Chapter 2

The end of any thing, is that which the Agent intends to accomplish, in, and by the operation which is proper unto section 1 its nature, and which it applies itself unto: that which any one aims at, and designs in himself to attain, as a thing good and desirable unto him, in the state and condition wherein he is. So the end which Noah proposed unto himself in the building of the Ark, was the preservation of himself and others, according to the will of God, he made an Ark to preserve himself and his family from the flood, according to all that God commanded him, so did he (Genesis 6:22). That which the Agent does, or whereto he applies himself, for the compassing his proposed end, is called the means, which two do complete the whole reason of working in free Intellectual Agents, for I speak only of such as work according to choice or election: so Absalom intending a revolt from his father to procure the Crown and kingdom for himself, he prepared him horses and chariots, and fifty men to run before him (2 Samuel 15:1), and further, by fair words and fawning compliances, he stole the hearts of the men of Israel (verse 6), then pretends a sacrifice at Hebron, where he makes a strong conspiracy (verse 12), all which were the means he used for the attaining of his foreproposed end.

Between both these, end and means, there is this relation, that (though in sundry kinds) they are mutually causes one of another: section 2, the end is the first principal moving cause of the whole: it is that, for whose sake the whole work is, no Agent applies itself to action but for an end: and were it not by that, determined to some certain effect, thing, way, or manner of working, it would no more do one thing than another. The inhabitants of the old world, desiring and intending unity and cohabitation, with (perhaps) some reserves to provide for their safety against a second storm, they cry, go to, let us build us a City and a Tower, whose top may reach unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth (Genesis 11:4). First they lay down their aim and design, and then let out the means in their apprehension conducing thereunto, and manifest then it is that the whole reason and method of affairs, that a wise worker, or Agent according to counsel proposes to himself, is taken from the end which he aims at, that is in intention and continuance the beginning of all that order which is in working. Now the means are all those things which are used for the attaining of the end proposed: (as food, for the preservation of life: sailing in a ship, for him that would pass the sea: laws for the quiet continuance of human society,) and they are the procuring cause of the end in one kind or another, their existence is for the end's sake, and the end has its rise out of them: following them either morally as their desert, or naturally as their fruit and product. First, in a moral sense, when the action and the end, are to be measured or considered in reference to a moral rule, or Law prescribed to the Agent, then the means are the deserving, or meritorious cause of the end: as if Adam, had continued in his innocence, and done all things according to the Law given unto him, the end procured thereby, had been a blessed life to eternity: as now the end of any sinful act, is death, the curse of the law. Secondly, when the means are considered only in their natural relation, then they are the instrumentally efficient cause of the end: so Joab intending the death of Abner, he struck him with his spear under the fifth rib, that he died (2 Samuel 3:27), and when Benaiah by the command of Solomon fell upon Shimei, the wounds he gave them were the efficient of his death (1 Kings 2:46), in which regard there is no difference, between the murdering of an innocent man, and the executing of an offender: but as they are under a moral consideration, their ends follow their deservings, in respect of conformity, section 3, to the rule, and so there is a distinction between them.

The former consideration, by reason of the defect and perverseness of some Agents, (for otherwise these things are coincident) holds out a two-fold end of things. First of the work, and Secondly of the workman: of the act, and the agent, for when the means assigned for the attaining of any end, are not proportioned unto it, nor fitted for it, according to that rule which the agent is to work by, then it cannot be, but that he must aim at one thing, and another follow in respect of the morality of the work, so Adam is enticed into a desire to be like God: this now he makes his aim which to effect, he eats the forbidden fruit, and that contracts a guilt which he aimed not at. But when the Agent acts aright, and as it should do: when it aims at an end that is proper to it, belonging to its proper perfection and condition, and works by such means as are fit, and suitable to the end proposed, the end of the work, and the workman, are one and the same: as when Abel intended the worship of the Lord, he offered a sacrifice through faith acceptable unto him: or as a man desiring salvation through Christ, applies himself to get an interest in him. Now the sole reason of this diversity is, that secondary Agents, such as men are, have an end set and appointed to their actions, by him which gives them an external rule or Law to work by; which shall always attend them in their working, whether they will or not. God only, whose will and good pleasure is the sole rule of all those works which outwardly are of him, can never deviate in his actions, nor have any end attend or follow his acts, not precisely by him intended.

