Chapter 15. What Man Was Created to Be, Where Is Treated of the Powers of the Soul, of the Image of God, of Free Will, and of the First Integrity of Nature

Now must we speak of the creation of man, not only because he is among all the works of God the most noble and most excellent example of his justice, wisdom and goodness: but also because as we said in the beginning, we cannot plainly and perfectly know God, unless we have withal a mutual knowledge of ourselves. Although the same knowledge be of two sorts, the one to know what we were created at the first beginning, the other to know what our estate began to be after the fall of Adam (for it were but to small profit for us to know our creation, unless we did also in this lamentable fall know what is the corruption and deformity of our nature:) yet at this time we will be content with description of our nature when it was pure. And before we descend to this miserable estate to which man is now in thralldom, it is good to learn what a one he was created at the beginning. For we must take heed that in precisely declaring only the natural evils of man, we seem not to impute them to the author of nature. For ungodliness thinks herself to have sufficient defense in this color, if it may lay for herself that whatever fault she has, the same did after a certain manner proceed from God, and sticks not if she be accused, to quarrel with God, and to lay the fault upon him whereof she is worthily accused. And they that would seem to speak somewhat more reverently of the majesty of God, yet do willingly seek to excuse their own wickedness, by nature, not considering that therein though not openly they blame God also, to whose reproach it should fall if it were proved that there is any fault in nature. Since then we see that our flesh gapes for all the ways to escape, whereby she thinks the blame of her own evils may any way be put off from her, we must diligently strive to meet with this mischief. Therefore we must so handle the calamity of mankind that we cut off all excuse, and deliver the justice of God from all accusation. Afterward in a place convenient we shall see how far men be now from that purity that was given to Adam. And first we must remember, that in this that man was taken out of earth and clay, a bridle was put upon his pride, for there is no greater absurdity, than for them to glory in their excellency that do not only dwell in a cottage of clay, but also are themselves in part but earth and ashes. But forasmuch as God did not only vouchsafe to give life to an earthen vessel, but also it was his pleasure that it should be the dwelling house of an immortal Spirit, Adam might justly glory in so great liberality of his maker.

Now it is not to be doubted that man consists of soul and body, and by the name of soul I mean an immortal essence, and yet created, which is the nobler part of him. Sometimes it is called the Spirit. Although when these two names Soul and Spirit are joined together, they differ one from the other in signification, yet when Spirit is set by itself it means as much as Soul. As, when Solomon speaking of death, says that then the Spirit returns to him that gave it. And Christ commending his Spirit to his Father, and Stephen his Spirit to Christ, both mean none other thing but that when the soul is delivered from the prison of the flesh, God is the perpetual keeper of it. As for them that imagine that the Soul is therefore called a Spirit because it is a breath or a power by God inspired or poured into bodies which yet has no essence: both the thing itself and all the Scripture shows that they do too grossly err. True it is that while men are fastened to the earth more than they ought to be, they grow dull — indeed, because they are estranged from the Father of lights they are blinded with darkness, so that they do not think upon this, that they shall remain alive after death. And yet is not that light so quenched in darkness, but that they be touched with some feeling of immortality. Surely the conscience which, discerning between good and evil, answers the judgment of God, is an undoubted sign of an immortal Spirit. For how could a motion without essence attain to come to the judgment seat of God, and throw itself into fear by finding its own guiltiness? For the body is not moved with fear of a spiritual pain, but it falls only upon the soul. Whereby it follows that the soul has an essence. Moreover, the very knowledge of God does prove that the souls which ascend up above the world are immortal: for a vanishing liveliness were not able to attain to the fountain of life. Finally, since so many excellent gifts with which man's mind is endowed do cry out that there is some divine thing engraved in it, there are even so many testimonies of an immortal essence. For that sense which is in brute beasts goes not out of the body, or at least extends no further than to things presently set before it. But the nimbleness of the mind of man which views the heaven and earth and secrets of nature, and comprehending all ages in understanding and memory, digests every thing in order and gathers things to come by things past, does plainly show that there lies hidden in man a certain thing separate from the body. We conceive by understanding the invisible God and Angels, which the body cannot do. We know things that are right, just, and honest, which are hidden from the bodily senses. Therefore it must be that the Spirit is the seat of this understanding. Indeed, even our sleep itself, which astonishes a man and seems to take life away from him, is a plain witness of immortality, since it does not only minister to us thoughts of those things that never were done, but also foreknowledge of things for time to come. I touch these things shortly which even profane writers do excellently set out with more gorgeous garnishment of words: but with the godly readers a simple putting in mind of them shall be sufficient. Now if the soul were not a certain thing by itself separate from the body, the Scripture would not teach that we dwell in houses of clay, that by death we remove out of the tabernacle of the flesh, that we do put off that which is corruptible, that finally at the last day we may receive reward every man as he has behaved himself in his body. For these places and others that we do everywhere commonly light upon, do not only manifestly distinguish the soul from the body, but also in giving to the soul the name of man do show that it is the principal part. Now whereas Paul does exhort the faithful to cleanse themselves from all defiling of the flesh and the Spirit, he makes two parts of man wherein abides the filthiness of sin. And Peter, where he calls Christ the shepherd and bishop of souls, would have spoken foolishly if there were no souls about whom he might execute that office. Neither would that conveniently stand together which he says of the eternal salvation of souls, and where he bids to cleanse our souls, and where he says that evil desires do fight against the soul, and where the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says that the pastors do watch that they may yield account for our souls, unless it were true that souls had a proper essence. To the same purpose serves it that Paul calls God for witness to his own soul, because it could not be called in judgment before God unless it were subject to punishment. And this is also more plainly expressed in the words of Christ, when he bids us to fear him which after that he has killed the body, can throw the soul into hell fire. Now where the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews does distinguish the Fathers of our flesh from God, which is the only Father of spirits, he would not otherwise more plainly affirm the essence of souls. Moreover, if the souls remained not alive being delivered from the prisons of their bodies, Christ should very foolishly have brought in the soul of Lazarus rejoicing in the bosom of Abraham, and again the soul of the rich man subject to horrible torments. The same thing does Paul confirm when he teaches that we wander abroad from God, so long as we dwell in the flesh, and that we enjoy his presence being out of the flesh. But, because I will not be long in a matter that is not obscure, I will add only this out of Luke, that it is reckoned among the errors of the Sadducees that they did not believe that there were any spirits and Angels.

