Chapter 7
A third way in which the death of Christ for sinners is expressed is satisfaction — that by his death he made satisfaction to the justice of God for the sins of those for whom he died, so that they might go free. It is true that the word 'satisfaction' does not appear in the Latin or English Bibles as applied to the death of Christ, and in the New Testament not at all, and in the Old only twice (Numbers 35:31-32). But the thing itself intended by that word — a compensation made to God by Christ for our debts — is everywhere ascribed to the death of our Savior, with other words in the original languages equivalent to the one we use to express the matter. That Christ did thus make satisfaction for all those for whom he died, or rather for their sins, is (as far as I know) confessed by all who are but outwardly called by his name, the wretched Socinians excepted, with whom we have no present concern. Let us first see what this satisfaction is, then how inconsistent it is with universal redemption.
Satisfaction is a term borrowed from law, applied properly to things, thence translated and accommodated to persons, and it is a full compensation to the creditor from the debtor. To whoever anything is due from any person, that person is his creditor and the other is his debtor, upon whom there is an obligation to pay or restore what is due from him, until he is freed by a lawful dissolution of that obligation — by rendering satisfaction to what his creditor may require by virtue of it. If I owe a man a hundred pounds I am his debtor by virtue of the bond in which I am bound, until something is done that recompenses him and moves him to cancel the bond — which is called satisfaction. From things real this was and is translated to things personal: personal debts are injuries and faults, which when a person has committed he is liable to punishment. He who is to inflict that punishment, or upon whom it rests to see that it is done, is the creditor — which he must do unless satisfaction is made. Now there may be a twofold satisfaction: first, by a payment of the very thing that is in the obligation, either by the party bound or by someone else in his place — as if I owe a man twenty pounds and my friend goes and pays it, my creditor is fully satisfied; second, by a payment of so much in another kind, not the same thing that is in the obligation, which by the creditor's acceptance stands in its place — upon which also freedom from the obligation follows, not of necessity but by virtue of an act of favor.
In the matter at hand: first, the debtor is man, owing the ten thousand talents (Matthew 18).
Second, the debt is sin — 'forgive us our debts' (Matthew 6).
Third, what is required in lieu of it, to make satisfaction for it, is death — 'in the day you eat of it you shall die' (Genesis 3); 'the wages of sin is death' (Romans 6).
Fourth, the obligation by which the debtor is bound is the law — 'cursed is everyone' (Deuteronomy 27); the justice (Romans 1:32) and the truth of God (Genesis 3).
Fifth, the creditor who requires this of us is God, considered as the offended party, the severe judge and supreme Lord of all things.
Sixth, what intervenes to destroy the obligation is the ransom paid by Christ — 'God set him forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood' (Romans 3:24-25).
I shall not enter upon any long discourse of the satisfaction made by Christ, but only clear it so far as is necessary to give light to the matter in hand. To this end two things must be clarified: first, that Christ did make such satisfaction as we speak of, and wherein it consists; and second, what is that act of God toward man the debtor which does and ought to follow the satisfaction made. For the first: the word itself does not appear in Scripture in connection with this matter, but the thing signified by it — a compensation made to God by Christ for our debts — does. To make satisfaction to God for our sins, it is required only that he undergo the punishment due to them, since that is the satisfaction required when sin is the debt. Now this Christ has certainly effected: 'he himself bore our sins in his own body on the tree' (1 Peter 2:24); 'by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities' (Isaiah 53:11). The Hebrew word 'nasa' in verse 12 likewise argues a taking of the punishment of sin from us and transferring it to himself, signifying as much as we mean by the word satisfaction. So also does Peter's Greek term used in its place; for to bear iniquity in scriptural language is to undergo the punishment due to it (Leviticus 5:17), which we call making satisfaction for it. This is further illustrated by the declaration of how he bore our sins — 'he was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities' (Isaiah 53:5) — to which is added that the chastisement of our peace was upon him. Every chastisement is either for instruction or for punishment and correction; the first cannot apply to our Savior the Son of God, who had no need to be taught with thorns and briars; it must therefore be punishment and correction for our sins laid upon him, whereby our peace — our freedom from punishment — was procured.
