Chapter 6: The Acts of God's Will and Christ's Satisfaction

The distinct consideration of the acts of God's will, in reference to the satisfaction of Christ, and our believing, (according to the former proposal) is the first thing to be considered.

Grotius, who with many (and in an especial manner with Mr. Baxter) is of very great account, (and that in theology) distinguishes (as himself calls them with a school term) 3 moments, or instances of the divine will.

1 Before the death of Christ, either actually accomplished, or in the purpose, and fore-knowledge of God; in this instant (he says) God is angry with the sinner, but so, as that he is not averse from all ways of laying down his anger.

2 Upon the death of Christ, or that being supposed, wherein God not only purposes, but also promises to lay aside his anger.

3 When a man by true faith believes in Christ, and Christ according to the tenure of the covenant commends him to God: here now God lays aside his anger, and receives man into favor. Thus far he.

Among all the attempts of distinguishing the acts of God's will in reference to Christ, and sinners, whatever I considered, I never found any more slight, atheological, and discrepant from the truth, than this of Grotius.

To measure the Almighty by the standard of a man, and to frame in the mind a mutable idol, instead of the eternal, unchangeable God, is a thing that the fleshly reasonings of dark understandings are prone to. He feigns the Lord in one instant angry, afterwards promising to cease to be so, then in another instant laying down his anger, and taking up a contrary affection, and you seem to me, to do no less.

What it may be esteemed in law, which was that author's faculty, I know not: but suppose in divinity, that (notwithstanding the manifold attempts of some [in non-Latin alphabet] in most heads of religion) the ascribing to the most holy, things alien, and opposite to his glorious nature, is by common consent, accounted no less than blasphemy: whether this be here done, or no, may easily appear. I hope then without the offence of any, I may be allowed to call those dictates of Grotius to the rule, and measure of truth.

1 Before the fore-sight of the death of Christ (says he) God is angry with sinners, but not wholly averse from all ways of laying aside that anger.

Answer 1 That God should be conceived angry after the manner of men, or with any such kind of passion, is gross anthropomorphism; as bad, if not worse, than the assigning of him a bodily shape. The anger of God is a pure act of his will, whereby he will effect and inflict the effects of anger. Now what is before the fore-sight of the death of Christ, is certainly from eternity. God's anger must respect either the purpose of God, or the effects of it. The latter it cannot be, for they are undoubtedly all temporal. It must be then his purpose from eternity to inflict punishment, that is the effect of anger. This then is the first thing in the business of redemption assigned by Grotius, to the Lord, namely he purposed from eternity, to inflict punishment on sinners: and on what sinners? Even those, for whom he gives Christ to die, and afterwards receives into favor, as he expresses himself. Behold here a mystery of Vorstian theology: God changing his eternal purposes. This Arminius at first could not accept, inferring from hence, that the will of God differed not from his essence, that every act thereof, is, 1 most simple: 2 infinite: 3 eternal: 4 immutable: 5 holy. Reason itself would fain speak in this cause, but that the Scriptures do so abound, many places are noted in the margin (James 1:17; 2 Timothy 2:19; Psalm 33:9, 10, 11; Acts 15:18, etc.) may be added. A mutable god, is of the dunghill.

2 That the death of Christ is not comprised in the first consideration of God's mind, and act of his will towards sinners to be saved, is assumed gratis.

3 He is not (says he) averse from all ways of laying down this anger. This scheme Grotius places (as is evident) in God, as the foundation, and bottom of sending Christ for our redemption. This he immediately subjoins without the least intimation of any further inclination in God towards sinners, for whom he gives his Son. But,

1 This is a mere negation of inflicting anger for the present: or a suspension of that affection from working according to its quality; which how it can be ascribed to the pure and active will of God, I know not. Yes, it is above disproved.

2 Such a kind of frame, as it is injurious to God, so to be held out as the fountain of his sending Christ to die for us, is (I am persuaded) an abhorrency to Christians. And,

3 Whether this answers that, which the Scripture holds out, as the most intense distinguishing love (John 3:16; Romans 5:8; chapter 8:32; 1 John 4:9, 10) is easily discernible. A natural velleity to the good of the creature, is the thing here couched, but was never proved.

In the second instance, God (says he) the death of Christ being supposed, not only determines, but also promises to lay aside his anger.