Also a strong proof of this may be gathered from where it is said, that man is created like to the image of God (Genesis 1:27). For although the glory of God does appear in the outward shape of man, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of the image of God is in the soul. I do not deny that as concerning our outward shape, inasmuch as the same does distinguish and sever us from brute beasts, we do also therein more nearly approach to God than they: neither will I much stand against them which think that this is to be accounted of the image of God, that where all other living creatures do groveling-wise behold the ground, to man is given an upright face, and he is commanded to look upon the heaven, and to advance his countenance toward the stars: so that this remain certain, that the image of God which is seen appears in these outward signs, is spiritual. For Osiander (whom his writings declare to have been in fickle imaginations fondly witty) referring the image of God without difference as well to the body as to the soul, mingles heaven and earth together. For he says, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit did settle their image in man, because though Adam had stood without falling, yet should Christ have become man. And so by their opinion the body that was appointed for Christ, was but an example or figure of that bodily shape which then was formed. But where shall he find that Christ is the image of the Spirit? I grant indeed that in the Person of the Mediator shines the glory of the whole Godhead. But how shall the eternal Word be called the image of the Spirit whom he goes before in order? Finally it overthrows the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, if he does here call him his image. Moreover I would fain learn of him how Christ does resemble the Holy Spirit in the flesh that he took upon him, and by what marks and features he does express the likeness of him. And whereas this saying: Let us make man after our image, does also belong to the Person of the Son, it follows, that he must be the image of himself: which is against all reason. Beside that, if Osiander's invention be believed, man was fashioned only after the figure and pattern of Christ in that he was man, and so that form out of which Adam was taken, was Christ, in that he was to be clothed with flesh, whereas the Scripture in a far other meaning teaches, that he was created in the image of God. But their subtle invention is more colorable which do thus expound it, that Adam was created in the image of God, because he was fashioned like to Christ, which is the only image of God. But that exposition also is not sound. Also some interpreters make a great disputation about Image and Likeness, while they seek a difference between those two words, where there is no difference at all, saying that this word Likeness is added to expound the other. First we know that among the Hebrews such repetitions are common, wherein they express one thing twice: and in the thing itself there is no doubt, but that man is therefore called the image of God, because he is like to God. Whereby appears that they are to be laughed at, which do so subtly argue about the words, whether they appoint Zelem, that is to say, Image in the substance of the soul, or Demuth, that is to say, Likeness in the qualities, or whatever other thing it be that they teach. For whereas God determined to create man after his own image, this being somewhat darkly spoken he does as by way of explanation repeat it in this saying, After his likeness, as if he would have said, that he would make man, in whom he would represent himself, as in an image, because of the marks of likeness graven in him. And therefore Moses a little after reciting the same thing, does repeat the Image of God twice, leaving out the name of Likeness. And it is a trifling objection that Osiander makes, that not a part of man, or the soul only with the gifts thereof, is called the Image of God, but the whole Adam which had his name given him of the earth, from where he was taken. Trifling, I say, will all readers that have their sound wit judge this objection. For where whole man is called mortal, yet is not the soul thereby made subject to mortality.

Again where he is called a living creature endued with reason, it is not thereby meant that the body has reason and understanding. Although therefore the soul is not the whole man, yet is it not inconvenient, that man in respect of the soul be called the image of God, albeit I hold still that principle which I have before established, that the Image of God extends to the whole excellence, whereby the nature of man has preeminence among all kinds of living creatures. Therefore in that word is noted the integrity that man had when he was endued with right understanding, when he had his affection framed according to reason, and all his senses governed in right order, and when in excellent gifts he did truly resemble the excellence of his Creator. And though the principal seat of the image of God were in the mind and heart, or in the soul and the powers thereof, yet was there no part of man, not so much as the body, wherein did not some sparks thereof appear. Certain it is, that also in all the parts of the world, there do shine some resemblances of the glory of God: whereby we may gather that where it is said, that his Image is in man, there is in so saying a certain secret comparison, that advances man above all other creatures, and does as it were sever him from the common sort. Neither is it to be denied, that the angels were created after the likeness of God, since (as Christ himself testifies) our chief perfection shall be to become like to them (Matthew 22:30). But not without cause does Moses by that peculiar title set forth the grace of God toward us, specially where he compares only visible creatures with man.

