Section 2: Objections to the Preceding Reasoning

1. If to some part of the preceding reasoning, it should be objected, that though the sinner, having suffered a punishment according to his deserts, has a right on the footing of justice to subsequent impunity, and therefore cannot be delivered from further punishment by grace, or through Christ; yet, as he has no right on the footing of justice, to the positive happiness of heaven, he may be admitted to this, entirely by grace, and through Christ: This would by no means be sufficient to reconcile the aforementioned inconsistences; as may appear by the following observations.

1. That Doctor C. asserts, not only that all men will be admitted to the positive happiness of heaven, [reconstructed: by] free grace; but that they will in the same way be delivered from the pains of hell: As in these instances; "The gift through the one man Jesus Christ, takes rise from the many sins which men commit, in the course of their lives, and proceeds in opposition to the power and demerit of them all, so as finally to terminate in justification, justification including in it deliverance from sin, as well as from death; their being made righteous, as well as reigning in life." "By the righteousness of the one man Jesus Christ the opposite advantageous gift is come upon all men, which delivers them from death, to reign in life for ever." "It seemed agreeable to the infinite wisdom and grace of God, that this damage should be repaired, and mankind rescued from the state of sin and death — by the obedience of one man." "Salvation from wrath is one thing essentially included in that justification which is the result of true faith." He speaks to the same effect in many other places. Indeed he never gives the least hint implying, that he imagined, that the introduction of the sinner to the positive happiness of heaven is more an act of grace, than his deliverance from the pains of hell: but all that he says on the subject, implies the contrary. Nor do I state this objection, because I find it in his book; but lest some of his admirers should start it, and should suppose, that it relieves the difficulties before pressed upon him.

As Doctor C. allows, that the deliverance of sinners from the pains of hell, in all instances, is as really an act of grace, and as really through Christ, as their admission to the joys of heaven; so the scriptures are very clear as to the same matter. Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us (Galatians 3:13). We shall be saved from wrath through him (Romans 5:9). Jesus who delivered us from the wrath to come (1 Thessalonians 1:10). And pardon or forgiveness, which is a discharge from deserved punishment, is, in its very nature, an act of grace, and is, in scripture, always spoken of as such, and as dispensed through Christ only. Nor is anything more clear from the scriptures, than that every person, who is saved, is saved in the way of forgiveness.

2. There would be no propriety in saying, that a person who has suffered all the punishment which he justly deserves, who is on the footing of law and justice released from all further punishment, and is placed in a state of mediocrity, in which he is the subject of no misery; is admitted to the positive happiness of heaven, by mercy, by pity or compassion: much less by "tender compassion" and "wonderful mercy," and by the utmost bowels of the divine compassion. A being who has by his personal sufferings, satisfied the law, stands as right with respect to that law, as if he had never transgressed it; or as another person, who retains his original innocence. [reconstructed: Nor] does any man suppose, that Gabriel was admitted to celestial happiness, in the way of mercy, pity, or tender compassion? — That he was admitted to it in the exercise of goodness, is granted. The same may be said of his creation, and of the creation of every being rational and animal. But no being is created out of compassion. With no more propriety can it be said, that an innocent being, or, which is the same as to the present purpose, that a being who has indeed transgressed, but has in his own person made satisfaction for his transgression, and on that footing is delivered from all punishment and misery, is admitted to high positive happiness, by mercy, pity or compassion. And how much more improperly are the strong epithets used by Doctor C. applied in this case? Is it an instance of tender pity, of wonderful mercy, of the utmost bowels of the Divine compassion, to admit to the happiness of heaven, an innocent creature, or one who, in his own person, stands perfectly right with respect to the divine law, and is not the subject of any misery?

3. To grant that those who shall have suffered a punishment according to their deserts, will on the footing of justice, be delivered from further wrath or punishment, and yet to insist that their admission to high positive happiness, is truly and properly an act of grace; would be only to raise a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word grace, and at the same time to grant, that the deliverance of the sinner from wrath, is no fruit of forgiveness, or of grace, even in the very sense in which the objector uses the word grace. It is no act of favour, or of goodness, as distinguished from justice, to deliver a person from wrath, who is innocent, or who in his own person has satisfied the law, and therefore now stands right with respect to it. But the idea of delivering a sinner from wrath, without forgiveness, and without grace, is as foreign from the scriptures, as that of the admission of a sinner, without grace, to the positive joys of heaven.

