Chapter 3: Whether the Damned Will in Fact Suffer Any Other Punishment

In the last chapter the subject of inquiry was, whether the damned sinner deserves, according to strict justice and the law of God, any other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead to repentance and prepare for happiness. But though it should be granted, that he does indeed deserve a further or greater punishment, than that which is sufficient for the ends just mentioned; yet it may be pleaded, that in fact he never will suffer any other punishment; that in hell the damned are punished with the sole design of leading them to repentance; that when this design shall have been accomplished, whatever further punishment they may deserve, will be graciously remitted, and they immediately received to celestial felicity. Whether this be indeed the truth, is the subject of our present inquiry — With regard to this subject, I have to propose the following considerations.

1. If the damned do indeed deserve more punishment, than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance; then they may, consistently with justice, be made in fact to suffer more. That they may consistently with justice be made to suffer according to their demerits, is a self-evident proposition. To punish them so far, is not at all inconsistent with the justice of God, therefore the objection drawn from the justice of God against vindictive punishment as opposed to mere discipline, must be wholly relinquished. A merely disciplinary punishment is one which is suited and designed to lead the sinner to repentance only. A vindictive punishment is one which is designed to be a testimony of the displeasure of God at the conduct of the sinner, and by that testimony, to support the authority of the divine law, subserve the general good, and thus satisfy justice: and it must be no more than adequate to the demerit of the sinner. I do not find that Doctor C. has in his whole book, given us a definition of a vindictive punishment, as he ought most certainly to have done. According to Chevalier Ramsay's definition of divine vindictive justice, vindictive punishment is, That dispensation of God, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it is totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated. What then is a disciplinary punishment? This definition perfectly confounds disciplinary and vindictive punishment.

If it be just to punish a sinner according to his demerit; as it certainly is by the very terms; and if such a punishment be greater than is sufficient to lead him to repentance merely; as is now supposed: then all objections drawn from the justice of God, against a vindictive punishment, and all arguments from the same topic, in favor of a punishment merely disciplinary, are perfectly groundless and futile. The sinner lies at mercy; and if he be released on his repentance, it is an act of grace, and not of justice.

2. If the damned do deserve more punishment than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance, they will in fact suffer more. As it is just, so justice will be executed. That they will be punished according to their demerits, is capable of clear proof, both by the authority of scripture, and by that of Doctor C.

(1) By the authority of scripture — This assures us, that God will render to every man according to his deeds to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul that does evil (Romans 2:6, etc.). For the work of a man, shall he render to him, and cause every man to find according to his ways (Job 34:2). You render to every man according to his work (Psalm 62:12). I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings (Jeremiah 17:10). See also chapter 32:19. For the son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works (Matthew 16:27). For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad (2 Corinthians 5:10). Behold I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be (Revelation 22:12). Agree with your adversary quickly, while you are in the way with him: lest at any time the adversary deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be cast into prison. Truly I say to you, you shall by no means come out from there, till you have paid the uttermost farthing (Matthew 5:25-26). In the parallel text in Luke, it is thus expressed, I tell you, you shall not depart from there till you have paid the very last mite. James 2:13, He shall have judgment without mercy, that has shown no mercy. Revelation 14:10, The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascends up for ever and ever.

These texts, it is presumed, sufficiently show, that we have the authority of scripture to prove, that in the future world, the wicked will be punished according to their demerits, and that no mercy will be shown them.

(2) The same truth is evidently held by Doctor C. — He asserts, that there will be no salvation for those in the next state, who habitually indulge to lust in this; but they must be unavoidably miserable, notwithstanding the infinite benevolence of the Deity, and to a great degree, God only knows how long, in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices. That some of them [the damned] shall be tormented for ages of ages, the rest variously, as to time, in proportion to their deserts: That they will suffer positive torments in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes: That there will be a difference in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds: That "if they" [the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are not saved till after they have passed through these torments [of hell] they have never been forgiven. The divine law has taken its course; nor has any intervening pardon prevented the full execution of the threatened penalty. Some observations have been already made on these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, to show, that on Doctor C's plan they equally prove, that all the damned are saved without forgiveness; that the divine law has its course on them all; that they all suffer the full threatened penalty, and of course they suffer all that punishment which they deserve.

The other quotations set this matter in a light equally clear. If the wicked shall be punished in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices; in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; according to the nature and number of their evil deeds; in proportion to their deserts; they will most certainly receive the full punishment due to them according to their demerits, and nothing will be remitted to them.

Thus it appears both by the authority of scripture and also by that of Doctor C. that the damned will actually suffer all that punishment, which they deserve. And as it is now supposed to be proved in the preceding chapter, that the damned deserve a further punishment than that which is conducive to their repentance and personal good; of course it follows, that they will in fact suffer such further punishment.

Objection — The argument from the scriptural declarations, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, etc., to prove, that they will suffer all which they justly deserve, is not conclusive; because the same expressions are used concerning the righteous, setting forth, that they shall be rewarded according to their works, etc. Yet it is granted on all hands, that their reward is not merely such as they deserve, or is not strictly according to justice.

Answer. The reward of the righteous is indeed not merely such as they deserve, but infinitely exceeds their deserts. It is therefore at least equal to their deserts; or it falls not short of them. If this be allowed concerning the punishment of the wicked, it is sufficient for every purpose of the preceding argument. If the wicked suffer a punishment at least equal to their demerits; then no part of the punishment deserved by them, is remitted to them. Besides, the declarations of scripture are, that the wicked shall pay the uttermost farthing, the very last mite; that they shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, etc., which are as strong and determinate expressions, to represent that they will be punished to the full extent of justice, as can be conceived.

3. Although Doctor C. is so great an enemy to vindictive punishment; yet he himself holds that men do even in this life suffer such punishment. But do those testimonies of his vengeance lose their nature as judgments on his part, and real evils on theirs, because they may be an occasion of that repentance, which shall issue in their salvation? When God threatened the Jewish nation, in case they would not do his commandments, with famine, the pestilence, the sword, and a dispersion into all parts of the earth; did he threaten them with a benefit? And when those threatenings were for their sins carried into execution, did he inflict a blessing on them? When he threatened in particular, that if they were disobedient, they should be cursed in the field (Deuteronomy 28:16), did he hereby intend, that the field should be cursed; but that he meant thereby a real benefit to them? If vindictive punishment be inflicted even in this life, much more may we conclude that it is inflicted in hell, the proper place of retribution to the wicked.