But yet it seems that there is not given a full definition of the image of God, unless it more plainly appears in what qualities man excels: and whereby he ought to be counted a glass, resembling the glory of God. But that can be by no other thing better known, than by the repairing of man's corrupted nature. First it is doubtless, that when Adam fell from his estate, he was by that departure estranged from God. Therefore although we grant that the Image of God was not altogether defaced and blotted out in him, yet was it so corrupted, that all that remains, is but ugly deformity. Therefore the beginning of recovery of safety for us, is in that restoring which we obtain by Christ, who is also for the same cause called the second Adam, because he restored us to true and perfect integrity. For although where Paul does in comparison set the quickening Spirit that Christ gives to the faithful, against the living soul in which Adam was created, he sets forth the more abundant measure of grace in the regeneration: yet does he not take away this other principal point, that this is the end of our regeneration, that Christ should new fashion us to the image of God. Therefore in another place he teaches, that the new man is renewed according to the image of him that created him. With this agrees this saying: put on the new man which is created according to God. Now it is to be seen, what Paul does principally comprehend under this renewing. First he speaks of knowledge and after of pure righteousness and holiness. Whereby we gather that the image of God was first of all to be seen in the light of the mind, in the uprightness of heart, and soundness of all the parts. For although I grant that this is a figurative phrase of speech to set the part for the whole: yet can not this principle be overthrown, that that thing which is the chief in the renewing of the image of God, was also the principal in the creation of him. And for the same purpose makes it that in another place he teaches, that we beholding the glory of God with open face, are transformed into the same image. Now do we see how Christ is the most perfect image of God, according to which we being fashioned are so restored, that in true godliness, righteousness, purity and understanding, we bear the image of God. Which principle being established, Osiander's imagination of the shape of our body does easily vanish away of itself. Where as the man alone is in Paul called the Image and glory of God, and the woman is excluded from that degree of honor, it appears by the rest of the text, that the same is to be applied only to civil order of policy. But that under the name of image, of which we speak, is comprehended all that belongs to the spiritual and eternal life, I think it is already sufficiently proved. And the same thing does John confirm in other words: saying that the light which was from the beginning in the eternal word of God was the light of men. For where his purpose was to praise the singular grace of God, whereby man excels all other living creatures to sever him from the common [reconstructed: sort], because he has attained no common life, but joined with the light of understanding, he therewith shows how he was made after the image of God. Therefore since the image of God is the uncorrupted excellence of the nature of man, which shined in Adam before his fall, and afterward was so corrupted and almost defaced, that nothing remains since that ruin, but disordered, mangled, and filthily spotted: yet the same does in some part appear in the elect, insomuch as they are regenerated, and shall obtain her full brightness in heaven. But that we may know on what parts it consists, it shall be good to treat of the powers of the soul. For that speculative device of Augustine is not sound, where he says that the soul is a glass of the Trinity, because that there are in it understanding, will, and memory. Neither is their opinion to be approved, which set the Image of God in the power of dominion given to him, as if he resembled God only in this mark, that he is appointed lord and possessor of all things, where as indeed the Image of God is properly to be sought within him, and not without him, and is an inward good gift of the soul.

But before I go any further, it is needful that I meet with the doting error of the Manichees, which Servetto has attempted to bring in again in this age. Where it is said that God breathed the breath of life into the face of man, they thought that the soul did convey into man the substance of God, as if some portion of the immeasurable God were come into man. But it is easy even shortly to show how many gross and foul absurdities this devilish error draws with it. For if the soul be by derivation part of the essence of God, it shall follow that the nature of God is subject, not only to change and passions, but also to ignorance, evil lusts, weakness, and all kinds of vices. Nothing is more inconstant than man, because contrary motions do toss and diversely draw his soul, oftentimes he is blind by ignorance, often he yields as vanquished even to small temptations, and we know that the soul itself is the sink and receiver of all filthiness, all which things we must ascribe to the nature of God, if we grant that the soul is of the essence of God, or a secret inflowing of godhead. Who would not abhor this monstrous device? Truly indeed does Paul allege out of Aratus, that we are the offspring of God, but in quality and not in substance, inasmuch as he has garnished us with godly gifts. But in the mean time to [reconstructed: tear asunder] the essence of the Creator, as to say that every man does possess part of it, is too much madness. Therefore we must certainly hold that the souls, although the image of God be graven in them, were no less created than the angels were. And creation is not a pouring out of one substance into another, but a beginning of essence made of nothing. And although the spirit of man came from God, and in departing out of the flesh returns to God, yet it is not forthwith to be said that it was taken out of his substance. And in this point also Osiander, while he glories in his illusions, has entangled himself with an ungodly error, not acknowledging the image of God to be in man without his essential justice, as though God by the inestimable power of his holy Spirit could not make us like himself, unless Christ should substantially pour himself into us. With whatever color many do go about to disguise these deceits, yet shall they never so beguile the eyes of the readers that are in their right wits, but that they will easily see that these things savor of the Manichees error. And where Saint Paul treats of the restoring of this image, it may be readily gathered out of his words that man was made of like form to God, not by inflowing of his substance, but by grace and power of his Spirit. For he says that in beholding the glory of Christ, we are transformed into the same image, as by the Spirit of God, which surely so works in us that it makes us of one substance with God.

