Chapter 10: The Right of Those for Whom Christ Died

That they for whom Christ died, have a right to the things which he purchased thereby (that is an actual right, for so men may have, to what they have not in actual possession) is no singular conception of mine; our divines freely express themselves to this purpose.

Even the commender, and publisher of Grotius his Book of Satisfaction, learned Vossius himself, affirms that Christ by his death purchased for us a double right: first, a right of escaping punishment, and then a right of obtaining the reward.

By the way, I cannot close with his distinction in that place, of some things that Christ by his life and death purchased for us, and other that he daily bestows: for the things he daily bestows are of them which by his death he purchased.

My expressions then alone are not subject to the consequences charged on them, for asserting a right to life and salvation in them for whom Christ died, even before believing.

Yes, some have gone farther, and affirmed that those for whom Christ died are in some manner restored into saving favor.

Not to mention some of them, to whose judgment Mr. Baxter seems to accede, who assert universal justification and restoration into grace upon the death of Christ: but I lay no weight on these things.

To clear my thoughts in this particular, two things must necessarily be inquired into, and made out.

1. Seeing the satisfaction and merit of Christ do tend directly for the good of them for whom he died, and that there is a distance and space of time between that death and their participation of the good things purchased thereby, wherein lies, or in what rests the efficacy of that his death, with the principle of the certain futurition of the spiritual things so procured, which those for whom he died shall assuredly in due time enjoy.

2. Wherein lies the obligation to death, hell, and wrath, which before believing the Scripture affirms to be upon the elect, seeing Christ has actually purchased for them freedom from these things: and this, without more ado, will be cleared in the former.

1. For the first then, upon the issue of the death of Christ, something being supposed in God beyond his mere purpose, of which before, some things being actually procured and purchased by it, which yet they for whom they are so purchased neither do nor possibly can upon the purchase immediately possess and enjoy: it is inquired wherein rests the efficacy of his death, which in due time causes the making out of all those spiritual blessings which by it are so procured.

Now this must be either in those for whom he died, or in himself as Mediator, or in his Father who sent him.

1. That it is not in them for whom he died is apparent: upon the death of Christ, in purpose and promise, when first its efficacy took place, they were not — I mean actually existent. True, they were potentially in the purpose of God: but will that make them a meet subject for the residence of this right and merit whereof we speak? As is the thing, such are all its affections and adjuncts: but possible, if it be no more. This is something actual whereof we speak.

2. That it is not in Christ as Mediator is no less evident. He that makes satisfaction, and he to whom it is made; he who merits any thing, and he at whose hands he merits it, must be distinguished. The second Person under the notion of performing the work of mediation receives not satisfaction.

The power Christ receives of the Father, because he is the Son of Man, to give eternal life to those given him of his Father, is of latter consideration to that we have in hand, being a result and consequence thereof.

3. It must therefore be in the Father, or God, as receiving satisfaction.

Of all the attributes of God where this may be placed (to speak after the manner of men) one of these four must needs be the proper seat of it: 1. His power. 2. His will. 3. His justice. 4. His truth.

1. His power; and then it must be, not that God has any addition of power, for that cannot be to him who is omnipotent; but that a way is made for the exercise of his power, which before by somewhat from himself was shut up.

And as some suppose it is no otherwise: that whereas the Lord could not make out grace and favor to sinners because of his justice necessarily inclining him to their punishment and destruction, now that justice being satisfied in Christ, he can collate any spiritual blessings upon them, as he sees good.

But this I have disproved elsewhere, and manifested.

- 1. That the foundation of this apprehension (being an impossibility in God to forgive sin, without satisfaction, because of the contrariety of it to the properties of his nature) is a groundless assertion. - 2. The foundation of God, in sending his Son to die for his elect is oppugned hereby. - 3. It is destructive to all the proper fruits and effects of the death of Christ, &c. Lib. 2. Cap. 2.

2. In the will of God, it seems that the merit and fruits of the death of Christ, whereof we treat, seem better to be treasured: and from hence it is that he can will, or wills to us the good things purchased by it.

1. That the will of God should by the death of Christ be changed into any other habitude than what it was in before, was before disproved.

2. That now God can will good things to us, holds out the enlargement of his power as to the acting thereof, mentioned above, rather than any thing properly belonging to the will of God.

3. God's willing good things to us, it cannot consist in: his willing of a thing is operative of it; it is his efficacious energetical will whereof we speak. When he actually wills grace, we have grace: and when he wills glory, we have glory: but that concerning which we speak is antecedent to the actual making out of grace and glory to us, being the procuring cause of them; though not of that act of the will of God, whereby they are bestowed.