4. If the punishment of hell be a mere discipline happily conducive to the good of the sufferers, there is no forgiveness in the preservation of a man from it. It is no forgiveness for a parent to give his child a licence to tarry from school; or for a physician to allow his patient to desist from the cold bath, which he had prescribed. Or if a parent, to inure his child to hunger and cold, have kept him for some time on a scanty diet, and have clothed him but thinly; it is no act of forgiveness, to allow the child in future a full diet, or warm clothing. Forgiveness is to remit a deserved penalty, or to exempt from penal evil; not to deprive of a benefit, or of anything which is absolutely necessary to our happiness, and which is therefore on the whole no real evil, but a real good. If therefore there be nothing more penal or vindictive in the punishment of hell, than in the cold bath, or in the scanty diet and thin clothing just mentioned; there is no more of forgiveness in exemption from the former, than in exemption from the latter. Thus the scheme of disciplinary punishment in hell leads to a conclusion utterly inconsistent with the whole tenor of scripture, and of the writings of Doctor C.

5. All those texts which speak of the divine vengeance, fury, wrath, indignation, fiery indignation, etc., hold forth some other punishment, than that which is merely disciplinary. The texts to which I refer are such as these: Deuteronomy 32:41, "If I whet my glittering sword and my hand take hold on judgment; I will render vengeance to my enemies, and will reward them that hate me." Romans 3:5-6, "Is God unrighteous, who takes vengeance? — 'God forbid.'" Romans 12:19, "Vengeance is mine: I will repay, says the Lord." Luke 21:22, "These be the days of vengeance." 2 Thessalonians 1:8, "In flaming fire taking vengeance of them, that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." Jude 7, "Suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." Job 20:23, "When he is about to fill his belly, God shall cast the fury of his wrath upon him." Isaiah 51:17, "Awake, awake, stand up O Jerusalem, which has drunk at the hand of the Lord, the cup of his fury; you have drunken the dregs of the cup of trembling, and wrung them out." Isaiah 59:18, "According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay fury to his adversaries, recompense to his enemies," etc. Instances of the denunciation of wrath against the wicked, are noted in the margin. Romans 2:8-9, "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that does evil." Hebrews 10:27, "A certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries." See also Psalm 50:22, Hebrews 12:29, Luke 12:46. Revelation 14:10, "Shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation." Therefore in the punishment of the wicked there will be no mixture of mercy or forgiveness.

It is of no importance, that in some of the texts now quoted, a reference is not had to the punishments of the future world, but to those of this life. If God can consistently with his perfections inflict a partial vengeance, why not the whole of that which is justly due? If he can and does inflict vengeance in this life, why not in the future too, provided, as is now granted, it be just?

That the passages now quoted, do indeed speak of a punishment more than merely disciplinary, is manifest by the very terms of the passages themselves. To say that vengeance, wrath, fury, indignation, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture, mean a mere wholesome, fatherly discipline, designed for the good only of the subjects, is to say that the inspired writers were grossly ignorant of the proper and common use of language; and particularly that they were wholly ignorant of that important distinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment, on which Doctor C. and other writers of his class so much insist. If vengeance mean fatherly discipline, what is proper vengeance? If it be proper to call fatherly chastisement, vengeance, wrath, fury, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture; by what name is it proper to call a punishment really vindictive?

6. The same may be argued from various other passages of scripture, some of which I shall now cite. 1 Corinthians 16:22: If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha. It is absurd to suppose, that this curse means a discipline designed for the good only of the patients. Such a discipline is so far from a curse, that it is a very great blessing. Deuteronomy 27:26, compared with Galatians 3:10: Cursed be he that confirms not all the words of this law, to do them. Deuteronomy 29:19: And it come to pass, when he hears the words of this curse, that he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst. The Lord will not spare him, but the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book, shall lie upon him, and the Lord will blot out his name from under heaven. And the Lord shall separate him to evil, out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant, that are written in this book of the law. This text seems to be in several respects inconsistent with the idea, that the future punishment of the sinner is merely disciplinary. It declares, that "the Lord will not spare him." But to inflict that punishment only, which is far less than the sinner deserves, and which is not at all vindictive, but wholly conducive to his good, is very greatly to spare him. It is further said, that the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against him: which is not an expression properly and naturally representing the discipline, which proceeds from parental affection seeking the good only of the child. The same may be observed of this expression, The Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven. It is added, All the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him — And the Lord shall separate him to evil — according to all the curses of the covenant, which are written in this book of the law. These last expressions seem to be very determinate. Curses are not blessings: but that discipline which is subservient to the good of the subject is a blessing. The curses here mentioned are all the curses written in this book of Moses, or the book of the Law. Therefore some men will suffer the curse of the law, even the whole curse of the law, or all the curses mentioned in the law; which, by what has come up to our view in the last chapter, appears to be more than a discipline promoting the good of the subject.

Again; Deuteronomy 11:26-29: Behold I set before you this day a blessing and a curse. A blessing, if you will obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a curse, if you will not obey the commandments of the Lord your God. Proverbs 3:33: The curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked; but he blesses the habitation of the just. Job 24:18: Their portion is cursed in the earth. Psalm 37:22: They that be cursed of him, shall be cut off. Psalm 119:21: "You have rebuked the proud, that are accursed." Jeremiah 11:3: Cursed be the man that obeys not the words of this covenant. Ibid. chapter 17:5: Cursed, be the man, that trusts in man, and makes flesh his arm. Malachi 1:14: "Cursed be the deceiver," etc. Chapter 3:9: "You are cursed with a curse." 2 Peter 2:14: "Cursed children."

By all these texts it appears, that some men do or shall suffer the curse of God. Whether all these texts refer to a curse to be inflicted after death, does not for reasons already given materially affect the present argument. A curse is undoubtedly a punishment which does not promote the good of the subject — otherwise a curse and a blessing are perfectly confounded.

If it shall still be insisted, that the curse so often mentioned, means that punishment only, which is conducive to the good of the subject: it may be answered, then there would be no impropriety in calling the present afflictions of the real disciples of Christ, by the name of a curse. Why then are they not so called in scripture? Why are not the real children of God, even the most virtuous and pious of them, said to be cursed by God, etc.? And why are not the curses of the wicked, as well as the afflictions of the righteous, said to work together for their good, and to work out for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? Doctor C. loves to illustrate the punishment of hell by the discipline inflicted by fathers on earth — with a sole view to the good of their children. But would it be proper to call the necessary, wise and wholesome discipline of earthly parents, by the name of a curse? Or is it ever so called, either by God or man? Equally absurd is it, to call the punishment of hell by that name, if it be designed for the good only of the patients.