It were but folly to borrow from the philosophers a definition of the soul, of whom almost none, except Plato, has perfectly affirmed it to be an immortal substance. Indeed some others also, that is the Socratians, do touch it, but so as none does plainly teach to others what he himself was not persuaded of. But therefore is Plato of the better judgment, because he does in the soul consider the image of God. Some others do so bind the powers and virtues of the soul to this present life, that being out of the body they leave to it nothing. Now we have already taught by the Scripture, that it is a bodiless substance: now we must add that although properly it is not comprehended in place, yet it is set in the body, and does there dwell as in a house, not only to minister life to all the parts of the body, and to make the instruments thereof meet and fitly serving for the actions that they are appointed for, but also to bear the chief office in governing the life of man, and that not only about the duties in this earthly life, but also to stir us up to the service of God. Although this latter imprint in this corruption is not plainly perceived, yet even in the vices themselves there remain imprinted some leavings thereof. For where does it come from but from shame, that men have so great care what be reported of them? And where does shame come from, but from regard of honesty? Whereof the beginning and cause is, that they understand that they are naturally born to observe justice, in which persuasion is enclosed the seed of religion. For as without all controversy man was made to meditation of the heavenly life: so is it certain that the knowledge thereof was engraven in his soul. And surely man should want the principal use of his understanding, if he should be ignorant of his own felicity, whereof the perfection is that he be joined with God, and therefore it is the chief action of the soul to aspire to it. And so the more that every man studies to approach to God, the more he thereby proves himself to be endowed with reason. As for them that would have diverse souls in man, that is, a feeling soul, and a reasonable soul, although they seem to say somewhat by reason provable, yet because there is no steadfast certainty in their reasons, we must reject them, unless we liked to encumber ourselves in things trifling and unprofitable. A great disagreement, say they, there is between the instrumental motions and the part of the soul endowed with reason. As though reason itself did not also dissent from itself, and some devices of it do strive with other some, as they were armies of enemies. But forasmuch as that troublesomeness proceeds from the corruption of nature, it were amiss to gather thereby, that there are two souls, because the powers of the soul do not agree together, in such well framed order as they ought. But as for more subtle disputation of the powers themselves, I leave that to the philosophers. A simple definition shall suffice us for edification of godliness. I grant that the things that they teach are true, and not only pleasant but also profitable to be known, and well gathered by them, and I forbid not such as are desirous to learn to study them. First therefore I admit that there are five senses, which Plato better liked to call instruments, whereby all objects are poured into common sense, as into a place of receipt: then follows Phantasy, which judges those things one from other that common sense has conceived, next is Reason, to which belongs the universal judgment of things: last, is the Understanding mind, which with earnestly bent and quiet viewing beholds all those things, that Reason is wont to discourse upon, and consider. And to the Understanding mind, Reason, and Phantasy, which are the three powers of the soul, that rest in knowledge, there do answer three others that do rest in Appetite, that is to say, Will, the parts whereof are to covet those things that the Understanding mind and Reason do lay before it: the Power of Anger, which catches those things that Reason and Phantasy do minister to it, the Power of Desiring, which takes hold of those things that Phantasy and Sense present it. Although these things be true, or at least likely to be true, yet because I fear that they shall more entangle us with obscureness than further us, I think it best to pass over them. If any man likes otherwise to divide the powers of the soul, and to call the one the power of Appetite, which although it be without reason itself yet does obey reason, if it be by other means directed, and to call the other the power of understanding, which is by itself partaker of reason, I am not much against it, neither will I confute this opinion, that there are three beginnings of doing: that is to say, Sense, Understanding, and Appetite. But let us rather choose a division, that is within the capacity of all men, which cannot be had from the philosophers. For they when they mean to speak most plainly, do divide the soul into Appetite and Understanding, but either of these they make of two sorts. Understanding, they say, is sometime Contemplative, which being contented with only knowledge, has no moving of action, which thing Cicero thinks to be expressed by this word ingenium, wit. Sometime they say it is practical, which by conceiving of good or evil does diversely move the Will. And appetite they do divide into Will, and Lust. Will they call that when Appetite, which they call Horme, obeys reason, and Lust they call that when the appetite shaking off the yoke of reason, runs out to intemperance. So always they imagine reason to be that in man, whereby man may rightly govern himself.

But we are constrained somewhat to swerve from this manner of teaching, because the philosophers who knew not the corruption of man's nature, which came for punishment of his fall, do wrongfully confound the two very diverse states of man. Let us therefore think of it thus, that there are in the soul of man two parts, which shall serve at this time for our present purpose, that is to say, Understanding and Will. And let it be the office of Understanding to discern between objects, or things set before it, as each of them shall seem worthy to be liked or disliked: and the office of Will to choose and follow that which Understanding says to be good, and to refuse and flee that which Understanding shall disallow. Let us not here be stayed at all with the mere subtleties of Aristotle, that the mind has of itself no moving, but that it is choice which moves it, which choice he calls the desiring understanding. But to the end we be not entangled with superfluous questions, let this suffice us, that the Understanding is as it were the guide and governor of the soul, and that Will has always regard to the appointment of Understanding, and awaits the judgment thereof in her desires. According to which, Aristotle himself has truly said, that fleeing or following is in Appetite such a like thing, as in the understanding mind is affirming and denying. Now how certain the government of Understanding is to direct the Will: that we will consider in another place. Here we mean only to show that there can be found no power in the soul but that may well be said to belong to the one of these two members. And in this sort under Understanding we comprehend Sense, which others do so distinguish, that they say Sense is inclined to pleasure, for which Understanding follows that which is good: and that so it comes to pass, that the appetite of sense is concupiscence and lust, the affection of understanding is Will. Again in place of the name of appetite, which they better like, I set the name of Will, which is more commonly used.

