of that Scipio, honored afterward by the name of his Punic conquest, always before he set upon any business, as Livy reports of him) to enter the Capitol alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justness, issue, and success of his intended designs; and then, Apud multitudinem, plerumquevelut mente divinitus monitâ agebat: he bore the multitude in hand, that whatever exploits he persuaded them to attempt, had all the approbation and unerring judgment of their deities. What were the ends of this man, whether an ambitious hope of fastening an opinion of his own divineness in the midst of the people, or a happy and politic imposture, the better to press those people (always more inclinable to the persuasions of superstitions than reason) to a free execution of his designs, it is not here necessary to inquire. Sure I am — even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like impostors, who boldly pretend to truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as Jacob in Esau's clothes, robbed Esau of the blessing: or as the ivy, which when it embraces the oak, does withal weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertain corrupt conceits, and then to wrest and hale principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errors of the mind, as in the distempers of the palate usual with men to find their own relish in everything they read.

Concerning the other abuse, it is an often observation of Aristotle, that principles and conclusions must be within the sphere of the same science; and that a man of learning ought always to be faithful to his own subject, and make no excursions from it into another science. And therefore he says that it is an equal absurdity for a mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on rhetorical probabilities, as it were for a [reconstructed: rhetorician], whose arguments should be more plausible and insinuative, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping a Genere ad Genus, and confounding the dependencies of truth, by transferring principles to sciences which they belong not to, has been ever prejudicial to knowledge; and error has easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one science by the principles of another. As when religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop and bow to reason; and when those assents which should be grounded upon faith, and not on mere human disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with nature, and no further. And hence it is that so many of the philosophers denied those two main doctrines, of the creation and resurrection (although in some of them the very sight of nature reaches to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those main principles of nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no further) that ex nihilo nihil fit; nothing can be made of nothing. And a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus; that there is no regress from a total privation to the habit [reconstructed: lost]. And this reason was evidently implied in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the root of all error, to the obstinate opposers of the resurrection: Erratis nescientes Scripturas, neque Potentiam Dei. Where are intimated two main principles of that mystery of the resurrection; the Word, and the power of God. This latter commanding our assent that it may be: that other, our assurance, that it will be. So that wherever there is an ignorance of these two, and we go about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing, than an obeying reason, the immediate consequence of such peremptory and preposterous course, is error and depravation of the understanding. Pythagoras and his scholars, out of a strong conceit that they had of the efficacy of music, or numbers, examining all the passages of nature by the principles thereof, fell into that monstrous error, that number was the first and most essential element in the constitution of all creatures. Thus as men which see through a colored glass, have all objects, how different soever represented in the same color: so they examining all conclusions by principles forestalled for that purpose, thinking every thing of what nature soever to be dyed in the color of their own conceits, and to carry some proportion to those principles. Like [reconstructed: Antiphron], Orites and others in Aristotle, who did confidently affirm every thing for real, which their imagination fancied to itself. But Tully has prettily reprehended this abuse in that satirical reprehension which he gives to Aristoxenus the musician, who needs out of the principles of his art, would conceive the soul of man to consist of harmony — [reconstructed: Hoc magistro] concedat Aristoteli; canere ipse doceat. Let him leave these things to Aristotle, and content himself with teaching men how to sing: intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any science beyond its own bounds.

2 Another cause of error may be affectation of singularity, and a disdain of being but an accession to other men's inventions, or of tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walk in ways of their own making, than in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented errors, than content with a derived and imputed learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers of heresy, than the heirs of truth, [reconstructed: Quase nihil fuisset] rectum, quod primum est; melius [reconstructed: existimant] quicquid est aliud, as Quintilian spoke elegantly on another occasion: as if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteem every thing therefore better, because new.