Moreover in the New Testament there are various words and expressions concerning the death of our Savior expressing what we intend by satisfaction. First, it is called a sacrifice of expiation (Ephesians 5:2), as is apparent by that type of it with which it is compared in Hebrews 9:14-15. Of the same force is the Hebrew word 'asham' (Isaiah 53:10; Leviticus 7:2): 'He made his soul an offering for sin' — a piacular sacrifice for the removing of sin — which the apostle abundantly clarifies by saying he was made sin itself (2 Corinthians 5:21), sin there being put for its adjunct, the punishment due to it. So also he is called a propitiation (1 John 2:2), to which answers the Hebrew word that means to undergo the debt and make compensation for it, which was the office of the one who was to be Job's redeemer (Job 19:25). All these and various other words declare the very same thing we intend by satisfaction: a taking upon himself the whole punishment due to sin, and in the offering of himself doing that which God, who was offended, was more delighted and pleased with than he was displeased and offended by all the sins of all those for whom he suffered and offered himself. There can be no more complete satisfaction made to any person than by doing that which pleases him more than it displeases him to have the offense against him repeated. God was more pleased with the obedience, offering, and sacrifice of his Son than he was displeased with the sins and rebellions of all the elect. As, if a good king had a company of his subjects stand out in rebellion against him, moved thereby to destroy them, and the only son of that king were to intercede for their pardon by offering himself to undergo the punishment his justice had allotted for the rebels — he would properly make satisfaction for their offense, and in strict justice they ought to be pardoned. This was Christ, as that sent-away goat that bore and carried away all the sins of the people of God, falling himself under them, though with assurance to break all the bonds of death and to live forever. Now, whereas there is a twofold satisfaction — payment of the very thing that was in the obligation, and payment of something else accepted by the creditor's grace in its place — it is worth inquiring which of these our Savior performed.
Fifth, that whereas discharge from further trouble is equitably due to a debtor who has been under obligation, his debt being paid — the Lord, having accepted payment from Christ in the stead of all those for whom he died, ought in justice, according to that obligation which in free grace he has put upon himself, to grant them a discharge. Sixth, that considering the relaxation of the law which by the supreme power of the lawgiver was effected as to the persons suffering the required punishment, such actual satisfaction is made to it that it can lay no more charge against those for whom Christ died than if they had actually fulfilled in the way of obedience whatever it required (Romans 8:32-34). Now how consistent these things — in themselves evident and clearly following from the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction declared above — are with universal redemption is easily discerned. For first, if the full debt of all is paid to the utmost extent of the obligation, how is it that so many are shut up in prison to eternity, never freed from their debts? Second, if the Lord as a just creditor ought to cancel all obligations and cease all suits against those whose debts are so paid, why does his wrath smoke against some to all eternity? Let no one tell me it is because they do not walk worthy of the benefit bestowed — for that failure to walk worthy is part of the debt, which is fully paid. As the third inference states: the debt so paid is all our sins. Third, is it probable that God calls any to a second payment and requires satisfaction from those for whom, by his own acknowledgment, Christ has made what is full and sufficient? Does he have a later reckoning he had not thought of? For concerning what was before him he spared him not (Romans 8). Fourth, how is it that God never gives a discharge to innumerable souls, though their debts are paid? Fifth, why does any soul live and die under the condemning power of the law, never released, if that law is fully satisfied on their behalf — so that it would be as if they had done whatever it could require? Let those who can reconcile these things do so. I am no Oedipus for them. The poor beggarly distinctions by which it is attempted have already been discussed. And so much for satisfaction.
In answer: refer this reason to God, which is its aim, and it will appear to be of no value. We deny that there is anything in God or done by him primarily for the good of any but himself; his self-sufficiency will not allow him to do anything with an ultimate respect to anything but himself. And when Grotius says the right of punishing is for the good of the community, we answer that the good of the community is the glory of God and that only — so these things in him cannot be distinguished.
Second, he adds: punishment is not in and for itself desirable, but only for the community's sake; now the right of dominion and the right of a creditor are things in themselves valuable and desirable, without consideration of any public aim.
In answer: first, the comparison ought not to be between punishment and the right of dominion, but between the right of punishment and the right of dominion; the act of the one is not to be compared with the right of the other.
Second, God desires nothing, nor is anything desirable to him, except for himself; to suppose a good desirable to God for its own sake is intolerable.
Third, there are some acts of supreme dominion that are in themselves and for their own sake as little desirable as any act of punishment — such as the annihilation of an innocent creature, which Grotius will not deny that God may do.
