Tantum Religio Potuit Suadere Malorum

Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.

How satanical was Julian's design to bring the Christians to nothing, by granting liberty of conscience to all the heretics and sectaries that were among them? But suppose the Commonwealth to run no hazard by the toleration of heresies and schisms, I answer further, 1. The text (Romans 13:4) speaks generally, and we must not distinguish where the Scripture does not distinguish. 2. Those that are in authority are to take such courses and so to rule, that we may not only lead a quiet and peaceable life, but further that it be in all godliness and honesty (1 Timothy 2:2). The magistrate is keeper of both Tables, and is to punish the violation of the first Table, as well as of the second. 3. Will any man, says Augustine, who is in his right wit, say to Kings, Do not care by whom the Church of God in your Kingdom be maintained or opposed: it does not concern you in your Kingdom, who will be religious, who sacrilegious: to whom notwithstanding it cannot be said, It does not concern you in your Kingdom, who be chaste, who whorish, &c. Is the soul's keeping faith and truth to God a lighter matter, than that of a woman to a man? He confesses in the same Epistle, that he and some other African divines were sometime of that opinion, that the Emperor should not at all punish the Donatists for their heresy or error, but such of them only as should be found to commit any riot or breach of peace, especially the furious and violent Circumcellions. But afterward he confesses that the Emperor had as good reason to repress their pernicious error, as their furious violence.

A fourth argument is drawn from the names which the Scripture gives to heretics and sectaries, holding forth the extreme danger of tolerating and letting them alone. They are called ravening wolves (Matthew 7:15), and grievous wolves not sparing the flock (Acts 20:29), thieves and robbers (John 10:8). Their word eats as a canker (2 Timothy 2:17), and is as a little leaven leavening the whole lump (Galatians 5:9). They are troublers of Israel (Acts 15:24; Galatians 5:12). Shall the troublers of the State be punished, and the troublers of Israel go free? Shall physicians cut off the member that has a gangrene in it, because it endangers the whole body, and shall the great State physicians suffer the gangrene to spread in the Church? Shall men's bodies, goods, and purses, be so far cared for, that thieves and robbers must not be suffered, but justice done upon them; and shall those have immunity who steal away souls from Christ, and rob us of the pearl of truth? No, shall the poor sheep be so much looked to, that the wolf must not be spared; and shall we suffer the soul-destroying wolves to enter, yes abide peaceably among the dear-bought flock of Jesus Christ?

Other arguments might be added, but let these suffice at this present. I come next to answer all the material objections which I have either read or heard (to my best remembrance) alleged against this coercive power of the magistrate in matters of religion.

First, the parable of the tares is objected: Christ will not have the tares to be plucked up, but to grow together with the wheat until the harvest (Matthew 13:29, 30). In this argument Mr. Williams in his *Bloudy Tenent* puts a great deal of confidence. But I am as confident to discover the strength of it to be less than nothing. For first he takes the tares to be meant neither of hypocrites in the Church, whether discovered or undiscovered; nor yet of those who are scandalous offenders in their life and conversation, but only of Antichristian idolaters and false worshippers: which is a most false interpretation. Christ himself expounds it generally, verse 38: The good seed are the children of the Kingdom: but the tares are the children of the wicked one. And verse 41, the tares are expounded to be all that offend, and which do iniquity. This being the clear meaning, it will follow undeniably, that if the magistrate must spare those who are meant by tares in the parable, then he must spare and let alone all scandalous offenders, murderers, adulterers, drunkards, thieves, &c. when any such are discovered in the visible Church. But this cannot be the meaning of the tares in the parable, says Mr. Williams, chapter 24, that wicked livers, opposite to the children of God, should be understood. For then, says he, when Christ says, Let the tares alone, he should contradict other ordinances for the punishment of evildoers by the magistrate. But this is a base begging of the question: for he well knew that those against whom he disputes hold that his exposition of the parable contradicts the ordinance of God for punishing idolaters and heretics, the question being whether this be not an ordinance as well as the punishment of scandalous livers. Besides, if the tares be Antichristian idolaters, and they must not be plucked up, but suffered to grow till the harvest, as he expounds, this contradicts other Scriptures, which say that the sword must be drawn against Antichristian idolaters, and they thereby cut off (Revelation 13:10 and 17:16).

But I proceed to a second answer. If by tares I should suppose only to be meant idolaters, heretics, and false worshippers (which is a gloss contrary to the text, as I have demonstrated) yet their argument will not conclude the forbearing or sparing of such, except only in such cases, and so far as the true worshippers of God cannot be certainly and infallibly distinguished from the false worshippers, as the wheat from the tares: as Jehu would not destroy the worshippers of Baal, till he was sure that none of the servants of the Lord were among them (2 Kings 10:23). The reason why the tares are not to be plucked up, is, lest while you gather up the tares, you root up also the wheat with them, verse 29. Now when a man is sure that he plucks up nothing but tares, or rather thorns, without the least danger to the wheat, how does the parable strike against his so doing? If M. S. will not believe me, let him believe himself, page 50. For my part, says he, when the civil magistrate shall be far enough out of this danger of fighting against God, I have nothing to say against his fighting with superstition, heresy, schism, &c.

