Chapter 2: The Nature of Christ's Payment for Sin

Mr. Baxter having composed his Aphorismes of Justification, with their Explications: before the publishing of them in print, he communicated them (as should appear) to some of his near acquaintance: To some things in them contained, one of his said friends gives in some exceptions; among other things he opposes to those Aphorismes, he also points at my contrary judgment in one or two particulars, with my reasons produced for the confirmation thereof. This provokes their learned author (though unwilling) to turn aside to the consideration of those reasons. Now the first of those particulars being about the payment made for sin, in the blood of Christ, of what sort, and kind it is: I shall willingly carry on the inquiry to this further issue, whereunto I am drawn out.

He looks upon the stating of the question as I professedly laid it down at my entrance into that disputation, and declares, that it is nothing at all to the question he has in hand, nor looking that way.

He distinguishes (says Mr. Baxter) between paying the very thing that is in the obligation, and paying of so much in another kind: Now this is not our question, nor any thing to it. Append. p. 137.

If it be so, I know no reason why I was plucked in to the following dispute, nor why Mr. Baxter should cast away so many pages of his book, upon that which is nothing at all to the business he had in hand.

But though there be nothing to this purpose, page 137 of my book, the place he was sent to, yet page 140 there is: as also something contrary to what is expressed in the former place, which he intimates in these words;

In page 140, he states the question far otherwise, (and yet supposes it the same) namely, whether Christ paid the idem, or the tantundum? which he interprets thus, that which is not the same, nor equivalent to it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the Creditor: Now what he means by (not equivalent) I cannot tell.

If he mean (not of equal value) then he fights with a shadow: He wrongs Grotius (for ought I can find in him) who teaches no such doctrine: However I do not so use to English (solutio tantidem.) But if he mean that it is not equivalent, in procuring its end ipso facto, delivering the debtor, without the intervention of a new concession or contract of the Creditor (as solutio ejusdem does) then I confess Grotius is against him, and so am I.

So also (God's gracious acceptance) is either in accepting less in value than was due, and so remitting the rest without payment, (this I plead not for) or else it is his accepting a refusable payment, which though equal in value, yet he may choose to accept according to the tenor of the obligation: This is gracious acceptance which Grotius maintains: and so do I: and so distinguish between solutio, and satisfactio, payment and satisfaction. Thus far he.

Sundry things are here imagined, and asserted: 1 Several passages are pointed at in my treatise, and a contradiction between them intimated. 2 Various conjectures given at my (plain, very plain) meaning, and divers things objected answerable to those conjectures, &c. Therefore to clear the whole, I shall first give you in the passages opposed, and then vindicate them from mutual opposition, with what is besides charged on them.

The first place mentioned in my treatise is in page 137, where after I had discoursed of the nature of satisfaction, in reference both to things real and personal, I laid down a distinction in these words:

There may be a twofold satisfaction: 1 By a solution or payment of the very thing that is in the obligation; either, by the party himself who is bound, or by some other in his stead: As if I owe a man 20 pounds, and my friend goes and pays it, my Creditor is fully satisfied. 2 By a solution or paying of so much although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which by the Creditor's acceptation stands in lieu of it: upon which also, freedom follows from the obligation, by virtue of an act of favor.

What now says Mr. B. to this? Why? It is nothing to the business he has in hand.

Let then this pass, and look to the next passage, which is opposed, and supposed to stand in opposition to the other.

Having laid down the former distinction, passing on to some other things concerning the nature of satisfaction, and the establishment of that of Christ from the Scripture, in page 140, I apply that distinction laid down before in general, to the kind of satisfaction made by Christ, in these words:

Whereas I said that there is a twofold satisfaction, whereby the debtor is freed from the obligation, that is upon him; the one being solutio ejusdem, payment of the same thing that was in the obligation: The other solutio tantidem, of that which is not the same, nor equivalent to it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the Creditor: It is worth our inquiry, which of these it was that our Savior did perform.

And accordingly I refer it to the first.

This (says Mr. B.) is a stating of the question far otherwise than before, yet supposing it the same.

But this I was so far from once mistrusting before, as that being informed of it, I cannot as yet apprehend it to be so.

In page 137 I lay down a distinction in general about the several kinds of satisfaction, which page 140 I plainly apply to the satisfaction of Christ, without any new, much less changed stating of a question.

My whole aim in that inquiry, was to search out that kind of punishment, which Christ underwent in making satisfaction for sin, namely, whether it were the same that was threatened to the transgressors themselves, or whether something else which God accepted in lieu thereof, relaxing the law, not only as to the person suffering, but also as to the penalty to be undergone?