3 Another cause may be the other extreme (for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of authority; when we bow our judgments not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. Et credere, quàm scire, videtur [illegible], we rather believe, than know what we assent to. It is indeed a wrong to the labors of learned men to read them always with a caviling and skeptical mind; and to doubt of everything, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withal, our credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resign our judgments into another man's hand. Belief, without evidence of reason, must be only there absolute, where the authority is [reconstructed: unquestionable], and where it is impossible to [illegible], there only it is impious to distrust. As for men's assertions, Quibus possibile est subesse falsum, what he said of friendship, Sic ama tanquam [reconstructed: Oderis], love with that wisdom as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantageous in knowledge: Sic crede tanquam dissensurus, so to believe, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much straitening of a man's own understanding, to enthrall it to any: or to esteem the dissent from some particular authorities, presumption and self-conceit. Nor indeed is there anything which has bred more distempers in the body of learning, than factions and sidings. When as Seneca said of Cato, that he would rather esteem drunkenness a virtue, than Cato vicious: so Peripatetics and Platonists, Scotists, and Thomists, and the rest (if I may venture so to call them, of those learned idolaters, in deifying the notions of mortal men) shall rather count error, truth, than their great masters erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reins of his own fancy: or to a presumptuous dependence only on his own judgment with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double estate of the learned; Inchoation and Progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a discerning judgment, and liberty of dissent; yet for the other, Aristotle's speech is true, Oportet discentem credere, Beginners must believe. For as in the generation of man, he receives his first life and nourishment from one womb, and after takes only those things, which are by the nurse or mother given to him; but when he is grown to strength and years, he then receives nourishment not from milk only, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choice or dislike: so in the generation of knowledge, the first knitting of the joints and members of it into one body is best effected by the authority and learning of some able teacher (though even of his tutors, Cato being a child, was wont to require a reason) but being grown thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the liberty of its own judgment, were to confine it still to its nurse or cradle. I speak not this therefore to the dishonor of Aristotle, or any other, [reconstructed: from] whose learning, much of ours, as from fountains, has been derived. Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challenges honor, reverence, and admiration. And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which has been given Aristotle by a learned man, that he has almost discovered more of nature's mysteries in the whole body of philosophy, than the whole series of ages since has in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy founders of learning do well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between reverence and superstition; we may assent to them as ancients, but not as oracles: they may have our minds easy and inclinable; they may not have them captivated and fettered to their opinions. As I will not distrust all, which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of error: so likewise will I suspend my belief upon probability of their mistakes: and where I find express reason of dissenting, I will [reconstructed: rather] speak truth with my mistress nature, than maintain an error with my master Aristotle. As there may be friendship, so there may be honor with diversity of opinions: nor are we bound therefore to defy men, because we reverence them. Plura [reconstructed: saepe] peccantur dum demeremur, quam dum [reconstructed: offendimus]; we wrong our ancestors more by admiring than opposing them in their errors; and our opinion of them is foul and without honor, if we think they had rather have us followers of them than of truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in Plutarch did his father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing: I will do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me. For good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. Aristotle's commendation of his middle-aged men, should be a rule of our assent to him, and all the rest of those first planters of knowledge. We ought neither to overprize all their writings by an absolute credulity; because they being men, and subject to error; may make us thereby liable to delusion; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being great men, and so well deserving of all posterity, they may challenge from us an easiness of assent to their authority alone (if it be only without and not against reason) as [reconstructed: Tully] professed in a matter so agreeable to the nature of man's soul, as immortality: Vt [reconstructed: rationem] nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangeret: though Plato had given no reason for it; yet his authority should have swayed assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose always to be swayed by truth, more than by the thousand years of Plato and Aristotle.

