Chapter 40: Of the Actions of the Understanding upon the Will — Directing toward the True End

Hitherto of the actions of the understanding, Ad extra, in regard of an object. Those Ad Intra, in regard of the will: wherein the understanding is a minister [reconstructed: or] counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an end, on which to fasten its desires: or to direct it in the means conducible to that end. For the will alone is a blind faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right good it ought to affect without the assistance of an informing power, so neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that good without the direction of a conducting power. As it has not judgment to discover an end: so neither has it discourse to judge of the right means, whereby that may be attained. So that all the acts of the will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding acts in the understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the rules of right reason. This operation of the understanding is usually by the Schoolmen called Imperium, or Mandatum, a mandate or command; because it is a precept, to which the will ought to be obedient. For the rules of living and doing well, are the statutes (as it were) and dictates of right reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the understanding has any superiority, in regard of dominion over the will; though it have priority in regard of operation. The power of the understanding over the will, is only a regulating and directing, it is no constraining or compulsive power. For the will always is [reconstructed: Domina suorum actuum]: the mistress of her own operation: for Intellectus non imperat, sed [reconstructed: solummodo] significat voluntatem imperantis. It does only intimate to the will, the pleasure and law of God: some seeds of which remain in the nature of man. The precepts then of right reason are not therefore commands, because they are proposed by way of mandate; but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by reason apprehended to be the commands of a divine superior power. And therefore in the breach of any such dictates we are not said properly to offend our understanding; but to sin against our lawgiver. As in civil policy, the offenses of men are not against inferior officers; but against that sovereign power, which is the fountain of law, and under whose authority all subordinate magistrates have their proportion of government. Besides, Ejus est imperare, Cujus est punire: for law and punishment being relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only can be an imposition of law, from which may be an infliction of punishment.

Now the condition under which the understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the nature of the will, and of sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them goodness, possibility; and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) immortality too. Every true object of any power, is that which bears such a perfect relation of convenience and fitness to it, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since [reconstructed: Malum est Destructivum] — all evil is destructive — it is impossible that by itself, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, it should ever have any attractive power over the desires of the will. And on the other side, since Omne bonum, is Perfectivum; since good is perfective, and apt to bring real satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the will, were it not that our understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions; and the will itself corrupted in its own inclinations.

But yet though all man's faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any divine and perfect good, yet so much he retains of his perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire anything, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable and destructive to his nature; since all natural agents aim still at their own perfection. And therefore it is impossible, that either good should be refused, without any apprehension of disconvenience; or evil pursued, without any appearance of congruity or satisfaction. That it may appear therefore how the understanding does always propose those objects, as good to the will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own nature, but in the apprehension of the understanding itself known to be evil. And on the contrary, why it does propose good objects, contrary to its own knowledge, as evil. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in good and evil: for first, all evil of sin, (though it have disconvenience to man's nature, as it is destructive; yet) on the other side, it has agreement to it, as it is crooked and corrupt. As continual drinking is most convenient to the distemper of a Hydroptic body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would die, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his death; but only to give satisfaction to his present appetite: so neither does man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, only that he may thereby come to destruction (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved nature. In the same manner likewise goodness, though it has the most absolute convenience to man, as it is [reconstructed: perfective], and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet [reconstructed: it] has as great a disconvenience toward men's corrupt faculties, as it is a strait rule to [reconstructed: square] them by, and in respect of its [reconstructed: Rectitude]. As light, [reconstructed: though] it be in its own property, the perfection of the eyes; yet to distempered eyes, it works more trouble than delight, because as in philosophy — Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis — so, Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum [reconstructed: appetentis]. So that if the [reconstructed: will] itself be by inherent pollution depraved and evil, it cannot but desire everything that bears proportion and conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the main reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten delight on those objects which they know to be evil, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent to as good.