Third, he proceeds: anyone may without wrong relinquish the right of supreme dominion or creditorship, but the Lord cannot omit the act of punishment for some sins, as those of the impenitent.
In answer: God may by virtue of his supreme dominion omit punishment without any wrong or prejudice to his justice. It is as great a thing to impute sin where it is not and to inflict punishment on that imputation, as not to impute sin where it is and to remove or not inflict punishment on that non-imputation. Now the first of these God did toward Christ, and therefore he may do the latter.
Second, the wrong or injustice of not punishing any sin or sins does not arise from any natural obligation but from consideration of an affirmative positive act of God's will, by which he has purposed to do it.
Fourth, he adds: no one can be called just for using his own right or lordship; but God is called just for punishing or not remitting sin (Revelation 16:5).
In answer: however it may be in other cases, in this matter God may certainly be said to be just in exacting his debt or using his dominion, because his own will is the only rule of justice.
Second, we do not say that punishing is an act of dominion, but an act of exacting a due debt — the requiring of this from Christ in our place, presupposing the intervention of an act of supreme dominion.
Fifth, his last reason is: because that virtue by which one relinquishes his dominion or remits his debt is liberality, but the virtue by which a person abstains from punishment is clemency — so punishment can be no act of exacting a debt or exercising dominion.
In answer: the virtue by which a person relinquishes the exaction of what is due, universally considered, is not always liberality. For as Grotius himself acknowledges, a debt may arise through injury to one's reputation, credit, or name by a lie, slander, or otherwise. The virtue by which a person is moved not to exact payment in the form of reparation is in this case not liberality but either clemency or that grace of the Gospel for which moralists have no name. And so it is with every offended party who has a right to require punishment from his offender but does not exercise it. So that notwithstanding these exceptions, this is eminently seen in this matter of satisfaction: that God as a creditor does exactly require the payment of the debt by way of punishment.
The second thing eminent in it is an act of supreme sovereignty and dominion, requiring the punishment of Christ for the full and complete answering of the obligation and fulfilling of the law (Romans 8:3; 10:4).
Now these things being thus at length unfolded, we may see briefly some natural consequences following from them as they are laid down. First, the full and due debt of all those for whom Jesus Christ was surety was fully paid to God according to the utmost extent of the obligation. Second, the Lord, who is a just creditor, ought in all equity to cancel the bond and cease all suits, actions, and proceedings against the debtor, full payment being made for the debt. Third, the debt thus paid was not this or that sin but all the sins of all those for whom and in whose name this payment was made (1 John 1:7), as was demonstrated before. Fourth, a second payment of a debt once paid, or a requiring of it again, is not answerable to the justice which God demonstrated in setting forth Christ to be a propitiation for our sins (Romans 3:25).
Fifth, since it is equitably due to a debtor who has been under obligation to receive a discharge from further suit once his debt is paid, the Lord, having accepted payment from Christ in the stead of all those for whom he died, ought in justice — according to that obligation which in free grace he has put upon himself — to grant them a discharge. Sixth, considering the relaxation of the law which the supreme power of the lawgiver effected as to the persons suffering the punishment required, such actual satisfaction is made to it that it can lay no more to the charge of those for whom Christ died than if they had really fulfilled in obedience whatever it required (Romans 8:32-34). Now how consistent these things — in themselves evident, and clearly following the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction — are with universal redemption is easily discerned. For first, if the full debt of all is paid to the utmost extent of the obligation, how is it that so many are shut up in prison to eternity, never freed from their debts? Second, if the Lord as a just creditor ought to cancel all obligations and cease all suits against those whose debts have been so paid, why does his wrath smoke against some to all eternity? Let none tell me it is because they do not walk worthy of the benefit bestowed — for that not walking worthy is part of the debt, which is fully paid, as the third consequence states: the debt so paid is all our sins. Third, is it probable that God calls any to a second payment and requires satisfaction from those for whom by his own acknowledgment Christ has made what is full and sufficient? Has he an after-reckoning that he did not think of? For in respect of what was before him, he spared him not (Romans 8). Fourth, how is it that God never gives a discharge to innumerable souls, though their debts are paid? Fifth, why does any soul live and die under the condemning power of the law, never released, if that law has been fully satisfied on his behalf, so that it is as though he had done whatever the law could require? Let those who can reconcile these things do so. The poor distinctions by which it is attempted have already been discussed. And so much for satisfaction.