I beseech the reader to consider what a contrast there is between the texts, which have now been quoted, and those in which a punishment really disciplinary is mentioned and described. In the former the punishment is called by the names of vengeance, fury, wrath, smoking wrath, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture, a curse, an anathema, all the curses of the law, etc. Whereas the real discipline of God's children is called a chastisement; If you be without chastisement, then are you bastards and not sons: a correction — I will correct you in measure, and will not leave you altogether unpunished. This correction is said to be mingled with pity. Like as a father pities his children; so the Lord pities those that fear him. I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes, nevertheless, my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him. But where in all the Scriptures is the punishment of the future state represented to be designed for the good of the subjects? Where is it in Scripture called a fatherly chastisement, correction or discipline, or by any other appellation of the like import? What right then have we to consider it as a mere chastisement? Is not this an idea formed in the fond imagination of those who would fain support a favourite system?

7. If future punishment be merely disciplinary, the discipline will produce its proper effect on some, sooner than on others. Some who shall in this life have contracted a less degree of depravity and hardness of heart, will be more easily and speedily brought to repentance, than others. This on the hypothesis now made, is both agreeable to the dictates of reason, and is the very doctrine expressly and abundantly taught by Doctor C. But how is this to be reconciled with the account of Scripture? That informs us, that all those on the left hand of the judge are to be sentenced to everlasting fire, and shall go away into everlasting punishment. The sentence denounced on all is in the same terms, and not the least intimation is given, that some of them shall be punished longer than others; much less that only some shall be punished for ages of ages; others released, in a much shorter time. Doctor C. and other writers of his class suppose, that in hell the wicked are put under those means of grace, which are vastly more advantageous, powerful and conducive to the effect of repentance, than those means which are enjoyed in this life. But the same writers will allow, that in many instances, even the means which are enjoyed in this life are followed with the desired effect of repentance, and this within so short a term as seventy years. Therefore we may reasonably conclude that within the like term, many more will be brought to repentance by the vastly more powerful means to be used with the damned: and so on through every successive period of seventy years. I think then an answer to two questions may justly be demanded of any one in Doctor C's scheme.

(1) With what truth or propriety can a sentence of everlasting punishment be pronounced on the whole body of sinners, when some of them shall repent and be saved very soon; others in large numbers, in every succeeding age, and even every year? As well might a sentence of exclusion from pardon and the favor of God during this life, be pronounced against the whole of every generation of mankind, because some men do indeed continue in that state during this life. In fact, with much greater truth and propriety might this latter sentence be pronounced, than the former; because it is granted by Doctor C. and others, that the greater part of men live and die in impenitence and alienation from God. Whereas, allowing that the punishment of the wicked is a mere discipline, we may presume, that very few indeed of the whole number of the damned, will remain in torment, for that duration, which according to the ideas of our opponents, is intended by everlasting and for ever and ever, and which is the longest punishment to be inflicted on any of the human race. This is a punishment reserved for a very few, the most depraved, hardened, abandoned sinners, perhaps one in a thousand or ten thousand. The rest less hardened and more easily wrought on by the powerful means of grace used with the damned, will be brought to repentance by a punishment of shorter continuance.

I know Doctor C. says, that though all the damned shall not, yet as some of them shall, suffer that punishment, which in his sense, is everlasting and forever and ever, therefore everlasting punishment may be truly asserted of them collectively. But the same reason would justify a sentence excluding the whole human race from pardon and the divine favor, during the whole of the present life. God might with the same truth and propriety have said to Adam and all his posterity, even after the revelation of the covenant of grace, I doom you, in righteous judgment, to live and die the objects of my wrath. This latter sentence would, for the reason before assigned, have been not only equally, but much more conformed to truth and fact, than that which shall be pronounced on the wicked at the end of the world; if they shall be delivered out of hell from time to time in every age and perhaps every year. Yet it is presumed, no man will plead for the truth and propriety of the sentence just supposed.

(2) The other question to which an answer may be expected, is, how has it come to pass, that no intimation of a difference in the duration of the punishment of the wicked, is hinted in any part of the Scriptures? The difference between a punishment of a few years, and one which is to last for ages of ages, or for such a duration, as may with propriety be called an eternity, is very great, and we should think, well worthy to be noticed in the Scriptures. To say, that it is noticed in those texts, which inform us, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, etc. is to beg a point in dispute: because those who believe endless punishment, believe that the works of all sinners deserve an endless punishment; and though they will suffer different punishments according to their different demerits; yet the difference will not consist in duration, but in degree: as the righteous will be rewarded differently according to their works; yet the reward of every individual of the righteous will be of endless duration.

8. If future punishment be designed as a mere discipline, to lead sinners to repentance, it is inflicted without any necessity, and therefore must be a wanton exercise of cruelty — The repentance of sinners may be easily obtained without those dreadful torments endured for ages of ages. Doubtless that same wisdom and power which leads a goodly number of mankind to repentance in this life, without the help of the torments of hell, might by the like or superior means, produce the like effect on all. The gospel might have been preached to all the heathens, and all those means of grace, which have been successful on some men, might have been used with all. And who will venture to say, that those means and that grace, which effected the repentance of Saul the persecutor, of the thief on the cross, of Mary Magdalene, and of the old, idolatrous Manasseh who had filled Jerusalem with innocent blood; could not have effected the repentance of any, or at least some of those who have been, or shall be, sent into the future state of punishment? How does it appear, that those means and that grace which were sufficient for the conversion of those noted sinners before mentioned, would not, had they been applied, have been sufficient for the conversion of thousands of others, who in fact have not been converted? And how does it appear, but that similar though more powerful grace and means, which are doubtless within the reach of divine power and knowledge, would have been sufficient for the repentance and conversion of all mankind? If so, the repentance of sinners might have been accomplished, at a cheaper rate, and in a way more demonstrative of the divine goodness, than by the awful means of hell-torments. Those torments therefore are inflicted without any real necessity, unless they be inflicted for some other end, than the repentance of the damned.