To which I may add another, namely, the resolution of a corrupt will to yield to itself all present satisfaction, and not to suffer itself to be swayed with the preoccupation of a future estate: insomuch that the small content which man's nature receives from the actual [reconstructed: fruition] of some instant-conceived good, prevails more to draw on appetite, than the fearful expectation of ensuing misery, can to deter from it. And the present irksomeness of pious duties, have more power to divert the corrupt mind from them; than the fore-conception of eternal bliss can have to allure the mind to a delight in them. Hence then it appears, what I understand by that first condition, with which reason is to propose any end or means to the will, that it may be desired; namely, Sub Ratione Boni, under the condition of good, not always true and moral; but sometimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved Understanding, Sub conceptu Convenientia: as it bears conformity to the present crooked estate of man's will: a depraved Understanding I say, and not always properly and precisely a darkened Understanding; depraved by neglect and inconsiderableness; not darkened by ignorance and blindness. For there may be an irregular will with a judgment rightly informed by truth. Otherwise there could not be any offence of presumption and knowledge. We are therefore to consider that there is in a well-stayed reason, a double act in the directing of the will. The one respects the nature and quality of the object: the other, more peculiarly the circumstance of time: the one is properly knowledge; the other circumspection, arising out of meditation, and more close pressing of the object, which is known as good to the will, against insinuations of sensitive desires, which aim only [reconstructed: at] the fruition of pleasure present. First, the Understanding proposes to the will felicity, as an absolute and eternal good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposes means for the attaining of it; namely, the practice of these precepts, which are revealed to us as necessary for obtaining the end desired. The will being, besides its own corruption, transported by the sensitive appetite, finds great irksomeness in those means. A [reconstructed: restraint] of all those present joys, delights, satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceives that great trouble is to be expected, many prejudices and difficulties to be grappled with; a severe hand to be held over passions; a narrow restraint to be observed towards mutinous and rebellious eruptions of the mind, fewer enablements for advancing our fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment; which withdraw the will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second act of the Understanding, efficacy and weight of consideration, by which it compares the circumstances of that difficulty of good to the will in regard of the small time, they shall continue; with the consequent and unspeakable good, that will in the end ensue therefrom, and also with the insufferable torments that follow the vileness of present pleasures. From which the will is made more inclinable (by the assistance of greater power than its own) to go along rather through thorns with virtue, than with adulterate and painted pleasures to dance towards ruin.

Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a blinded Understanding; but the defect of the latter, namely, an insufficiency and inefficacy of pondering the circumstances, and pressing the endless consequence of good or evil, works properly a depraved Understanding, in regard of practical or applicative direction. As a man walking in some deep contemplation by a ditch; though his eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may perhaps fall into it; not out of blindness, but out of inconsiderateness, as not fixing his conceit thereon; but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Understanding being taken up by the imposture of the affections, with the conceit of present good, or present ill in any object, and thereby being diverted from a serious inquiry, after the true rectitude and obliquity thereof, suffers the will fearfully to plunge itself in danger and misery.

Another condition, under which an end or means are to be proposed by the will, is [reconstructed: Sub ratione Possibilis], as a good possible. For if once the Understanding discovers impossibility in any object, the will cannot fasten any desire upon it: since all appetite is only terminated by that which can replenish and satiate the power. Now all satisfaction is by fruition; all fruition necessarily presupposes a possibility of acquiring: so that where this is taken away, the will is left hopeless, and therefore desireless; and therefore we see that the nearer any thing comes to impossibility, the more averse is the will of most men from it: as is plain in these things that are perplexed and difficult to attain. And if here the wish of him in the Poet be objected:

[reconstructed: O mihi praeteritos referat si Jupiter annos?]

O that Jove would me restore, the years that I have lived before.

It may be answered that this was a wish only, and not a will. Since that which a man wills, he does really endeavour to obtain.

