Chapter 23. A Refutation of the Slanders With Which This Doctrine Has Always Been Wrongfully Burdened

But when the wit of man hears these things, the frowardness thereof can not be restrained, but that by and by as at the bloody blast of a trumpet, sounding to battle, it diversely and excessively turmoils. And many indeed, as though they would drive away the malice from God, do so grant election, that they deny that any man is reprobate: but they do so ignorantly and childishly: forasmuch as election itself could not stand unless it were set contrary to reprobation. God is said to sever them whom he adopts to salvation: it should be more than foolishly said that others do either by chance or by their own endeavor obtain that which only election gives to a few. Therefore whom God passes over, he rejects: and for no other cause, but that he will exclude them from the inheritance which he does predestinate to his children. Neither is the waywardness of men tolerable, if it will not suffer itself to be bridled with the word of God, where the incomprehensible counsel of God is treated of, which the angels themselves do worship. But we have already heard that hardening is no less in the hand and will of God than mercy. Neither does Paul (as these men do that I have spoken of) busily labor to excuse God with a lying defense: but only he teaches that it is not lawful for the thing formed to quarrel with him that formed it. Now whoever does not admit that any are rejected of God, how will they encumber themselves from that saying of Christ, Every tree which my Father has not planted, shall be plucked up by the root? They plainly hear that all they are adjudged and avowed to destruction, whom the heavenly Father has not vouchsafed to plant as holy trees in his ground. If they deny this to be a sign of reprobation, then there is nothing so clear that it may be proved to them. But if they cease not to wrangle, let the sobriety of faith be contented with this admonition of Paul, that there is no cause to quarrel with God, if he willing on the one side to show his wrath and to make his power known does with dumb sufferance and lenity bear with the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction: and on the other side he makes known the riches of his glory toward the vessels of mercy which he has prepared to glory. Let the readers mark, how Paul to cut off occasion from whisperings and backbitings, gives the chief rule to the wrath and power of God: because it is unjust that those deep judgments which swallow up all our senses, should be made subject to our determination. Our adversaries' answer is very trifling, that God does not utterly reject them whom he suffers in lenity, but abides with a mind hanging in suspense toward them, if perhaps they may repent. As though Paul gives to God a patience, to look for their turning, whom he says to be made to destruction. For, Augustine says rightly where he expounds this place, where power is joined to sufferance, God does not suffer, but governs with his power. They further say also that it is not for nothing said that the vessels of wrath are prepared to destruction: but, that God has prepared the vessels of mercy: because by this means he ascribes and challenges the praise of salvation to God, but the blame of destruction he casts upon them which by their own will do bring it upon themselves. But although I grant to them that Paul by the diverse manner of speaking did soften the roughness of the first part of the sentence, yet it is not meet to assign the preparing to destruction to any other thing than to the secret counsel of God: which also is affirmed a little before in the rest of the text. That God stirred up Pharaoh: then, that he hardens whom he will. Whereupon follows that the hidden counsel of God is the cause of hardening. This at least I get which Augustine says, that when God of wolves makes sheep, he does with a mightier grace reform them, that their hardness may be tamed: and therefore God for this cause does not convert the obstinate, because he does not show forth in them the mightier grace, which he wants not if he would show it forth.

These sayings indeed should be sufficient for the godly and sober, and those who remember themselves to be men. But forasmuch as these venomous dogs do cast up not only one sort of venom against God, we will, as the matter shall serve, answer to every one particularly. Foolish men do various ways quarrel with God, as though they had him subject to their accusations. First therefore they ask, by what right the Lord is angry with his creatures, of whom he has not been first provoked by any offense: for to condemn to destruction whom he will, agrees rather with the willfulness of a tyrant, than the lawful sentence of a judge. Therefore they say that there is cause why men should charge God, if by his bare will, without their own deserving, they be predestinated to eternal death. If such thoughts do at any time come into the mind of the godly, to break their violent assaults they shall be sufficiently armed with this — although they had no more — if they consider how great wickedness it is, even so much as to inquire of the causes of the will of God: since of all things that are, it is the cause, and worthily so ought to be. For if it have any cause, then somewhat must go before it, to which it must be as it were bound: which it is unlawful once to imagine. For the will of God is so the highest rule of righteousness, that whatever he wills, even for this that he wills it, it ought to be taken for righteous. When therefore it is asked, why the Lord did it: it is to be answered, because he willed it. But if you go further in asking why he willed it, you ask something greater and higher than the will of God: which cannot be found. Let therefore the rashness of man restrain itself, and not seek what is not, lest perhaps it may not find that which is. With this bridle (I say) he shall be well restrained, whoever he be that will dispute of the secrets of God with reverence. As for the boldness of the wicked, which dread not openly to speak evil of God: against it the Lord with his own righteousness, [reconstructed: without any defense of ours], shall sufficiently defend himself, when he shall take all shifting from their consciences, and hold them fast convinced, and condemn them. Neither do we yet thrust in the feigned device of absolute power, which as it is profane, so worthily ought to be abhorred of us. We feign not God lawless, who is a law to himself: because (as Plato says) men stand in need of laws, who are troubled with unlawful lusts: but the will of God is not only pure from all fault but also is the highest rule of perfection, indeed and the law of all laws. But we deny that he is subject to yield account. We deny also that we are fit judges, who would pronounce on this cause after our own sense. Therefore if we attempt further than we lawfully may, let that threatening of the Psalm bring us in fear, that God shall overcome so often as he is judged by any mortal man.

So can God in keeping silence, put his enemies to silence. But, that we may not suffer them freely to scorn his holy name, he delivers to us out of his word weapons against them. Therefore if any man assail us with such words: why God has from the beginning predestinated some to death, which when they were not, could not yet deserve the judgment of death: we in stead of answer may again on our side ask of them, what they think that God owes to man, if he will judge him by his own nature. In such sort as we be all corrupted with sin, we can not but be hateful to God: and that not by tyrannous cruelty, but by most upright reason of justice. If all they whom the Lord does predestinate to death, are by the estate of nature subject to the judgment of death: of what injustice against themselves, I beseech you, may they complain? Let all the sons of Adam come: Let them strive and dispute with their creator for that by his eternal providence they were before their generation condemned to everlasting misery. What shall they be able once to mutter against this defense, when God on the other side shall call them to acknowledging of themselves? If they be all taken out of a corrupt mass, it is no marvel if they be subject to damnation. Let them not therefore accuse God of injustice, if by his eternal judgment they be appointed to death, to which they themselves do [reconstructed: feel] whether they will or no, that they are willingly led of their own nature. Whereby appears how wrongful is the desire of their murmuring, because they do purposely hide the cause of damnation which they are compelled to acknowledge in themselves, the laying of the blame upon God may acquit them. But though I do a hundred times confess, as it is most true, that God is the author of it, yet they do not immediately wipe away the guilt which being engraved in their consciences from time with oft recourse, presents itself to their eyes.

