Chapter 10: Of the Rule of True Love and How Love Begets Love

From this general and fundamental cause of love, proceed some others, special and particular; of which, the first and principal is a similitude and resemblance between the thing loved, and that which is the natural rule of love.

Now, the rule of all love, is by divine truth prescribed to be God, and a man's self; so that, what bears similitude to these, is the proper and right object of our affection. To speak therefore a word or two of these.

The master-wheel, or first mover in all the regular motions of this passion, is the love of God, grounded on the right knowledge of him; whereby the soul being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite goodness, is earnestly drawn and called out, as it were, to desire a union, vision, and participation of his glory and presence; yielding up itself to him, (for by love a man gives himself to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its affections and actions to his will.

And this love is then regular, when it takes up all the kinds of love, and all the degrees of love. For we love God, Amore amicitiae, for the goodness and excellency which is in himself, as being most lovely; and Amore desiderii, with a desire of being united to him, as the fountain of all our blessedness; and Amore complacentiae, with a love of joy and delight in him; when the soul goes to God, like Noah's dove to the ark, and with infinite sweetness and security reposes itself in him; and lastly, Amore Benevolentiae, with an endeavor (so far as a poor creature can to an infinite Creator; for our good extends not to him) to bring all praise, service, and honor to him.

And thus we are to love him above all things; first, Appretiative, setting a higher price upon his glory and command, than upon any other thing besides; all dung, in comparison. Secondly, Intensive, with the greatest force and intention of our spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our love of him: thirdly, Adequately, as the complete, perfect, and adequate object of all our love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the wise man speaking of the love and fear of God, tells us, that it is Totum Hominis, the whole of man. Other objects are severally fitted, to several faculties; beauty to the eye, music to the ear, meat to the palate, learning to the mind; none of these can satisfy the faculty, to which it belongs not. And even to their proper faculties, they bring vanity and vexation with them: vanity, because they are empty, and do deceive; and because they are mortal, and will decay: vexation, in the getting; for that is with labor; in the keeping, for that is with fear; in the multiplying, for that is with care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfeit, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is Totum Hominis, fitted to all the wants of an immortal soul: fullness, to make us perfectly happy; immortality, to make us perpetually happy; after whom we hunger with desire, and are not gripped; on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be loved, not with a divided, but a whole heart. To love any creature, either without God, or above God, is Cupiditas, lust: (which is the formal of every sin, whereby we turn from God to other things) but to love the creatures under God, in their right order; and for God, to their right end, (for he made all things for himself) this is Charitas, true and regular love.

Now, the image and likeness of God, (not to speak of that eternal and essential character of his Father's brightness) is in his Word, and in his works; the one, being the manifestation of his will; and the other, of his power and wisdom. Our love to his Word, is our search of it; as being the only glass, wherein we see the wonders and deep things of God: our belief of it, all, and only; acknowledging in it, the fullness of its truth, and of its sufficiency: and our obedience to it, submitting ourselves, with purpose of heart, to the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the works of God, there are two chief things, to which the affection of man is by the creatures attracted, and with which it desires a union, namely, the truth and goodness of them; for by these only, may all the diverse faculties of man's soul be exercised and delighted: the love of both of which, is then only regular, when it is limited, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act; humble, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity: and lastly, subordinate to that great love of God, whose image we can no further truly love in the creature, than as we are thereby directed to a further love of him.

I come now to that other rule of love, wherein Aristotle has placed the nature thereof, a man's self, or that unity and proportion which the thing loved bears to the party loving; which in one place, he calls equality; in another, identity; in another, similitude; in another, communion; all relative terms, which refer to the party loving.

The root of every man's love to himself, is that unity and identity which he has with himself; it being natural to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of its own being: because the more simple and one it is, the more it is like the fountain of its being; and therefore has the more perfection in it. And this love of man to himself, if subordinate to the love of God, and governed thereby, is Debitum Natura, a necessary debt; and such, as the neglect of which, is a trespass against nature.