The last condition (which is restrained only to the utmost end of man's desire) is that it be proposed, Sub ratione Immortalis, as an immortal good. The endlessness of happiness is that only which makes it a perfect end. For the mind of man naturally is carried to an immortality of being; and therefore also consequently to an immortality of happiness; it being a necessary desire of all natural agents, to attain a perfection proportionate to the measure of their continuance. So then man's end must not be only good, but forever good, totally and eternally: not only a fullness of joy in the nature of it; but a fullness of perpetuity in the continuance. Most perfect in proportion in the spirituality; most infinite in proportion to the immortality of man's soul. The frailty and languishing of any good, and a foresight of the loss thereof, with the ablest [reconstructed: minds] does much weaken the desire of it. And the reason is, because providence and forecast is a certain companion of the human nature; and he which is most a man, is most careful to contrive the advancement of his future estate. It is beastly to fasten only upon present good; this being a main difference between the Understanding, and the sensual appetite, that this respects only the present joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its own immortality, fastens itself upon the remotest times, indeed outruns all time, and suffers itself to be ever swallowed up with the meditation and providence of an endless happiness. And therefore the reason that Aristotle brings against his master's Ideas, argues an Understanding less divine in this particular than Plato's was, when he says that eternity does no more perfect the nature of good, than continuance does the nature of white. For though it be true, that it is not any essential part of goodness in itself; yet it is a necessary and principal condition to make goodness, happiness; that is, an adequate object to man's desires; there is not then the same proportion between eternity and good, as there is between continuance and white: For continuance is altogether extrinsic and irrelative in respect of white; but the happiness of man has an intrinsic connection with immortality, because man's utmost and adequate good must be proportioned to the nature of his mind (for that is no perfect good that does not every way replenish and leave nothing behind it that may be desired) so that man himself being endless, can have no end able to limit his desires, but an infinite and immortal good; which he may enjoy without any anxiety for after-provision. I dare say there is not an atheist in the world, who has in his life be-beasted himself by setting his desires only on transitory and perishable goods, that would not on his deathbed count it the best bargain he ever made to change souls, with one of those whose diligence in providing for a future happiness, he has often in his beastly sensuality impiously derided.

Now of these two directions of the Understanding to the Will, in desiring the end or means, the corruption is for the most part more gross and palpable in assistance to the means, than in the discovery of the end; and far oftener fails the Will herein than in proposing an object to fix its desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same supreme and immortal happiness, the Beatific Vision; every Balaam fastens on that; and yet their means to it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any agreement in an end, where is such notable discord in the ways to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the several proportion, which the true end and the true means to it bear to the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one general hindrance or error about the right end, namely the ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion between man and the right means of a true end is far greater. For there is not only error in the speculation of them, but reluctance in other practical faculties, proceeding from their general corruption in this estate, and nailing the affection on the present delight of sensual objects. First, for the Understanding, I observe therein a double hindrance concerning these means: ignorance and weakness; the one respects the examination of them; the other, their presentation or enforcement upon the Will. For the former of these, there seems to be an equal difficulty between the end and the means, as proceeding in both from the same root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the ignorance of the end is far more preventable (considering the helps we have to know it) than of the means. Not but that there are as powerful directions for the knowledge of the means, as of the end; but because they are in their number many, and in their nature repugnant to man's corrupt minds. There is therefore more weariness, and by consequence more difficulty in the inquiry after them, than after the end, because that is in itself but one; and besides, bears with it (under the general notion of happiness) such an absolute conformity to man's nature, as admits of no refusal or opposition: insomuch that many that know heaven to be the end of their desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way there.

Now besides this ignorance, when the knowledge of the means is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free exercise of them. For (as Aristotle observes) among all the conditions required to moral practice, knowledge has the least sway. It has the lowest place in virtue, though the highest in learning.

There is secondly in the Understanding weakness, whereby it oftentimes connives at the irregular motion of the will, and withdraws it from examining with a piercing and fixed eye, with an impartial and bribeless judgment, with efficacy and weight of meditation, the several passages of all our actions, with all the present and consequent inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vast labor to run over all the oppositions, which virtuous means, leading to a happy end, do always find in the several faculties of man: how the will itself is stubborn and froward; the passions rebellious, and impatient of suppression; the senses and sensitive appetite thwart and wayward, creeping always like those under-Celestial orbs into another motion, quite contrary to that which the Primum Mobile: [reconstructed: Enlightened] reason should confer upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a disproportion between the means of happiness, and the general nature of corrupt man. For all goodness is necessarily adjoined with rectitude and straightness (in that it is a rule to direct our life) and therefore a good man, is called an upright man; one that is everywhere even and straight. To which Aristotle perhaps had one eye, when he called his happy man, a four-square man, which is everywhere smooth, stable, and like himself. But now on the other side, man's nature in this estate of corruption, is a distorted and crooked nature; and therefore altogether unconformable to the goodness which should as a canon, direct it to the true and principal end it aims at. And this is the reason, why so many men are impatient of the close and narrow passage of honesty. For crooked and reeling movers necessarily require more liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in natural bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow bounds as that, which is straight.