Chapter 24: Of the Causes of Hope — Want, Knowledge, Faith, and Confidence

The next things to be considered are the causes of this passion: the first impulsive cause of hope is our want and our weakness put together, the one driving us ad Bonum, to the object; the other ad Auxilium, to the aid (and wherever there is indigence, there is impotence likewise.) Now in whatever man we find these two unsupplied, there is the root and fundamental ground of hope; notwithstanding, for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite passion out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection to evil, and utter banishment from the fountain of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of fruition, which is their Sabbath and rest; the estate of travel, which is the day of work, and the estate of damnation, which is the night of despair: in the first we have the accomplishment; in the third the final overthrow; in the second the exercise of our hopes — because in that alone our indigence may by God's fullness be filled, and our impotence by his will and power supplied. In which respect, all men have room for hope to enjoy God their last good; though not a hope of confidence, assurance, and expectation, which is peculiar only to the godly (who alone have a present interest in his promises;) yet such a general hope as may well suffice to [reconstructed: stop] the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the power, or to conclude the unwillingness of God to help us.

The next cause of hope is experience and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conducing to the attainment thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not trial of our strength or others' opposition, or of the difficulties of the object, may with hot and eager minds work presumptions of success, and an empty and ungrounded hope (which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by Aristotle to be [illegible], men of strong hopes) being naturally or by distemper bold and opinionative: even as on the other side, strength and acuteness of understanding, because it sees so far into the object, works often diffidence, slowness and irresolution in our hopes, as Pliny out of Thucydides observes; and the philosopher likewise of old [reconstructed: men], that they are [illegible] men slow in [reconstructed: their] hopes, because of great experience. Yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the later does from some opinion of ignorance: for of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares to them, Aristotle says they are therefore confident — quia seputant superiores, because they believe much in their own strength. And of young men he says in the same place of his Rhetorics, [illegible] they are peremptory in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas, on the other side, as [reconstructed: a lame] man placed upon some high tower can overview with his eye more ground than he has hope to overrun with his feet in a whole day, so men that have attained to some good pitch of knowledge, and are withal not insensible of their own weakness, out of the vastness of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame to themselves as narrow hopes as they do large desires; but then [reconstructed: this] proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly, but only as it serves to discover to us how much knowledge we want.

So then properly knowledge and experience is the cause of hope; experience I say, either of the conquerableness of the object by our own means, or of the sufficiency of the power and readiness of the will of him from whom we expect further assistance. For [reconstructed: as] there is less casualty, and by consequence, more presumption to be had of an event of art th[reconstructed: an] of fortune (the one proceeding from a governed, the other from a blind and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater hope and confidence to be given to the success of an enterprise, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. Experience [illegible] as the philosopher observes, the root of art — [illegible] inexperience [illegible] of sort [illegible].

Now this experience may be such, either as we ourselves have had, or such as we have observed others [illegible] to have — [illegible] which we have from ourselves is the most forcible to [illegible] this affection, because every man is the best [illegible] of his own abilities. And it is that which [illegible] forth influence and force into all our actions; nothing could more assure the hopes of David in his encounter with [reconstructed: Goliath], than an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a lion and a bear, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of Jesse, and not of God that were endangered. Thus the eye of faith and hope looks both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprises: for though in some cases it is requisite with Saint Paul to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloth, weariness, and distrust; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein perhaps our former successful resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish hopes. O passi graviora, was the best argument which he could have used to put his fellows in confidence of that which he added:

[reconstructed: Dabit Deus his quoque finem.]

Since other greater griefs you have found ease, doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battle between Scipio and Hannibal, [reconstructed: ad amnem Ticinam]; though the victory by reason of the excellency of the general fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman general could not have used a more effectual persuasion to hope, than when he told his soldiers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome, Cum ijs est vobis pugnandum quos [reconstructed: priore bello] terrâ marique vicistis. You are to join battle with those whom in the former war you conquered both by land and sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the fear of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the hope of a second victory persuade the other to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battle between the Greeks and the Trojans, when Hector had driven the Greeks into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by Homer:

[⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩]. These were the mutual motions did engage the minds of Greeks and Trojans on this rage. The Grecians all despaired to escape the blow, deeming themselves near to an overthrow. But former victory in those of Troy, kindled a hope another to enjoy. They boldly promised to themselves the day, the Grecians ships to burn, and then to slay. Thus hope of victory inflamed the one, the other were more inflamed, because they had none.

That experience from others, which may enliven and perfect our hope, in the applying their examples and successes to our own encouragements. For since the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one another's steps (precedents having the same precedence to reason in vulgar judgments, which a living and accompanying guide has to a Mercury's finger in a traveler's conceit; the one only pointing to, but the other leading in the way. And as I find it observed, that running metal will sooner melt other of its own kind, than fire alone: so the examples of virtue will sooner allure and prevail with the minds of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, than a naked and empty speculation of precepts. It has pleased nature to make man, not only a moral, but a sociable creature, that so when his hopes towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the reason of precepts, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious and common sense of examples.

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures, Quam quae sunt oculis Commissa fidelibus —

Those things more sluggishly our minds excite, which enter at the ears, than at the sight.

Sight which is the sense of example, is more often employed in the government of our passions, than hearing, which is the sense of precept. And therefore when the Poet would [reconstructed: fit advice for] the person of Ascanius, he does not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble natures.

— Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum, Et Pater [reconstructed: Aeneas], & Avunculus excitet Hector.

Recount the brave examples of your blood, and what you have in them seen great and good, let be your pattern, that the world may see father and uncle both alive in you.

For though an argument from example, to prop a fainting hope be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect of moral and persuasive insinuation, as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions which Agamemnon gave to Menelaus, when he commanded him to go into the army of the Grecians, and animate them to the battle.

[⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩]. Run through the army, cry, encourage all, mind them of their progenitors, and call each by his name, praise them, and let us too what we command to others, ourselves do.

It is true indeed that some men are blessed with a greater excellence of gifts than others; yet we are not to think that any man was ever made, as Seneca speaks of Cato, In convitium humani generis, for a reproach of men's weakness, rather than for an example and encouragement of their actions: or for astonishment rather than emulation to others. This being one end of nature, in framing men of great virtues, not only that we might wonder and believe, and know that the same things which for the greatness of them, are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their possibility be the objects of our hope; and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of hope, may be large furnishing with, or strong dependance upon the assistant means of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterprise are in stead of head and hands, to advance a man's design, which likewise is elegantly expressed by Diomedes and [reconstructed: Sarpedon] in Homer:

— [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩] [⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩][⟨◈⟩]. If any second would accompany, my hopes and courage would the greater be: for when two join, the one may haply note what the other [reconstructed: overpass'd] or if he knew it, his counsel would be weak, and his mind slow, when he should execute what he does know.

And according as these means, which we rely upon, have more or less power or certainty in them; they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt hope — such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like. All which can be causes only of a hope of probability, but not of certainty; because they are all means which are subject to [illegible] age, and are also subject to the providence of God, who only can establish and give final security to our hopes, as being such an assistant, in whom there is neither weakness nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.

All other aids have two ill qualities in them; they have wings, and therefore can easily forsake us; and they have thorns, and therefore if we lean too hard on them, they may chance in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

[⟨ in non-Latin alphabet ⟩].

If the thing lies within my power to do, and divine Providence permits it too.

Here then we may discover corruption in this passion, when the mind ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it has, so build to itself peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in itself light and opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermixture of fear and caution might have been retained.

And as there is an error in the [reconstructed: t]rust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those means: For though divine Hope has but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore has but one manner of being produced; yet these lower Hopes, of which I speak, do always depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference to divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdom of combining their aids, and of fitting them to casual occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which makes all worldly hopes so full of lightness and uncertainties, Leves spes & cer[reconstructed: tamina]s, as the Poet calls them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our means to the variety of occasions; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony; the having of our minds, either too light and volatile; or too fixed and constant, or too spread and wandering; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspicious; or too peremptory, resolute, or hasty; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious, or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some of which there is not any man quite freed from) may often notwithstanding the good store of other aids, endanger and shipwreck the success of our endeavors: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry, to be used as in the trial of Mathematical conclusions, the mediums to which are so touched and dependent upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labor in vain, and have all to do again.

A fourth cause of Hope, may be goodness and facility of Nature, whereby we find a disposition in ourselves of readiness, to further any man's purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others; for it is the observation of Aristotle, touching young men, sud ipsorum innocentia caterosmetiuntur. Their own goodness makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every man's prejudice loves to find his own will and opinion, so does his charity to find his own goodness in another man. They therefore who are soft and facile to yield, are likewise to believe, and dare trust them whom they are willing to please. And this indeed is the Rule of Nature, which makes a man's self the pattern of what it makes his neighbor the Object.

Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of Hope; to wit, Faith and Credulity, in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof: For promises are obligations, and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate: so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of Hope, which according as the Authority on which it relies, is more or less sufficient and constant, is likewise more or less evident and certain.

And in these two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Judgment come between them and our Hopes.

For as he said of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes sibi somnia fingunt, they build more upon Imagination than Reality. And then if what Tacitus speaks in another sense, fingunt, creduntque — if our facility feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will issue no other than Ixion's Hope, a Cloud for Juno. And therefore Aristotle out of an easiness to Hope, collects in young men, an easiness to be deceived, credulity very often meets with Impostures. And he elsewhere places credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men among those who are exposed to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others: and as once Apelles, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtain for a Picture.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of Hope, is wise confidence, or a happy mixture of boldness, constancy, and Prudence together; the one to put on upon an enterprise; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occur; and the third, to guide and manage ourselves amidst those difficulties: For as he said in studies, so we may in actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) Altius [reconstructed: ibunt], qui ad sum[reconstructed: ma] [reconstructed: nituntur]. The further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get, and then,

— Possunt quia posse videntur.

When a man thinks, this I can do, By thinking, he gets power too.

And to this does the Historian attribute all the success of Alexander's great victories, Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere, his confidence judging them feasible, did by that means get through them. And though it was venturous; yet as the case might be, it was wise counsel which we find in the same Historian, Audeamus quod credi, non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur, facillimum erit. Let us show our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprise, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easy: For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more than they discover when they see our attempts greater than they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy shoes, that they may begin to conquer the difficult in the learning of the Art. And therefore the Philosopher tells us, that bold men, are men of Hope; for boldness suffers not a man to be wanting to himself: and there are two Principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, audentes fortuna iuvat. That resolution is usually favored with success; or if it miss of that Magnis tamen excidit ausis; yet the honor of attempting a difficulty, is more than discredit of miscarriage in it.