4 Another cause of error may be a fastening too great an affection on some particular objects, which makes the mind conceive in them some excellencies which nature never bestowed on them: as if truth were the handmaid to passion, or chameleon-like could alter itself to the temper of our desires. Everything must be unquestionable and authentic, when we have once affected it. And from this root, it is probable did spring those various opinions about the utmost good of man's nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long ago observed by Varro) which could not but be out of every particular philosopher's [reconstructed: conceit], carrying him to the approbation of some particular object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the corruption of his own crooked nature: so that every man sought happiness, not where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the rule of his own disordered and entangled judgment; from where could not possibly but issue many monstrous errors, according as the minds of men were any way transported with the false delight, either of pleasure, profit, pomp, promotion, fame, liberty, or any other worldly and sensual objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnatural course; like that of the atheist in his opinion of the soul and deity: for whereas in nature and right method, the determinations of the understanding concerning happiness should precede the pursuit of the will: they on the contrary side, first love their error, and then they prove it; as the affection of an atheist leads him first to a desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceives it would go far better with him in the end, than otherwise it is like to do) and then this desire allures the understanding to dictate reasons and inducements, that may persuade to the belief thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an opinion: Quod nimis volumus facile credimus, we easily believe what we willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by nature he love sin) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereof; either from others, or himself; and therefore be his errors never so palpable, his affections never so disordered, his mind never so depraved and averse from the rules of reason, he will notwithstanding easily persuade himself to think he is in the right course, and make his judgment as absurd in defending, as his will and affections are in embracing vicious suggestions, Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus. When once our minds are by the violence and insinuation of affection transported into any crooked course, reason will freely resign itself to be perverted, and the discourse of the understanding will quickly be drawn to the maintaining of either; so easy it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as a body disordered and affected in any part, especially those vital ones, which diffuse their virtue into the whole, the weakness spreads, and overruns all the other, though remotest from it — so likewise the violent motion of partial and unruly appetites, which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of man's soul — out of the natural harmony and consent which they desire to have among themselves; but especially do they labor to win over the judgment to their side, and there hence to get to themselves warrant and approval. For as where the understanding is regular, the chief dominion thereof is over affection — and therefore we see always, that men of the most settled and even judgments have the most unresisted power in the government of passions — so on the other side, when the affections are strongly inclined to any, either enormous motion in morality, or object in nature, the first faculty whereon they strive to transfer their prejudice is the reason, since without the assent and approval thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedom from distractions and fear, as if they were warranted thereto by the sophistry and disputes of that power. Thus as it is usual with men of deceitful palates (as before I touched) to conceive in everything they taste the same disagreeing relish, wherewith their mouth is at that time disordered: so it is with men's minds prepossessed with any particular fancy: Intus Existens prohibet alienum. They cannot see it in its own proper colors, but according as their conceits are any way disordered and transported by the violence of their affection. And hence in natural philosophy sprang that opinion of Aristoxenus the musician (which I spoke of before) that the soul of man consisted in harmony, and in an apt concord, Velut in Cantu & [reconstructed: Fidibus], between the parts; and Tully intimates the reason I speak of very prettily: Hic ab artificio suo non recessit: this man knew not how to leave his own art; and more expressly of the same in another place: Ita delactatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre [reconstructed: conatur]. He was so affected with music, that he transferred it upon the soul.

5 Another reason, which I conceive, of corruption of the understanding by error, is curiosity and pushing it forward to the search of things clasped up and reserved from its inquiry. It is the natural disease of mankind to desire the knowledge of nothing more than what is least attainable. It a Naturâ comparatum est (says Pliny) ut proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo [reconstructed: animi] rerum [reconstructed: Cupiditas] languescit, cum [reconstructed: facili] occasio est. It is the vanity of man, as well in knowledge, as in other things, to esteem that which is far fetched (as we say) and dear bought most precious; as if danger and [reconstructed: rarity] were the only argument of worth. The inquiry after the estates of [reconstructed: spirits], and separated souls, the hierarchies of angels; and (which is more) the secret counsels of God, with other the like hidden mysteries, do so wholly possess the minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable inquiries, and so become not only hurtful, in regard of their own vanity and fruitlessness; but also in that they hinder more wholesome and useful learnings. And yet ignorance is of so opposite a nature to man's soul, that though it be holy, it pleases not; if there be but evil (the worst of all objects) unknown. The Devil persuades Adam rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.

But we are to remember that in many things, our searchings and bold speculations must be content with those silencing, more than satisfying reasons. Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est [reconstructed: mundi]: Thus God will have it, thus nature requires. We owe to nature's works as well our wonder, as our inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more to magnify than to search. There are as in the countries of the world, so in the travels of men's wits; as well Praecipitia, as Via; as well gulfs and quicksands, as common seas. He that will be climbing too high, or sailing too far, is likely in the end to gain no other knowledge, but only what it is to have a shipwreck, and to suffer ruin. Man is of a mixed nature; partly heavenly; partly mortal and earthly; and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the soul to no higher contemplations, than base and worldly is an argument of a degenerate nature: so to spurn and disdain these lower inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soar after inscrutable secrets; to unlock and break open the closet of nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deep and impenetrable counsels of heaven, which we should with a holy, fearful, and astonished ignorance only adore, is too bold and arrogant sacrilege, and has much of that pride in it, by which the angels fell. For Ero similis Altissimo, I will be like the most high, was (as it is believed) the devil's first sin: and Eriti tanquam Dij, you shall be like to God, was I am sure his first temptation, justly punished both in the author and [reconstructed: observer] with darkness; in the one, with the darkness of Tophet; in the other, with the darkness of error.