Book 3, Chapter 1: The Nature of Virtue

Of the Nature and Differences of Vertue, and the Order of the Questions.

Thus far we are proceeded in the handling of two sorts of questions, whereof some concern man as he is considered apart by himself, without respect to another: some again concern man, as he stands in the first relation, namely to God.

Now we come by order, to speak of the third and last head of cases, propounded by the conscience of man, as he stands in the second relation, to man. And under this head are comprehended all those questions of conscience, that are incident to the lives of men; and which belong to man, as he is a member of some society, whether it be the family, the church, or the commonwealth.

For the better and more orderly proceeding in this discourse, some convenient subject or matter is to be propounded, whereunto all the questions that follow may fitly be reduced. Now of all other, the most convenient subject in this kind is virtue, and therefore according to the differences of virtue, we will distinguish the questions into three several sorts.

But before we proceed to particulars, it shall not be amiss to speak somewhat generally of virtue, so far forth, as the knowledge thereof may give light to the things that follow.

Touching virtue, two things are briefly to be remembered: first, what it is; and then, what be the distinct kinds thereof.

Virtue is a gift of the Spirit of God, and a part of regeneration, whereby a man is made apt to live well.

I call it first, a gift of the Spirit of God, because in whomever it is, whether in Christians or in heathen men, it has the nature of a gift that flows immediately from the Spirit of God. And this I put in the first place, to confute the received error of the wisest heathen philosophers, which call virtue a habit of the mind, obtained and confirmed by custom, use, and practice.

Secondly, I call it such a gift, as is also a part of regeneration; and this is added for two causes.

First, that we may put a difference between Christian and heathen virtues. For, howbeit the same virtues in kind and name, are and may be found, both in them that profess Christ, and those also that are ignorant of the true God; yet they are in them after a diverse manner. For in heathen men they are the gifts of God, but not parts of regeneration and new birth: but in those that be true Christians, they are indeed not only the gifts of God's Spirit, but also essential parts of regeneration.

That we may the better yet conceive this difference, we must understand, that the grace of God in man, is two-fold; restraining, and renewing.

Restraining is that, which bridles and restrains the corruption of men's hearts, from breaking forth into outward actions, for the common good, that societies may be preserved, and one man may live orderly with another. Renewing grace is that, which does not only restrain the corruption, but also mortifies sin, and renews the heart daily more and more. The former of these is incident to heathen men; and the virtues which they have, serve only to repress the act of sin in their outward actions: but in Christians, they are graces of God, not only bridling and restraining the affections, but renewing the heart, and mortifying all corruption. And though those virtues of the heathen be graces of God, yet they are but general and common to all: whereas the virtues of Christians, are special graces of the Spirit, sanctifying and renewing the mind, will, and affections. For example, chastity in Joseph was a grace of God's Spirit, renewing his heart; but chastity in Xenocrates was a common grace, serving only to curb and restrain the corruption of his heart. And the like may be said of the justice of Abraham, a Christian, and of Aristides, a heathen.

Secondly, I add this clause, to meet with an error of some learned philosophers, who taught, that the very nature of virtue stands in a mean, or mediocrity of affections. This that they say is true in part, but not wholly. For the mediocrity, of which they speak, without renovation of affections, is nothing: and therefore all virtues, that are not joined with a renovation and change of the affections, are no better than sins. This point the philosophers never knew, and hence it was, that they stood only upon a mediocrity, defining a man to be truly virtuous, that did wisely observe a mean between two extremes.

Lastly, I say that this gift of God, makes a man fit to live well. In which clause stands the proper effect of virtue; which is, to make those in whom it is, to lead their lives well. And by this we are advertised, to take heed of the opinion of philosophers, concerning some particular virtues. For in their moral discourses, they give both the name and the nature of virtue to those things, which are either false and counterfeit virtues, or indeed none at all. For example, Aristotle makes urbanity a virtue, which is indeed a sin, being nothing else, but a dexterity in mocking and descanting upon persons and names: and so it is reckoned by Paul among grievous sins and vices, which are to be avoided (Ephesians 5:4). Again, the philosopher calls magnanimity (whereby a man thinks himself worthy of great honors, and thereupon enterprises great things) a virtue; which notwithstanding is to be held a flat vice. For by the law of God, every man is to range himself within the limits of his calling, and not to dare, once to go out of it. Whereas on the contrary, the scope and end of this virtue (as they term it) is to make men to attempt high and great matters above their reach, and so to go beyond their callings. Besides, it is directly opposite to the virtue of humility, which teaches that a man ought always to be base, vile, and lowly in his own eyes. The Prophet David clears himself of this sin (Psalm 131:1), when he says, Lord, I am not high minded, mine eyes are not haughty, I have not walked in things that be great, and above my reach. Furthermore, no virtue must make us to forsake good life, but every one serves for this end, to make us fit to live a godly life.

The next point to be considered is, what be the kinds of virtue.

Virtue is either in the mind of man, or in the will. The virtue of the mind, is prudence. The virtue of the will, is that which orders man's will; and it is two-fold: for it respects either ourselves, or others.

That which respects ourselves, is conversant about two main things in the heart of man, the revenging, and the lusting power. That which respects the revenging power, is clemency; which stands in the ordering and reforming of the raging power of anger. The next, which respects the lusting power, is temperance.

Virtues that do respect others, are either concerning courtesy, as liberality; or concerning equity. And these consist partly in doing of equity, as justice; partly in defending and maintaining it, as fortitude.

Now according to this distinction of virtues, the questions of conscience are to be distinguished, in this sort. Some of them concern prudence; some concern clemency; some temperance; some liberality; some also concern justice, and some fortitude. Of all which in order.