Again they except and say: were they not before predestinated by the ordinance of God to the same corruption which is now alleged for the cause of damnation? When therefore they perish in their corruption, they do nothing but suffer the punishment of that misery into which by his predestination Adam fell and drew his posterity headlong with him. Is not he therefore unjust, which does so cruelly mock his creatures? I grant indeed that all the children of Adam fell by the will of God into that misery of state wherein they are now bound: and this is it that I said at the beginning, that at length we must always return to the determination of the will of God, the cause of which is hidden in himself. But it does not follow immediately that God is subject to this slander. For we will with Paul answer them in this manner, O man, what are you that contends with God? Does the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you formed me so? Has not the potter power to make of the same lump one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor? They will say that the righteousness of God is not truly defended in this way, but that we seek a shift, such as they are accustomed to have who lack a just excuse. For what else seems here to be said, than that God has a power which cannot be hindered from doing anything, whatever it be, as he wills himself? But it is far otherwise. For, what stronger reason can be brought than when we are commanded to think what a one God is? For how should he commit any injustice, who is judge of the world? If it properly pertains to the nature of God to do judgment, then he naturally loves righteousness, and abhors unrighteousness. Therefore the Apostle did not, as though he were overtaken, look about for holes to hide in: but showed that the reason of the righteousness of God is higher than that it either is to be measured by the measure of man, or may be comprehended by the slender capacity of the wit of man. The Apostle indeed confesses that there is such depth in the judgments of God, with which the minds of men should be swallowed, if they endeavored to pierce into it. But he teaches also how heinous a wrong it is, to bind the works of God to such a law, that so soon as we do not understand the reason of them, we may be bold to disallow them. It is a known saying of Solomon (which yet few do rightly understand): The great creator of all renders reward to the fool, and reward to transgressors (Proverbs 26:10). For he cries out concerning the greatness of God: in whose will it is to punish fools and transgressors, although he does not vouchsafe to let them have his Spirit. And monstrous is the madness of men, when they so covet to make that which is unmeasurable, subject to the small measure of their reason. The angels which stood still in their uprightness, Paul calls elect. If their steadfastness was grounded upon the good pleasure of God, the falling away of the others proves that they were forsaken: of which thing there can no other cause be alleged than reprobation, which is hidden in the secret counsel of God.

Come now: let there be present some Manichee, or Celestine, a slanderer of the providence of God: I say with Paul that there ought no reason to be rendered of it: because with the greatness of it, it far surpasses our understanding. What marvel? Or what absurdity is it? Would he have the power of God so limited, that it may be able to work no more than his mind is able to conceive? I say with Augustine, that they are created by the Lord, whom he without doubting foreknew that they should go into destruction: and that it was so done, because he so willed: but why he willed, it is not our part to ask a reason of it, who cannot comprehend it: neither is it fitting that the end of God should come down into controversy among us, of which so often as mention is made, under the name of it is named the highest rule of righteousness. Why therefore is any question moved of unrighteousness where righteousness clearly appears? Neither let us be ashamed, after the example of Paul, so to stop the mouths of the wicked, and from time to time so often as they shall be bold to bark against it, to repeat this, Who are you miserable men, that lay an accusation to God's charge? And do therefore lay it to his charge because he does not temper the greatness of his works to your dullness? As though they were therefore wrongful, because they are hidden from flesh. The unmeasurableness of the judgments of God is by clear experiences known to you. You know that they are called the deep bottomless depth. Now ask of the narrow capacities of your wit, whether they comprehend that which God has decreed with himself. What good does it do you therefore with mad searching to plunge yourselves into the bottomless depth, which reason itself teaches you that it shall be to your destruction? Why are you not at the least restrained with some fear of that which both the history of Job and the books of the Prophets do report of the incomprehensible wisdom, and terrible power of God. If your mind is unquieted, let it not grieve you to embrace the counsel of Augustine. You being a man look for an answer at my hand: and I also am a man. Therefore let us both hear him that says: O man, what are you? Better is a faithful ignorance than rash knowledge. Seek merits: you shall find nothing but pain. O depth. Peter denies: yet the thief believes: O depth. Do you seek a reason? I will tremble at the depth. Reason you, I will wonder: dispute you, I will believe: I see depth, but I reach not the bottom. Paul rested, because he found wondering. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable: and are you come to search them? He says that his ways are impossible to be traced out: and do you trace them? With proceeding further we shall profit nothing: for neither shall we satisfy their wanton curiosity, neither does the Lord need any other defense, than which he has used by his Spirit, which spoke by the mouth of Paul: and we forget to speak well, when we cease to speak with God.

Their other objection also arises out of ungodliness, which yet tends not so directly to the accusing of God as to the excusing of the sinner. However, the sinner who is condemned of God cannot be justified without dishonor of the judge. Thus therefore profane tongues do bark against God, saying: why should God impute those things for sin to men, of which he has by his predestination laid necessity upon men? For what should they do? Should they wrestle with his decrees? But so should they do it in vain, since they cannot do it at all. Therefore they are not rightfully punished for those things, of which the cause is in God's predestination. Here I will abstain from the defense to which the ecclesiastical writers do commonly flee, namely that the foreknowledge of God does not prevent the man from being accounted the sinner, because God foresees the evils of man, not his own. For so the cavil would not stay here, but will rather press us further with saying that God might, if he had wished, have provided remedy for those evils which he foresaw; and that since he has not so done, he has of determined purpose created men to that end that he should so behave himself on earth; and if by the providence of God, man was created to this condition, that he should do all those things that he does, then he is not to be blamed for that which he cannot avoid, and which he undertook by the will of God. Therefore let us see how this knot ought to be well loosed. First of all this ought to be held certain among all men which Solomon says, that God has created all things for himself, and the wicked man to an evil day. Behold, when the disposing of all things is in the hand of God, when in his power remains the rule of safety and death: he so orders them by his counsel and beck, that among men there are born some adjudged even from their mother's womb to death, who with their destruction may glorify his name. If any man answers, that there is no necessity laid upon them by the providence of God, but rather that he created them in such estate, because he foresaw their perverseness to come: he neither says nothing at all, nor altogether. The old writers are accustomed indeed sometimes to use this solution: but as it were doubtingly. But the Schoolmen rest upon it, as though nothing could be objected against it. Indeed I will willingly grant, that foreknowledge alone brings no necessity to creatures, although all men do not so agree; for there be some that will have it also to be the cause of things. But it seems to me that Valla, a man otherwise not much practiced in holy writings, saw both more deeply and more wisely, who showed that this contention is superfluous: because both life and death are rather the doings of God's will than of his foreknowledge. If God did but foresee the successes of men, and did not also dispose and order them by his will, then this question should not without cause be raised, whether his foreseeing any thing availed to the necessity of them. But since he does none otherwise [reconstructed: foresee] the things that shall come to pass, than because he has decreed that they should so come to pass: it is vain to raise controversy about foreknowledge, where it is certain that all things do happen rather by ordinance and commandment.