Thirdly, what if I shape yet another answer to the argument out of Mr. Williams owne words? Chapter 27. I acknowledge, says he, this command [Let them alone] was expresly spoken to the messengers or ministers of the Gospel, who have not civill power or authority in their hand, and therefore not to the civill Magistrate, King or Governour. Now therefore what a blockish argument is it, to reason from this Parable against the coercive power of the magistrate in matters of religion? If there must be a forbearance of any severity, we must forbeare Church censures and excommunication a way of rooting out the tares, which Mr. Williams himselfe justifieth as much as we doe.

Fourthly, and if the utter extirpation and plucking up of Hereticks by capitall punishments, should be understood to be forbidden in the parable, (as it is not) yet the stopping of their mouths, the dissipating and suppressing of them, some other coercive way, is not forbidden, as Chrysostome noteth upon the place, whom Euthymius and Theophylactus doe follow in this, allowing of coercive, though not capitall punishments.

Fifthly, Calvin, Beza, and our best Interpreters, take the scope and intent of that parable, not to be against the immoderate severity of Magistrates, but against the immoderate zeal of those who imagine to have the Church rid of all scandalous and wicked persons, as wheat without tares, corn without chaffe, a flock of sheep without goats, which has been the fancy of Novatians, Donatists and Anabaptists. The parable therefore intimates to us (as Bucerus upon the place expoundeth it) that when the Magistrate has done all his duty in exercising his coercive power, yet to the worlds end there will be in the Church a mixture of good and bad. So that it is the universall and perfect purging of the Church, which is put off to the last judgement, not the punishment of particular persons. Neither doe the servants in the parable aske whether they should pluck up this or that visible tare, but whether they should goe and make the whole field rid of them; which field is the generall visible Church sowed with the [illegible]eed of the Gospel; and so much for that argument.

Another negative argument is this. Such a coercive power in matters of religion, maketh men hypocrites and seven times more the children of hell. Christs Ordinances put upon a whole City, or a Nation, may more civilize and moralize, but never christianize them; says Mr. Williams, chapter 82. I answer, this argument does utterly condemn Josiahs Reformation as sinfull, for the caused all Judah to stand to the Covenant, as we heard before from (2 Chronicles 34:32), yet Iudah became thereby more hypocriticall. Treacherous Iudah has not turned to me with her whole heart, but fainedly, says the Lord, speaking of those very days of Iosiah (Jeremiah 3:6, 10).

2. This argument maketh also against the punishment of adulteries, murthers, thefts, robberies, &c. for unlesse filthy lust, hatred, and covetousnesse in the heart be mortified, and men convert freely and sincerely, the reducing of them to a morall conversation maketh them hypocrites, and neerer hell then before.

3. There are two sorts of Christs Ordinances: some for the communion of Saints: others, for the conversion of sinners. It is far from our thoughts to admit, much lesse to compell, a whole City, or Nation promiscuously, to the use of the former. But yet converting or reducing ordinances may and ought to put upon all whom they concern. The means must be used and mens hearts left to God.

Object. 3. This doctrine of the Magistrates coercive power, maketh many to stumble at the Presbyterian Reformation, as a bloudy Reformation, as a building of Zion with bloud, and Ierusalem with iniquity (Micah 3:10). Answ. 1. We have not so learned Christ, we abominate the Popish and Prelaticall tyranny. We know that the servant of the Lord must not strive; but be gentle to all men, apt to teach, patient: In meeknesse instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth (2 Timothy 2:24, 25). Yet he who said so, could also say, I would they were even cut off which trouble you (Galatians 5:12). It is my souls desire that the secular coercive power may be put forth upon those only who can by no other means be reclaimed, & who can be no longer spared without a visible rupture in the Church, and the manifest danger of seducing and misleading many souls. A Presbytery is not so ill a neighbor, that no man who has the least differing opinion may live beside it.