Now then, as we love ourselves, for the unity which we have in ourselves; so, wherever we find any similitude to ourselves, or character of ourselves, either in nature or habits, upon that also do the beams of this affection extend. Now, a thing may represent ourselves, first, in substance; as the husband and wife are said to be one flesh, and children are branches and portions of their parents. Secondly, in qualities or accidents; as one man resembles another in natural, and one friend another in habitual qualities; as face answers to face in water, so the heart of man to man.

With respect to this double similitude, there is a double love; the one, natural; the other, acquired, or habitual: the former is common with men to other creatures. Thus in Aelian, Plutarch, and others, we read of the natural affection of elephants; which seeing their young fallen into a deep pit, will leap down after them, though it be present death; and of the marvelous cunning and valor which many other birds and beasts use to provide for the safety of their brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered. Indeed, the pelican (if we believe the story) does feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with serpents, with her own blood to recover them again: which emblem John the second, king of Portugal is said to have chosen, whereby to express his love to his subjects. And Homer elegantly expresses the care of a bird feeding her young ones.

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She brings her young ones what meat she can find, when she herself with hunger's almost pinned. And the like affection, another poet has expressed in the most cruel of all the beasts, the tiger: — Sic Aspera Tygris Foetibus abreptis Scythico deserta sub Antro Accubat, & lepidi lambit vestigia lecti. The tiger (which most thirsts for blood) seeing herself robbed of her tender brood, lies down lamenting in her Scythian den, and licks the prints where her lost whelps had lain.

And this kind of piety we find reciprocal, returning from the young ones upward — so the young lions are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observed of eagles, storks and other creatures. And hence we read of [in non-Latin alphabet], laws, which receive their denomination from the stork, providing that children should nourish and take care of their parents in their distress. And for men, so great is the power of natural affection, that parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vicious men (as Seneca somewhere speaks) desire that their sons may be virtuous, and virtuous men that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves, as Hector prayed for his son.

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Let it be said, here's a brave son indeed, who does his noble father far exceed.

And Aeneas to Ascanius.

Disce puer virtutem ex me, verosque labores, Fortunam ex aliis,—

Virtue and patience learn my son of me, but may your fortunes better patterns see.

And therefore unnaturalness of affection is reckoned up by the Apostle among the foulest of sins, when like Ishmael the nature of men grows wild and brutish, as the philosopher calls such men [in non-Latin alphabet], men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnatural man is called Onager homo, a wild-ass man (Genesis 16:12; Job 11:12); but a meek and tender-spirited man is called Ovis homo, a sheep man, or a man of a sociable and calm disposition (Ezekiel 36:37-38). And among the Thebans there was a law made, which appointed a capital penalty upon those unnatural men, who should cast out and expose their children to ruin.

And as this kind of love arises from propinquity of nature, so another there is growing out of similitude of manners. All flesh, as Sirach speaks, will resort to their like (Ecclesiastes 13:17), and every man will keep company with such, as he is himself; as we see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excels in any quality, shall ever want friends; because every man, that either has or likes that quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or practice of any good things labors to commend himself to his own judgment, and to the love of others; he is engaged (unless he will be false to his own grounds) to love any other whom he observes to study and practice the same thing. For how can I expect, that that in me should reap love from others, which in others reaps nothing but envy from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to love that, which he himself hates; because we are too apt to make our judgments or passions the rule of another man's, and to dislike that in him, which we do not allow in ourselves. Which unruly affection, the poet has excellently described in Achilles, when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and Agamemnon.

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It is not courteous, that where I hate, you should love, except you'd have me hate you too: but take this rule, if you'll be thought my friend; the man that offends me, do you offend.

So much naturally are men in love with their own likeness, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated: and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate everything of him, of whom they would make a prey.

It is true, that in some cases, similitude is the cause of envy; but this is only then, when first the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality: in which case, the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough streams, which makes them run with the more noise. Therefore, a wise and meek-tempered man shall sooner win and hold the love of an angry man, than he, who is like to him in that distemper; because such a man (though indeed he be conqueror, in regard of his wisdom) yet by his patience he seems to yield: and there is nothing which a man's passion loves so much as victory. Whereas between anger and anger there must needs be fighting of affections, which is the remotest temper from love.