They say that this is not written in express words, that it was decreed of God, that Adam should perish by his falling away. As though the same God, whom the Scripture reports to do whatever he will, created the noblest of all his creatures to an uncertain end. They say he had free will, that he might shape to himself his own fortune; and that God decreed nothing, but to handle him according to his deserving. If so cold a device be received, where shall be that almightiness of God, whereby he governs all things according to his secret counsel, which hangs upon none other thing than itself? But predestination, whether they will or no, shows itself in Adam's posterity. For it came not to pass naturally that all men should lose salvation by the fault of one parent. What hinders them to confess of one man, that which against their wills they confess of all mankind? For why should they lose their labor with dallying shifts? The Scripture cries out that all men were in the person of one man made bondservants to eternal death. Since this cannot be imputed to nature, it is plain that it proceeded from the wondrous counsel of God. But it is too much absurdity that these good patrons of the righteousness of God do so stumble at a straw, and leap over great beams. Again I ask: how came it to pass, that the fall of Adam did wrap up in eternal death so many nations with their children being infants, without remedy, but because it so pleased God? Here their tongues which are otherwise so prattling, must of necessity be dumb. It is a terrible decree, I grant: yet no man shall be able to deny, but that God foreknew what end man should have, before he created him, and therefore foreknew it because he had so ordained by his decree. If any man here inveighs against the foreknowledge of God, he rashly and indiscreetly stumbles. For what matter is there, I beseech you, why the heavenly judge should be accused for that he was not ignorant of that which was to come? Therefore if there be any either just or colorable complaint, it touches predestination. Neither ought it to serve as an absurdity which I say, that God foresaw not only the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity, but also disposed it after his own will. For as it belongs to his wisdom, to foreknow all things that shall be: so it belongs to his power, to rule and govern all things with his hand. And this question Augustine very well discusses, as he does others, saying: We most wholesomely confess that which we most rightly believe, that the God and Lord of all things, who created all things very good, and foreknew that evil things should spring out of good, and knew that it more pertained to his almighty goodness even of evil things to do well, than not to suffer them to be evil: that he so ordered the life of angels and men, that in it he might first show what free will could do, and then what the benefit of his grace and judgment of justice could do.

Here they run to the distinction of will and permission, by which they will have it granted that the wicked perish, God only permitting but not willing it. But why should we say that he permits it, but because he so wills. Howbeit it is not likely, that man by himself, by the only permission of God, without any his ordinance, brought destruction to himself: as though God appointed not, of what condition he would have the chief of his creatures to be. I therefore will not doubt to confess simply with Augustine, that the will of God is a necessity of things, and that what he wills, it must of necessity come to pass: as those things shall truly come to pass which he has foreseen. Now if for excuse of themselves and of the ungodly, either the Pelagians, or Manichees, or Anabaptists, or Epicureans (for with these four sects we have to do in this question) shall object against us necessity whereby they be bound by the predestination of God: they bring nothing fit to the purpose. For if predestination be nothing else but a dispensation of righteousness of God, which is hidden indeed, but yet without fault: for as much as it is certain that they were not unworthy to be predestinate to that estate, it is also as certain that the destruction is most righteous which they enter into by predestination. Moreover their destruction so hangs upon the predestination of God, that both cause and matter thereof is found in themselves. For the first man fell, because the Lord so judged it to be expedient: why he so judged, is unknown to us: yet it is certain that he so judged for no other reason but because he saw that thereby the glory of his name should be worthily set forth. When you hear mention of the glory of God, there think of his righteousness: for it must be righteous that deserves praise. Man therefore falls, the providence of God so ordaining it: but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had a little before pronounced, that all the things which he had made were very good. From where therefore comes that perverseness to man, to fall away from his God? Lest it should be thought to be of creation, the Lord with his commendation allowed that which came from himself. Therefore by his own evilness he corrupted the nature which he had received pure of the Lord, and by his fall he drew his whole posterity with him into destruction. Therefore let us rather behold an evident cause of damnation in the corrupted nature of mankind, which is nearer to us, than search for a hidden and utterly incomprehensible cause thereof in the predestination of God. Neither let it grieve us so far to submit our understanding to the immeasurable wisdom of God, that it may yield in many secrets of his. For, of those things which it is neither granted nor lawful to know, the ignorance is well learned: the coveting of knowledge, is a kind of madness.

Some man perhaps will say, that I have not yet brought enough to subdue that wicked excuse. But I verily confess that it can never be brought to pass, but that ungodliness will always grudge and murmur against it: yet I think that I have spoken so much as might suffice to take away not only all reason but also all color of gainsaying. The reprobate would be thought excusable in sinning, because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning: especially since such necessity is cast upon them by the ordinance of God. But we deny that they are thereby well excused, because the ordinance of God, by which they complain that they are destined to destruction, has its righteousness, unknown indeed to us, but yet most certain. Whereupon we conclude, that they bear no evil which is not laid upon them by the most righteous judgment of God. Then, we teach that they do perversely, who to seek out the beginning of their damnation, bend their eyes to the secret closets of the counsel of God, and wink at the corruption of nature, from where their damnation springs. And this withstands that they cannot impute it to God, for he witnesses of his own creation. For although man is created by the eternal providence of God to that calamity, to which he is subject: yet the matter thereof he took from himself, not of God: for as much as he is by no other means so lost, but because he went out of kind from the pure creation of God into a corrupt and impure perverseness.

Now the adversaries of God's predestination do slander it also with a third absurdity. For when we impute it to nothing else but to the choice of the will of God, that they are made free from the universal destruction, whom he makes heirs of his kingdom, thereby they gather that there is with him accepting of persons, which the Scripture everywhere denies: and therefore, that either the Scripture disagrees with itself, or that in the election of God there is respect of deservings. First, the Scripture in another sense denies that God is an accepter of persons, than as they judge it. For by the name of person, it signifies not a man, but those things which being seen with eyes in man are wont to procure either favor, grace, and dignity, or hatred, contempt, and shame: as, riches, wealth, power, nobility, office, country, excellence of beauty, and such other: on the other side poverty, need, baseness, vileness, contempt, and such other. So Peter and Paul do teach that the Lord is not an accepter of persons, because he puts not difference between the Jew and the Greek, to refuse the one and embrace the other for only respect of nation. So James uses the same words when he means to affirm that God in his judgment nothing regards riches. But Paul in another place speaks thus of God, that in judging he has no consideration of freedom or bondage. Therefore there shall be no contrariety if we shall say that God according to the will of his good pleasure without any deserving chooses to his sons whom he will, rejecting and refusing others. But the matter may thus be opened, that men may be more fully satisfied. They ask how it comes to pass, that of two between whom no deserving puts any difference, God in his electing passes over the one and takes the other. I on the other side do ask them, whether they think that in him that is taken there is anything that may make the mind of God to incline toward him. If they confess (as they needs must) that there is nothing, it shall follow that God looks not upon man, but from his own goodness fetches a cause why to do good to him. Whereas therefore God chooses one man, refusing another, this comes not of respect of man, but of his mercy alone, which ought to have liberty to show forth and utter itself where and when it pleases him. For we have in another place also showed, that there were not from the beginning many called noble, or wise, or honorable, that God might humble the pride of flesh: so far is it that his favor was bound to persons.

Therefore many do falsely and wickedly accuse God of partial unrighteousness, for that he does not in his predestination keep one set course toward all men. If (say they) he find a guilty man, let him equally punish all: if he find them not guilty, let him withhold the rigor of his judgment from all. But so they deal with him, as if either mercy were forbidden him, or when he would have mercy he be compelled altogether to give over his judgment. What is it that they require? If all be guilty, that all may together suffer one punishment. We grant the guiltiness to be common, but we say that the mercy of God helps some. Let it help all, say they. But we answer, that it is right that he should also in punishing show himself a rightful judge. When they do not allow this, what do they else but either go about to strip God of his power to have mercy, or at least to grant it him upon this condition, that he utterly give over his judgment. Therefore these sayings of Augustine agree very well together. Since in the first man the whole mass of mankind fell into condemnation, these vessels that are made of it to honor, are not the vessels of their own righteousness, but of the mercy of God: and whereas others are made to dishonor, the same is not to be imputed to unrighteousness but to judgment, etc. That to those whom he refuses, God renders due punishment: to those whom he calls, he gives undeserved grace: that they are delivered from all accusation, after the manner of a creditor, in whose power it is, to forgive the one, and ask of the other. Therefore the Lord also may give grace to whom he will, because he is merciful: and give it not to all, because he is a just judge. He may by giving to some that which they do not deserve, show his free grace: and by not giving to all, declare what all deserve. For whereas Paul writes that God enclosed all under sin, that he might have mercy upon all, it is therewith to be added that he is debtor to no man: because no man first gave to him, that he may require the like of him.