2. Perhaps it may be objected to part of the preceding section, that by punishment in proportion to their deserts, and "according to their evil deeds," &c. Doctor C. meant not a punishment equal to strict justice, or satisfactory to the justice of God; but one in which a due proportion to the deserts of the various persons, with respect to one another, who are the subjects of the punishment, is observed. But to this it may be answered, Doctor C. doubtless meant to use the expressions, in proportion to their deserts, "according to their evil deeds," &c. in the same sense in which the Scriptures say, according to their works; "according to the fruit of their doings," &c. This is manifest not only by the similarity of the expressions, but by his own reference to those phrases in Scripture, as in the following passages, which is plainly inconsistent with that difference the Scripture often declares there shall be, in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds. Under the prospect of being condemned by the righteous Judge of all the earth — to positive torments awfully great in degree, and long in continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes. Here he undoubtedly refers to those passages in which the Scriptures assure us, that the judge will render to every man according to his deeds; "according as his work shall be," &c. Now these phrases of Scripture are clearly explained to us, by those representations, in which the punishment of the wicked is illustrated by the imprisonment of a debtor, till he shall have paid the uttermost farthing, the very last mite, &c. and by the passages, in which it is declared, that the wicked shall have judgment without mercy; that God will not pity, nor spare them &c. Whereas, if they suffer less than they deserve according to strict justice; so far they are the objects of mercy and pity; so far God does spare them; so far they have mercy mixed with judgment. Nor can it be said, that they pay the uttermost farthing of the debt.

Again; Doctor C. allows, that the wicked will in the second death receive the wages of sin. But the wages of a man are not merely a part, or a certain proportion of what he deserves, or has earned, but the whole. No man who has faithfully done the work, which he contracted to do for ten pounds, will allow, that five pounds are his wages for that work.

3. It may also be objected to a part of the former section, that though "the law shall have its course" on some men, and "the full penalty threatened in the law, be executed on them;" still this does not imply a punishment equal or satisfactory to strict justice; as the divine law itself does not, nor ever did threaten all that punishment, which is deserved according to strict justice: and therefore though the damned shall suffer all which is threatened in the law, yet they will not suffer a vindictive punishment, a punishment which shall "satisfy the justice of God." Concerning this objection it may be observed;

1. That by the law is meant, to use Doctor C's own words, "the moral law," the law of nature, the law of reason, which is the law of God: and to say, that this law does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is to say, that it does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of reason. If so, it is not the law of reason; which is contrary to the supposition. Therefore to say, that the law of reason does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is a real contradiction.

2. That Doctor C. neither does nor could consistently make this objection; because if the objection were just, men might be justified, "on a claim founded on mere law." On the principle of the objection, the law threatens a punishment far less than we deserve; and a man having suffered this punishment, may be justified on the foundation of mere law: the law would be satisfied, and the man would stand right with respect to it, nor would it have any further claim on him, in the way of punishment, more than on a person who had never transgressed. Therefore he from then on obeying the law, might as truly be justified on the foot of mere law, as if he had rendered the same obedience, without ever transgressing.

But Doctor C. holds, that mankind universally have sinned, and consequently cannot be justified upon a claim founded on mere law. And that the whole world had become guilty before God, and were therefore incapable of being justified upon the foot of mere law. That all men are incapable of justification upon the foot of mere law, as having become guilty before God. To the same effect in various other passages. So that according to Doctor C. if future punishment be intended to satisfy the law, it is equally impossible, that all men should be saved, as it is on the supposition, that future punishment is intended to satisfy justice.

3. Doctor C. allows, that a man having suffered the penalty of the law, is not, and cannot be, the object of forgiveness. If they are not saved, till after they have passed through these torments, they have never been forgiven — the divine law has taken its course; nor has any intervening pardon prevented the full execution of the threatened penalty on them. Forgiveness strictly and literally speaking, has not been granted to them. But if those who suffer the penalty of the law, are not, in their subsequent exemption from punishment, the objects of forgiveness, they suffer all they deserve. So far as they are exempted from deserved punishment, they are forgiven: forgiveness means nothing else than an exemption from deserved punishment.