I am aware, it will be objected, that if God should bring men to repentance by efficacious grace or means, it would be inconsistent with their moral agency, would destroy their liberty, and reduce them to mere machines. But were Paul, Mary Magdalene, etc. brought to repentance in such a way as to destroy their liberty? It will not be pretended. Neither can it be pretended, that the same means and grace would have destroyed the liberty of others. This being granted, it necessarily follows, that if repentance be the only end, hell-torments are arbitrarily inflicted on all those, who might have been, or may in future be brought to repentance by those means, and that grace, by which Paul or any other man has been brought to repentance in this life — I ask, does God in this life, apply all those means and all that grace, to all men, to lead them to repentance, which are consistent with their moral agency? And if he apply to any man, more powerful means, or more efficacious grace, than he does apply to him, would he destroy all his liberty and reduce him to a mere machine? If so, then how are the more powerful means of hell-torments consistent with moral agency or liberty? They, it is said, are more powerful and efficacious means of grace, than any employed in this life: and if in this life the utmost is done to lead sinners to repentance, which is consistent with moral agency; hell-torments must entirely destroy moral agency and reduce poor damned souls to mere machines; and of course they will be no more capable of repentance or salvation, than clocks and watches.

If on the other hand it be said, that the utmost which is consistent with moral agency, is not done in this life, to lead men, to repentance; it will follow, that God chooses to inflict hell-torments, not merely as a necessary mean to lead sinners to repentance; to grant which, is to give up the whole idea, that they are merely disciplinary.

Those whom I am now opposing, hold, that God cannot, consistently with their moral agency, bring all men to repentance in this life. How then can he, consistently with their moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell? If those means which would be effectual in this life, would be inconsistent with moral agency, why are not hell-torments equally inconsistent with moral agency, since it is allowed that they will be effectual? Or if those means which are barely effectual in hell, be not inconsistent with moral agency, I wish to have a reason assigned, why those means which would be barely effectual in this life, would be any more inconsistent with moral agency.

Doctor C. and others hold, that to say, that God cannot consistently with moral agency, or in a moral way, bring men to repentance in hell, is to limit his power and wisdom. But to say, that God cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring men to repentance in this life, as really implies a limitation of the divine power and wisdom, as to say, that he cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell. How is it any more reconcilable with those divine perfections, that he cannot reduce a sinner to repentance, in seventy years, than that he cannot produce the same effect, throughout eternity? To say, that there is not time in this life, for the sinner to obtain a thorough conviction of the necessity of repentance, affords no relief to the difficulty. For though it should be granted, that there is not time for the sinner to obtain this conviction by experience, which however there seems to be no necessity of granting; yet cannot God exhibit the truth in such a manner, as to produce that conviction? And let a reason be given, why that conviction produced by a clear divine exhibition of truth and a sense of happiness and misery, set in such a light, as to lead to repentance, is more inconsistent with moral agency, than the same conviction obtained by experience, or by the torments of hell.

If hell-torments be necessary to lead sinners to repentance, because they are more painful, than the afflictions or other means used with men in this life; why are not greater afflictions sent on men in this life? It is manifest, that most men might suffer much greater afflictions, than they really do suffer. And if greater pain be all that is wanting to lead them to repentance, it seems that to inflict that, would be the greatest instance of goodness, and might supersede the necessity of hell-torments.

It is granted by Doctor C. and others, that hell-torments will certainly lead to repentance all who suffer them. At the same time he objects to the idea of leading sinners to repentance by the efficacious grace of God, that it destroys moral agency. But if there be a certain established, unfailing connection between hell-torments continued for a proper time, and repentance; those torments as effectually overthrow moral agency, as efficacious grace. All that need be intended in this instance, by efficacious grace, is such an exhibition or view of the truth and of motives, as will certainly be attended with repentance. But such an exhibition of the truth as this, is supposed by Doctor C. to be made in hell. And why this exhibition made in hell is more consistent with moral agency, than an exhibition which is no more effectual, powerful or overbearing, made in this life, I wish to be informed.

Perhaps it will be further pleaded, that though it be feasible to lead sinners to repentance in this life; yet it is not wise and best. But why is it not as wise and good, to persuade sinners to repent, without the use of hell-torments, as by those torments? If indeed it be fact, that God does not inflict endless but disciplinary misery on sinners, we may from there conclude, that it is wisely so ordered. But this is not to be taken for granted; it ought to be proved before an inference is drawn from it. It is the great question of this dispute.

9. That future punishment is not merely disciplinary, appears from the various declarations of scripture, that those who die impenitent, are lost, are cast away, perish, suffer perdition, are destroyed, suffer everlasting destruction, etc. as in these texts; John 17:12. None of them is lost, save the son of perdition. Luke 9:25. What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself or be cast away. Matthew 13:48. Gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad [illegible] away. 2 Peter 2:13. They shall utterly perish in their own corruption. Hebrews 10:39. We are not of them that draw back to perdition; but of them that believe to the saving of the soul. 2 Peter 3:7. But the heavens and the earth which are now, are reserved to fire, against the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men. Matthew 10:28. Fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. 2 Thessalonians 1:9. Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power. But what truth or propriety is there in these expressions, if future punishment be a mere discipline? The damned in hell are no more cast away, lost, destroyed; they no more perish, or suffer perdition, than any of God's elect are cast away, etc. while they are in this world. Hell is no more a place of destruction, than this world. The wicked in hell are no more vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, than the saints are in this world. The damned are under discipline; so are even the most virtuous and holy, while in this life. Yet they are not lost, cast away, rejected as reprobate silver, or destroyed by God; but are kept as the apple of his eye. And as the means of grace, under which the damned are placed, are far more adapted certainly to secure and promote their greatest good, than any means which we enjoy in this state; to consider and to speak of them as lost, cast away, destroyed, etc. because they are under those means, is to the highest degree absurd. They are just as much further removed from a state, which can justly be called destruction, perdition, etc. than they were, while in this world, as the means of grace which they enjoy in hell are more powerful and effectual to prepare them for happiness, than those means which they enjoyed in this world.

Suppose a man seized with some dangerous disease, and a variety of means is used for his recovery, but in vain. Suppose it appears, that if no more effectual means be employed, he will never be recovered. Suppose further, that at length an entirely different course is taken with him, a course which is not only far more likely than the former to be successful; but concerning which there is absolute certainty, that it will be successful: I ask, can the man now under the operation of these most excellent and infallible means, with any truth be said to be lost, to be cast away, to be destroyed, etc.? Or if those terms must be applied to one or other of those situations, in which we have supposed him to be at different times; to which of them are they applied with the least truth and reason? This example may illustrate the subject now under consideration.