This also they often say, to overthrow predestination, that while it stands, all carefulness and endeavor of well doing falls away. For who (say they) shall hear that either life or death is certainly appointed for him by the eternal decree of God, but that it will by and by come into his mind that it makes no matter how he behave himself, since the predestination of God can by his work be nothing hindered or furthered? So shall all men dissolutely throw forth themselves, and after a desperate manner run headlong wherever their lust shall carry them. And truly they say not altogether falsely, for there be many swine, which with filthy blasphemies defile the doctrine of predestination, and by this pretense also do mock out all admonishments and rebukes, saying, God knows what he has once determined to do with us: if he has decreed our salvation, he will bring us to it at the time appointed: if he has predestined our death, we should travail in vain to the contrary. But the Scripture, when it teaches with how much greater reverence and religiousness we ought to think of so great a mystery, does both instruct the godly to far other sense, and well confute these men's outrage. For it does not speak of predestination to this end, that we should be encouraged to boldness, and with unlawful rashness attempt to search the unattained secrets of God: but rather that being humbled and abased we should learn to tremble at his judgment, and reverently to look up to his mercy. To this mark the faithful will level themselves. As for that filthy groaning of swine, it is well confuted by Paul. They say that they go carelessly forward in vices: because if they be of the number of the elect, their vices shall nothing hinder them, but that they shall at length be brought to life. But Paul tells that we are to this end, that we should lead a holy and faultless life. If the mark of that election is directed to be holiness of life, it ought more to awake and stir us up cheerfully to practice that holiness, than to serve for a cloaking of slothfulness. For how greatly do these things differ the one from the other: to cease from well doing, because election suffices to salvation: and that the appointed end of election is that we should apply ourselves to the endeavor of good doings. Away therefore with such sacrileges, which do wrongfully misturn the whole order of election. Where they stretch their blasphemies further, when they say that he who is reprobate of God, shall lose his labor if he go about to make himself allowable to him with innocence and honesty of life: therein they are taken with a most shameless lie. For, from where could such endeavor come but from election? For whoever be of the number of the reprobate, as they are vessels made to dishonor, so they cease not with continual wicked doings to provoke the wrath of God against themselves, and by evident tokens to confirm the judgment of God which is already pronounced upon them: so far be they from striving with him in vain.

But others do maliciously and shamefully slander this doctrine, as though it did overthrow all exhortations to godly living. For which matter in old time Augustine was burdened with a great malice, which he wiped away with his book of Correction and Grace written to Valentine, the reading of which will appease all godly and tractable men: yet I will touch a few things, which (as I trust) shall satisfy them that be honest and not contentious. We have already seen how open and loud a preacher of the free election Paul was: was he therefore cold in admonishing and exhorting? Let these good zealous men compare their earnestness with his, and it shall be found in them less in comparison of his incredible heat. And truly this principle takes away all doubts, that we are not called to uncleanness, but that every man should possess his vessel in honor, etc. Again, that we are the handiwork of God created to good works which he has prepared that we should walk in them. Summarily, they that are even but moderately exercised in Paul, shall without long declaration easily perceive how fitly he makes these things to agree, which they feign to disagree. Christ commands that men believe in him — yet is his definitive sentence neither false nor contrary to this commandment, where he says, No man can come to me, but he to whom it is given of my father. Let preaching therefore have its course, which may bring men to faith, and with continual profiting hold them fast in perseverance. Neither yet let the knowledge of predestination be hindered, that they which obey may not be proud as of their own, but may glory in the Lord. Christ not for nothing says, Whoever has ears of hearing, let him hear. Therefore when we exhort and preach, they that have ears do willingly obey: but whoever lacks ears, in them is fulfilled that which is written, That hearing they hear not. But why (says Augustine) should some have, and others not have? Who has known the mind of the Lord? Must that therefore be denied which is open, because that cannot be comprehended which is hidden? These sayings I have faithfully reported out of Augustine: but because perhaps his words shall have more authority than mine, come, let us bring forth the very words that are read in himself. If when this is heard, many are turned into dullness and sluggishness, and being inclined from labor to lust do go after their desires: ought that therefore to be accounted false which is spoken of the foreknowledge of God? If God has foreknown that they shall be good, shall they not be good, in however great evilness they now live? And if he has foreknown that they will be evil, shall they not be evil, in however great goodness they be now seen? Shall therefore those things which are truly spoken of the foreknowledge of God, be for such causes either to be denied or to be left unspoken of? Namely then when if they be not spoken of, men go into errors. The rule (says he) to keep truth unspoken, is one thing, and the necessity to speak truth is another. As for the causes of leaving truth unspoken, it were long to search them out all: of which yet this is one, that they be not made worse which understand it not, while we mean to make them more learned that understand it, who when we speak any such thing are indeed not made more learned, nor yet are made worse. But when a true thing is in such case, that when we speak it, he is made worse that cannot conceive it: and when we speak it not, he is made worse that can conceive it: what think we now to be done? Is not the truth rather to be spoken, that he may conceive it, that can conceive it: than to keep it unspoken, that not only neither of them may conceive it, but also he that more understands may be the worse? Whereas if he did hear and conceive it, by him also many should learn? And we will not say that which, as the Scripture witnesses, we lawfully might have spoken. For we fear so much lest when we speak, he be offended that cannot conceive it: but we fear not lest while we hold our peace, he that can conceive truth be deceived with falsehood. Which sentence he at the last, shortly summing up, more plainly also confirms. Therefore if the Apostles and they which followed them, the doctors of the Church, did both, namely both godly preached of the eternal election of God, and held the faithful in awe under the discipline of godly life: why do these our adversaries being confuted with invincible force of truth, think that they say well in saying that which is spoken of predestination is not to be preached to the people although it be true? Yes, it must in any wise be preached, that he which has ears to hear may hear. But who has ears if he has not received them from him that promises that he will give them? Truly let him that receives not, refuse it: so that yet he which receives it, do take and drink, do drink and live. For as godliness is to be preached, that God may be rightly worshipped: so is also predestination, that he which has ears to hear of the grace of God, may glory in God and not in himself.