His Justice, and Truth only remain. For Justice, that which is Commutative properly, with one Consent is removed from God. Who has given first to him, and it shall be rendered to him again. Neither is distributive Justice to be supposed in him, antecedent to some free engagement of his own. Where no Obligation is, there cannot be so much as distributive Justice properly. All Obligation from God to the Creature, is from his own free engagement: otherwise he stands in no Relation to it, but of absolute Dominion, and Sovereignty. All the Justice of God then (we consider not the universal Rectitude of his nature, but) in reference to the Creature, is Justitia regiminis (Psalm 33:4, 5; 1 John 1:5), and therefore must suppose some free Constitution of his Will.

This then rightly considered, do I affirm to be affected with the Merit of Christ: there I place the procuring Efficacy thereof, from where it is, that all the Fruits of it are made out to us. But this in due order.

The first thing of immediate concernment hereunto, is the Covenant of the Father with the Son: the free engagement of God, to do such and such things for Christ, upon the performance of such other things to him appointed. This is the foundation of the Merit of Christ as was before declared. Hence is distributive Justice ascribed to God, as to this thing. It is righteous with him being engaged by his own free Purpose and Promise, to make out those things, which he appointed to be the Fruit and Procurement of the Death of Christ. And from there it is, that all the things purchased by the Death of Christ, become due to those for whom he died: even from the Equity attending this Justice of God.

Herein also his Truth has a share: by his Truth, I understand his Fidelity and Veracity in the performance of all his engagements. This immediately attends every Obligation that by any free Act of his Will, God is pleased in his Wisdom to put upon himself: and is naturally under Consideration before that distributive Justice whereby he is inclined to the Performance it self of them.

This then is that I say;

God by free Purpose and Compact, making way for the Merit of Christ, which absolutely could be none, is obliged from the Veracity and Justice, which attends all his Engagements, to make out as in his infinite Wisdom shall seem meet; all those things which he has set, appointed, and proposed as the Fruit and Purchase of his Death, to all them for whom he died. And in This, rests the Merit of Christ.

Here Two things may be observed;

1 What we ascribe to the Merit of Christ: namely, the Accomplishment of that Condition, which God required to make way, that the Obligation which he had freely put upon himself, might be in actual force. And so much, (how rightly, I leave to himself to Consider) does Mr Baxter assign to our own works: Thes. 26. p. 140.

2 The mistake of those who wind up the MERIT of Christ, as affecting God (if I may so speak) to a Conditional Engagement, namely, that we shall be made Partakers of the Fruits of it, upon such and such Conditions, to be by us fulfilled. For,

1 All such Conditions (if spiritual Blessings) are part of the Purchase of the Death of Christ: and if not, are no way fit to be Conditions of such an Attainment.

2 It cannot be made apparent how any such Conditional stipulation can be ascribed to God. That God should engage upon the Death of Christ, to make out Grace and Glory, Liberty and Beauty, to those for whom he died, upon CONDITION they do so, or so.

1 Leaves no proper place for the Merit of Christ.

2 Is very improperly ascribed to God. Lawyers tell us, that all stipulations about things future, are either sub Conditione, or sub Termino. Stipulations or Engagements upon CONDITION, that are properly so, do suppose him that makes the Engagement to be altogether uncertain of the Event thereof.

Stipulations sub Termino, are absolute to make out the things engaged about, at such a Season. Upon the very Instant of such a Stipulation as this, an Obligation follows as to the thing, though no Action be allowed to him to whom it is made, until the Term and Time appointed be come.

In those Stipulations that are under CONDITION, no Obligation ariseth at all from them, it being wholly uncertain whether the Condition will be fulfilled or no. Only in Two Cases does such an Engagement bring on an immediate Obligation.

1 If the Condition required be in things necessary and unalterable: As if Cajus should engage himself into Tilius to give him an 100. l. for his House on the morrow if the Sun shine: here ariseth an immediate Obligation, and it is the same as if it had been conceived only sub Termino, without Condition at all.

2 If by any means, he that makes the Stipulation, knows infallibly, that the Condition will be fulfilled, though he to whom it is made, knows it not. In this Respect also, the Stipulation sub Conditione, introduceth an immediate Obligation, and in that regard, is co-incident with that which is only sub Termino.

Whether an Engagement upon Condition properly, without the former Respects, that is a Stipulation to an Event dubious and uncertain, can be ascribed to God, is easy to determine. To Assert it, oppugnes the whole nature of the Deity, and over-throws the Properties thereof, immediately and directly. All other Stipulations under Condition are co-incident (as I said before) with that which is sub Termino only, from where ariseth an immediate Obligation for the performance of the thing stipulated about; though there be not an immediate Action granted him to whom it is made.

Surely they are wide, (if not very wild) who Affirm, that all the Stipulations on the part of God upon the Death of Christ are upon a Condition, which himself knows to be impossible for them to perform to whom they are made, which among wise men are always accounted Nugatory and Null.

This being then so vain, I say that the Merit of Christ flowing from the free purpose and Compact of God, resteth on his Justice from there also arising, fixing thereon an Obligation to make out all the Fruits of it, to them for whom he died, sub Termino only; whereby a present right is granted them thereunto, though they cannot plead for present Enjoyment.