4. Doctor C. says, that Adam (and for the same reason doubtless men in general) must have rendered himself obnoxious to the righteous resentment of his God and King, had he expressed a disregard to any command of the moral law, the law of which the Doctor is speaking in that passage. But the righteous resentment of God for transgression is a just punishment of transgression; and a just punishment is any punishment, which is not unjust. And it is impossible that Adam should be obnoxious to such a punishment, if the law, the most strict rule of God's proceedings with his creatures, had not threatened it. Thus Doctor C. himself grants, that the punishment threatened in the law is the same which is deserved according to strict justice.

The Doctor everywhere holds, that "the law of GOD is a perfect rule of righteousness." But if the law does not threaten all the punishment which is justly deserved by sin, it is no more truly a perfect rule of righteousness, than the gospel is. Again; Is the law that rule of right, which GOD knows to be the measure of men's duty to him, and of what is fit he should do for, or inflict upon them, as they are either obedient, or disobedient? There is, without all doubt, such a rule of men's duty towards GOD, and of GOD's conduct towards men, in a way of reward or punishment, according to their works. There could scarcely be a more explicit concession, that the divine law threatens all that punishment, which is according to justice. It is declared to be, not only the rule of right, but the measure of what is fit in punishment, as well as of duty. Indeed Doctor C. never once, so far as I have noticed, suggests the idea, that the divine law does not threaten all that punishment, which is deserved by sin.

5. According to this objection, the moral law is a dispensation of grace, as truly as the gospel. But how does this accord with the scripture? That declares, that "the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth," or the gracious truth, "came by Jesus Christ;" (John 1:17). "If they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise made of none effect. Because the law works wrath. — Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace;" (Romans 4:14). "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law;" (1 Corinthians 15:56). As in the objection now under consideration, the law is supposed to be as really a dispensation of grace, as the gospel; we may say, The strength of sin is the gospel, as truly as, The strength of sin is the law. Besides; if the law be a dispensation of grace, how can it be said to be the strength of sin? It threatens a part only of the punishment deserved by sin; and therefore it neither points out, how strong sin is, to bring into condemnation, nor does it give to sin its proper force to terrify and torment the sinner, by exhibiting the whole punishment deserved by sin. On the ground of this objection, the strength of sin consists in the rule of strict justice, not in the law.

6. The apostle tells us, that "by the law is the knowledge of sin." But the knowledge of the evil or demerit of sin is obtained by the knowledge of the threatening of the law only. If the law does not threaten all that punishment, which sin deserves, we know not by the law, what sin deserves, or how evil it is. And if we know not this by the law, neither do we [illegible] by any [illegible] means whatever. Nor do we know our own demerit, nor our own proper characters as sinners; nor are we in any capacity to judge concerning our obligation to gratitude for the redemption of Christ, or for salvation through him; nor have we the proper motive to repentance set before us, in all the scriptures. The proper motive to repentance is the evil of sin. And if we have not the knowledge of the evil of sin, it is impossible we should know the grace of pardon, or of salvation from that punishment which is justly deserved by sin.

7. The apostle declares, as we have seen, that "by the law is the knowledge of sin," and that "the law works wrath." But on the principle of this objection, by the law is the knowledge of grace, and the law works grace: and GOD without any atonement did grant to sinners some remission or mitigation of deserved punishment. Why then could not complete remission or pardon have been granted in the same way? What need was there of Christ and his death? Yet Doctor C. holds, that it was with a view to the obedience and death of Christ, upon this account, upon this ground, for this reason, that GOD was pleased to make the gospel promise of a glorious immortality to the miserable sons of men.

8. If the full punishment to which the sinner justly exposes himself by sin, be not pointed out in the law; it is not a good law, as it does not teach the subject of the law the truth in this matter; but it is a deceitful law, or is directly calculated to deceive. It threatens a punishment, which the subject would naturally believe to be the whole punishment to which he is exposed by transgression, or which can be justly inflicted on him. But this, if the objection be well grounded, is by no means the case. Thus the law would naturally tend to deceive fatally all its subjects.