10. If it be consistent with the divine perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of advancing his own good, as is implied in the very idea of disciplinary punishment; why is it not equally consistent with the same perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of promoting the good of the system; provided that misery do not exceed the demerit of the subject? I presume no believer in endless punishment, will plead for any degree or duration of punishment, which is not subservient to the glory of the Deity implying the greatest good of the universe. Therefore, all such punishment, as is not subservient to that end, is foreign to the present question. Further, it is now supposed to be proved, that other punishment than that which is adapted to prepare the sinner for happiness, is justly deserved by the sinner. Now since this it allowed or proved, why is it not consistent with every attribute of the Deity, to inflict that other punishment, provided only it be subservient to the good of the system?

It is holden by our opponents, that the punishment of a sinner may lead him to repentance. So it may lead other sinners to repentance; or it may restrain them from sin, and in a variety of ways may equally subserve the good of those who are not the subjects of the punishment, as it may the good of him who is the subject of it. And that the good of other persons may be of equal worth and importance, in fact, of far greater worth to the system, than the good of the transgressor himself, cannot be denied. Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this article, if the personal good of the sinner be a sufficient reason why he should be punished according to justice; why is not the good of others, or the good of the system, a sufficient reason for the same proceeding? And is it not evident, not only that such a punishment is consistent with the perfections of God; but that those perfections, goodness itself not excepted, require it? In this case, to inflict a punishment merely conducive to the good of the person punished, would be no fruit of goodness, but of a contrary principle; and the doctrine of merely disciplinary punishment, if it mean a punishment conducive indeed to the good of the subject, but destructive to the good of the system, is so far from being built on the divine goodness, as some boast; that it is built on a very different foundation. I am aware, that it is holden by the advocates for universal salvation, that the good of the system cannot be promoted by the endless misery of any individual, but requires the final happiness of every one. Merely to assert this however, as some do very confidently, is perfect impertinence. Let them prove it, and they will do something to the purpose.

11. If none of the damned will be punished for any other end than their own good, and yet they all deserve to be punished more than is subservient to their own good; then some of them deserve to be punished for a longer term, than that which in scripture, according to Doctor C's sense of it, is said to be forever and ever. The punishment, which in the language of scripture, is said to be everlasting, forever and ever, etc. will actually be suffered by some of the damned, as is agreed on all hands. But if none of the damned will suffer any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good, then the punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever, is conducive to their personal good. They therefore deserve a punishment of greater duration than that which in scripture is said to be forever and ever: and of course that more durable punishment is the curse of the divine law, and is threatened in the law. But where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is any punishment threatened, or even hinted at, of greater duration than that which shall last forever and ever? — So that this scheme of disciplinary punishment necessarily brings us to this absurdity, that the true and real curse of the divine law, is not contained in the law; and that the punishment justly deserved by the sinner, is nowhere revealed or even hinted at, in all the scripture. Yet the scripture assures us, that some sinners will be in fact punished according to their demerits, so as to pay the uttermost farthing, and to receive judgment without mercy. And no man pretends that any sinner will suffer more than that punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever. The consequence is, that that punishment which is forever and ever, is the whole that the sinner deserves, and therefore is by no means a mere discipline.

12. Our Lord informs us (Matthew 10:33), that whoever shall deny him before men, shall be denied by him before his Father. But on the hypothesis now under consideration, this means only, that Christ will deny him till he repents. In (Luke 13:25), etc. we read, that when once the master of the house shall have risen and shut the door, some will begin to stand without and to knock, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us, and will urge several arguments in favour of their admission: to whom the master will answer, I know you not, from where you are; depart from me, all you workers of iniquity. But on the present hypothesis, Christ will deny them in no other sense than he denies every real penitent and believer, during the present life. He will deny the wicked after the general judgment no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined; after that, he will know them, will own them, and receive them to eternal and blissful communion with himself. The same is observable of all his most sincere disciples in this life. While here, they are under discipline, though not so merciful and gracious a discipline as that with which the damned are favoured. However, during the continuance of the discipline of this life, Christ denies and refuses to confer on any of his disciples, an entire exemption from pain, distress, or affliction; and subjects them equally with the rest of the world, to these calamities: so that in this respect all things come alike to all. He does indeed give them assurance of rest and glory after this life. As full assurance of rest and glory after the expiration of the term of their discipline, is, on the present hypothesis, given to all the damned. Also in the prospect of this rest and glory, and in the certain knowledge that they are the objects of his favour, he affords his disciples much relief and comfort under their present trials. The same sources of relief and comfort are afforded to all the damned. So that Christ denies the damned in no other sense, than that in which he denies his most sincere followers, during this life.

The same observations for substance may be made concerning the application of the damned for admission into heaven, after the general judgment, and the answer and treatment which they shall receive on that occasion. The door shall be shut against them no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life. The master of the house will answer, I know you not, (that is) I do not as yet own you as my friends and disciples, because you have not yet been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life. He will tell them, Depart from me, all you workers of iniquity. But this means no more, than that they must not be admitted but heaven, till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of all real christians in this life.

13. On the hypothesis now under consideration, what damnation do those in hell suffer, more than real Christians suffer in this life? They are kept in a state of most merciful and gracious discipline, till they are prepared, and then they are taken to heaven. The same is true of every real Christian in this life. This difference however is worthy of notice, that the discipline of hell is far more advantageous than that of this life, because more effectual, and likely to fit the subject for heaven more speedily and thoroughly; otherwise it would never have been applied. It is also a more merciful and gracious exhibition of the divine goodness. Doubtless that mean of grace, which is most happily and effectually conducive to the speedy repentance and preparation of the sinner for heaven, is to him the most merciful and gracious exhibition and demonstration of the divine goodness.

It is true, the discipline of hell is attended with more pain than that of this life. So the discipline of this life, with respect to some individuals, is attended with more pain, than it is with respect to others. Yet it does not hence follow, that some Christians suffer damnation in this life: nor will it be pretended, that either the scriptures or common sense would justify the calling of those greater pains of some Christians in this life, by the name of damnation, in any other sense, than the less pains or afflictions of other Christians, may be called by the same name.