God therefore has furnished the soul of man with an understanding mind, whereby he might discern good from evil, and right from wrong, and having the light of reason going before him, might see what is to be followed or forsaken. For which cause the Philosophers have called this directing part the Guider. To this he has joined will, to which belongs choice. With these noble gifts the first state of man excelled, so that he not only had enough of reason, understanding, wisdom, and judgment, for the government of this earthly life, but also to climb up even to God and to eternal felicity. Then to have Choice added to it, which might direct the appetites, and order all the instrumental motions, and that so the Will might be altogether agreeable to the government of reason. In this integrity, man had free will, whereby if he would he might have attained eternal life. For here it is out of place to raise the question of the secret predestination of God: because we are not now about to discuss what might have chanced or not, but what at that time was the nature of man. Adam therefore might have stood if he would, because he fell not but by his own will. But because his will was pliable to either side, and there was not given him constancy to continue, therefore he so easily fell. Yet his choice of good and evil was free. And not that only, but also in his understanding mind, and in his will was most great uprightness, and all his instrumental parts orderly framed to obedience, until by destroying himself he corrupted the good things that were in him. From here comes it that all the Philosophers were so blinded, for that in a ruin they sought for an upright building, and for strong joints in an unjointed overthrow. This principle they held, that man could not be a living creature, endowed with reason, unless there were in him a free choice of good and evil: and they considered, that otherwise all the difference should be taken away between virtues and vices, unless man did order his own life by his own advice. Thus far had they said well if there had been no change in man, which change because they knew not of, it is no marvel though they confound heaven and earth together. But as for them who professing themselves to be the disciples of Christ, do yet seek for free will in man, that has been lost and drowned in spiritual destruction, they in going between the Philosophers' opinions and the heavenly doctrine are plainly deceived, so that they touch neither heaven nor earth. But of these things we shall better speak in place fit for them: now only this we have to hold in mind, that man at his first creation was far other than his posterity ever since, which taking their beginning from him being corrupted, has from him received an infection derived to them as it were by inheritance. For then all the parts of his soul were framed to right order, then stood safe the soundness of his understanding mind, and his will free to choose the good. If any do object that it stood but in slippery state, because his power was but weak, I answer that that state was yet such as sufficed to take from him all excuse, neither was it reasonable to restrain God to this point, to make man such a one as either could not or would not sin at all. I grant such a nature had been better, but therefore precisely to quarrel with God, as though it had been his duty to have given that to man, is too much injustice, forasmuch as it was in his own choice to give how much pleased him. But why he did not uphold him with the strength of steadfast continuance, that rests hidden in his own secret counsel: it is our part only to be so far wise as with sobriety we may. Man received indeed to be able if he would, but he had not to will that he might be able. For of this will should have followed steadfast continuance. Yet is he not excusable, who received so much that of his own will he has wrought his own destruction. And there was no necessity to compel God to give him any other than a mean will and a frail will, that of man's fall he might gather matter for his own glory.

Now we must speak of the creation of humanity — not only because among all God's works humanity is the most noble and excellent display of His justice, wisdom, and goodness, but also because, as stated at the beginning, we cannot know God clearly and completely without also knowing ourselves. This self-knowledge is of two kinds: first, what we were at the original creation, and second, what our condition became after the fall of Adam. It would profit us little to understand our creation without also understanding, in this sorrowful fall, the corruption and deformity of our nature. Yet for now we will be content with a description of our nature as it was when it was pure. Before we descend to the miserable condition in which humanity now lives in bondage, it is good to learn what kind of being was created in the beginning. We must take care that in precisely describing humanity's natural evils, we do not appear to charge them against the Author of nature. For ungodliness always thinks it has a sufficient defense if it can claim that whatever fault it has somehow originated with God — and when accused, it does not hesitate to turn the charge back on God. Those who want to sound more respectful of God's majesty yet still try to excuse their own wickedness by blaming nature — not realizing that in doing so, though not openly, they also blame God, since any fault found in nature would ultimately reflect on its Creator. Since we see that our flesh is always looking for every possible escape from its own blame, we must earnestly cut off this maneuver. We must therefore handle the calamity of humanity in such a way that all excuses are removed and the justice of God is defended against every accusation. In a fitting place we will see how far people have now fallen from the purity given to Adam. First, let us remember that in being made from earth and clay, humanity received a check on its pride — for nothing is more absurd than for those who dwell not only in a house of clay but are themselves in part earth and ashes to boast of their own excellence. Yet since God was pleased not only to give life to an earthen vessel but also to make it the dwelling of an immortal Spirit, Adam could justly glory in the great generosity of his Maker.

It is beyond question that humanity consists of soul and body. By 'soul' I mean an immortal though created essence, which is the nobler part of a person. It is sometimes also called the spirit. When 'soul' and 'spirit' appear together, they carry somewhat different meanings, but when 'spirit' stands alone it means the same as 'soul.' Solomon says that at death the spirit returns to the one who gave it. When Christ commended His spirit to the Father, and Stephen his spirit to Christ, both meant simply that when the soul is freed from the prison of the body, God is its eternal keeper. As for those who imagine the soul is called a spirit merely because it is a breath or power God breathes into bodies without any real essence — both experience and all of Scripture show them to be grossly mistaken. It is true that when people are more earthbound than they ought to be, they grow dull — estranged from the Father of lights, they are blinded and do not think about surviving after death. Yet that light is not so fully extinguished by darkness that they feel nothing of immortality. The conscience — which distinguishes good from evil and answers to God's judgment — is an unmistakable sign of an immortal spirit. For how could something without essence come before God's judgment seat and throw itself into fear at the discovery of its own guilt? The body is not troubled by the fear of spiritual punishment — that falls on the soul alone. It follows therefore that the soul has genuine existence. Moreover, the very knowledge of God proves that souls are immortal, since they ascend above the world — and a vanishing breath would be incapable of reaching the fountain of life. Finally, the many excellent gifts with which the human mind is endowed testify to something divine engraved within it, and are so many evidences of an immortal essence. The awareness found in animals does not extend beyond the body, or at least does not reach further than what is immediately before it. But the agility of the human mind — which surveys heaven and earth and the secrets of nature, comprehends all ages in thought and memory, arranges everything in order, and infers the future from the past — plainly shows that something separate from the body is hidden within humanity. We understand the invisible God and angels through the mind — something the body cannot do. We know what is right, just, and honorable — things hidden from the bodily senses. The spirit must therefore be the seat of this understanding. Even sleep itself — which stupefies a person and seems to take away life — is a clear witness to immortality, since in dreams we receive not only thoughts of things that never happened but sometimes foreknowledge of things to come. I touch these things briefly, which secular writers have treated more elaborately and eloquently. For godly readers, a simple reminder will be sufficient. If the soul were not a thing distinct from the body, Scripture would not teach that we dwell in houses of clay, that death means departing from the tabernacle of the flesh, that we put off what is corruptible, and that at the last day every person will receive what he deserves for what he did in the body. These and many other passages commonly found throughout Scripture not only clearly distinguish the soul from the body but, by giving the soul the name 'man,' show that it is the principal part. When Paul urges the faithful to cleanse themselves from every defilement of flesh and spirit, he identifies two parts of a person in which the corruption of sin dwells. Peter, by calling Christ the Shepherd and Guardian of souls, would have spoken foolishly if there were no souls over whom He could exercise that office. Nor would his other statements hold together — about the eternal salvation of souls, about cleansing our souls, about evil desires warring against the soul, about pastors watching to give account for souls — unless souls had real existence. Paul calling God as witness over his own soul confirms this, since it would have no standing before God unless it were subject to judgment. Christ says it still more plainly when He commands us to fear the one who, after killing the body, can throw the soul into hell. The author of Hebrews, by distinguishing earthly fathers from God who is the Father of spirits, could not have more clearly affirmed the real existence of souls. Moreover, if souls did not continue living after leaving their bodily prisons, Christ would have spoken nonsensically when He depicted the soul of Lazarus resting in Abraham's bosom and the soul of the rich man suffering terrible torment. Paul confirms the same when he teaches that while we are in the flesh we wander from God, but out of the flesh we enjoy His presence. And not to linger on a matter that is not obscure, I will add only this from Luke: it is counted among the errors of the Sadducees that they did not believe in the existence of spirits and angels.