And yet that holy man, as he had a singular desire to edify, so tempers the manner of teaching the truth, that offense be wisely avoided so far as it lawfully may be. For he shows that those things which are truly said, may also be conveniently said. If any man do thus preach to the people: 'If you do not believe, the cause is that you are already predestined of God to destruction' — such a man does not only cherish slothfulness, but also maintains wickedness. If any man also stretches his saying to the time to come, and says that those who hear shall not believe, because they are reprobate: this shall be rather a cursing than a teaching. Such therefore Augustine not unworthily bids to depart from the Church, as foolish teachers, and unlucky and ill-prophesying Prophets. In another place he truly affirms that it is to be understood that a man then profits with rebuking, when he has mercy and helps — which makes to profit whom he will, even without rebuking. But why some thus, and some otherwise? God forbid, that we should say that the power of judging belongs rather to the clay than to the potter. Again afterward: 'When men by rebuking either come or return into the way of righteousness, who works salvation in their hearts but he who, when any, whoever he be, planted and waters, gives the increase — whom, when he will save, no free will of man resists?' It is therefore not to be doubted that the wills of men cannot resist the will of God (who both in heaven and earth has done whatever he would, and who has also done those things that are to come) but that he may do what he will, as much as even of the very wills of men he does what he will. Again, when he will lead men to him, does he bind them with corporeal bonds? He inwardly works, inwardly holds hearts, inwardly moves hearts, and draws them with their wills which he himself has made in them. But, that which he adds by and by ought in no way to be omitted: that because we do not know who belongs or does not belong to the number of the predestinate, we ought so to be disposed that we would have all men to be saved. So shall it come to pass, that whoever we find, we shall strive to make him a partaker of peace. But our peace shall rest upon the children of peace. Therefore for our part, we must apply wholesome and sharp rebuking to all men like a medicine, that they perish not, nor destroy others, but it shall be the work of God to make it profitable to them whom he has foreknown and predestined.

When the human mind hears these things, its stubbornness cannot be held back — it rushes into conflict from every side, as though provoked by a battle trumpet. Many people, as though trying to clear God of wrongdoing, accept election but deny that any are reprobate. But they do this foolishly and childishly — because election itself cannot stand unless it is set in contrast with reprobation. God is said to set apart those He adopts to salvation. It would be more than foolish to say that others attain by chance or by their own effort what election gives to only a few. Therefore those whom God passes over He rejects — for no other reason than that He chooses to exclude them from the inheritance He predestined for His children. The stubbornness of people is intolerable if it will not submit to the Word of God when God's incomprehensible counsel is at issue — counsel that the angels themselves worship. We have already heard that hardening is no less in the hand and will of God than mercy. Paul does not busy himself with defending God through dishonest excuses, as these people do. He simply teaches that it is not lawful for the thing formed to quarrel with its maker. Now, those who will not admit that any are rejected by God — how will they handle Christ's statement: 'Every plant which My heavenly Father did not plant shall be uprooted' (Matthew 15:13)? They hear plainly that all those whom the heavenly Father did not plant as holy trees in His ground are condemned to destruction. If they deny this is a sign of reprobation, then nothing could be plain enough to prove it to them. But if they persist in quarreling, the sobriety of faith must be content with Paul's warning: there is no reason to quarrel with God if — willing on the one hand to display His wrath and make His power known — He bears with long patience the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, and on the other hand makes known the riches of His glory toward the vessels of mercy which He prepared for glory. Readers should note how Paul, to cut off all grumbling and murmuring, gives supreme authority to God's wrath and power — because it is unjust to subject to our judgment those deep counsels that overwhelm all our understanding. The objection of our opponents is very flimsy — that God does not completely reject those with whom He bears patiently, but remains toward them in a kind of suspense, waiting to see if they might repent. As though Paul gives God a waiting posture toward those he says are made for destruction. Augustine rightly says in expounding this passage: 'Where power is joined with patience, God does not merely endure — He governs by His power.' They further argue that it is not for nothing that the vessels of mercy are said to be 'prepared by God,' while the vessels of wrath are said to be 'prepared to destruction' — the difference in language, they say, shows that God claims the praise of salvation for Himself while casting the blame for destruction on those who bring it upon themselves by their own will. I grant that Paul by this variation in wording did soften the rough edge of the first part. Yet it is not right to assign the preparing for destruction to anything other than the secret counsel of God — which is also affirmed just before in the same passage. God stirred up Pharaoh; He hardens whom He wills. From this it follows that God's hidden counsel is the cause of hardening. At the very least I receive what Augustine says: when God turns wolves into sheep, He reforms them with a stronger grace — enough to tame their hardness. And therefore God does not convert the obstinate because He does not display in them that stronger grace, which He is not lacking should He choose to display it.

These words should be enough for the godly and sober, who remember that they are only human. But since these venomous attackers hurl not just one kind of poison against God, we will answer each objection as occasion demands. Foolish people quarrel with God in various ways, as though they had Him on trial before their accusations. First, they ask by what right the Lord is angry with His creatures, when they have not first provoked Him by any offense — for to condemn to destruction whoever He wills looks more like the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge. Therefore, they say, people have grounds to charge God if they are predestinated to eternal death by His bare will, without any deserving of their own. If thoughts like these ever press upon the godly, this alone — if they have nothing else — should be enough to break their violent force: the consideration of how great a wickedness it is even to inquire into the causes of God's will. Since God's will is the cause of all that is, it rightly ought to be so. For if God's will had a cause, then something would have to precede it to which it would be bound — which it is not lawful even to imagine. The will of God is the highest rule of righteousness. Whatever He wills, for the very reason that He wills it, ought to be taken as right. When therefore the question is asked, 'Why did the Lord do it?' the answer is: because He willed it. If you press further and ask why He willed it, you are asking for something greater and higher than the will of God — which does not exist. Therefore let human rashness hold itself back and not search for what is not, lest it fail to find what is. This bridle, I say, will rightly restrain whoever will discuss God's secrets with reverence. As for the boldness of the wicked who do not shrink from openly speaking evil of God — the Lord will sufficiently defend Himself by His own righteousness, without any defense from us, when He strips all evasion from their consciences, holds them tightly convicted, and condemns them. We are not inventing the false device of an 'absolute power' — which, being godless in its conception, we rightly abhor. We do not imagine God as lawless. He is a law to Himself — because, as Plato says, laws are needed by human beings who are troubled by unlawful desires. But God's will is not only pure from all fault; it is the highest standard of perfection and indeed the law of all laws. But we do deny that He is required to give an account. We also deny that we are fit judges to pronounce on this matter by our own reasoning. Therefore, if we press further than is lawful, let that warning of the psalm bring us to fear: that God will prevail every time He is judged by any mortal man.

God could silence His enemies by saying nothing at all. But so that we may not allow them to mock His holy name unchallenged, He equips us from His Word with weapons against them. Therefore if someone attacks us with this question — why God from the beginning predestined some to death, who when they did not yet exist could not have deserved the sentence of death — we may answer by turning the question back: what do they think God owes to humanity, if He judges it according to its own nature? Since we are all corrupted with sin, we cannot but be hateful to God — not through tyrannical cruelty on His part, but by the completely righteous logic of justice. If all those whom the Lord predestines to death are, by their natural condition, already subject to the sentence of death — of what injustice against themselves may they complain? Let all the sons of Adam come — let them strive and dispute with their Creator that by His eternal providence they were condemned to everlasting misery before they were born. What can they possibly mutter in reply, when God on His side calls them to examine themselves? If they are all drawn from a corrupt source, it is no wonder they are subject to condemnation. Let them not therefore accuse God of injustice if by His eternal judgment they are appointed to death — to which they themselves, whether they will or not, feel themselves drawn by their own nature. This reveals how wrongful their murmuring is: they deliberately hide the cause of condemnation that they are forced to acknowledge within themselves, hoping that by blaming God they can absolve themselves. But though I grant a hundred times over — as is entirely true — that God is the author of it, this does not wipe away the guilt that is engraved in their consciences and presents itself again and again to their eyes.