But 2. this objection does as much strike against the New England government, as against the government of the neighbouring reformed Churches. For in New England there has been severity enough (to say no worse) used against Hereticks and Schismaticks. And here I must appeal the consciences of those who now plead so much for liberty of conscience and toleration in this Kingdom, were they able to root out the Presbyterians and their way, & could find civil authority inclinable to put forth the coercive power against it, whether in that case would they not say, that the Magistrate may repress it by strong hand, if it cannot be otherwise repressed. It is not without cause that I put this Query to them; for Mr. S. pag. 50. (a passage before cited) does allow of the Magistrate's fighting against a doctrine or way which is indeed superstition, heresy, or schism, and only pretends to be from God, when it is indeed from men. Also that pamphlet called As you were, p. 3. tells us that it was neither Gamaliel's meaning nor Mr. Goodwin's meaning, that every way pretending to be from God must be let alone, but that only we are to refrain & let alone, till we are certain that we are out of danger of fighting against God, while we endeavor to overthrow it. Now I assume, there are some who plead for liberty of conscience, who profess that they are certain and fully assured, upon demonstrative proofs, that the Presbyterian way is not from God, nor according to the mind of Jesus Christ (which is hinted to us both in the pamphlet last cited p. 5, 6. & in [illegible] pag. 25.). Therefore according to their principles they must allow of the putting forth of the civil coercive power against the Presbyterian way. And if so, what a grand imposture is this? What a deceiving of the world? What a mocking of the Parliament and of the Kingdom? To plead generally for liberty of conscience, when they intend only liberty to themselves, not to others that are opposite to them. Which appears yet further by the compassionate Samaritan, pag. 10. he says that no man is to be punished or discountenanced by authority for his opinion, unless it be dangerous to the State, pag. 23, 24. he discourses against the opinion of Presbyterians as most dangerous to the State. Therefore he would have the Presbyterians discountenanced and punished by authority, and intends liberty only to the Separatists, Anabaptists, and the like.

I have done with three objections, but I have three words more to speak with the compassionate Samaritan, in answer to his three arguments for liberty of conscience, in which though all the strength of his discourse does lie, I hope to make him ashamed of them, if he can at all blush.

His first argument is this, Whatever a man's reason does conclude to be true or false, to be agreeable or disagreeable to God's word, that same to that man is his opinion or judgement, and so man is by his own reason necessitated to be of that mind he is: Now where there is a necessity, there ought to be no punishment, for punishment is the recompense of voluntary actions, therefore no man ought to be punished for his judgement. Answer 1. The question is not whether a man ought to be punished for his judgement, but whether a man ought to be punished for such professions or practices in religion, as are found to be pernicious, hurtful, and destructive, to the glory of God, the truth of the Gospel, the Ordinances of Christ, the reformation of religion, the peace of the Church. I know he will be ready still to set on foot his argument, for that a man's judgement and reason does so necessitate and conclude him that he cannot choose but profess and practice as he does. Therefore I add 2. this argument of his strikes against the justice of the Parliament done or to be done upon Malignants, for as much as their judgement binds them, and their reason does necessitate them to judge and speak and act as they do. 3. It strikes at the very justice of God upon reprobate and unbelieving men, for as much as they cannot receive the things of God (1 Corinthians 2:14), cannot hear the words of Christ (John 8:43), cannot receive the spirit of truth (John 14:17). But 4. the formal solution is this; there is a gross fallacy in the argument, for we must distinguish necessity, there is a natural necessity, which takes away the [illegible], and a moral necessity, which takes away the [illegible] of a man's being of another judgement or way. Again, there is an absolute necessity, and a hypothetical necessity. Now the necessity of a Heretic's judging thus, because his reason concludes him thus, is not a moral necessity or obligation upon him, as if it were not lawful to him to judge or do otherwise, (no, he ought and is bound by the word of God to judge otherwise, and do otherwise) but it is a natural necessity, (I mean of sinful nature) and that not simple and absolute, neither, but hypothetical only, and upon this supposition that he has not yet opened his eyes to receive more light, nor set his heart singly and in the fear of God to seek more light. So that the plain English of this Samaritan's argument is this: Though God's word binds a man to such a duty, yet if his own erroneous, perverse and corrupt judgement conclude him so far that his opinion cannot agree with the word of God, and himself cannot be brought to the practice of that necessary duty; such a man ought not to be punished. Or as if one should argue thus: He that has borrowed from me a thousand pound, has by his own fault disabled himself to pay it: therefore I may not call him to an account for it.

But let us see whether this Samaritan be happier in his second argument. Which is this: It's known that the Fathers, General Councils, National Assemblies, Synods and Parliaments in their times have been most grossly mistaken: and though the present times be wiser than the former, &c. yet since there remains a possibility of error, notwithstanding never so great presumptions to the contrary, one sort of men are not to compel another, since this hazard is run thereby, that he who is in an error may be the constrainer of him who is in the truth.

Answer 1. Farewell Parliaments, if this argument hold good. The Parliament may fine no man, imprison no man, banish no man: they may compel no man to Assessments, Taxes, Excise, Billeting of Soldiers &c. And why forsooth? Because they may not presume of an infallible and unerring spirit, but may err, and have erred as well as other men.

2 He argueth from the hazard of compulsion, it may fall out that he who is in the truth may be constrained and persecuted. True: it may fall out so; and the Lord save us that we never be accessary to the persecuting of any who is in the truth, for so it may be again through mens corruption and abuse of the magistrates power, (so the best things may be abused.)

But the liberty of conscience which he pleadeth for, runs a far greater hazard, even the hazard of not only shaking but overturning truth, and peace, and religion, and ordinances, and Church, and souls, and all. To the ruin of all these, and to a thousand mischiefs, this kind of liberty prepareth a broad way, and openeth a wide door; and it is better, as he said, to live where nothing is lawful, than where every thing is lawful.