9. From what is granted by Doctor C. it certainly follows, that the threatening of the law is all that can be inflicted consistently with justice, and that the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, is one and the same. He says, "Whatever sin may in its own nature, be supposed to deserve; it is not reasonable to suppose, that it should be universally reckoned to death, when no law is in being that makes death the special penalty of transgression." "Sin is not reckoned, brought to account, ought not to be looked upon as being taxed with the forfeiture of life, when there is no law in being, with death as its affixed sanction." Therefore whatever sin may be supposed to deserve, it is not reasonable, that it should be reckoned, it ought not to be reckoned, or which is the same thing, it is not just, that it should be reckoned to any punishment whatever, when there is no law in being, which makes that punishment the special penalty of transgression. Therefore, as I said, the punishment threatened in the law, is all which can be inflicted consistently with justice; and the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, are one and the same.

10. If the law does not threaten all that punishment which is just, we cannot possibly tell what is a just punishment, or what justice threatens or admits with regard to punishment, and what it does not admit. If once we give up the law and the testimony, we are left to our own imaginations. Doctor C. holds that the wages of sin are the second death, and that this death is a punishment which shall last, according to the language of Scripture, for ever and ever. Are these wages, and this punishment which shall continue for ever and ever, adequate to the demand of justice or not? If they are, then the law threatens all which justice requires. If they are not, then the wages of sin, and the punishment for ever and ever, are a gracious punishment, and sinners deserve a longer punishment. But how do we know that sinners deserve a longer punishment than this? No longer punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of Scripture.

11. If sin deserves a longer punishment than that which is threatened in the law, it deserves either an endless punishment, or a temporary punishment longer than that which is threatened in the law. But if sin deserves an endless punishment, it is an infinite evil. If it deserves a temporary punishment though longer than that which is threatened in the law, all men may finally be saved, even though the state of future punishment be intended to satisfy the divine justice — the contrary of which however is asserted by Doctor C.

12. If the damned, though they shall be punished according to law, will not be punished as much as they deserve, what shall we make of the Scriptures, which declare that they shall have judgment without mercy; that God will not spare, nor pity them; that wrath shall be poured upon them without mixture, etc.

I now appeal to the reader, whether, notwithstanding this objection, the damned, in suffering the whole penalty threatened in the divine law, do not suffer as much as they deserve according to strict justice, and therefore suffer a penalty to the highest degree vindictive.

4. If it should be further objected that there is no inconsistency in representing future punishment to be fully adequate to the demerit of sin, and yet to represent it as disciplinary, and adapted to the repentance and personal good of the patient — as both the ends of the personal good of the patient, and of the satisfaction of justice, are answered by it — it is to be noticed:

1. If this objection means that the punishment which is merely adapted to the personal good of the patient is all which is deserved by sin, I beg leave to refer the objector to the next chapter.

2. If it means that though sin does deserve, and the damned will suffer, more punishment than that which is conducive to the personal good of the patient — even all that punishment which is according to strict justice — yet all will be saved finally: then it will follow that an endless punishment is not deserved by sin. In this case, I beg leave to refer the objector to chapter 6.

3. Still on the foundation of this objection, the damned, as they will have previously suffered all that they deserve, will finally be delivered from further suffering of wrath, not by forgiveness, not by grace, nor through Christ, but entirely on the footing of strict justice, as having suffered the full penalty of the law.

4. Doctor C. could not consistently make this objection. The objection holds that the damned do suffer a punishment entirely satisfactory to justice, and Doctor C. allows that if the punishment of the wicked be intended to satisfy the justice of God, and give warning to others, it is impossible all men should be saved.

Having in this first chapter so far attended to Doctor C.'s system concerning future punishment as to find that it appears to be a combination of the most jarring principles, and having particularly pointed out the mutual discordance of those principles, I might spare myself the labor of a further examination of his book — until at least it should be made to appear that those principles do in reality harmonize with each other. But as some may entertain the opinion that though there be inconsistencies in the book, yet the general doctrine of universal salvation is true, and is defensible, if not on all the grounds on which Doctor C. has undertaken the defense of it, yet on some of them at least — therefore I have determined to proceed to a more particular examination of this doctrine, and of the arguments brought by Doctor C. in support of it.