The first of these (and that with the concurrent suffrage of far the greatest number of Protestant divines) I assert with sundry arguments, page 141, 142, &c. 154, 155, 156. To which assertion, he neither opposes himself, nor once attempts to answer any of the arguments whereby I proved it.

This being my intendment, page 137, I intimate that Christ paid the same thing that was in the obligation, as if in things real a friend should pay 20 pounds for him that owed so much, and not any thing in another kind: and page 140 I affirm that he paid Idem, that is the same thing that was in the obligation; and not tantundum, something equivalent thereunto, in another kind.

The first of these is nothing to our purpose (says Mr. B.) but the latter; the latter crossing the former. So he. But truly (such is my dulness) I cannot as yet be won to his mind herein.

But though I agree with my self, perhaps I do not with the Truth. That description of solutio tantidem, namely, that it is a payment of that which is not the same, nor equivalent to it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the Creditor, is peculiarly opposed.

To make this expression obnoxious to an exception, M. B. divides it, that so it may be entangled with a fallacy, [in non-Latin alphabet]: And first, he asks (as before) what I mean by [not equivalent] and hereunto supposing two answers, to the first he opposes a shadow, to the latter himself.

1 If (says he) by [not equivalent] you mean not of equal value, you fight with a shadow, and wrong Grotius: however I do not use so to English solutio tantidem.

By [not equivalent] I mean that which is not of equal value, or certainly I mistook the word; and if so, had need enough to have gone to M. B. or some other learned man, to have learned to English solutio tantidem.

But, do I not then fight with a shadow?

Truly cut my words thus off in the middle of their sense, and they will be found fit to cope with no other adversary: but take them as they lie, and as intended, and there is scarce any shadow of opposition to them, cast by M. B. passing by. My words are, (It is not equivalent, but only in the gracious acceptation of the Creditor:) Is not the plain meaning of these words, that tantundem in satisfaction, is not equivalent to idem [in non-Latin alphabet], but only [in non-Latin alphabet]? What is denied of it absolutely, is affirmed in some respect. He that says, It is not equivalent, but only in gracious acceptation, in that sense affirms it to be equivalent; and that it is in respect of that sense, that the things so called, is said to be tantundem, that is equivalent.

Now what excepts M. B. hereunto? Does he assert tantundem to be in this matter equivalent to idem [in non-Latin alphabet]? It is the very thing he opposes all along, maintaining that solutio tantidem stands in need of gracious acceptance, ejusdem of none: and therefore they are not as to their end [in non-Latin alphabet] equivalent.

Or will he deny it to be equivalent in God's gracious acceptance? This he also contends for himself. Though refusable, yet equivalent.

What then is my crime? I wrong Grotius! Wherein? In imposing on him, that he should say, it was not of equal value to the idem that Christ paid. Not one such word, in any of the places mentioned. I say, Grotius maintains, that the satisfaction of Christ, was solutio tantidem. Will you deny it? Is it not his main endeavour to prove it so? Again, tantundem I say is not in this case equivalent to idem [in non-Latin alphabet], but only [in non-Latin alphabet]: does not M. B. labor to prove the same? Where then is the difference? Were it not for Ignoratio Elenchi in the bottom, and Fallacia plurium interrogationum at the top, this discourse would have been very empty.

2, But he casts my words into another frame, to give their sense another appearance; and says,

If you mean that it is not equivalent in procuring its end, ipso facto, delivering the debtor without the intervention of a new concession or contract of the Creditor, as solutio ejusdem does, then I confess Grotius is against you, and so am I.

Of Grotius I shall speak afterwards: for the present I apply my self to M. B. and say,

1 If he intend to oppose himself to any thing I handle and assert in the place he considers, he does by this quaerie plainly [in non-Latin alphabet], and that from a second inadvertency of the argument in hand; it is of the nature of the penalty undergone, and not of the efficacy of the satisfaction made thereby, that I there dispute.

2 I conceive that in this interrogation and answer, he wholly gives up the cause, that he pretends to plead, and joins with me (as he conceives my sense to be) against Grotius and himself.

If (says he) he mean that it is not equivalent, in procuring its end ipso facto, without the intervention of a new concession or contract as solutio ejusdem does, then I am against him.

Well then: M. B. maintains that solutio tantidem is equivalent with solutio ejusdem in obtaining its end ipso facto: for says he, if I say it is not equivalent, he is against me [in non-Latin alphabet]. But is this his mind indeed? Will his words bear any other sense?