Secondly, when by accident, the quality, wherein men agree, does any other way inconvenience them — either in point of credit, usefulness, or profit. For as the stars, though they agree in light, yet Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur, those that are small suffer loss by the brightness of others. So among men, agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proves a prejudice and disadvantage to the other, as the poet said.

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The potter's often angry with his mates, one neighbor architect the other hates.

And therefore as the sun and moon agree best in their light when they are farthest asunder, so in these arts, which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one does the less damage or darken the other.

Now this natural and habitual love is then regular, when subordinate to that greater, our love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly informed reason, which among many others are these three.

First, that our love carry its right respect, and no sinister, or [reconstructed: by-end] with it; that we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, only upon our own benefit: For, as the Philosopher speaks, true love is a benevolent affection, willing good to another for his own sake. Hominum charitas, says Cicero, gratuita est. True love is free, and without self-respects: whereas to shroud our own private aims under the name of friendship — Non est amicitia sed mercatura — is only to make a trade and merchandise of one another.

Secondly, that our love be [reconstructed: serene], not mudded with error, and prejudice: in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses, that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable rebuke of Polydamas to Hector.

[in non-Latin alphabet] Because you can in war all men outdo, will you presume you can in counsel too? One breast's too narrow to contain all arts, God distributes his gifts in several parts.

In this case therefore our care must be to discern between the abilities and infirmities of men, that our honor and love of the person render not his weaknesses beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappy diligence in the imitation of them. Vix enim dici potest, quanto libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus; love is very apt to transport us so far as to make us imitate the errors of whom we love. Like unskillful painters, who not being able to reach the beauty of the face, express only the wrinkles and blemishes of it.

Thirdly, that our love keep in all the kinds thereof its due proportion, both for the nature of them, being towards some a love of reverence, towards others of friendship, towards others of compassion, towards others of counsel and bounty; as also for their several degrees of intensity, which are to be more or less according to the natural, moral, or divine obligations which we find in the persons loved. For though we must love all men as ourselves, yet that infers not an equality, but a fidelity and sincerity of love; since even within ourselves, there is no man but loves his head and his heart and other vital parts with a closer affection than those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repairable. And therefore the Apostle limits the [in non-Latin alphabet], the greatest degree of our love upon two objects, those of our own house, and those of the household of faith (1 Timothy 5:8; Galatians 6:10); not excluding others, but preferring these.

I shall end this particular with naming one species of love more (for all this hitherto has been Amor Amicitiae, a love of a person for himself) and it is that which the Schools call Amor Concupiscentiae, a love of concupiscence, or a circular love, that which begins and ends in a man's self, when his affections having gone forth to some object, does again return home, and loves it not directly for any absolute goodness which it has in itself, but as it is conducive and bears a relation of convenience to him that loves it. For though all affection of love (as Aristotle observed) be circular, in as much as the object first moves the appetite, and then the appetite moves to the object, and so the motion ceases where it began (which is a circle;) (which also by the way shows us in an emblem the firmness and strength which love works among men; because of all forms and fabrics, those which are circular are the strongest; as we see in arches, wherein every part does mutually touch and clasp in that which is next it:) yet in this love which I here speak of, there is a greater circle; in that, after all this, there is another return from the object to the appetite, applying the goodness thereof to the same, and loving it only for the commodity and benefit, which the mind is likely to receive from it.

Another subordinate and less principal cause of love, may be love itself; I mean in another man: for as it is natural, according to Aristotle, to praise, so sure it is to love, [in non-Latin alphabet] — men of loving and good natures: and so he makes just, beneficent, and pleasant [in non-Latin alphabet] men that are true lovers of their own friends to be the proper objects of love. And herein is that partly verified, that love is strong as death. For as that grave which buries a dead man, does likewise bury all his enemies (it being unnatural to hate the dead, whom we cannot hurt: for the utmost harm that malice can do is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of Thebes, [reconstructed: Eteocles] and Polynices;

Nec furiis post fata modus [reconstructed: flammaeque] rebelles Seditione rogi.—

Their furies were not bounded by their fate, one's funeral flame the other's flame did hate.)

