Chapter 3: The Foreknowledge of God

The praescience, or foreknowledge of God, has not hitherto in express terms been denied by the Arminians, but only questioned, and overthrown by consequence: inasmuch as they deny the certainty and unchangeableness of his decrees, on which it is founded: it is not a foreknowledge of all, or any thing, which they oppose, but only, of things free and contingent: and that only to comply with their formerly exploded error, that the purposes of God concerning such things, are temporal and mutable; which obstacle being once removed, the way is open how to ascribe the presidentship of all human actions, to omnipotent contingency, and her Sire Free-will. Now, we call that contingent, which in regard of its next and immediate cause, before it come to pass, may be done, or may be, not done: as, that a man shall do such a thing tomorrow, or any time hereafter: which he may choose whether ever he will do, or no. Such things as these are free and chanceable, in respect of men their immediate, and second causes, but if we (as we ought to do) look up to him who fore-sees, and has ordained the event of them, or their omission, they may be said necessarily to come to pass, or to be omitted: it could not be, but as it was. Christians hitherto, (yes, and Heathens) in all things of this nature, have usually upon their event, reflected on God, as one, whose determination was passed on them from eternity, and who knew them long before: as the killing of men by the fall of a house, who might in respect of the freedom of their own wills, have not been there: or if a man fall into the hands of thieves, we presently conclude, it was the will of God: it must be so, he knew it before.

Divines for distinction sake, ascribe to God a twofold knowledge; one, intuitive, or intellective whereby, he foreknows and sees all things that are possible: that is, all things that can be done by his Almighty power: without any respect to their future existence, whether they shall come to pass, or no: yes, infinite things whose actual being, eternity shall never behold, are thus open and naked to him: for, was there not strength and power in his hand to have created another world? Was there not counsel, in the storehouse of his wisdom, to have created this otherwise? Or not to have created it at all? Shall we say, that his providence extends itself every way, to the utmost of its activity? Or can he not produce innumerable things in the world, which now he does not? Now all these, and every thing else, that is feasible to his infinite power, he fore-sees and knows, Scientia (as they speak) simplicis intelligentiae, by his essential knowledge.

Out of this large and boundless territory of things possible, God by his decree freely determines what shall come to pass; and makes them future, which before were but possible. After this decree (as they commonly speak) follows, or together with it, (as others more exactly) takes place, that praescience of God, which they call visionis of vision, whereby he infallibly sees all things in their proper causes; and how and when they shall come to pass. Now these two sorts of knowledge differ, in as much as by the one, God knows what it is possible may come to pass; by the other, only what it is impossible, should not come to pass: things are possible, in regard of God's power, future, in regard of his decree. So, (that if I may so say) the measure of the first kind of science, is God's omnipotency what he can do: of the other, his purpose what certainly he will do, or permit to be done. With this praescience then, God foresees all, and nothing but what he has decreed shall come to pass.

For every thing to be produced next and under him, God has prepared divers and several kinds of causes: diversly operative in producing their effects: some whereof, are said to work necessarily: the institution of their nature, being to do as they do, and not otherwise: so the Sun gives light, and the fire heat. And yet in some regard, their effects and products may be said to be contingent, and free: inasmuch, as the concurrence of God the first cause is required to their operation, who does all things most freely, according to the counsel of his will; thus the Sun stood still in the time of Joshua: and the fire burned not the three Children: but ordinarily such agents working necessitate naturae, their effects are said to be necessary.

Secondly, to some things God has fitted free and contingent causes: which either apply themselves to operation in particular, according to election: choosing to do this thing, rather than that: as Angels, and men, in their free and deliberate actions, which they so perform, as that they could, have not done them: or else, they produce effects [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉], merely by accident: and the operation of such things, we say to be casual: as if a hatchet falling out of the hand of a man, cutting down a tree, should kill another, whom he never saw. Now nothing in either of these ways comes to pass, but God has determined it, both for matter, and the manner: even so, as is agreeable to their causes; some necessarily, some freely, some casually, or contingently, yet all so, as having a certain futurition from his decree; he infallibly foresees that they shall so come to pass: but yet, that he does so, in respect of things free, and contingent is much questioned by the Arminians in express terms, and denied by consequence, notwithstanding Saint Hierome affirms, that so to do, is destructive to the very essence of the Deity.