3. It follows not that because Parliaments may not presume of an unerring spirit, therefore they cannot be certain that they are in the truth concerning this or that particular, so that they may confidently compel men to it, without fear of fighting against God. The acknowledgement of a possibility of error, and that we know but in part as long as we are in this world, may well consist with mens fullness of persuasion from the light of God's word, concerning this or that truth to be believed, or duty to be done.

I make haste to his third argument. To compel me, says he, against my conscience, is to compel me against what I believe to be true, and so against my faith; now whatever is not of faith is sin: to compel me therefore against my conscience, is to compel me to do that which is sinful. And, again I am counselled by the Apostle to be persuaded in my own mind of the truth of that way wherein I serve the Lord, &c.

Answ. 1. This also shaketh loose Parliamentary authority; though the Gentleman who wrote these arguments pretendeth to stand for it, as much as any other. His argument will conclude (if it concludeth at all) that the Parliament may not compel Malignants, disaffected persons, Rebels, to any thing which they are not persuaded in their own minds to be right. It is against my conscience, will the Antiparliamentary malignant say, to contribute to the war, to acknowledge this for a Parliament, as long as the King does not acknowledge it; to reveal such a design, or to confess this or that plot against the Parliament, when I am examined; therefore I shall sin if I do so, for whatever is not of faith is sin, and the Parliament shall compel me to sin, if they compel me to do so. For though the thing may be in itself good, yet if it do not appear to be so to my conscience, the practice thereof in me is sinful, which therefore I ought not to be compelled to, says the Samaritan. If he say his argument is only concerning matters of religion, I answer, Whatever his intention be in offering the argument, the very nature and force of the argument itself driveth universally against the compelling of a man to any thing whatever which is against his own conscience, except he will say that it is a sin to serve God against my conscience, but it is no sin to serve the Parliament against my conscience. Says not the Apostle, WHATEVER is not of faith is sin: and, He that doubteth is damned?

But 2. when the Apostle says so, he does not exclude all manner of doubting, as the Casuists well observe, but only practical doubts: for a man may have his conscience morally and practically certain, so that he may do such a thing lawfully, and with confidence that he is doing the will of God, and yet withal he may be perhaps fluctuating in some speculative doubts concerning that very thing. For instance: a Christian may come to the Lords Table with so much faith (I mean not now the faith of the person which justifieth before God, but the faith of that action) as maketh his coming lawful, though his thoughts be exercised with some doubts concerning the truth of his repentance and faith. A soldier may in faith go out to war, being assured that what he does he may do without sin, but yet he has happily his own speculative doubts concerning the nature, causes, and ends of the war. A man may with freedom and persuasion of mind (so far as concerneth his practice) submit to Presbyterial government, who yet perhaps has not throughly satisfied himself concerning the grounds and warrants which it has from the word of God.

The Samaritan will reply (it may be) that he has no faith at all concerning the practice itself, and that he may not be compelled to do any thing against his conscience, for that were to compel him to sin. To take off this, I add 3. If the thing be indifferent, I confess no man is to be compelled to it against his conscience, for this has been the tyranny of Papists and Prelates, to compel men against their conscience to certain rites which themselves acknowledged to be merely indifferent, setting aside obedience to authority in such things, which (say they) is not indifferent. But if the word of God either directly or by necessary consequence, make the thing necessary, and such as we cannot leave undone without sin and breach of duty; if there be such an obligation from the word, then may a man be compelled to it, though against his conscience.

But then you will say, I am brought into a necessity of sinning, for if I obey not, I refuse a duty; if I obey, I doe it against my conscience. Answ. This necessity is not absolute, but hypotheticall, is not perse, but per accidens, so long as a man retaineth the error of his conscience, which he ought to cast away. You will say againe, supposing that my conscience cannot be satisfied, nor made of another opinion then now I am of, whether in this case, and so long as it standeth thus with me, may authority compell me to obey against my conscience, and so to sinne? Or whether ought they not rather permit me not to obey, because my conscience forbiddeth me. Answ. The thing being necessary, as has been said, it is pars tutior, yes, tutissima, that a man be compelled to it, though it be against his erring and ill informed conscience. I know so long as he has such an erring conscience he cannot but sin in obeying. But the sin of not obeying is greater and heavier: for this is a sin in the fact it self; that a sin in the manner of doing only, being not done in faith: this is a sin of it selfe, that is a sin only by accident: this is a sin materially; that is a sinne only interpretatively to him, because he thinks so: this is a sin for the substance; that a sin for the circumstance: this cannot be made to be no sin, for the nature of the duty cannot be altered; that may cease to be a sin, for the mans conscience may through Gods mercy and blessing upon the means, be better informed. So that there can be no doubt but this is every way a greater sin then that, and consequently more to be avoided. And thus I have dispatched the Samaritane who did undertake to pour oyl into the wounds of the Separation. Medice cura teipsum.