Strong proof of the soul's reality can also be drawn from the statement that humanity was created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27). For though God's glory appears in the outward form of a person, there is no doubt that the proper seat of the image of God is in the soul. I do not deny that in our outward form — which distinguishes and separates us from animals — we also approach God more closely than they do. Nor will I argue strongly against those who think something of the image of God is seen in the fact that while all other creatures look down at the ground, humanity is given an upright stance and directed to look toward the heavens — provided it remains clear that the image of God which appears in these outward signs is spiritual in nature. Osiander — whose writings show him to have been cleverly unstable in his imaginings — applied the image of God without distinction to both body and soul, mixing heaven and earth together. He claimed that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit established their image in humanity because, even if Adam had never fallen, Christ would still have become human. On this view, the body appointed for Christ was merely the pattern for the bodily form that Adam received. But where does Osiander find that Christ is the image of the Spirit? I grant that in the person of the Mediator the glory of the whole Godhead shines. But how can the eternal Word, who precedes the Spirit in order, be called the Spirit's image? Furthermore, calling the Son the Spirit's image destroys the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. I would also like to know how Christ resembles the Holy Spirit in the flesh He took on, and by what marks He expresses that likeness. And since the words 'Let us make man in our image' also involve the person of the Son, it would follow that He is His own image — which is contrary to all reason. Beyond that, if Osiander's invention were true, humanity was formed only after the pattern of Christ as a man, making Christ the template from which Adam was taken, whereas Scripture teaches in an entirely different sense that humanity was created in the image of God. A more plausible but still unsound view is that Adam was created in the image of God because he was made to resemble Christ, who is the only image of God. Some interpreters also make a great deal of the distinction between 'image' and 'likeness,' finding a difference between the two words where there is none. Likeness is added simply to explain image. We know that the Hebrew language commonly repeats the same idea in two different words, and the meaning is simply that humanity is called the image of God because it resembles God. The arguments about whether 'zelem' (image) refers to the substance of the soul and 'demuth' (likeness) to its qualities deserve only to be laughed at. When God determined to create humanity in His own image, He expressed the same idea a second time by saying 'in His likeness,' as if to say He would make a creature who would reflect Him — as in a mirror — because of the marks of resemblance engraved in him. This is confirmed by Moses, who a little later, when repeating the same account, uses 'image of God' twice and drops the word 'likeness' altogether. The objection raised by Osiander — that it is not a part of humanity, or the soul alone with its gifts, that is called the image of God, but the whole Adam who received his name from the earth — is trivial. All sound-minded readers will judge it so. For when whole man is called mortal, this does not make the soul subject to mortality.

When a person is called a rational creature, this does not mean that the body possesses reason and understanding. Although the soul is not the whole person, it is perfectly appropriate to call a person the image of God with respect to the soul — while I still maintain the principle established above: that the image of God extends to the entire excellence by which human nature is elevated above all other created kinds. That word, then, points to the integrity humanity possessed when endowed with right understanding, with affections shaped by reason, with all the senses ordered rightly, and with such excellent gifts that humanity truly reflected the excellence of its Creator. Though the principal seat of the image of God was in the mind and heart — in the soul and its powers — there was no part of humanity, not even the body, in which some sparks of that image did not appear. It is certain that throughout all parts of creation there shine some reflections of God's glory. From this we gather that when humanity is called the image of God, there is an implied comparison that elevates humanity above all other creatures and sets it apart from the common order. Nor is it to be denied that the angels were also created in the likeness of God, since — as Christ Himself testifies — our ultimate perfection will be to become like them (Matthew 22:30). But Moses was not without good reason in using this particular title to set forth the special grace of God toward us — especially when he is comparing only the visible creatures with humanity.