A third way Scripture expresses Christ's death for sinners is satisfaction — that by His death He made satisfaction to the justice of God for the sins of those for whom He died, so that they might go free. It is true that the word 'satisfaction' does not appear in the Latin or English Bibles as applied to Christ's death, and in the New Testament not at all, and in the Old Testament only twice (Numbers 35:31-32). But the reality the word points to — a compensation made to God by Christ for our debts — is everywhere attributed to the death of our Savior, using other words in the original languages that are equivalent to the one we use to express it. That Christ made such satisfaction for all those for whom He died, or rather for their sins, is (as far as I know) acknowledged by all who bear the name of Christ outwardly, the wretched Socinians excepted, with whom we have no present concern. Let us first see what this satisfaction is, and then how incompatible it is with universal redemption.
Satisfaction is a legal term, originally applied to things, then extended and applied to persons — it means a full payment or compensation to a creditor from a debtor. Whoever is owed something from another person is that person's creditor, and the other is his debtor, under an obligation to pay or restore what is owed, until freed by a lawful discharge of that obligation — by rendering satisfaction to what the creditor may rightfully require. If I owe a man a hundred pounds I am his debtor by virtue of the bond I have signed, until something is done that compensates him and leads him to cancel that bond — which is called satisfaction. This was then extended from financial debts to personal offenses: personal debts are wrongs and faults, and when a person commits them he becomes liable to punishment. The one who is to inflict that punishment, or upon whom it falls to see that it is done, is the creditor — which he must do unless satisfaction is made. Now there can be two kinds of satisfaction: first, by payment of the very thing specified in the obligation, either by the party bound or by someone else in his place — as when I owe a man twenty pounds and my friend goes and pays it, fully satisfying my creditor; second, by payment of something equivalent of a different kind — not the same thing specified in the obligation — which the creditor accepts in its place, after which freedom from the obligation follows, not automatically but by an act of grace.
In the matter at hand: first, the debtor is man, owing the ten thousand talents (Matthew 18).
Second, the debt is sin — 'forgive us our debts' (Matthew 6).
Third, what is required in place of it, to make satisfaction for it, is death — 'in the day you eat from it you will surely die' (Genesis 3); 'the wages of sin is death' (Romans 6).
Fourth, the obligation by which the debtor is bound is the law — 'cursed is everyone' (Deuteronomy 27); the justice (Romans 1:32) and the truth of God (Genesis 3).
Fifth, the creditor who requires this of us is God, considered as the offended party, the strict judge and supreme Lord of all things.
Sixth, what intervenes to cancel the obligation is the ransom paid by Christ — 'whom God displayed publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith' (Romans 3:24-25).
I will not enter into a lengthy discussion of the satisfaction made by Christ, but will only clarify it as far as necessary to shed light on the matter at hand. Two things need to be established: first, that Christ did make the kind of satisfaction we are describing, and what it consists of; and second, what God's response toward the debtor ought to be following the satisfaction made. As for the first: the word itself does not appear in Scripture in this connection, but the reality it signifies — a compensation made to God by Christ for our debts — does. To make satisfaction to God for our sins, it is required only that He undergo the punishment due to them, since that is the satisfaction required when sin is the debt. This Christ has certainly accomplished: 'He Himself bore our sins in His body on the cross' (1 Peter 2:24); 'By His knowledge the Righteous One, My Servant, will justify the many, as He will bear their iniquities' (Isaiah 53:11). The Hebrew word 'nasa' in verse 12 likewise points to a taking of the punishment of sin from us and transferring it to Himself, meaning essentially what we mean by the word satisfaction. Peter's Greek term used in its place carries the same meaning; for to bear iniquity in scriptural language is to undergo the punishment due to it (Leviticus 5:17), which we call making satisfaction for it. This is further illustrated by the description of how He bore our sins — 'He was pierced for our transgressions, He was crushed for our iniquities' (Isaiah 53:5) — to which is added that the punishment that brought us peace was on Him. Every punishment is either for instruction or for correction; the first cannot apply to our Savior the Son of God, who had no need to be taught with suffering; it must therefore be punishment and correction for our sins laid upon Him, by which our peace — our freedom from punishment — was procured.