What terms can be invented to hold out more expresly a change, and alteration in the unchangable God, than these here used, I know not. That the will or mind of God is altered from one respect towards us, to another, by the consideration of the death of Christ, is a low, carnal conception. The will of God is not moved by any thing without itself. Alterations are in the things altered, not in the will of God concerning them. To make this the whole effect of the death of Christ (that God should determine, and promise to lay aside his wrath) is no Scripture discovery, either as to name, or thing. The purposes of God, which are all eternal, and the promises of God, which are all made in time, are very inconveniently ranged in the same series. That by the death of Christ, atonement is made, everlasting redemption purchased, that God is reconciled, a right to freedom obtained, for those for whom he died, shall be afterwards declared. If God does only purpose, and promise to lay aside his anger upon the death of Christ, but does it not until our actual believing; then, 1 our faith is the proper procuring cause of reconciliation; the death of Christ, but a requisite antecedent, which is not the Scripture phrase (Romans 5:10; 2 Corinthians 5:18; Ephesians 2:16; Colossians 1:20, 21; Daniel 9:24; Hebrews 2:17; Ephesians 1:7; Hebrews 9:12). 2 How comes the sinner by faith, if it is the gift of God? It must be an issue of anger, and enmity, for that scheme only, is actually ascribed to him, before our enjoyment of it; strange! that God should be so far reconciled, as to give us faith, that we may be reconciled to him, that thereupon he may be reconciled to us.

3 For the third instance, of God's receiving the sinner into love, and favor upon his believing, quite laying aside his anger. I answer: To wave the anthropomorphism, wherewith this assertion is tainted as the former: If by receiving into favor, he intend absolute, complete pactional justification, being an act of favor, quitting the sinner from the guilt of sin, charged by the accusation of the law, terminated on the conscience of a sinner: I confess it, in order of nature, to follow our believing.

I might consider further the attempts of others for the right stating of this business, but it would draw me beyond my intention. His failings herein, who is so often mentioned, and so much used, by him, who gives occasion to this rescript, I could not but remark. What are my own thoughts and apprehensions of the whole, I shall in the next place briefly impart.

Now to make way hereunto, some things I must suppose: which though some of them otherwhere controverted, yet not at all in reference to the present business: and they are these.

1 That Christ died only for the elect: or God gave his Son to die only for those, whom he chooses to life, and salvation for the praise of his glorious grace.

This is granted by Mr. Baxter, where he affirms, That Christ bore not punishment for them, who must bear punishment themselves in eternal fire (Thes. 33. p. 162). And again, Christ died not for final unbelief (Thes. 32. p. 159); therefore not for them who are finally unbelievers, as all non-elected are, and shall be. For what sinners he died, he died for all their sins (Romans 5:6, 7, 8; 2 Corinthians 5:21; 1 John 1:7).

If any shall say, That as he died not for the final unbelief of others, so not for the final unbelief of the elect, and so not for final unbelief at all.

I answer,

First, If by final unbelief, you mean that which is actually so, Christ satisfied not for it. His satisfaction cannot be extended to those things, whose existence is prevented by his merit. The omission of this in the consideration of the death of Christ, lies at the bottom of many mistakes. Merit, and satisfaction, are of equal extent as to their objects: both also tend to the same end, but in sundry respects.

Secondly, If by final unbelief, you understand that which would be so, notwithstanding all means, and remedies, were it not for the death of Christ, so he did satisfy for it. Its existence being prevented by his merit. So then, if Christ died not for final unbelief, he died not for the finally unbelieving: though the satisfaction of his death has not paid for it, the merit of his death would remove it.

Thirdly, I suppose, That the means, as well as the ends, grace, as glory, are the purchase, and procurement of Jesus Christ: see this proved in my Treatise of Redemption, Lib. 3. Cap. 4. &c.

Fourthly, That God is absolutely immutable, and unchangable in all his attributes: neither does his will admit of any alteration. This proved above.

Fifthly, That the will of God is not moved properly by any external cause whatever, to any of its acts, whether imminent, or transient. For,

1 By a moving cause, we understand a cause morally efficient; and if any thing were so properly in respect of any act of God's will, then the act (which is the will of God acting) must in some respect (namely, as it is an effect) be less worthy, and inferior to the cause; for so is every effect, in respect of its cause. And,

2 Every effect produced, proceeds from a passive possibility to the effect, which can no way be assigned to God, besides it must be temporary; for nothing that is eternal, can have dependance upon that, whose rise is in time: and such are all things external to the will of God, even the merit of Christ himself.

3 I cannot imagine how there can be any other cause, why God wills any thing, than why he not wills, or wills not other things, which for any to assign, will be found difficult (Matthew 11:25; chapter 20:15). So then when God wills one thing for another, as our salvation for the death of Christ, the one is the cause of the other; neither moves the will of God. Hence,

Sixthly, All alterations are in the things, concerning which the acts of the will of God are, none in the will of God itself.

These things being premised, what was before proposed, I shall now in order make out; beginning with the eternal acts of the will of God towards us, antecedent to all, or any consideration of the DEATH of CHRIST.