Book 1, Chapter 3: The Subjection and Power of Conscience

Of the subiection and power of Conscience.

The fourth and last ground, is touching the subiection and power of Conscience. Wherein we are to remember two things: what Conscience is; and what is the naturall condition of it in every man. For the first; the name of Conscience will give light to the thing it selfe. For it signifieth a knowledge ioyned with a knowledge; and it is so tearmed in two respects. First, because when a man knowes or thinks any thing, by meanes of Conscience, he knows what he knowes & thinks. Secondly, because by it, man knowes that thing of himselfe, which God also knowes of him. Man has two witnesses of his thoughtes, God, and his owne conscience; God is the first and chiefest; and Conscience is the second subordinate to God, bearing witnes to God either with the man or against him. Therefore it is nothing els but a part of the vnderstanding, whereby a man knowes what he thinkes, what he wills and desires, as also in what manner he knoweth, thinketh, or willeth, either good or evil. Wherevnto this must be added, that as conscience knowes our thoughts, wils, & actions, so it testifies thereof to God, either with vs, or against vs.

In the second place, the naturall condition or propertie of every mans conscience is this; that in regard of authoritie and power, it is placed in the middle between man and God, so as it is under God and yet aboue man. And this naturall condition has two parts: the first is the subiection of conscience to God and his word. Concerning which subiection we have this rule: That God alone by his word does onely bind the conscience, by causing it in euerie action either to excuse for well doeing, or accuse for sinne. And this God does properly. For first, he is the onely Lord of the conscience, which created it, and gouernes it. 2. Againe, he is the only law-giuer, that has power to saue or destroy the soule, for the keeping & breaking of his Lawes (James 4:12). 3. And further, mans conscience is knowne to none, besides himselfe, but to God: What man knoweth the things of a man, saue the spirit of a man which is in him? (1 Corinthians 2:11). And it is God onely that giues liberty to the conscience, in regard of his owne lawes. Upon this it followeth, that no mans commandement or Law can of it selfe, and by it owne soueraigne power bind conscience, but does it onely by the authoritie and vertue of the written word of God, or some part thereof. And therefore if it be alleadged, that subiection is due to the Magistrate for conscience sake (Romans 13:5), the Answer is at hand; that subiection is indeede to be performed to ciuill authoritie ordained by God, and obedience also to the Lawes of the Magistrate for feare of wrath, and for auoiding of punishment, but not for conscience of the said authoritie or lawes properly and directly, but for conscience of Gods commandement, which appointeth both Magistracie, and the authoritie thereof. This is it that bindes the conscience immediatly; that by vertue of a superiour Law, whereby it standeth in force, namely the Law of God.

The second part of the naturall condition of conscience, is the power which it has over man to accuse or excuse him in respect of things done. And this is plaine by Saint Pauls conclusion, whatever is not of faith, that is, whatever man does, whereof he is not certenly perswaded in judgement and conscience, out of Gods word, that the thing may be done, it is sinne. More plainely: a thing may be said, not to be done of faith three waies. First, when it is done with doubting, and vnresolued conscience, as in those that are weake in knowledge. Of which sort were some in the Primitiue church, who notwithstanding they heard of the doctrine of Christian libertie, yet they were of opinion, that after Christs ascension, there was a difference to be made of meates, and thereupon thought, they might not eate of some kind of meats. Suppose now, that these persons (by accident) should have been drawne to eate swines flesh, which themselues had holden a thing forbidden. These men upon this very fact had sinned, because that which they did, was upon an vnresolued conscience. So says the Apostle (Romans 14:23), He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eate, because he eateth not of faith. Secondly, when a thing is done upon an erronious conscience, it is not of faith, and therefore it is a sinne. Thus the Masse-Priest sinneth in saying Masse, though he thinke in his conscience, the thing he does, is the ordinance of God. And thus Heretikes doe die Heretikes, though when they die, they be fully perswaded there opinions be the truth. Againe in the same manner; Put the case a man should be of opinion, that fornication, or theft, were things arbitrarie and indifferent, and hereupon his conscience should tel him he might take opportunitie, and commit either of these sinnes; whether is this action in the partie thus perswaded, a sinne or no? I answer, the case is plaine, that the fact is done upon an erronious conscience, and therefore must be a sinne in the doer. For the error of the iudgement cannot take away the nature of that which is simply evil. Sinne is sinne, and so remaineth notwithstanding any contrarie perswasion of the conscience. The reason is, because though the conscience erreth and is misinformed, yet it bindeth so farre forth, as that if a man iudge a thing to be evil, either simply or in some respect, (though falsely) and yet afterward does it, he has sinned and offended the Maiestie of God, as much as in him lieth. Thirdly, when a thing as done with a repugning or gainsaying conscience, though upon error and false iudgement of the conscience, it is in the doer a sinne. Thus an Anabaptist, that holdeth it vnlawfull to sweare, sinneth if he take an oath; not in swearing simply, for that is Gods ordinance, but because he sweares against the perswasion of his Conscience.