First, their doctrine of the immutability of God's decrees, on whose firmness is founded the infallibility of this prescience, does quite overthrow it; God thus foreknowing only what he has so decreed shall come to pass; if that be no firmer settled, but that it may, and is often altered, according to the divers inclinations of men's wills, (which I showed before they affirm,) he can have at best but a conjectural foreknowledge, of what is yet for to come: not founded on his own unchangeable purpose; but upon a guess, at the free inclination of men's wills. For instance: God wills that all men should be saved: this act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditional decree to save all men if they will believe; well, among these is Judas, as equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as Peter? God then will have him to be saved, and to this end, allows him all those means, which are necessary to beget faith in him, and are every way sufficient to that purpose, and do produce that effect in others: what can God foresee then but that Judas, as well as Peter, will believe? He intends he should, he has determined nothing to the contrary: let him come then, and act his own part, why, he proves so obstinately malicious, that God with all his omnipotence as they speak, by any way, that becomes him, which must not be by any irresistible efficacy, cannot change his obdurate heart: well then, he determines according to the exigence of his justice, that he shall be damned for his impenitence; and foresees that accordingly: but now, suppose this wretch even at his last moment, should bethink himself and return to the Lord, which in their conceit he may, notwithstanding his former reprobation: (which as they state it, seems a great act of mercy): God must keep to the rules of his justice and elect or determine to save him: by which the varlet has twice, or three times, deceived his expectation.

Secondly, they affirm, that God is said properly to expect, and desire, divers things, which yet never come to pass: we grant says Corvinus, that there are desires in God, that never are fulfilled: now surely to desire what one is sure, will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom, or counsel: and therefore they must grant, that before, he did not know, but perhaps so it might be. God wishes and desires some good things, which yet come not to pass, say they, in their confession: from where one, of these two things, must needs follow: either first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire, and expect, what he knows shall never come to pass: or else, he did not know but it might; which overthrows his prescience. Yes, and say they expressly, that the hope, and expectation of God, is deceived by man: and confess, that the strength, of their strongest argument; lies in this, that God hoped, and expected, obedience from Israel. Secondly, that he complains that his hope is deluded: which being taken properly, and as they urge it, cannot consist with his eternal prescience. For they dis-esteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed to God per [illegible], in regard of that analogy, his actions hold with such of ours, as we perform having those passions.

Thirdly, they teach, that God has determined nothing, concerning such things, as these in question. That God has determined future contingent things to either part, (I mean such as issue from the free will of the creature) I abominate, hate, and curse, as false, absurd, and leading us on to blasphemy, says Arminius: to determine of them to either part, is, to determine, and ordain, whether they shall be, or whether they shall not be: as that David shall, or shall not go up tomorrow, against the Philistines and prevail. Now the infallibility of God's foreknowing of such things, depending on the certainty of his decree, and determination: if there be no such thing as this; that also, must needs fall to the ground.

Fourthly, see what positively they write, concerning this everlasting foreknowledge of God. First, they call it a troublesome question. Secondly, they make it a thing disputable, whether there be any such thing, or no? And though happily it may be ascribed to God: yet, thirdly, they think it no motive to the worship of him. Fourthly, they say, better it were quite exploded, because the difficulties that attend it, can scarcely be reconciled, with man's liberty, God's threatenings and promises. Yes, fifthly, it seems rather to be invented, to crucify poor mortals: than to be of any moment in religion; so Episcopius: it may be excepted, that this is but one Doctor's opinion: it is true; they are one man's words; but the thing itself, is countenanced by the whole sect. As first, in the large prolix declaration of their opinions, they speak not one word of it, and being taxed for this omission, by the professors of Leyden: they vindicate themselves so coldly in their Apology, that some learned men do from hence conclude; that certainly in their most secret judgments, all the Arminians, do consent with Socinus, in ascribing to God, only a conjectural foreknowledge. And one great prophet of their own affirms roundly, that God after his manner oftentimes fears, that is, suspects and that not without cause, and prudently conjectures, that this or that evil may arise; Vorst: and their chiefest patriarchs, that God does often intend, what he does not foresee will come to pass, Armin. Corvin. Now whether this kind of atheism be tolerable among Christians or no, let all men judge who have their senses exercised in the word of God, which I am sure teaches us another lesson.

First: it is laid down, as a firm foundation: that known to God, are all his works, from the beginning of the world (Acts 15:18). Every thing then, that in any respect may be called his work, is known to him from all eternity: now, what in the world, if we may speak as he has taught us, can be exempted from this denomination? Even actions in themselves sinful are not; though not as sinful, yet in some other regard, as punishments of others; Behold, says Nathan, to David, (in the name of God) I will take your wives before your eyes, and give them to your neighbor, and he shall lie with your wives, in the sight of this sun: for you did it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel (2 Samuel 12:11-12). So also, when wicked robbers had nefariously spoiled Job of all his substance; the holy man concludes, The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away (Job 1:1). Now, if the working of God's providence be so mighty, and effectual, even in, and over those actions, wherein the devil, and men, do most maliciously offend, as did Absalom, and the Sabean, with the Chaldean thieves, that it may be said to be his work, and he may be said to do it, (I crave liberty to use the Scripture phrase) then certainly nothing in the world, in some respect or other, is independent of his all-disposing hand. Yes, Judas himself betraying our Savior, did nothing, but what his hand and counsel before determined should be done (Acts 4:28), in respect of the event of the thing itself. And if these actions, notwithstanding these two hindrances, First, that they were contingent, wrought by free agents, working according to election and choice: Secondly, that they were sinful and wicked in the agents, had yet their dependence on his purpose and determinate counsel; surely, he has an interest of operation in the acts of every creature; but his works, as it appears before, are all known to him from the beginning: for he works nothing by chance, or accidentally, but all things determinately, according to his own decree, or the counsel of his own will (Ephesians 1:11).