Again, the end of every free Agent is either that which he effects, or that for whose sake he does effect it, when a man builds, section 4, a house, to let to hire, that which he effects is the building of a house, that which moved him to do it, is love of gain. The Physician cures the patient, and is moved to it, by his reward: the end which Judas aimed at, in his going to the Priests, bargaining with them, conducting the soldiers to the garden, kissing Christ, was the betraying of his Master: but the end for whose sake the whole undertaking was set on foot, was the obtaining of the thirty pieces of silver: what will you give me and I will do it? The end which God effected by the death of Christ, was the satisfaction of his justice, the end for whose sake he did it, was either supreme, or his own glory, or subordinate, ours with him.

Moreover the means are of two sorts, First, such as have a true, section 5, goodness in themselves, without reference to any further kind; though not so considered as we use them for means: no means as a means, is considered as good in itself, but only as conducible to a further end: it is repugnant to the nature of means, as such, to be considered as good in themselves: study is in itself the most noble employment of the soul; but aiming at wisdom or knowledge, we consider it as good, only insofar as it conduces to that end; otherwise as a weariness to the flesh (Ecclesiastes 12:12). Secondly, such as have no good at all, in any kind as in themselves considered, but merely as conducing to that end, which they are fit to attain, they receive all their goodness (which is but relative) from that whereunto they are appointed; in themselves no way desirable: as the cutting off a leg or an arm for the preservation of life; taking a bitter portion for health's sake, throwing corn and cargo into the sea to prevent shipwreck: of which nature is the death of Christ, as we shall afterwards declare.

These things being thus proposed in general, our next task must be to accommodate them to the present business in hand, section 6, which we shall do in order, by laying down the Agent working, the means wrought, and the end effected in the great work of our Redemption; for those three must be orderly considered and distinctly, that we may have a right apprehension of the whole, into the first whereof we make an entrance in.

The end of any action is what the agent intends to accomplish through the activity proper to its nature — what someone aims at and designs to achieve as something good and desirable given their circumstances. So the end Noah set for himself in building the ark was the preservation of himself and others, according to God's will. He built the ark to save himself and his family from the flood, doing exactly as God commanded him (Genesis 6:22). What the agent does, or the effort he applies toward reaching his intended goal, is called the means. These two together — end and means — make up the complete logic of action for free, rational agents (I am speaking only of those who act by choice). For example, Absalom intended to revolt against his father and seize the crown and kingdom for himself. He prepared horses and chariots and fifty men to run before him (2 Samuel 15:1). Then through flattery and fawning he stole the hearts of the men of Israel (verse 6), then pretended to offer a sacrifice at Hebron, where he organized a powerful conspiracy (verse 12). All of these were the means he used to reach his predetermined goal.