The next thing comes in my way, is an argument brought for liberty of conscience, from Gamaliel's speech in favor of the Apostles (Acts 5:38, 39). Refrain from these men & let them alone: for if this counsell or this work be of men, it will come to nought. But if it be of God you cannot overthrow it, lest haply you be found even to fight against God. The strength of his argumentation did lie in this D[•]lemma; this doctrine or way is either of men, or of God. If it be of men, you shall not need to represse it, for it will come to nought of it self, which he proves by two historical instances of Judas and Theudas. If it be of God, it is in vain to strive against it, for it must prevail, and the counsell of heaven must stand. Therefore be what it will be, there is no danger to let it alone. But on the other side, if you goe about to represse it, you runne the hazard both of fighting against God, and of provoking the displeasure as well of the Romanes who have not permitted to you the liberty of capitall punishments, as of the people of the Jews who magnifie these men and their way. This is the whole substance, sense, and scope of that speech of Gamaliel in the Councell. Hence did some argue for a toleration to Servetus and other hereticks. And though this their way was then discovered to be their folly, yet their posterity approve their sayings. The same argument is used in that pamphlet called Liberty of Conscience, p. 34, 35. Upon the same foundation does Mr. Goodwin build in his [〈in non-Latin alphabet〉], and the Paraenetick for Christian liberty, pag. 2. and 11. supposing the credit and authority of Gamaliel's speech, for matter of truth to be one and the same with other scriptures, and that there is nothing in all that speech but what is fully consonant with the word of God, unquestionably so acknowledged. So Mr. Goodwin affirmeth, p. 10. and after him one P. P. which is by interpretation, Poor Pamphleter, fals in the same ditch; he might well call it As you were, for he makes that party to be never a jot more in the right. First of all he will contend with us that Protestant interpreters doe commend Gamaliel's speech, and justify Mr. Goodwin's doctrine. Sure I am, Calvin takes Gamaliel to be a godlesse politician, and a neutralist, and his speech to have a great error in it. So says Pelargus upon the place.

But to save me a labor in looking upon other interpreters, because the Poor Pamphleter appealeth first to Piscator and Beza, and afterwards to Gualther, (as Mr. Goodwin did before him) let him be judged by these and no other. P[•]scator says plainly, that Gamaliel's speech was not right, while he says, If this counsell or this work be of men, it will come to nought, his meaning being that therefore they should let it alone. Beza thinks Gamaliel spake not from love to the Apostles, but from fear of the Romanes. Gualther thinks it a most pernicious tenent which some build upon this place, concerning the toleration of heresies and errors. Yes, Beza de Haereticis à Magistratu puniendis, citeth and approveth Calvin's judgement, condemning Gamaliel for neutrality, and his speech of error.

These learned divines have so well opened and cleared the point, that there is no place left for what the Poore Pampleter has said, yet two things more I must take notice of in him. He says it was not for any fear of the Jews or Romanes that Gamaliel gave this advice. Not for fear of the people of the Jews, for that would be but at the Apostles apprehension, not execution. What non-sense is here? The people were angry at laying hands on the Apostles, but there was no fear of their wrath if the Apostles should be killed. Not for fear of the Romanes wrath, which, says he, they often regarded not, as (Acts 23:27). A place which confuteth himself, for when the Jews would have killed Paul, Claudius Lysias came with an army and rescued him: a danger which we must think the wisdome of Gamali[•]l & the councell could better foresee, then that rude and furious multitude, which would have killed Paul.

Next he will not yield so much as that Gamaliel did doubt whether the Apostles doctrine were from God or not, and that he made it an uncertain case. In this Sir you have faced about, sure you are not as you were, for Mr. Goodwin himself ΘΕΟΜΑΞΙΑ, pag. 11. says, that Gamaliel in point of judgement or conscience, was still but where he was, doubtful and in suspense with himself about the business. Well, but why has he now denied that Gamaliel made it a doubtful and uncertain case? He might, says he, and in all likelihood did thus express himself for fear or policy: So did Hushai strangely for an honest heart in that case of Davids, in his counsel to Absalon (2 Samuel 17), yet Hushai made a round lie, even against his knowledge. Look about you my masters, know whom you trust; here's a generation of men, pretending to a more perfect and saint-like reformation than others, but yet they think it no fault to lie and dissemble for good ends. No, that's not all, pag. 4. answering to an objection made against those who do commend and magnify themselves, for greater gifts and graces than other men have; he tells us it is no fault for a man not only to compare, but prefer himself to another, and that on purpose to heighten his own estimation. Which how sweetly it agrees with Paul's doctrine (Philippians 2:3), In lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves; let every sober and moderate spirit judge. How now, poor pamphleteer? Is it not enough for you to defend a lying tongue, but you will needs defend pride too? Those are two (I am sure) of the seven things which are abomination to the Lord (Proverbs 6:16, 17). And here I leave the poor pamphleteer with this black mark upon him; I will not proceed to answer a fool in his foolishness, lest I be like to him; thus far I have answered, lest he be wise in his own eyes.