Yet a full definition of the image of God requires us to understand more plainly in what qualities humanity excels — that is, by what features humanity ought to be regarded as a mirror reflecting God's glory. This is best understood by looking at the restoration of humanity's corrupted nature. It is certain that when Adam fell from his original state, he became estranged from God by that departure. Therefore, although the image of God was not entirely obliterated in him, it was so corrupted that what remains is nothing but ugly deformity. The beginning of our recovery and safety lies in the restoration we receive through Christ, who for this very reason is called the second Adam — because He restores us to true and complete integrity. When Paul compares the life-giving Spirit that Christ gives to the faithful with the living soul in which Adam was created, he sets forth the greater measure of grace in regeneration. But he does not set aside the other foundational point: that the goal of our regeneration is for Christ to remake us in the image of God. In another place Paul teaches that the new man is renewed according to the image of the one who created him. This agrees with the command: 'Put on the new man, created according to God.' Now we must see what Paul chiefly includes under this renewal. First he speaks of knowledge, and then of pure righteousness and holiness. From this we gather that the image of God was chiefly seen in the light of the mind, the uprightness of the heart, and the soundness of all the parts. Though I grant that this is a figure of speech — using part for the whole — the principle cannot be overthrown: what is most central in the renewal of the image of God was also most central in its original creation. To the same purpose, Paul teaches elsewhere that we, beholding the glory of God with unveiled face, are transformed into the same image. We now see how Christ is the most perfect image of God, and how we, being fashioned after Him, are restored so that in true godliness, righteousness, purity, and understanding we bear the image of God. With this principle in place, Osiander's notion of a bodily image falls apart by itself. When Paul alone calls the man the image and glory of God, and seems to exclude the woman from that dignity, the context makes clear this applies only to civil and social order. That the image of God — as we are speaking of it — encompasses everything belonging to spiritual and eternal life, I believe has already been sufficiently proved. John confirms the same in different words, saying that the light which was from the beginning in the eternal Word of God was the light of men. His purpose was to honor the singular grace of God by which humanity excels all other creatures — set apart from the common order because it attained not merely physical life but life joined with the light of understanding — and by this he shows how humanity was made in the image of God. Therefore, the image of God is the uncorrupted excellence of human nature that shone in Adam before the fall, and was afterward so corrupted and nearly defaced that only disordered, mangled, and deeply stained remnants remain. Yet it appears in part among the elect insofar as they are regenerated, and it will attain its full brightness in heaven. To know what this image consists of, we must consider the powers of the soul. Augustine's speculative idea that the soul is a reflection of the Trinity because it has understanding, will, and memory is not sound. Nor should we accept the view that locates the image of God in the power of dominion given to humanity — as if the resemblance to God consisted only in being appointed lord and ruler over all things — for the image of God must be sought properly within a person, not outside, as an inward spiritual gift of the soul.

Before going further, I must address the foolish error of the Manichees, which Servetus attempted to revive in our own time. Where Scripture says that God breathed the breath of life into man's face, they concluded that the soul conveyed the very substance of God into humanity — as if some portion of the infinite God had entered into man. It is easy, even briefly, to show how many gross and foul absurdities this devilish error produces. If the soul were by derivation a part of God's essence, then God's nature would be subject not only to change and emotional disturbance, but also to ignorance, evil desires, weakness, and every kind of vice. Nothing is more unstable than a human being — contradictory impulses toss and pull the soul in different directions. People are often blinded by ignorance, often defeated by even small temptations, and the soul itself is the reservoir of all kinds of filth. If the soul is of the essence of God, all of this must be attributed to God's own nature. Who would not recoil from such a monstrous idea? Paul rightly quotes Aratus that we are God's offspring — but this is in quality and character, not in substance, inasmuch as God has adorned us with godlike gifts. To tear apart the essence of the Creator by saying that every person possesses a piece of it is utter madness. We must therefore firmly hold that the souls of human beings, though the image of God is engraved in them, were created no less than the angels were. And creation is not the pouring out of one substance into another — it is the origination of existence out of nothing. Although the human spirit came from God and returns to God when it departs from the flesh, it does not follow that it was taken from His substance. Osiander also entangled himself in an ungodly error at this point, while boasting in his illusions. He refused to recognize the image of God in humanity apart from an essential union with God's justice — as if God, by the power of His Holy Spirit, were unable to make us like Himself without Christ substantially infusing Himself into us. However cleverly many may try to disguise these deceptions, they will never so blind the eyes of sound-minded readers that they fail to see the Manichean flavor of these ideas. And when Paul speaks of the restoration of this image, his words make clear that humanity was made in God's likeness — not by an infusion of His substance, but by the grace and power of His Spirit. Paul says that by beholding the glory of Christ we are transformed into that same image by the Spirit of God — who works in us so powerfully as to make us sharers in God's nature, without making us one substance with God.

It would be folly to borrow a definition of the soul from the philosophers, since almost none of them — except Plato — clearly affirmed it to be an immortal substance. Some others, including the Socratics, touched on this, but in such a way that none of them clearly taught what he himself was not fully convinced of. Plato is wiser in this, because he does recognize in the soul the image of God. Others so tie the powers and activities of the soul to this present life that they leave it nothing once it is outside the body. We have already established from Scripture that the soul is an incorporeal substance. We must add that although it is not contained within physical space, it is placed in the body and dwells there as in a house — not only to give life to all parts of the body and make its organs fit instruments for their appointed functions, but also to hold the chief governing role in human life. This governance extends not only to earthly duties but also to stirring us toward the service of God. Though this latter purpose is barely visible in our current corruption, even in our vices some traces of it remain. Where does it come from but from shame that people care so much about their reputation? And where does shame come from but from a sense of what is honorable? The source of that sense is the understanding that people are naturally born to pursue justice — and within that conviction lies the seed of religion. For just as it is beyond question that humanity was made for the contemplation of the heavenly life, so it is certain that the knowledge of this was engraved in the soul. Indeed, a person would lack the chief use of his understanding if he were ignorant of his own true happiness — which consists in being joined to God, and toward which it is the chief work of the soul to aspire. So the more any person strives to draw near to God, the more he thereby proves himself truly endowed with reason. As for those who would assign multiple souls to a person — a sensitive soul and a rational soul — although they seem to offer some reasons for this, their arguments lack firm ground, and we should set them aside rather than get entangled in trivial and unprofitable disputes. There is, they say, a great conflict between the physical impulses and the rational part of the soul. But reason itself is often at war with itself, with one idea struggling against another as if they were opposing armies. Since this inner conflict comes from the corruption of nature, it would be wrong to conclude from the discord between the soul's powers that there are therefore two souls. As for the more detailed analysis of the soul's powers, I leave that to the philosophers. A simple description will serve our purpose of building up godliness. I grant that what they teach is true and not only interesting but also useful and well-reasoned, and I do not forbid those who are eager to learn from studying it. I acknowledge the five senses, which Plato preferred to call instruments — through which all impressions are gathered into common sense as into a receiving center. Then follows imagination, which distinguishes the impressions that common sense has received. Next comes reason, which renders universal judgments about things. Finally there is the mind's understanding, which with focused and quiet attention contemplates all that reason deliberates and considers. Corresponding to these three knowing powers — understanding, reason, and imagination — there are three powers in the realm of desire: the will, which reaches toward what understanding and reason present to it; the passion of anger, which seizes what reason and imagination offer it; and the power of appetite, which grasps what imagination and sense present to it. Even if these things are true, or at least plausible, I think it best to pass over them here for fear they will entangle us in obscurity more than help us. If someone prefers to divide the powers of the soul differently — calling one the appetitive power, which though without reason in itself can obey reason when guided from outside, and the other the understanding power, which participates in reason by its own nature — I will not object or argue against it. Nor will I dispute the view that there are three principles of action: sense, understanding, and appetite. But let us choose instead a division within reach of all people — one we cannot get from the philosophers. When the philosophers want to speak most plainly, they divide the soul into appetite and understanding, each of which they further subdivide. Understanding, they say, is sometimes contemplative — content with knowledge alone, without moving to action — and sometimes practical, which moves the will by evaluating what is good or evil. Appetite they divide into will and lust: will is when appetite, which they call horme, obeys reason; lust is when appetite shakes off reason's restraint and runs into excess. In their view, reason is always the faculty by which a person rightly governs himself.