Again they object: were these people not predestinated by God's decree to the very corruption that is now alleged as the cause of their condemnation? When they perish in their corruption, they are only suffering the punishment of the misery into which Adam fell by God's predestination and into which he dragged his descendants headlong. Is God not unjust, then, for so cruelly mocking His creatures? I grant that all the children of Adam fell by God's will into that miserable condition in which they are now held. And this is what I said at the outset — that we must always come back to the determination of God's will, the cause of which is hidden within Himself. But it does not immediately follow that God is subject to this slander. We will answer them as Paul does: 'O man, who are you to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, "Why have you made me like this?" Has not the potter a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for common use?' (Romans 9:20-21). They will say that this is not a real defense of God's righteousness — merely an evasion of the kind used by those who lack a just excuse. For what is being said here, they argue, other than that God has a power that cannot be prevented from doing whatever He wills? But it is far otherwise. What stronger reason can be given than to be directed to think about what kind of God He is? For how could He commit any injustice — He who is the judge of the whole world? If it belongs to God's very nature to execute judgment, then He naturally loves righteousness and abhors unrighteousness. Therefore the apostle was not looking for a hiding place when pressed. He was showing that the righteousness of God is too high to be measured by a human standard or grasped by the limited capacity of human understanding. The apostle acknowledges that there is such depth in God's judgments that human minds would be swallowed up if they tried to penetrate it. But he also teaches what a serious wrong it is to bind God's works to a human law — so that as soon as we cannot understand His reason, we feel justified in disapproving them. Solomon's well-known saying is understood by few: 'The great God who created everything renders to the fool his due, and renders to transgressors their due' (Proverbs 26:10). He is proclaiming the greatness of God — in whose will it lies to punish fools and transgressors, even though He does not give them His Spirit. It is monstrous madness that people desire to subject what is immeasurable to the small measure of their own reason. The angels who remained upright Paul calls elect. If their steadfastness was grounded in God's good pleasure, then the fall of the others shows they were abandoned — and no other cause can be assigned for that than reprobation, hidden in God's secret counsel.

Come then — let a Manichee or a Celestine, a slanderer of God's providence, step forward. I say with Paul that no reason is owed for it — because in its greatness it far surpasses our understanding. What is so remarkable or absurd about this? Would one have God's power limited so that it can accomplish no more than the human mind can conceive? I say with Augustine: they were created by the Lord — and He undoubtedly foreknew they would go to destruction. It was done because He willed it. But why He willed it, we cannot comprehend — and it is not our place to demand a reason. Nor is it fitting that the purpose of God should be brought before our tribunal. For whenever it is mentioned, what is named by that word is the highest rule of righteousness. Why then raise any question about injustice where righteousness clearly appears? Let us not be ashamed, following Paul's example, to silence the mouths of the wicked — and as often as they dare to bark, to repeat: 'Who are you, miserable people, to bring a charge against God?' Do you bring it against Him because He does not scale down the greatness of His works to fit your dullness? As though His works were unjust simply because they are hidden from flesh. The immeasurable depth of God's judgments is plainly known to you. You know they are called 'the deep' — an unfathomable abyss. Now ask your narrow intellect whether it can comprehend what God has decreed within Himself. What good does it do to plunge yourself with frantic searching into the bottomless depth, when reason itself tells you this will lead to your destruction? Why are you not at least restrained by the awe that both the book of Job and the prophets inspire when they speak of God's incomprehensible wisdom and terrible power? If your mind is unsettled, take comfort in Augustine's counsel: 'You — being a man — look for an answer from me. I too am a man. Therefore let us both hear the One who says, "O man, who are you?" Better is a faithful ignorance than rash knowledge. Seek for merits — you will find nothing but punishment. O the depth! Peter denies, yet the thief believes. O the depth! Do you seek a reason? I will tremble at the depth. You reason — I will wonder. You dispute — I will believe. I see the depth, but I cannot reach the bottom. Paul stopped because he found only wonder. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable — and have you come to search them? He says His ways are impossible to trace — and yet you trace them?' We will gain nothing by going further. We will not satisfy their restless curiosity. The Lord needs no other defense than what He has already provided through His Spirit speaking by the mouth of Paul. And we lose the ability to speak rightly when we cease to speak with God.

Their other objection also springs from ungodliness, though it aims not so much at accusing God as at excusing the sinner. Yet a sinner condemned by God cannot be justified without dishonoring the Judge. So irreverent voices bark against God: 'Why should God charge as sin the things that His predestination has made necessary for people? What are they supposed to do? Should they fight against His decrees? That would be futile since it is impossible. Therefore they are not rightly punished for things whose cause lies in God's predestination.' Here I will leave aside the defense to which church writers commonly retreat — namely, that God's foreknowledge does not prevent the person from being counted the sinner, since God foresees the evil in the person, not in Himself. For the objection would not stop there but would press further: God could have provided a remedy for the evils He foresaw, and since He did not, He deliberately created people for this end — that they should conduct themselves as they do. And if by God's providence a person was created in this condition — to do all that he does — he cannot rightly be blamed for what he could not avoid and what he undertook by God's will. Let us therefore see how this knot ought to be properly untied. First, this saying of Solomon should be held as certain by all: 'The Lord has made everything for its own purpose, even the wicked for the day of evil' (Proverbs 16:4). Behold — when the ordering of all things is in God's hand, and the rule of life and death rests in His power, He orders them by His counsel and decree so that among human beings some are born condemned even from their mother's womb to death — that through their destruction He may glorify His name. If someone answers that God's providence lays no necessity upon them — that He created them in such a condition only because He foresaw their future perverseness — he is saying something, but not really resolving anything. The older writers sometimes use this solution, but somewhat tentatively. The Scholastics rest on it as though it were unanswerable. I am willing to grant that foreknowledge alone does not impose necessity on creatures — though not all agree on this, since some hold that foreknowledge is also the cause of things. But it seems to me that Valla — a man not otherwise deeply versed in sacred writings — saw both more deeply and wisely when he showed that the whole dispute is superfluous, because both life and death are actions of God's will rather than of His foreknowledge. If God merely foresaw the outcomes of human affairs without also ordering and arranging them by His will, there would be some reason to debate whether His foreseeing something imposed necessity on it. But since He foresees what will come to pass only because He has decreed that it shall come to pass, it is pointless to argue about foreknowledge when it is certain that all things happen by His ordinance and command.

They say it is not written in so many words that God decreed Adam's fall. As though the same God, whom Scripture says does whatever He wills, created the most noble of all His creatures toward an uncertain end. They say Adam had free will to shape his own destiny, and that God decreed nothing except to deal with him according to his deserving. If so weak a solution is accepted, where is the almighty power of God by which He governs all things according to His secret counsel — counsel that depends on nothing outside itself? But predestination shows itself in Adam's descendants, whether people want it to or not. It did not happen by natural causes that all humanity should lose salvation through the fault of one parent. What prevents them from acknowledging in one man what they are forced to acknowledge against their will regarding all of humanity? Why exhaust themselves with evasive games? Scripture declares plainly that in the person of one man all people were made slaves of eternal death. Since this cannot be attributed to nature, it is clear it proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God. But there is far too much absurdity in these defenders of God's righteousness stumbling over a straw while leaping over enormous beams. I ask again: how did it come to pass that Adam's fall plunged so many nations — along with their infant children — into eternal death without remedy, unless it pleased God? Here the tongues that are otherwise so talkative must fall silent. It is indeed a fearful decree. Yet no one will be able to deny that God foreknew what end humanity would come to before He created it — and He foreknew it because He had so ordained it by His decree. If someone attacks God's foreknowledge here, he stumbles rashly and carelessly. For what reason is there to charge the heavenly Judge simply for not being ignorant of what was coming? Therefore, if there is any just or plausible complaint, it touches predestination. Nor should what I say seem absurd — that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and in him the ruin of his descendants, but also arranged it according to His own will. For just as it belongs to His wisdom to foreknow all things that will be, so it belongs to His power to govern and direct all things with His hand. Augustine discusses this very well, as he does other matters: 'We most healthfully confess what we most rightly believe — that God and Lord of all things, who created all things very good and foreknew that evil things would rise out of good, and knew that it pertained more to His almighty goodness to do good even out of evil things than not to permit them to be evil, so ordered the life of angels and of men that He might first show in it what free will could do, and then what the benefit of His grace and the sentence of His justice could do.'