Moreover, the New Testament uses various words and expressions regarding our Savior's death that express what we mean by satisfaction. First, it is called a sacrifice of atonement (Ephesians 5:2), as is apparent from the type it is compared with in Hebrews 9:14-15. The Hebrew word 'asham' carries the same force (Isaiah 53:10; Leviticus 7:2): 'He made His soul an offering for sin' — a sacrifice of atonement for the removing of sin — which the apostle clarifies by saying He was made sin itself (2 Corinthians 5:21), with sin there standing for its consequence, the punishment due to it. He is also called a propitiation (1 John 2:2), which corresponds to the Hebrew word meaning to undertake the debt and make compensation for it — the office of the one who was to be Job's redeemer (Job 19:25). All these and various other words declare the same thing we mean by satisfaction: a taking upon Himself the full punishment due to sin, and in the offering of Himself doing what God, who was offended, was more pleased and satisfied with than He was displeased and offended by all the sins of all those for whom He suffered and offered Himself. There can be no more complete satisfaction made to any person than by doing what pleases him more than the offense against him displeases him. God was more pleased with the obedience, offering, and sacrifice of His Son than He was displeased with the sins and rebellions of all the elect. It is like a good king whose subjects have risen in rebellion against him, so that he is moved to destroy them, and the king's only son intercedes for their pardon by offering himself to bear the punishment his father's justice has appointed for the rebels — he would properly make satisfaction for their offense, and in strict justice they ought to be pardoned. This was Christ, as the scapegoat that bore and carried away all the sins of God's people, falling under them Himself, though with the certainty of breaking the bonds of death and living forever. Now, since there are two kinds of satisfaction — payment of the very thing that was required, and payment of something else accepted by the creditor's grace in its place — it is worth asking which of these our Savior performed.
Fifth, since a debtor who has paid his debt is equitably due a discharge from any further obligation, the Lord — having accepted payment from Christ in place of all those for whom He died — ought in justice, according to the obligation He has placed upon Himself by free grace, to grant them a full discharge. Sixth, considering the relaxation of the law that the supreme lawgiver brought about concerning the persons bearing the required punishment, such actual satisfaction is made to it that it can bring no further charge against those for whom Christ died — as if they had personally fulfilled everything the law required (Romans 8:32-34). Now how consistent these things — which are themselves evident and flow directly from the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction stated above — are with universal redemption is easily seen. First, if the full debt of all is paid to the last requirement of the obligation, how is it that so many are confined in eternal punishment, never freed from their debts? Second, if the Lord as a just creditor ought to cancel all obligations and cease all claims against those whose debts are so paid, why does His wrath burn against some for eternity? Let no one say it is because they do not live worthy of the benefit given — for that failure to live worthily is itself part of the debt, which is fully paid. As the third point states: the debt so paid is all our sins. Third, is it credible that God calls anyone to a second payment and demands satisfaction from those for whom, by His own acknowledgment, Christ has made full and sufficient satisfaction? Does He have a later accounting that He had not considered earlier? For regarding what was before Him He did not spare His own Son (Romans 8). Fourth, how is it that God never gives a discharge to countless souls, even though their debts are paid? Fifth, why does any soul live and die under the condemning power of the law, never released, if that law is fully satisfied on their behalf — such that it would be as if they had done everything it could require? Let those who can reconcile these things do so. I am no puzzle-solver for them. The inadequate distinctions by which this is attempted have already been addressed. And so much for satisfaction.
In reply: apply this argument to God, which is its real target, and it will be seen to carry no weight. We deny that there is anything in God or done by Him primarily for the good of any but Himself; His self-sufficiency will not allow Him to act with any ultimate reference to anything outside of Himself. And when Grotius says the right of punishment exists for the good of the community, we answer that the good of the community is the glory of God and that alone — so these things in Him cannot be separated.
Second, Grotius adds: punishment is not desirable in and for itself, but only for the sake of the community; whereas the right of dominion and the right of a creditor are things desirable in themselves, apart from any consideration of public benefit.
In reply: first, the comparison should not be between punishment and the right of dominion, but between the right of punishment and the right of dominion; the act of the one should not be compared with the right of the other.
Second, God desires nothing, nor is anything desirable to Him, except for His own sake; to suppose a good desirable to God for its own sake is not acceptable.
Third, there are some acts of supreme dominion that are just as little desirable in themselves as any act of punishment — such as the annihilation of an innocent creature, which Grotius will not deny that God is able to do.