3 Whether tantundem and idem in the way of satisfaction be equivalent to the obtaining the end ipso facto aimed at, (which he here asserts, though elsewhere constantly denies couching in this distinction the [in non-Latin alphabet] of a great part of his discourse) certainly is nothing at all to the question I there agitated; maintaining, that it was idem and not tantundum that Christ paid, and so the end of it obtained ipso facto, answerable to the kind of the efficacy and procurement thereof.

But perhaps I do not conceive his mind aright: peradventure his mind is, that if I do maintain the SATISFACTION OF CHRIST to procure the end aimed at, ipso facto, as solutio ejusdem would have done, then to profess himself my adversary.

- 1 This is not here expressed, nor intimated. - 2 It is nothing at all to me, who place the matter of the satisfaction of Christ, in solutione ejusdem. - 3 About the end of satisfaction in the place opposed I speak not, but only of the nature of the penalty undergone whereby it was made. - 4 To the thing it self, I desire to enquire;

1 What M. B. intends by solutio ejusdem in the business in hand? Does he not maintain it to be the offender's own undergoing the penalty of the law? What end I pray does this obtain ipso facto? Can it be any other but the glory of God's justice in the everlasting destruction of the creature? How then can it possibly be supposed to attain the end spoken of ipso facto? If this be the only meaning of solutio ejusdem, in this sense, the end of it is distant from the end of satisfaction [in non-Latin alphabet].

By the laying the penalty on Christ, that God intended the freedom of those for whom he underwent that penalty, I suppose cannot be doubted: but in inflicting it on the offenders themselves, that he has any such aim, wants an Origen to assert.

2 Whether the Penalty due to One, may not be undergon by Another? And if so, Whether it be not the same Penalty (the idem) or no? In things Real, I gave an Instance before: If a man pay twenty pounds for another who owed it, does not he pay the idem in the Obligation? And may not this hold in things Personal also?

Of the Satisfaction of Christ procuring it's End ipso facto, (I mean in it's own kind, for the Death of Christ must be considered as Meritorious, as well as Satisfactory if deliverance be attended as the End of it) I shall speak afterwards in it's proper place. The present Controversie is no more but this;

Whether Christ underwent the Penalty threatned to us, or some other thing accepted in stead thereof, by a new Constitution? Which is all one, Whether in laying our iniquities upon Christ, the Law of God was relaxed only as to the Persons suffering, or also as to the Penalty suffered? That is, Whether Christ paid the idem in the Obligation, or tantundum? To suppose that the idem of the Obligation is not only the Penalty it self, but also the Offendors own suffering that Penalty, and then to enquire, Whether Christ underwent the idem, is to create an easie Enemy, to triumph in his dejection.

That the Law was relaxed, as to the persons suffering, I positively Assert; but as to the Penalty it self, that is not mentioned. Of these two things alone then must be our Enquiry.

- 1 Whether Christ in making satisfaction, underwent that Penalty that was threatned to the Offendors themselves? - 2 Whether the Penalty though undergone by another, be not the idem of the Obligation?

Of both these after the cleering of the residue of Mr Baxters Exceptions.

Nextly he requireth what I intend by Gracious Acceptance, or rather giveth in his own sense of it, in these words.

So also (Gods Gracious Acceptance) is either his accepting lesse in value then was due, and so remitting the rest without payment: this I plead not for: or else it is his accepting of a refuseable Payment, which though equal in value, yet he may chuse to accept according to the tenor of the Obligation. This is Gracious acceptance which Grotius maintaineth: and so do I. Thus far, he.

Now neither is this any more to the business [〈◊〉] have in hand.

1 The value of any Satisfaction in this Business, ariseth not from the innate worth of the things whereby it is made; but purely from Gods free Constitution of them to such an End. A distinction cannot be allowed of more or less value in the things appointed of God for the same End; All their value ariseth meerly from that appointment: they have so much as he ascribeth to them, and no more. Now neither idem nor tantundum are here satisfactory, but by vertue of divine Constitution: only in tantundem I require a peculiar acceptance to make it equivalent to idem in this business, that is as to satisfaction: or (if you please) an acceptance of that which is not idem, to make it a tantundum. So that this Gracious Acceptance, is not an accepting of that which is less in value then what is in the Obligation, but a free Constitution appointing another thing to the End, which before was not appointed.

2 He supposeth me, (if in so many mistakes of his, I mistake him not) to deny all Gracious Acceptance where the Idem is paid, which (in the present case) is false: I assert it necessary, because not paid per eundem; yes and that other person not procured by the Debtor, but graciously assigned by the Creditor.