Here they retreat to the distinction between will and permission — claiming that the wicked perish by God's permission, not His will. But why do we say He permits it, except that He wills it? Moreover, it is not credible that the human being by himself alone, through God's bare permission without any ordinance, brought ruin upon himself — as though God did not determine what condition He would have the chief of His creatures be in. I will therefore not hesitate to confess plainly with Augustine: the will of God is the necessity of things, and what He wills must of necessity come to pass — just as those things He has foreseen will truly come to pass. Now if the Pelagians, Manichees, Anabaptists, or Epicureans — for we are dealing with these four groups in this question — should plead on their own behalf or on behalf of the ungodly the necessity imposed by God's predestination, they bring forward nothing that helps their case. For if predestination is nothing other than a dispensation of God's righteousness — hidden indeed, but still without fault — it is as certain that they were not undeserving of being predestined to that condition as it is that the destruction they enter through predestination is entirely just. Moreover, their destruction hangs upon God's predestination in such a way that its cause and material are found within themselves. For the first man fell because the Lord judged it fitting. Why He so judged, we do not know. Yet it is certain He so judged for no other reason than because He saw that through it His name's glory would be rightly displayed. When you hear mention of God's glory, think of His righteousness — for what deserves praise must be righteous. Man therefore falls, God's providence so ordaining it — but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had just pronounced that everything He had made was very good. Where then does the perverseness come from in the man who turns away from his God? Lest it be thought to have come from the creation, the Lord had approved what came from Himself. Therefore by his own wickedness he corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, and by his fall dragged his entire posterity into destruction with him. Let us therefore look at the evident cause of condemnation in the corrupted nature of humanity — which is near at hand — rather than searching for its hidden and utterly incomprehensible cause in God's predestination. And let us not be troubled to submit our understanding to the immeasurable wisdom of God, so that it may yield before many of His secrets. For those things which it is neither permitted nor lawful to know — ignorance of them is well-learned wisdom. The craving for that knowledge is a kind of madness.

Someone may say that I have not yet said enough to silence that wicked excuse. I freely confess it can never be done in such a way that ungodliness will stop grumbling and complaining. Yet I believe I have said enough to remove not only every valid argument but even every plausible pretext for objecting. The reprobate want to be considered excusable in sinning because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning — especially since that necessity is said to be laid upon them by God's ordinance. But we deny that they are excused by this, because the ordinance of God by which they complain they are destined to destruction has its righteousness — unknown to us, indeed, but most certain. From this we conclude that they suffer no evil that has not been laid upon them by God's most righteous judgment. Furthermore, we teach that they act perversely when — seeking the origin of their condemnation — they fix their eyes on the hidden chambers of God's counsel and shut their eyes to the corruption of nature from which their condemnation actually springs. This prevents them from charging God with it, since He testified well concerning His own creation. For although a person is created by God's eternal providence for the calamity to which he is subject, the material of that calamity came from himself — not from God. He was lost for no other reason than that he departed from the pure creation of God and fell into corrupt and impure perverseness.

The opponents of predestination also charge it with a third absurdity. Since we attribute it to nothing but the choice of God's will that those He makes heirs of His kingdom are freed from the universal destruction, they argue that this makes God a respecter of persons — which Scripture everywhere denies. Therefore, they conclude, Scripture contradicts itself, or God's election must take merit into account. First, Scripture denies that God is a respecter of persons in a different sense than they suppose. By the word 'person' Scripture does not mean the individual as such but rather those visible qualities in a person that tend to win favor, esteem, and dignity, or to earn hatred, contempt, and shame — such as wealth, power, nobility, office, social standing, physical beauty, and the like, or on the other side, poverty, lowliness, disgrace, and so on. When Peter and Paul teach that the Lord is not a respecter of persons, they mean He makes no distinction between Jew and Greek — refusing one and embracing the other based merely on national identity. James uses the same words to affirm that God in His judgment pays no regard to riches. Paul elsewhere says that in God's judging there is no consideration of whether someone is free or a slave. Therefore there is no contradiction in saying that God, according to the will of His good pleasure, without any consideration of merit, chooses some to be His sons and rejects others. Let the matter be opened further so that people may be more fully satisfied. They ask: how does it happen that of two people between whom no merit makes any difference, God in electing passes over one and takes the other? I in turn ask them: do they think there is anything in the one who is taken that could incline God's will toward him? If they admit — as they must — that there is nothing, it follows that God does not look at the person but draws the cause from His own goodness when He does good to him. When therefore God chooses one person and passes over another, this comes not from respect of persons but from His mercy alone — which must be free to show itself where and when it pleases Him. We have shown elsewhere also that from the beginning not many who were noble, wise, or honored were called — precisely so that God might humble the pride of the flesh. So far is His favor from being bound to persons.

Many therefore falsely and wickedly accuse God of partial injustice, on the grounds that He does not follow one uniform course toward all in His predestination. If He finds people guilty, they say, let Him punish all equally. If He finds them not guilty, let Him withhold the rigor of His judgment from all. But in arguing this way, they deal with God as though mercy were forbidden to Him, or as though if He chose to show mercy He would be compelled to entirely abandon His judgment. What exactly are they demanding? That since all are guilty, all must suffer the same punishment together? We grant the guilt is common, but we say God's mercy helps some. 'Let it help all,' they say. But we answer: it is right that He should also, in punishing, show Himself a just judge. When they refuse to allow this, what are they doing but trying to strip God of the power to show mercy — or at best, granting it to Him only on the condition that He utterly abandon His judgment? Therefore these statements of Augustine agree well together: 'Since in the first man the whole mass of humanity fell into condemnation, those vessels that are made from it to honor are not vessels of their own righteousness but of the mercy of God. And where others are made to dishonor, this is not to be attributed to unrighteousness but to judgment.' 'To those He refuses, God renders the punishment they are owed. To those He calls, He gives undeserved grace. They are released from all accusation in the manner of a creditor who has the power to forgive one debt and demand payment of another.' Therefore the Lord may give grace to whom He wills, because He is merciful — and may withhold it from all others, because He is a just judge. He may by giving to some what they do not deserve show His free grace, and by not giving to all, declare what all deserve. For where Paul writes that God shut all up in disobedience, so that He might have mercy on all, it must be added that He is debtor to no one — since no one first gave to Him so as to put Him under obligation.