Third, Grotius continues: anyone may without wrong give up the right of supreme dominion or creditorship, but the Lord cannot omit punishment for some sins — specifically those of the impenitent.
In reply: by virtue of His supreme dominion, God may withhold punishment without any violation of or damage to His justice. It is as great a thing to impute sin where it does not exist and to inflict punishment on that basis, as it is not to impute sin where it does exist and to withhold or not inflict punishment on that basis. Now the first of these God did toward Christ, and therefore He may do the latter.
Second, any wrong or injustice in not punishing a sin does not arise from a natural obligation but from the consideration of God's own positive act of will, by which He has purposed to do it.
Fourth, Grotius adds: no one can be called just merely for using his own right or authority; but God is called just for punishing or for not remitting sin (Revelation 16:5).
In reply: however it may be in other cases, in this matter God can certainly be said to be just in requiring His debt or exercising His authority, because His own will is the only rule of justice.
Second, we do not say that punishing is an act of authority, but an act of requiring a just debt — with the requiring of this from Christ in our place presupposing the intervention of an act of supreme authority.
Fifth, his final argument is: the virtue by which one relinquishes authority or cancels a debt is generosity, but the virtue by which a person refrains from punishment is mercy — therefore punishment cannot be an act of requiring a debt or exercising authority.
In reply: the virtue by which a person relinquishes the requiring of what is owed, considered broadly, is not always generosity. For as Grotius himself acknowledges, a debt may arise through injury to one's reputation, credit, or name through a lie, slander, or other means. The virtue by which a person is moved not to demand reparation in such a case is not generosity but either mercy or that grace of the Gospel for which moralists have no name. And so it is with every offended party who has the right to require punishment from his offender but chooses not to exercise it. So, notwithstanding these objections, this remains clearly evident in the matter of satisfaction: that God as a creditor does exactly require payment of the debt in the form of punishment.
The second prominent element is an act of supreme sovereignty and authority, requiring the punishment of Christ as the full and complete answer to the obligation and fulfillment of the law (Romans 8:3; 10:4).
With these things now unfolded, we may briefly note some natural consequences that follow from them. First, the full and complete debt of all those for whom Jesus Christ was surety was fully paid to God, meeting the full requirement of the obligation. Second, the Lord, as a just creditor, ought in all fairness to cancel the bond and cease all suits, actions, and proceedings against the debtor, since the debt has been fully paid. Third, the debt so paid was not this or that particular sin but all the sins of all those for whom and in whose name this payment was made (1 John 1:7), as was demonstrated earlier. Fourth, requiring a second payment of a debt already paid is not consistent with the justice God demonstrated in setting forth Christ as a propitiation for our sins (Romans 3:25).
Fifth, since it is equitably due to a debtor to receive a discharge from further obligation once his debt is paid, the Lord — having accepted payment from Christ in place of all those for whom He died — ought in justice, according to the obligation He has taken upon Himself in free grace, to grant them a full discharge. Sixth, considering the relaxation of the law that the supreme lawgiver brought about regarding the persons bearing the required punishment, such actual satisfaction is made to it that it can bring no further charge against those for whom Christ died — as if they had personally fulfilled in obedience everything the law required (Romans 8:32-34). Now how consistent these things — which are themselves evident and follow directly from the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction — are with universal redemption is easily seen. First, if the full debt of all is paid to the utmost requirement of the obligation, how is it that so many are confined in eternal punishment, never freed from their debts? Second, if the Lord as a just creditor ought to cancel all obligations and cease all claims against those whose debts have been so paid, why does His wrath burn against some for eternity? Let no one say it is because they do not live worthy of the benefit given — for that failure to live worthily is itself part of the debt, which is fully paid, as the third consequence states: the debt so paid is all our sins. Third, is it credible that God demands a second payment and requires satisfaction from those for whom, by His own acknowledgment, Christ has made full and sufficient satisfaction? Does He have a later accounting He had not thought of? For in regard to what was before Him, He did not spare His own Son (Romans 8). Fourth, how is it that God never grants a discharge to countless souls, even though their debts are paid? Fifth, why does any soul live and die under the condemning power of the law, never released, if that law has been fully satisfied on his behalf — so that it would be as if he had done everything the law could require? Let those who can reconcile these things do so. The inadequate distinctions by which this is attempted have already been addressed. And so much for satisfaction.