Secondly: the manner of God's knowing of things, does evidently show, that nothing that is, or may be, can be hid from him: which is not by discourse and collection of one thing out of another, conclusions out of principles: but altogether and at once, evidently, clearly, and distinctly, both in respect [illegible], by one most pure act of his own essence he discerns all things. For there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all are naked and opened to his eyes (Hebrews 4:13). So that those things, concerning which we treat, he knows three ways: First, in himself and his own decree, as the first cause, in which respect they may be said to be necessary, in respect of the certainty of their event: Secondly, in their immediate causes, wherein their contingency does properly consist: Thirdly, in their own nature as future, but to his infinite knowledge even present.

Thirdly: the Scripture is full of expressions to this purpose, to wit; That God knows all secrets, and reveals hidden things: he searches the reins, and the heart: he knows the number of the stars: and the birds of the air: the lilies of the field, the falling of sparrows, the number of the hairs of our heads. Some places are most remarkable, as that of the Psalmist, He knows my thoughts long before: even before ever they come into our minds, before their first rising; and yet many actions that are most contingent, depend upon those thoughts known to God from eternity. No, which breaks the very neck of the goddess contingency, those things wherein her greatest power is imagined to consist, are directly ascribed to God: as our words the answer of the tongue (Proverbs 16:1), the directing of an arrow, shot by chance, to a mark not aimed at (1 Kings 22:34). Surely God must needs foreknow the event of that contingent action; he must needs know the man would so shoot who had determined his arrow should be the death of a King. He makes men poor and rich (Proverbs 22:1). He lifts up one, and pulls down another (Psalm 75). How many contingencies did [illegible], his piercing eye run through, to foresee the crowning of Esther, for the deliverance of his people. In a word; known to God are all his works: now what can possibly be imagined to be more contingent, than the killing of a man by the fall of an axe from out of his hand, who intended no such thing; yet this God assumes as his own work (Exodus 21:13; Deuteronomy 9:4-5), and so surely was by him foreknown.

Fourthly: Do but consider the prophecies in Scripture; especially those concerning our Savior, how many free and contingent actions did concur for the fulfilling of them: as Isaiah 7:14, chapter 9:5, and chapter 53; Genesis 3:15, etc. The like may be said of other predictions: as of the wasting of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, which though in regard of God's prescience, it was certainly to come to pass: yet they did it most freely, not only following the counsel of their own wills; but also using divination, or chanceable lots for their direction (Ezekiel 21:21). Yet he who made the eye sees all these things (Psalm 94:9).

Divers other reasons and testimonies might be produced to confirm our doctrine, of God's everlasting prescience; which notwithstanding Episcopius's blasphemy, that it serves for nought but to cruciate poor mortals; we believe to be a good part of the foundation of all that consolation which God is pleased to afford us in this vale of tears; amidst all our afflictions, and temptations, under whose pressure, we should else faint and despair. It is no small comfort to be assured, that we do, nor can suffer nothing, but what his hand and counsel guide to us: what is open, and naked before his eyes, and whose end and issue he knows long before: which is a strong motive to patience, a sure anchor of hope, a firm ground of consolation. Now to present in one view, how opposite the opinions of the worshippers of the great goddess contingency, are to this sacred truth: take this short Antithesis.

Knowne to God are all his workes from the beginning of the world (Acts 15:18). Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked, and opened to the eyes of him with whom we have to do (Hebrews 4:13). He that formed the eye shall he not see (Psalm 94:9). When a man goes into the wood with his neighbor to hew wood, and his hand fetches a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and the head slips from the helve, and lights upon his neighbor that he die (Deuteronomy 19:5), God delivers him into his hand (Exodus 21:13). Take no thought, saying, what shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed, for your heavenly Father knows that you have need of all these things (Matthew 6:31-32). Take away God's prescience and you overthrow his deity: Hierom. God sometimes fears and prudently conjectures, that this, or that evil may arise, Vorsti. God does not always foresee the event of what he intends, Corvin. Future contingencies are not determined to either part, Armin., that is, God has not determined, and so consequently does not foreknow, whether they shall come to pass or no. God hopes and expects, divers things that shall never come to pass: Rem. The doctrine of prescience seems to be invented only to vex and cruciate poor mortal men: Episcop.