Only I add one thing more in answer to that argument for liberty of conscience, from Acts 5:38, 39. Suppose Gamaliel's principles to be good, and this speech to be of truth and authority, (which I have proved it is not) yet it is not applicable to the toleration of heretics and sectaries now, that case of the Apostles being extraordinary, and great miracles wrought by them, to the conviction of their most malignant opposites (Acts 4:16).

Some it may be will object further from Isaiah 11:9. a place objected in the Paraenetick, pag. 3. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain. And Luke 9:54. And when his disciples James and John saw this, they said, Lord will you that we command fire to come down from heaven, and consume them, even as Elias did? But he turned and rebuked them, and said, You know not what manner of spirit you are of, for the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them. A place objected by Nicolaides Refut. tract. de Eccl. cap. 4.

Answ. That prophecy concerning the Christian church (Isaiah 11:9) is not to be understood generally, as the word sounds, for then adulterers, murderers, &c. are not to be hurt and destroyed by the Christian magistrate. The meaning therefore is, that those who have formerly been as lions and wolves to the poor lambs of Christ, shall either be renewed and changed in their nature, or (which is more probable) shall be so restrained and overawed by the power and providence of God, that it shall not be in their power to hurt or destroy any of the saints for the truth or the gospel's sake. [in non-Latin alphabet], Neither shall they be able to destroy any: So the Septuagints. God shall so preserve and protect his church, that she shall be like a lamb among wolves, or like a kid among leopards, or like a child putting his hand on the cockatrice den, and yet shall not be hurt nor destroyed thereby. And as this prophecy guards and protects none but those who are in God's holy mountain, professors and lovers of the gospel, and the ordinances of Jesus Christ: so our Lord Christ's rebuke (Luke 9:54, 55) strikes not against any just and necessary severity, but against a private vindictive spirit, and carnal blind zeal: it being the purpose of Christ, then, most of all other times, not to exercise violence, (as tyrants do in conquering new dominions) but to conquer and subdue souls by his doctrine and miracles, with a spirit of meekness, especially having to do with the Samaritans, or any other who had never yet known nor received the gospel. Even those who say most for a coercive power to be put forth against heretics and schismatics, do not allow of the compelling of infidels, pagans, or Jews, by external punishments to receive the gospel.

But now after all this debate upon the question in hand, and after all these arguments for the affirmative and for the negative, some will happily desire and expect some further modification and explanation of the matter in certain positive conclusions or distinguishing assertions. For whose satisfaction I say,

First, there are five sorts of toleration proceeding from five different principles. 1. Of indifferency. 2. Of policy. 3. Of pretended conscience and equity. 4. Of necessity. 5. Of charity.

The first is when the magistrate is a Nullifidian, Neutralist, and Adiaphorist, esteeming as Gallio did, questions of the law and of the ordinances of Christ, to be of words and names, or things which he cares not for (Acts 18:14, 15).

The second is when the magistrate tolerates heretics and sectaries for his own profit, or some such interest of policy, such as makes the Pope to tolerate the Jews in Italy, yes in Rome itself, where they have their synagogues, circumcision and liturgies, because his profit by them is greater than by the very courtesans; yes, besides their certain tribute, he does sometimes impose on them a subsidy of ten thousand crowns extraordinary for some service of the State, as Europae speculum, pag. 221, 222. has represented to us. And whether the States of the united Provinces do not grant tolerations upon the like interests of their own profit, I leave it to the judgement of their own consciences.

The third is the toleration pleaded for here, by Mr. Williams, the compassionate Samaritan, &c. as if justice, equity, duty, and conscience should make the magistrate forbear all coercive power in matters of religion. All these three I utterly condemn, and the former arguments do strongly militate against them.

The fourth kind of toleration, arising from necessity which has no law, may well be mourned for as an affliction, it cannot be condemned as the Magistrate's fault. Even a David may have cause to complain that the sons of Zerviah are too strong for him. In such cases as these, our Divines have given a relief to the conscience of the Christian Magistrate, purging him of the guilt of this kind of toleration; provided always, that he has endeavoured so far as he can to extirpate heresies, and to establish the true religion only. Which has nothing to do with that principle now defended, that the Magistrate though he may never so easily, yet he ought not nor cannot without sin exercise a coercive power in matter of religion.

The fifth and last is that kind of toleration whereby the Magistrate when it is in the power of his hand to punish and extirpate, yet having to do with such of whom there is good hope either of reducing them by convincing their judgments, or of uniting them to the Church by a safe accommodation of differences, he grants them a Supersedeas; or though there be no such grounds of hope concerning them, yet while he might crush them with the foot of power, in Christian pity and moderation, he forbears so far as may not be destructive to the peace and right government of the Church, using his coercive power with such mixture of mercy as creates no mischief to the rest of the Church. I speak not only of bearing with those who are weak in the faith (Romans 15:1), but of sparing even those who have perverted the faith, so far as the word of God and rules of Christian moderation would have severity tempered with mercy: that is (as has been said) so far as is not destructive to the Church's peace, nor shakes the foundations of the established form of Church government, and no further: these last two kinds of toleration are allowed; the first three are wholly condemned.