Even so likewise a man's love has a power to bury his enemies, and to draw to itself the most backward and differing affections; for being of a transient nature, and carrying forth itself into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other natural agents) works similar and alike affections to itself. For besides that, hereby an adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity; he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witness, his conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, Saul the pattern of raging and unreasonable envy, was sometimes brought to relent and accuse himself. And this is the occasion (as I take it) of that speech of Solomon: If your enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for you shall heap coals of fire upon his head. Which, though perhaps, with earthy and base minds, it has a property of hardening and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with minds ingenuous and noble, it has a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the Apostle tells us, that we love God, because he loved us first (1 John 4:19); and Mary Magdalene having had much forgiven her, did therefore love Christ much (Luke 7:47). And therefore the poet's counsel is good:

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If for your love yourself would be loved, show love to those that do show love to you.

The next two causes, which I conceive, of love, I will join in one; namely, the absence from, and contrarily, the presence with the thing loved; both which, in a different respect, do exercise love. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of Aristotle, that though distance of place does not dissolve the root and habit yet it does the exercise and acts of love; except he meant it (as I suppose he does) of the transient acts thereof, whereby each friend does the office of love and [reconstructed: beneficence] to another. For, as in natural bodies there is not only a [reconstructed: complacency] or delight in their proper place, when they enjoy it; but an innate propension and motion thereunto, when they are absent from it; so in the mind of man (whose love is his weight) there is not only a love of delight in the [reconstructed: fruition], but a love likewise of desire, in the privation of a good; which, the more it wants, the more it fixes itself upon it: as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the poet expresses the love of Dido to Aeneas:

Illum absens absentem anditque videtque.

When night had severed them apart, she heard and saw him in her heart.

And it is the wonder of love (as Saint Chrysostome speaks) to collect and knit together in one, things far separated from each other: wherein stands the mystery of the communion of the Church on earth, both with itself, in all the dispersed members of it, and with Christ the Head; and that other part of it, which triumphs in Heaven. So that herein, divine love has the same kind of virtue with divine faith; that as this is the being and subsisting of things to come, and distant in time; so that is the union and knitting of things absent, and distant in place.

But then, much more does presence to the goodness of an object loved, increase and exercise our love; because it gives us a more complete sight of it, and union to it. And therefore Saint John speaks of a perfection, and Saint Paul of a perpetuity of our love to God, grounded on the fullness of the beatific vision, when we shall be forever with the Lord; whereas now, seeing only in a glass darkly, as we know, so likewise we love but in part only. And Aristotle makes mutual conversation and society one of the greatest bonds of love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise; and from there, a greater increase of the affection.

As living creatures, so affections are nourished, after the same manner as they are produced: now it is necessary, for the first working of love, that the object have some manner of presence with the affection, either by a knowledge of vision, or of faith. And therefore Saint Paul says, if they had known, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory; their ignorance and hatred of him, went both together: Simul ut desinant ignorare, cessant et odisse; as soon, says Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate him: and usually, in the phrase of the Scripture, knowledge and love are identical. So then, all love proceeding from knowledge, and all knowledge presupposing some presence of the thing known, it appears, that the presence of the object begets, and therefore, by proportion, it nourishes this affection.

The last cause or inducement to this passion, (which I will but name) is an aggregate of diverse beautiful and amiable qualities in the object; as namely, sympathy, justice, industry, temperance, ingenuity, facility, pleasantness and innocence of wit, meekness, yieldingness, patience, sweetness of behavior and disposition, without closeness, suspicion, intermeddling, inquisitiveness, moroseness, contempt, dissension; in all which, men are either Injusti or Pugnaces, do either wrong us, or cross us: which two, the philosopher makes the general opposites of love: on which I shall forbear to insist, as also on the circumstances of the act of this passion itself, in the quantity and quality thereof, and shall proceed in brief to the consequences or effects of this passion.