We are compelled to depart somewhat from the philosophers' approach here, because they did not know the corruption of human nature that came as the punishment of the fall, and so they wrongly combine what are in fact two very different states of humanity. For our present purpose, let us understand the soul as having two parts: understanding and will. Let it be the function of understanding to discern between objects presented to it — judging what deserves approval or disapproval. Let it be the function of will to choose and pursue what understanding judges to be good, and to reject and flee what understanding condemns. We need not be held back here by Aristotle's subtle argument that the mind has no motion of its own but is moved by choice, which he calls 'desiring understanding.' To avoid getting entangled in unnecessary questions, let it be enough to say this: understanding is the guide and governor of the soul, and will always looks to understanding's direction and awaits its judgment before reaching out for anything. Accordingly, Aristotle himself said truly that fleeing and following in appetite corresponds to affirming and denying in the understanding mind. How reliable understanding's government of the will actually is — that we will consider in another place. Here we only mean to show that every power in the soul can be assigned to one of these two parts. Under understanding we also include sense, which some distinguish from it by saying that sense is inclined toward pleasure while understanding pursues the good — so that the appetite of sense is desire and lust, while the affection of understanding is will. In place of their preferred term 'appetite,' I use 'will,' which is more commonly understood.

God therefore furnished the human soul with an understanding mind, by which a person could discern good from evil and right from wrong — with the light of reason as a guide to show what is to be followed or avoided. The philosophers called this guiding faculty the 'ruler' of the soul. To this God added the will, which belongs the power of choice. The original state of humanity excelled in these noble gifts: not only was there sufficient reason, understanding, wisdom, and judgment for governing earthly life, but also the capacity to rise to God and to eternal happiness. Choice was added to direct the appetites and govern all the physical impulses, so that the will would be entirely in agreement with the guidance of reason. In this integrity, humanity possessed free will, by which it could have attained eternal life if it had chosen to. This is not the place to raise the question of God's secret predestination — we are not discussing what might or might not have happened, but what human nature actually was at that time. Adam could have stood firm if he had chosen to, for he fell only by his own will. But because his will was flexible in either direction and he was not given the constancy to remain firm, he fell so easily. Yet his choice between good and evil was genuinely free. Not only that — his understanding mind and will were both marked by great uprightness, and all his physical faculties were orderly framed for obedience, until by destroying himself he corrupted the good things within him. This is why all the philosophers were so misled: they went looking for a sound structure in the ruins, and for solid joints in a collapsed building. Their principle was that a human being could not be a rational creature unless there were in him a free choice of good and evil — and they reasoned that without this, the difference between virtues and vices would disappear, since a person could not be held responsible for the ordering of his own life. So far they reasoned correctly — if humanity had never changed. But because they did not know about that change, it is no wonder they confused everything together. As for those who call themselves disciples of Christ yet go looking for free will in humanity — a will that has been lost and drowned in spiritual ruin — they are plainly deceived by trying to split the difference between the philosophers and heavenly teaching, and they land on neither. But we will speak of these things better in their proper place. For now let us hold to this: humanity at the original creation was far different from all its descendants, who, taking their beginning from corrupted Adam, have received from him a corruption handed down as an inheritance. At the beginning all the parts of the soul were rightly ordered, the soundness of the understanding mind stood safe, and the will was free to choose the good. If anyone objects that this state was precarious because the power was only weak, I answer that even so it was sufficient to remove all excuse. Nor was it reasonable to require God to create a person who could not or would not sin at all. I grant such a nature would have been superior — but to quarrel with God as though He were under obligation to give that to humanity is far too presumptuous. How much He gave was His own choice to make. Why He did not uphold Adam with the strength of steadfast perseverance remains hidden in His own secret counsel — it is our part only to be as wise as sobriety allows. Humanity received the ability to stand firm if it chose to, but not the will that would have produced the standing firm. Yet humanity is not excusable — it received enough, and by its own will it worked its own destruction. And God was under no obligation to give more than a weak and pliable will, so that from humanity's fall He might draw material for His own glory.