My second distinction is concerning the punishments inflicted by the Magistrate upon Heretics. They are either exterminative, or medicinal. Such as blaspheme God or Jesus Christ, or who fall away themselves and seduce others to Idolatry, ought to be utterly cut off according to the law of God. But as for other Heretics, they are to be chastened with medicinal punishments as mulcts, imprisonments, banishment, by which through God's blessing they may be humbled, ashamed, and reduced. Not that I think the proper end of civil and coercive punishments to be the conversion and salvation of the Delinquent, (which is the end of Church censures & of Excommunication itself) but that the right method of proceeding does require that the Magistrate inflict the smaller punishments first, that there may be place for the offender's bringing forth of fruits worthy of repentance, and he may be at least reduced to external order and obedience, being persuaded by the terror of civil power, which may and does (when blessed of God) prove a preparation to free obedience, as the needle is to the thread, or the law to the Gospel, servile fear to filial fear: and that the Magistrate step not up to the highest justice till other punishments have proved ineffectual: which made Constantine punish the Heretics of his time not with death, but with banishment, as is manifest by the Proem of the Council of Nice. In such cases it may be said to the Heretic of the Magistrate — He is the Minister of God to you for good, more good I am sure, than if the golden reins of civil justice should be loosed, and he suffered to do what he list. Therefore Augustine likens this coercive punishing of Heretics to Sarah her dealing roughly with Hagar, for her good and humiliation. I conclude, connivance and indulgence to Heretics is a cruel mercy: correction is a merciful severity, and a wholesome medicine, as well to themselves as to the Church.

Thirdly, we must distinguish between the coercive power of the Magistrate in matters of religion, and the abuse of that power; when we justify the power, we justify not the abuse of it; and when we condemn the abuse, we must not therefore condemn the power. Acontius Stratag. Stat. li. 3. pag. 147. builds much upon this notion, let a man imagine that his lot is fallen in those times when the truth is persecuted by authority, when the Magistrate justifies the wicked and condemns the godly, (which has been the more ordinary condition of the Church) and then let him accordingly shape the resolution of the question concerning the Magistrate's punishing of Heretics. Will not a man think (says he) it had been better that Heretics had not been punished, than that upon pretence of coercive power against Heretics, the edge of the civil sword be turned towards the Preachers and Professors of the truth? But notwithstanding of all this, truth must be truth, and justice must be justice, abuse it who will. Parliaments and Synods have been many times enemies to the truth, and have abused their power in matters of religion: must we therefore deny the power of Parliaments and Synods? Or must we cast off any ordinance of God because of the abuse of it? If the thing were indifferent, the abuse might take away the use: not so, when the thing is necessary. I add (which is well observed by Calvin) when Jeremiah was accused and arraigned as worthy to die, his defence is not this, You ought not to vindicate religion with the sword, nor put any man to death for the cause of conscience, but this is it, Know you for a certain, that if you put me to death, you shall surely bring innocent blood upon yourselves, and upon this city, and upon the inhabitants thereof: for of a truth the Lord has sent me to you to speak all these words in your ears (Jeremiah 26:15). Neither did ever the Apostles (though often persecuted) plead the unlawfulness of persecuting men for heresy, but they pleaded the goodness of their cause, and that they were no Heretics.

Fourthly, I distinguish between bare opinions or speculations, and scandalous or pernicious practices, as Mr. Burton does in his Vindication of the Independent Churches, pag. 70. You must distinguish, says he, between men's consciences and their practices. The conscience simply considered in itself is for God, the Lord of the conscience alone to judge, as before. But for a man's practices (of which alone man can take cognizance) if they be against any of God's commandments of the first or second Table; that appertains to the civil magistrate to punish, who is for this cause called Custos utriusque Tabulae, the keeper of both Tables: for this he cites (Romans 13:3, 4) and adds. So as we see here what is the object of civil power, to wit actions good or bad, not bare opinions, not thoughts, not conscience, but actions. And this is his answer to the interrogatory concerning the lawful coercive power of civil magistrates in suppressing heresies. In which he handsomely yields the point, for who does advise the Parliament to punish men for their thoughts, or bare opinions, or for conscience simply considered in itself? It is for preaching, printing, spreading of dangerous opinions, for schismatical, pernicious and scandalous practices, for drawing factions among the people contrary to the Covenant, for resisting the reformation of religion, for lying and railing against the Covenant, the Parliament, the assembly of Divines, or against the reformed Churches.