They also often say, in order to overthrow predestination, that while it stands, all diligence and effort toward living well falls away. For who — they ask — upon hearing that life or death has been certainly fixed for him by God's eternal decree, will not immediately conclude that it makes no difference how he conducts himself, since the predestination of God can be neither hindered nor advanced by anything he does? In this way all people will recklessly abandon themselves and run headlong wherever their passions take them. And they are not entirely wrong — for there are many crude and irreverent people who defile the doctrine of predestination with filthy blasphemies and use it as an excuse to mock all warnings and reproofs, saying: 'God knows what He has decided to do with us. If He has decreed our salvation, He will bring us to it at the appointed time. If He has predestined our death, we would labor in vain against it.' But Scripture, in teaching how much greater reverence and godly fear we ought to have for so great a mystery, shapes the godly toward a very different understanding and thoroughly refutes these people's insolence. For Scripture does not speak of predestination to encourage boldness, or to invite lawless searching into God's hidden secrets — but rather to humble us, so that we learn to tremble at His judgment and look up with reverence to His mercy. The faithful will align themselves to this purpose. As for that crude grumbling, Paul answers it well. They say they go on carelessly in their vices because, if they are among the elect, their vices will not prevent them from ultimately being brought to life. But Paul says we are chosen for this very end: to lead a holy and blameless life. If the mark of election is aimed at holiness of life, it ought to awaken and stir us all the more eagerly to pursue that holiness — not to serve as a cover for laziness. For how great is the difference between these two: ceasing to do good because election is sufficient for salvation, and recognizing that the appointed goal of election is that we should devote ourselves to doing good. Away, then, with such sacrilege, which so wickedly perverts the whole order of election. Where they go further in their blasphemies and say that a person who is reprobate before God wastes his effort by trying to commend himself to God through innocent and honorable living — in this they are caught in the most shameless lie. For where would such an effort even come from, except from election? Those who are among the reprobate — being as they are vessels made for dishonor — never cease to provoke God's wrath against themselves with their ongoing wickedness, and by unmistakable signs confirm the judgment of God already pronounced upon them. They are far from striving against God in vain.

Others maliciously and shamelessly slander this doctrine, claiming that it destroys all exhortation to godly living. Augustine was once heavily burdened with this charge, which he cleared away in his book On Rebuke and Grace, addressed to Valentinus. Reading it will put all godly and teachable people at ease. I will touch on a few points that should satisfy those who are honest and not merely contentious. We have already seen how openly and forcefully Paul preached free election — was he therefore cold in giving admonition and exhortation? Let these supposedly zealous men compare their own earnestness with his, and they will find themselves far below his incredible warmth. And indeed this principle removes all doubt: 'God has not called us to impurity, but that each one of you should know how to control his own body in holiness and honor.' And again: 'We are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand so that we would walk in them' (Ephesians 2:10). In summary, anyone who has even moderate familiarity with Paul will easily see, without lengthy explanation, how well he holds together what these people claim cannot be reconciled. Christ commands people to believe in Him — yet His own definitive statement is neither false nor in conflict with this command: 'No one can come to Me unless it has been granted him by the Father' (John 6:65). Therefore let preaching run its course — bringing people to faith and holding them steadfastly in perseverance. And let the knowledge of predestination not be suppressed, so that those who obey may not pride themselves as though the fruit were their own, but may glory in the Lord. Not without reason does Christ say: 'He who has ears to hear, let him hear.' When we exhort and preach, those who have ears willingly obey. But those who lack ears — in them is fulfilled what is written: 'Hearing, they do not hear.' But why do some have ears and others not? 'Who has known the mind of the Lord?' Must what is openly stated be denied because what is hidden cannot be comprehended? These things I have faithfully drawn from Augustine. But since his words may carry more authority than mine, let us bring forward his actual words. 'If when this is heard, many are turned to laziness and sloth, and inclined from effort toward desire, do they follow their lusts? Ought what is said of God's foreknowledge therefore to be accounted false? If God has foreknown that they will be good, will they not be good — however great their wickedness now? And if He has foreknown they will be evil, will they not be evil — however great their goodness now appears? Shall the things that are truly said of God's foreknowledge be denied or left unsaid for such reasons? Especially when if they are left unsaid, people fall into error.' 'The rule for keeping truth unspoken is one thing; the necessity of speaking the truth is another. The causes for keeping truth unspoken are many and would take long to search out. One such cause is this: that those who do not understand a thing might not be made worse while we try to instruct those who do — when in fact those we address are made neither more learned nor worse.' 'But when a true thing is in such a case that speaking it makes the one who cannot grasp it worse, and not speaking it makes the one who can grasp it worse — what should be done? Is it not better to speak the truth, that the one who can grasp it may grasp it, than to keep silent — so that not only neither grasps it, but even the one of greater understanding is made worse? Whereas if he heard and grasped it, through him also many might learn? And we would not be saying what, as Scripture testifies, we may lawfully say. For we fear so much that when we speak, the one who cannot grasp it may be offended — but we fear not at all that while we remain silent, the one who can grasp the truth may be deceived by falsehood.' 'Therefore if the apostles and those who followed them — the teachers of the church — both preached godly concerning God's eternal election and also kept the faithful in awe under the discipline of godly living: why do our adversaries, confuted by the invincible force of truth, think they speak well when they say that what is said about predestination must not be preached to the people, even if it is true?' 'Yes, it must in every way be preached, so that he who has ears to hear may hear. But who has ears, unless he has received them from the One who promises to give them? Let the one who does not receive them refuse — yet let the one who does receive them take and drink, drink and live. For as godliness is to be preached so that God may be rightly worshiped, so also is predestination to be preached — so that he who has ears to hear of the grace of God may glory in God and not in himself.'

Yet that holy man, with his intense desire to build others up, also shapes the manner of teaching the truth so that offense is wisely avoided as much as is lawfully possible. For he shows that what is truly said can also be said fittingly. If someone were to preach to the people: 'If you do not believe, the reason is that God has already predestined you to destruction' — such a person not only nurses laziness but actively promotes wickedness. If someone also extends his statement to the future and says that those who hear will not believe because they are reprobate, this is more a curse than a teaching. Therefore Augustine rightly tells such people to leave the church as foolish teachers and ill-omened prophets. In another place he truthfully affirms that a rebuke only makes a person better when God in His mercy makes it effective — for God makes whom He will to profit even without rebuke. But why does this happen with some and not others? God forbid that we should say the power of judgment belongs to the clay rather than to the Potter. He writes again: 'When people by rebuke either come or return to the way of righteousness, who works salvation in their hearts but the One who, when any person — whoever he is — plants and waters, gives the increase? And when He wills to save, no man's free will resists Him?' 'It is therefore not to be doubted that the wills of people cannot resist the will of God — who in heaven and earth has done whatever He wills, and who will also do what is yet to come. He does what He wills even with the very wills of men.' 'When He wills to draw people to Himself, does He bind them with bodily chains? He works inwardly, holds hearts inwardly, moves hearts inwardly, and draws them with their own wills — wills which He Himself has made in them.' And what he adds immediately after must not be omitted: that because we do not know who belongs or does not belong to the number of the predestined, we ought to be so disposed that we wish all people to be saved. Let this then come to pass: that whoever we encounter, we strive to make them a partaker of peace. But our peace will rest upon the children of peace. Therefore on our part, we must apply wholesome and sharp rebuke to all people like medicine, so that they may not perish or destroy others. But it will be the work of God to make that medicine profitable for those He has foreknown and predestined.