On the whole then, when the scripture says, "He that believes, and is baptized shall be saved; but he that does not believe shall be damned:" the whole meaning is, he that believes, shall be admitted to heaven immediately after death: but he that does not believe, shall not immediately be admitted, merely because he is not yet prepared for it by repentance; but he shall be put under a discipline absolutely necessary for his own good, and the most wise, effectual, merciful and gracious, that divine wisdom and goodness can devise; and as soon as this discipline shall have prepared him for heaven, he shall be admitted without further delay. When the scriptures say, "he that does not believe the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abides on him;" the meaning is, he shall not see life till he is brought to repentance by the merciful discipline just now mentioned; and not the wrath of God abides on him; because he shall be made the subject of nothing wrathful or vindictive; but the mercy, or most merciful and benevolent discipline of God abides on him.

14. If the only end of future punishment be the repentance of the sinner, and if the means used with sinners in hell be so much more powerful and happily adapted to the end, than those used in this life; it is unaccountable, that while so many are led to repentance by the comparatively weak means used with men in this life, and within so short a period as seventy years, the far more powerful means applied in hell, should not be productive of the same effect, in a single instance, within so long a period as a thousand years. That none are to be delivered out of hell, within a thousand years after the general judgment, is explicitly taught by Doctor C. His words are, "This period" (a thousand years) "must run out, before the wicked dead could any of them live as kings and priests with Christ."

We all doubtless believe, that many sinners die impenitent, who are not the subjects of depravity and hardness of heart vastly greater, than are in some, who are brought to repentance in this life. Now put the case of the class of sinners, who are the subjects of a depravity and hardness of heart, the very next in degree to that of the most depraved of those who are brought to repentance in this life. Is it reasonable to believe, that these cannot be brought to repentance, even by the most powerful means of grace enjoyed in hell, within a less time than a thousand years? If it be not reasonable to believe this, then it is not reasonable to believe Doctor C.'s scheme of disciplinary punishment.

15. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. This death is understood by Doctor C. and other advocates for universal salvation, to mean the second death. Then the second death is doubtless an enemy. But if it consist in a necessary discipline, the most wise and wholesome, the most conducive to the good of the recipients, and to the divine glory, which the wisdom of God can devise; surely it is no enemy either to God or the recipients; but is a perfect friend to both. With what truth then could the apostle call it an enemy?

16. The scripture, so far from declaring those who suffer chastisement and disciplinary pains, accursed, merely on that account, expressly declares them blessed. (Psalm 94:12) "Blessed is the man whom you chasten, O Lord, and teach him out of your law; that you may give him rest from the days of adversity." But where are the damned ever said to be blessed? They are constantly declared to be accursed. (Hebrews 12:5-9) "You have forgotten the exhortation, which speaks to you, as to children, 'My son, do not despise the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when you are rebuked by him. For whom the Lord loves, he chastens, and scourges every son whom he receives. If you endure chastening, God deals with you as with sons. For what son is he, whom the Father does not chasten? But if you are without chastisement, of which all are partakers, then you are bastards and not sons.'" This passage evidently considers those who suffer chastisement from the hand of God, as his children, his sons. If therefore the damned suffer a mere chastisement, they are not accursed, but are the blessed sons or children of God. But are they ever so called in scripture? Beside; this passage evidently supposes, that some men do not suffer fatherly chastisement, of which all the sons or children of God are partakers: and expressly declares, that such as do not suffer it are bastards and not sons: which seems not to agree with the idea, that all the damned, will by fatherly chastisement be brought to final salvation. If no other punishment be inflicted by God, than fatherly chastisement, then there are no bastards in the universe. Yet it is evidently supposed in this text, that there are bastards.

(Hebrews 10:28) He that despised Moses' law died without mercy — of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who has trodden under foot the Son of God? etc. But if all who die impenitent, be sent to a state of discipline most excellently adapted to their good and salvation, no man dies without mercy. This discipline itself is the greatest mercy which can, in their state of mind, be bestowed upon them. With respect to the same subject, it is said, (Hebrews 2:2) that every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward. A just recompense is a punishment adequate to the demands of justice; and this, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, cannot be a mere merciful discipline.

17. If the punishment of hell be a mere wholesome discipline, then what the apostle says of the discipline of Christians in this life, may be said with equal truth and propriety of the punishment of the damned: thus, We glory in damnation; knowing that damnation works repentance, and repentance salvation.

18. If no other than a disciplinary punishment be consistent with the divine goodness; surely the requirement of an atonement in order to pardon, is unaccountable. The doctrine of atonement, and of the necessity of it to pardon and salvation, is abundantly held by Doctor C. He says, Jesus Christ is the person upon whose account happiness is attainable by the human race. He speaks of the "sacrifice of himself," which Christ offered up to God to put away sin. The obedience of Christ to death, is the ground or reason upon which it has pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the race of Adam. "By thus submitting to die, he" (Jesus) "made atonement, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to." Christ was sent into the world to make way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy towards the sinful sons of men. The only begotten Son of God both did and suffered everything that was necessary, in order to a righteousness on account of which God might, in consistency with the honor of his perfections, and the authority of his law, make the grant of life. Accordingly this meritorious righteousness is that for the sake of which, upon the account of which, this blessing is conferred. According to Doctor C. then, Christ has not only made atonement by his obedience and death, but that atonement was necessary to the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy to the sinner; and without that atonement, saving mercy could not have been exercised toward the sinner, in a consistency with wisdom, justice and holiness, or the honor of the divine perfections, or the authority of the divine law and government. The constitution therefore by which salvation can be obtained in no other way, than in consequence and on account of his obedience and death, is not only consistent with wisdom, holiness, justice, indeed, all the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government: but it was required by them all.

But the sufferings and death of Christ, or his atonement, is no discipline of the sinner. They are as foreign from it as the vindictive punishment of the sinner himself. The atonement, as Doctor C. has explained it, makes way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy toward the sinner. It was therefore designed to satisfy the divine wisdom, justice and holiness. It was designed to make the grant of life to the sinner consistent with the honor of the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government. And if our Lord Jesus Christ might, in the behalf of the sinner, be made to suffer in order to satisfy divine justice; why may not the sinner himself be made to suffer for the same end?

If Christ has, on the behalf of sinners, suffered for the end of supporting the authority of the divine law and government; what reason can be assigned, why it should be inconsistent with any attribute of the Deity, that sinners themselves should be made to suffer for the same end? But this would be a proper vindictive punishment. Therefore Doctor C. is entirely inconsistent with himself, in allowing the atonement of Christ, in the terms before quoted; and yet denying the reasonableness of a vindictive punishment, or its consistency with the divine perfections.