Fifthly, we must distinguish the persons who are in the error, whether Heresiarchs and ring-leaders, or whether followers only, and such as do actiagere; whether schismatizing, or schismatized; whether more weak, or more willful; whether seducers, or seduced; whether pious, or profane, or Pharisaical; whether peaceable, moderate, calm, docile, or turbulent, factious, fierce, railing, obstinate, incorrigible. So that when the thing is brought from the Thesis to the Hypothesis, there is very much to be trusted to the prudence, circumspection, and observation of those who are in authority, to set apart those for punishment who resist Reformation, as Jannes and Jambres did resist Moses (2 Timothy 3:8), and are said to trouble the Churches (Acts 15:24; Galatians 1:7 & 5:12), and to trouble them more or less, as they are more or less troublers of Israel. Let not the magistrate fear to say to every Achan, Why have you troubled us? the Lord shall trouble you this day (Joshua 7:25). Other seduced ones the magistrate is to command sub poena, and cause them stand to the Covenant of God, as Josiah did, if they cannot be persuaded to do it willingly. If the magistrate miscarry in a misapplication of his coercive power, let him answer to God and his conscience for his error. It is not in my thoughts either to plead for or allow of the persecuting of pious and peaceable men.

Sixthly, as the reformation and preservation of religion differ much from the propagation of religion: so the coercive power put forth in the suppressing of heresy or schism, is a thing of another nature than the compelling of infidels by the sword to receive the Gospel. Let the Pope, and the Spaniard, and Mahomet propagate religion by the sword; that is not it I plead for. None of the Gentiles was of old compelled to be circumcised, but being circumcised he might be compelled to keep the Law of Moses. Also if strangers of the Gentiles were sojourning or trading in the land of Israel, they might be compelled to abstain from the public and scandalous breaking of the moral law (Nehemiah 13:16, 21; Exodus 20:10), which things did belong to the preservation, not to the propagation of religion.

Seventhly, to establish by a law the toleration, liberty and immunity of such a sect or way, so as all that will may join in it, is a thing of most dangerous consequence. But to permit such or so many persons of a sect to enjoy the liberty of their own consciences and practices, with such limitations as shall be found necessary, is a tolerable toleration, I mean a thing though not to be wished, yet to be allowed. The Romans in their heathenish way did put a difference between these two: when they abolished the Bacchanalian festivity and discharged it, they granted no toleration to such as pleased still to observe it: only they were content that some few upon leave first obtained from the Senate, and upon certain conditions, might be permitted to continue their own practice, as to their part.

Eighthly, there is also a great difference between toleration and accommodation. By accommodation I understand an agreement of dissenters with the rest of the Church in practical conclusions, so that if any difference be, it is in their principles, not in their practices, and so not obvious, apparent and scandalous to people. I had rather go two miles in an accommodation, (yes, as many as the word of God will suffer me) than one mile in a toleration. For in that way there is no schism, no rent in Israel, but the Lord one, and his name one. In this way there is Temple against Temple, and Altar against Altar, Manasseh against Ephraim, and Ephraim against Manasseh, and they both against Judah: a misery from which the Lord deliver us. I do not deny but if a safe and happy accommodation be impossible, such a toleration as I have formerly spoken of, is not to be disallowed. But the accommodation is a more excellent way, and that which is to be rather embraced, yes, endeavoured for and followed after, according to the Apostle's rule (Philippians 3:15, 16), (which Isidorus Pelusiota did long since observe to be the best and happiest way of putting an end to divisions and dissentions in the Church) Let us therefore as many as be perfect be thus minded: and if in any thing you be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this to you. Nevertheless whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.

If it be said, Quorsum haec? what do I conclude from all this? It is to leave this confirmed and sealed truth in the bosom of the High Court of Parliament, and of all inferior magistrates according to their place and interest, under them, that it is their duty, without respect of persons, to endeavor the extirpation of heresy and schism, and whatever shall be found contrary to sound doctrine, and the power of godliness, lest they partake in other men's sins, and thereby be in danger to receive of their plagues; and that the Lord may be one, and his name one in the three kingdoms: and to endeavor the discovery of all such as have been or shall be evil instruments, by hindering the reformation of religion, or making any faction or party among the people, contrary to the solemn League and Covenant, that they may be brought to public trial, and receive condign punishment, &c. Which as they had great reason to swear and covenant, so now they have greater reason to perform accordingly; and as it is in itself a duty, and we tied to it by the oath of God, and his vows that are upon us, as firmly as ever the sacrifice to the horns of the altar: so we are to take special notice of the unhappy consequences which follow upon our slackness, slowness and slothfulness, in fulfilling that sacred oath, namely, the hindering of uniformity, the continuing and increasing of a rupture both in Church and State, the retarding of reformation, the spreading and multiplying of heresies and sects, while every one does what is right in his own eyes; the great scandal given both to enemies and friends: to enemies, who are made to think worse of our Covenant, because we do not perform it: The Review of the Covenant, printed at Oxford, upbraids us with this: that heresy and schism was never more suffered, and less suppressed in London, than since we swore to endeavor the extirpation of the same: to friends also, who are mightily stumbled by our promising so much, and performing so little in this kind: which the Wallachian Classis in their late Letter to the Reverend Assembly of Divines at Westminster (printed before Apollonius his Book) does sadly and seriously lay to our consciences.