Between the end and the means there is this relationship: though they operate differently, each is in some sense the cause of the other. The end is the first and primary driving cause of the whole action. It is what the entire work exists for. No agent acts without a purpose — if an agent were not directed toward some definite goal, thing, or way of working, it would have no more reason to do one thing than another. The people of the ancient world, wanting to remain together and perhaps to protect themselves against another catastrophe, declared, "Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower whose top will reach into heaven, and let us make for ourselves a name, otherwise we will be scattered abroad over the face of the whole earth" (Genesis 11:4). They first set down their aim and goal, then devised the means they believed would achieve it. This shows clearly that the whole logic and method of a wise and purposeful agent is drawn from the end he aims at. The end is the beginning in intention — it gives order to everything that follows in execution. The means are all those things used to reach the proposed end — such as food for the preservation of life, sailing a ship for crossing the sea, and laws for the peaceful ordering of human society. The means are the procuring cause of the end in one way or another. They exist for the sake of the end, and the end arises from them — following either as their moral desert or as their natural fruit and product. In the moral sense: when an action and its end must be evaluated in relation to a moral rule or law given to the agent, the means are the deserving or meritorious cause of the end. For instance, if Adam had remained in his innocence and done everything according to the law given to him, the end he would have obtained was a blessed life into eternity. As it stands now, the end of any sinful act is death — the curse of the law. In the natural sense: when the means are considered only in their physical relationship to the result, they are the instrumentally efficient cause of the end. When Joab intended the death of Abner, he struck him in the stomach with a spear, and Abner died (2 Samuel 3:27). When Benaiah, by Solomon's command, struck down Shimei, the wounds he inflicted were the efficient cause of his death (1 Kings 2:46). In purely physical terms there is no difference between murdering an innocent man and executing a criminal. But when viewed under a moral framework, their ends follow from what they deserve — their conformity to or violation of the rule — and this is what distinguishes them.

The earlier consideration — due to the failure and corruption of some agents (for in a rightly ordered situation these would coincide) — reveals a twofold end in any given action: first, the end of the work itself, and second, the end of the worker. When the means assigned to reach a goal are not properly fitted to it according to the rule the agent is supposed to follow, it is inevitable that the agent aims at one thing while something else actually results in terms of the moral character of the action. So Adam was enticed into desiring to be like God. He made that his aim, and to accomplish it he ate the forbidden fruit — which instead brought upon him a guilt he had not intended. But when an agent acts rightly — when it aims at an end suited to its proper nature and condition, and uses means genuinely fitted to that end — the end of the work and the end of the worker are one and the same. Abel intended to worship the Lord, so he offered a sacrifice that was, through faith, acceptable to Him. Or consider a person who desires salvation through Christ and seeks to be united to Him. The sole reason for this difference is that secondary agents — such as human beings — have an end assigned to their actions by the One who gives them an external rule or law to work by. That end will always follow their actions, whether they intend it or not. Only God — whose will and good pleasure is the sole rule of all His outward works — can never deviate in His actions, and can never have an end follow His acts that He did not precisely intend.

Furthermore, the end of every free agent is either what he actually produces or what motivates him to produce it. When a man builds a house to rent out, what he produces is the house; what motivated him to build it was the desire for income. A physician heals a patient but is motivated by his fee. Judas went to the chief priests, bargained with them, led the soldiers to the garden, and kissed Christ — the end he was aiming at was the betrayal of his Master. But the end for whose sake he set the whole plan in motion was the thirty pieces of silver: "What are you willing to give me, and I will deliver Him to you?" The end God accomplished through the death of Christ was the satisfaction of His justice. The end for whose sake He did it was either supreme — His own glory — or subordinate — our good along with His.

The means used to reach an end are of two kinds. First, there are means that have genuine worth in themselves apart from what they accomplish — though we do not regard them that way when using them as means. Strictly speaking, nothing viewed purely as a means is considered good in itself; it is good only insofar as it leads to a further end. It goes against the very nature of a means to be valued for its own sake. Study is in itself the noblest occupation of the mind, yet when we are using it as a means toward wisdom or knowledge, we value it only as far as it serves that end — otherwise it is "a wearisome effort" (Ecclesiastes 12:12). Second, there are means that have no value whatsoever in themselves. Their only goodness — and it is a relative goodness — comes entirely from the end they are suited to achieve. They are not in any way desirable in themselves: amputating a leg or an arm to preserve life; taking a bitter medicine for the sake of health; throwing cargo and grain into the sea to prevent a shipwreck. The death of Christ is of this nature, as we will explain later.

With these general principles established, our next task is to apply them to the matter at hand. We will do so in order, by identifying the agent who works, the means employed, and the end achieved in the great work of our redemption. These three must be carefully and distinctly considered if we are to understand the whole rightly. We begin with the first.