Chapter 20: Of the Causes of Joy

I now proceed to speak of the more particular causes and effects of this passion. Touching the former, not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid (which the Philosopher has given some instances of) — the general cause is the natural goodness of the object, and the particulars under that. Anything which has a power to unite and make present the object with the faculty. And that is done (to speak only of intellectual powers) three manner of ways: by contemplation, by confidence, and by fruition — by thinking of it in the mind, by expecting of it in the heart, and by enjoying it in the whole man.

Contemplation adds to the soul a double delight: first, from its own property, it being the proper and natural agitation of man's mind, insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively. And therefore the devil's first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evil as good, for he knew that the mind of man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in its own nature had no perfection in it.

But then secondly, in the object of true delight, contemplation ministers a further joy, in that it does in some sort pre-unite our souls and our blessedness together: and this is partly the reason why Aristotle so much advances his contemplative before his practical felicity. For though this in regard of its immediate reference to communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive nature; yet certainly, in that sweetness of content, that serenity of soul, that exaltation of thoughts which we receive from those noble motions of the higher mind, the other does far in pleasure and satisfaction surpass all active happiness. And hence we see in the parts of man's body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practical. The parts of vision are before the parts of action; the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself (notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession nor intermission of delight) yet by way of expression toward us, he did not in the creation of the world so much joy in his fiat, as in his vidit; not so much when he gave his creatures their nature, as when he saw their goodness: nature being the object of power; but goodness the object of delight; and therefore the day of his rest was more holy than the days of his working, that being appointed for the contemplation, as these were for the production of his creatures.

And as contemplation by way of prescience, when it looks forward on good things hoped: so also by way of memory, when it looks backward and receives evil things escaped, does minister matter of renewed joy. No man looks on the sea with more comfort, than he who has escaped a shipwreck. And therefore when Israel saw the Egyptians dead on the sea shore, the fear of whom had so much frightened them before, they then sang a song of triumph. Past troubles do season, and as it were balance present comforts, as the snow in winter increases the beauty of the spring.

But in this particular of contemplation, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be corruption in the excess (for in those matters of delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt nature — I mean divine things — we seldom err in the other extreme). And that is, when we do not divide ourselves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, so to attend upon mere mental notions, as to neglect the practical part of our life, and withdraw ourselves from the fellowship and regard of human society, is as wicked in religion, as it would be in nature monstrous to see a fire burn without light, or shine without heat (aberrations from the supreme law being in divine things impious as they are in natural prodigious).

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of hermits and votaries from human society, under pretense of devoting themselves to contemplation, and a fore-enjoying of the light of God, is toward him as [reconstructed: unpleasing], as it is in itself uncomfortable, for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of delight is the sure confidence of the mind, whereby upon strong and [reconstructed: unwavering] grounds, it waits for the accomplishment of its desires: so that whatever does encourage our hope, does therewith strengthen and enlarge our delight. Spe gaudent says Saint Paul, and Sperantes gaudent says the Philosopher — hope and joy go both together: for where hope is strong, it does first divert and take off the mind from poring upon our present wants, and withal ministers tranquility to it from the evidence of a future better estate (Romans 12:12).

But here we must take heed of a deep corruption: for though I incline not to that opinion which denies hope all assuaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating mind; yet to have an ungrounded confidence, and either out of presumption or security to resolve upon uncertain and casual events, and therefrom to deduce arguments of comfort, works but an empty and imaginary delight, like his in the poet:

—Petit ille dapes sub imagini somni, Oraque vana movet, dentemque indente fatigat.

Who dreaming that he was a guest at his imaginary feast, did vainly glut upon a thought, tiring each jaw and tooth for naught: and when he fancied dainty meat, had nothing but a dream to eat.

Or like the musician in Plutarch, who having pleased Dionysius with a little vanishing music, was rewarded with a short and deceived hope of a great reward. A presumptuous delight though it seems for the time to minister as good content as that which is raised on a sounder bottom; yet in the end will work such inconveniences as shall altogether countervail and outweigh the [reconstructed: deceit] of its former joys. For the mind being mollified and puffed up with a windy and unnourishing comfort, is quite disabled to bear the [illegible] of some sudden evil, as having its forces scattered by security, which caution and [reconstructed: fear] would have collected. For we know in bodies, union strengthens natural motion, and weakens violent; and in the mind the collecting and uniting of it does both enable it for prosecution of its own ends, and for resisting all opposite force. It is therefore no comforting but a weakening confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectual cause of delight is the fruition of good, and the real union thereof to the mind, for all other things work delight no further than either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of pleasure and joy, the more the union is, the more is the delight (and union is the highest degree of fruition that can be): thus we see the presence of a friend yields more content than the absence, and the embraces, more than the presence; so in other outward delights, those of incorporation are greater than those of adhesion. As it is more natural to delight in our meats than in our garments; the one being for a union inward to increase our strength, the other outward only to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most clear are most pleasant, and perspicuity argues the more perfect union of the object to the faculty. And therefore we have Speculum put together by Saint Paul: we see as in a glass darkly, where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union to his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the glass of nature and of faith (both of which are in their kind evidences of things not seen). We shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union; in his presence only is the fullness of joy.

Now three things there are which belong to a perfect fruition of a good thing. First, property to it, for a sick man does not feel the joy of a sound man's health, nor a poor man of a rich man's money. Property is that which makes all the emulation and contention among men, one man being aggrieved to see another have that which he either claims or covets. Secondly, possession: for a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own, if it be any way detained and withheld from him, which was the cause of that great contention between Agamemnon and Achilles, and between the Greeks and Trojans, because the one took away and detained that which was the other's. Thirdly, accommodation, to the end for which a thing was appointed: for a man may have anything in his custody, and yet receive no comfort nor real delight from it, except he apply it to those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good but the using of it which makes it beneficial.

Now besides those natural causes of delight, there is by accident one more; to wit, the change and variety of good things, which the diversity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptiness of such things as we seek delight from, does occasion. Where nature is simple and uncompounded, there one and the same operation is always pleasant; but where there is a mixed and various nature, and diversity of faculties, to which belong diversity of inclinations, there changes do minister delight: as among learned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments which do not bring a satiety along with them, as has been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the philosopher gives for the walking of the body, when he inquires the reason why in a journey the inequality of the ways does less weary a man than when they are all plain and alike, we may give for the walking and wandering of the desire (as Solomon calls it): to wit, that change and variety do refresh nature, and are in place of a rest to it. And therefore as I have before observed of Nero, the same has Tully observed of Xerxes, that he proposed rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.

To this may be added as a further cause of pleasure: whatever serves to let out and to lessen grief, as words, tears, anger, revenge, because all these are a kind of victory, than which nothing brings greater pleasure. And therefore Homer says of revenge that it is sweeter than the dropping honey.