19. We are assured, that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose (Romans 8:28). But this implies, that all things do not work for good, to them who love not God. Yet all things do work for their good, if they suffer no other than a disciplinary punishment. Concerning those who are Christ's, it is said, that all things are theirs; whether Paul or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are theirs (1 Corinthians 3:21-22). But on the supposition, that all punishment is disciplinary, it is equally true concerning all mankind, that all things present and to come are theirs. Yet this is not said, but the contrary is implied in that it is said of those only who are Christ's or are Christians, that all things are theirs.

20. I argue from those words of the wise man (Ecclesiastes 9:10): Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave where you go. If future punishment be disciplinary, the damned are in a state of probation, and may and will so exercise their rational powers, as shall finally issue in their salvation. But can this be reconciled with the words of Solomon, that in the future state, there is no work to be done, no device to be invented, no knowledge or wisdom to be exercised by us, to the accomplishment of what we now leave undone? This is manifestly the argument, by which he presses on us the present diligent discharge of our duty; and this argument would be utterly inconclusive, if there were another state, in which what our hand now finds to do, might be done.

Of similar import is (John 9:4): I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day; the night comes when no man can work. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world. That our Lord, by the day, means this life, is manifest by the last words of the quotation. But if in the future state no man can work, the future state is not a state of probation.

To these I may add, Genesis 6:3: My spirit shall not always strive with man — yet his days shall be a hundred and twenty years. As if it had been said, my spirit shall not always strive with man; yet he shall strive with him a hundred and twenty years, and no longer; for so long only shall his days be continued. But how is this consistent with the idea, that God will be striving with man, for ages of ages after his days shall have been elapsed?

Objection 1. If to some part of the foregoing reasoning it be objected, that it supposes future punishment to be merely disciplinary, and designed to subserve no other end, than the repentance of the sinner: whereas it is granted, that God may and will inflict vindictive punishment, but not a punishment merely vindictive; that he may take vengeance of the sinner, provided at the same time he aim at the good of the sinner: To this I answer —

1. That in this objection it is granted, that God may and will inflict on the damned a punishment properly vindictive, a punishment over and above that which is conducive to the personal good of the sinner. But this is to grant all which is pleaded for in this chapter, and all which at present is attempted to be proved.

2. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may inflict vengeance, provided he do it with a sole view to the good of the sinner, it confutes itself; it seems to grant something, but in reality it grants nothing. It seems to admit a proper vindictive punishment, but really admits no punishment besides that which is merely disciplinary. For to talk of inflicting vengeance with a sole view to the good of the subject, can mean nothing more, than to inflict pain with a sole view to the good of the subject; and this is nothing more than a punishment merely disciplinary: if God show displeasure with a sole view to the good of the sinner, this is mere discipline.

3. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may consistently with his perfections, inflict a proper vindictive punishment, provided at the same time that he is aiming at a proper vindication of his broken law and despised government, he aim at the good of the sinner also; I answer, if it be right and consistent with the perfections of God, to vindicate his law and government, there is no necessity of bringing in the aid of another motive or design, to make it right or consistent with his perfections. If on the other hand, it be not in itself right to vindicate his law and government, no other affections, views or actions, however right and benevolent, co-existing with the supposed vindication, can atone for it, or make it right.

To illustrate this by an example: A parent has a disobedient child; and it is become necessary both for the good of the child, and for the support of the parent's authority in his family in general, and over his child in particular, that he be properly punished. Accordingly from both these motives, the good of the child and the support of his own authority, the parent inflicts the proper punishment. This according to the objection now before us, is right. But according to the same objection, if the child be desperate and there be no prospect of effecting his good by punishment, it is not consistent with the character of a good parent to inflict the same punishment, from the motives of supporting his own government and the good of the family only. If this action done from these motives only, be a wrong action, it is still wrong, so far as it proceeds from the same motives, however it may arise in part from the motive of the child's good. To render this still plainer, let us suppose, that a parent inflicts pain on his child merely to afford amusement to his neighbours, as the Romans were wont to exhibit fights of gladiators. It will be agreed on all hands, that this action is abominable. Again, suppose the same pain be inflicted partly from the motive of amusing his neighbours, and partly from a regard to the child's good. I presume all will allow, that so far as the action proceeds from the former motive, it is still abominable, and is not sanctified by the co-existent motive of the child's good.

On the whole, we arrive at this conclusion; that if it be consistent with the divine perfections, that God should inflict punishment from the two motives of vindicating his own law and government and benefiting the sinner; it is equally consistent with the divine perfections to inflict punishment from the former motive only. All the vindictive punishment pleaded for, is that which is deserved by the sinner and is necessary to support the divine law and moral government in proper dignity, and thus to promote the general good: and this surely is opposed to no attribute of God, whether justice or goodness.

Objection 2. To the argument drawn from the destruction threatened to the wicked, it may be objected, that this destruction means, that they shall be destroyed as sinners only, or shall be brought to repentance and a renunciation of sin. To this it may be answered, that in this sense every one who in this life repents and believes, is destroyed, and suffers destruction. Yet this is never said in scripture. This sense of the word destruction makes the punishment of hell, and the awful curse of the divine law, to consist in repentance, which is no punishment or curse, but an inestimable blessing. Besides, that repentance, on which the sinner is forgiven if it can be called a destruction at all, is not an everlasting destruction, but an emotion of heart, which is begun and finished in a very short time. Or if by this everlasting destruction be understood the habitual and persevering repentance of the true convert; then the glorified saints in heaven, are constantly suffering that destruction which will be everlasting, and which is the curse of the divine law.

Before this subject is dismissed, proper notice ought to be taken of some arguments urged in favour of the sentiment, that the punishment of hell is merely disciplinary.

1. It is urged, that the various afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients: therefore probably the same end is designed by the sufferings of hell. To this it may be answered, It is by no means granted, that all the afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients. It does not appear, that men in general, who are visited with the loss of children, wives, or other dear friends; or with the loss of eyesight, of some other sense, or of a limb; or with distressing pains or incurable diseases; are thereby rendered more happy in this life. If men may be allowed to judge by their own experience, they will in most cases decide the question in the negative. Nor does the decision in many cases appear ill founded to those, who have opportunity to observe persons under those afflictions. To say that men are no proper judges, whether they themselves be, in this life, made more happy or not, by the afflictions which they suffer, is to say, that they are no judges of their own happiness or misery. This being once established, we may assert, that hell-torments though endless promote the happiness of the patients: because being no judges of their own happiness or misery they may be extremely happy, at the very time they judge themselves to be perfectly miserable.