3 To make up his Gracious acceptance in his latter sense, he distinguisheth of payments refusable, and not refusable; in the Application of which distinction to the payment made by Christ, I cannot close with him.

For,

A Payment is refusable either absolutly and in it self, or upon supposal: The Death of Christ considered absolutly and in it self, may be said to be refusable as to be made a Payment; not a refusable payment: and that, not because not refusable, but because not a payment. Nothing can possibly tend to the procurement and compassing of any End by the way of Payment, with the Lord, but what is built upon some free Compact, Promise, or Obligation of his Own. But now consider it as an Issue flowing from divine Constitution, making it a payment, and so it was no way refusable, as to the compassing of the End appointed. Thus also, as to the Obligation of the Law, for the fulfilling thereof, it was refusable in respect of the person paying, not in respect of the payment made: That former respect being also taken off by divine Constitution, and Relaxation of the Law as to that, it becometh wholly unrefusable: that is, As it was paid it was so; for satisfaction was made thereby upon the former supposals of Constitution and Relaxation.

4 Does not Mr B. suppose, That in the very Tenure of the Obligation there is required a solution, tending to the same End as satisfaction does? No, Is not that [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] the [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] of this Discourse? Deliverance is the aim of Satisfaction, which receives it's Spring and Being from the Constitution thereof. But is there any such thing as Deliverance once aimed at, or intended in the tenor of the Obligation? I suppose no.

5 Neither is the Distinction of solutio and satisfactio (which Mr B. closeth withal) of any weight in this Business; unless it would hold [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉], which it will not, and so is of no use here.

For,

- 1 There is solutio tantidem, as well as ejusdem, and therein consists satisfaction according to Mr B. - 2 Whether Satisfaction be inconsistant with solutio ejusdem, but not per eundem is the [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉].

After all this Mr B. ads,

Yet here Mr Owen enters the List with Grotius.

Where I pray? I might very justly make enquiry from the Beginning to the Ending of this Discourse, to find out what it is, that this word HERE, particularly answereth to. But to avoid as much as possible all strife of words, I desire the Reader to view the Controversie agitated between Grotius and my self, not as here represented by Mr Baxter, so changed by a new dress, That I might justly refuse to take any acquaintance with it, but as by my self laid down in the places excepted against; and he will quickly find it to be,

1 Not whether the Law were at all relaxed, but whether it were relaxed as well in respect of the penalty to be suffered, as of the person suffering? That is, whether God be only a Rector, or a Rector and Creditor also in this business? (which controversy by the way, is so confusedly proposed, or rather strangely handled by Mr B. page 145, where he adjudges me in a successeless assault of Grotius, as makes it evident he never once perused it.)

2 Nor secondly, whether there be any need of God's gracious acceptance in this business, or no; for I assert it necessary (as before described) in reference to solutio ejusdem, sed non per eundem.

3 Neither thirdly, whether the satisfaction of Christ considered absolutely, and in statu diviso, and materially, be refusable, which I considered not, or be unrefusable, supposing the divine constitution, which Grotius (as I take it) delivered not himself in. Nor,

4 About the value of the payment of Christ in reference to acceptance; but merely (as I said before,)

Whether the Lord appointing an end of deliverance, neither intimated nor couched in the obligation, nor any of its attendencies, constituting a way for the attainment of that end, by receiving satisfaction to the obligation, did appoint that the thing in the obligation should be paid though by another, or else some new thing that (of itself, and by itself) never was in the obligation, either before or after its solution: as the payment made by Christ must be granted such, unless it were for substance the same which the Law required.

And here (with most divines) I maintain the first, namely, that the Law was relaxed in respect of the person suffering, but executed in respect of the penalty suffered: relaxation and execution are not in this business opposed [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] but only [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉].

He that would see this further affirmed, may consult what I wrote of it in the place opposed, which is not once moved by any thing here spoken to the contrary.

By the way observe, I speak only of the penalty of the Law, and the passive righteousness of Christ, strictly so called: for his active righteousness or obedience to the Law, (though he did many things we were not obliged to, for the manifestation of himself, and confirmation of the doctrine of the Gospel) that it was the very idem of us required. I suppose none can doubt.

What place that active righteousness of Christ has, or what is its use in our justification, I do not now enquire, being unwilling to immix myself unnecessarily in any controversy, though I cannot but suppose that M. B. his discourse hereabouts gives advantage enough, even Minorum Gentium Theologis, to ordinary divines (as he calls them) to deal with him in it.