In any case in which calamity proves fatal, it is absurd to pretend, that it promotes, in this life, the happiness of the patient, unless calamity itself be happiness. No man has opportunity in this life to derive any good from the pains of death. Therefore at least these pains are not designed for the subject's good during his present life.

Here it may be proper to mention several remarkable instances of grievous calamity recorded in scripture: As the instance of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Pharaoh, Saul, the house of Eli, Nadab and Abihu, Hiel, etc. It is presumed, Doctor C. himself would not pretend, that these calamities were intended for "the profit of the sufferers themselves" in this life. What right then had he to argue, as in the following passage? The proper tendency and final cause of evils in the present state, are to do us good. This is the voice of reason confirmed by experience, and scripture concurs herewith. He then quotes Psalm 89:31-34; and proceeds, If evil, punishment or misery in the present life is mercifully intended for the good of the patients themselves why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as the father of mercies, and God of pity, confined to this world only? The force of all this depends entirely on the supposition, that in all instances of suffering in this life, the end is the sufferer's good during this life.

But this supposition, we see by what has been said already, is by no means true. The superstructure therefore built on this foundation falls entirely to the ground. We all grant, that in some instances afflictions are intended for the good of the sufferers. A proof of this, which needed no proof — Doctor C. has produced out of the eighty-ninth psalm. On this foundation extended in his own imagination to comprehend all instances of affliction, he built an argument in which he triumphed. Now since there are those several instances of calamity before mentioned, which Doctor C. would not pretend were designed for the sufferer's good in this life; I might as well suppose that no other instances of calamity are designed for the sufferers good in this life; and then adopt Doctor C's strain of ardent declamation, in manner following: If evil punishment or misery in the present life, be not intended for the good of the patients themselves, but to support the authority of the divine law, and thus subserve the general good; why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as a God of perfect purity and strict justice, limited to this world only? Why should it not be supposed, that the infinitely holy God has the same hatred of sin in the other world which he has in this? And that he has in the next state the same intention which he has in this, to vindicate, by punishments, his law and government.

The truth is, that as some of the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life and others are as manifestly not intended for his good in this life; nothing certain can be hence concluded concerning the end of the misery of the damned. In fact: if it were certain, that all the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life or that they are not intended for his good in this life; yet it could not be certainly from there concluded, that the miseries of the damned are intended for the good of the patients, nor that they are not intended for the good of the patients. But this point must be determined by other evidence, the evidence of revelation.

If it should be said, that though some of the sufferings of this life do not, in this life, produce good to the patients; yet they will produce good to them in the future life; it will be sufficient to reply, that this wants proof; that it is a main point in the present dispute; and that it should be taken for granted, is not to be suffered.

2. It is also urged by our author, that the whole course of nature, and even the revelations of scripture constantly speak of God, as the universal father, as well as governor of men — What now is the temper and conduct of fathers on earth towards their offspring? They readily do them good and chastise them for their profit; but they do not punish their children, having no view to their advantage. And shall we say that of our father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father? He abounds in pathetic discourse of the same strain, which is much more suited to work on the imaginations and passions of mankind, than on their reason. The foundation of all this discourse is, that fathers on earth, acting in character, never punish and never can punish their children, but with a design to promote their personal good. But would Doctor C. himself adventure to lay down this position, and to abide by it? Did never a wise and good father find it necessary, to punish, and even to cast out of his family, a desperate child, to prevent his ruining the rest of the children? Was there never, or can there possibly never be, an instance of this? If such an instance ever has, or ever may occur, the appearance of argument in the forecited passage, vanishes at once. Not only do fathers find it necessary to punish desperate children, without any prospect of their personal good; but very frequently do kings, governors and chief magistrates find this necessary with regard to their subjects. Now in the scripture, God much oftener illustrates his character, by that of a king, a prince, a sovereign lord, than by that of a father. And [reconstructed: as kings], etc. often find it necessary to inflict capital and other punishments, without any view to the personal good of the sufferers; we may hence deduce an argument, that God also will punish many of his rebellious subjects, without any view to their personal good; but to support his moral government, to be an example of terror to others, and thus to secure the general good: and this argument would be at least as strong as that of Doctor C. just cited.

3. It may be pleaded, that though calamities in this life do not always issue in the sufferers' good; yet God may compensate them in the future state, for the loss or suffering, of which they are the subjects in this life. Thus our author, it is possible that the evils which any suffer in this, may be made up to them in another state. It is granted, that God is able to compensate his creatures for the evils of this life; but that he in fact will do it in all cases, is to be proved. Besides; the very idea of compensation is inconsistent with the idea of disciplinary punishment and that all the evils of both this life and the future are necessary and are intended for the good of those who suffer them. For if this idea be just, what foundation is there for compensation? Will a father compensate a child for the pain of that discipline which is absolutely necessary for his good and most wisely adapted to it? No man would ever think of it. Compensation supposes, that the evil for which compensation is made, has been inflicted from other motives, than a regard to the good of the sufferer. And if evil may in one instance be inflicted from other motives than a regard to the good of the sufferer; it may in any other instance in which justice and wisdom admit of it; and if in this state, in the future too. If the evils of life be intended for the good only of the subjects, we may as well talk of compensating a man for the pain of drawing a tooth which is a perpetual torment to him; or for the disagreeable taste of the dose which cures him of the colic; as to talk of compensating him for the calamities of life. The saints will indeed be rewarded for their patience under these calamities; and this part of their holiness is doubtless as amiable, and is as properly as any part of their holiness the object of the complacency of the Deity, and of those rewards which are the fruits of that complacency. But those rewards are not to be considered as compensations of losses or of damages. The very idea of compensation implies, that that for which compensation is made, is on the whole an evil to the person compensated. But the very idea that present evils are necessary and conducive to the good of the subjects, implies, that on the whole they are no evils to the subjects.

It is now submitted to the reader, whether the doctrine, that the damned will in fact suffer no other punishment, than that which is subservient to their personal good, be not in many respects most glaringly inconsistent with the scriptures; and whether it be not equally irreconcilable with their general tenor as with many particular passages; and also with many parts of Doctor C.'s book.