Chapter 6: God's Conversableness with Men

What is intended by God's conversableness with men, considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a Temple. An account of the Epicurean Deity. Its existence is impossible any way to be proved if it did exist. Nor can it be affirmed to any good intent. That such a being is not God. That the absolute perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of religion. From there more particularly deduced to this purpose: his omniscience, omnipotence, unlimited goodness, immensity. Curcellaeus's arguments against this last considered.

Nor is the thing here intended less necessary to a Temple and religion, than what we have hitherto been discoursing of. For such a sort of deity as should shut up itself, and be reclused from all converse with men, would leave us as unfurnished of an object of religion, and would render a Temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were none at all. It were a being not to be worshipped, nor with any propriety, to be called God more (in some respect less) than an image or statue. We might, with as rational design, worship, for a God, what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man, as dedicate Temples to a wholly unconversable deity: that is, such a one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men; but, that cannot admit it. Or whose nature were altogether incapable of such converse.

For that measure and latitude of sense must be allowed to the expression "conversableness with men" as that it signify both capacity and propension to such converse. That God is both, by his nature, capable of it, and has a gracious inclination of will thereto. Indeed we will add (what is also not without the compass of our present theme, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it) that he is not only inclined to converse with men, but that he actually does it. As we call him a conversable person that upon all befitting occasions does freely converse with such as have any concern with him.

It will indeed be necessary to distinguish God's converse with men, into:

That which he has in common with all men: so as to sustain them in their beings, and some way, influence their actions (in which kind he is also conversant with all his creatures) and

That which he more peculiarly has with good men.

And, though the consideration of the latter of these will belong to the discourse concerning his Temple itself, which he has with and in them; yet it is the former, only, we have now to consider, as presupposed thereto, and as the ground thereof. Together with his gracious propension to the latter also.

As the great Apostle, in his discourse at Athens, lays the same ground for acquaintance with God (which he intimates should be set afoot and continued in another sort of Temple than is made with hands) that he has given to all breath, and being, and all things, and that he is near and ready (from where they should therefore seek him, if perhaps they might feel after him, and find him out) in order to further converse.

And here, our business will have the less in it of labour and difficulty; for that we shall have little else to do, besides only the applying of principles already asserted (or possibly the more express adding of some or other that were implied in what has been said) to this purpose.

From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that (in the former sense) he does converse with men, and is graciously inclined thereto (in the latter.) And yet because the former is more deeply fundamental, as whereon all depends, and that the act of it is not denied for any other reason than an imagined impossibility; that is, it is not said he does not sustain and govern the world, upon any other pretense, but that he cannot (as being inconsistent with his nature and felicity,) this we shall therefore more directly apply ourselves to demonstrate, that his nature does not disallow it, but necessarily includes an aptitude thereto.

Nor yet though it may be a less laborious work than the former that we have dispatched, is it altogether needless to deal somewhat more expressly in this matter. Inasmuch as what opposition has been made to religion in the world has for the most part been more expressly directed against this ground of it. I say more expressly; for indeed by plain and manifest consequence it impugns that also of God's existence: that is through this, it strikes at the other. For surely (however any may arbitrarily, and with what impropriety and latitude of speech they please, bestow titles and eulogies here or there) that being is not God, that cannot converse with men; supposing them such as what purely and peculiarly belongs to the nature of man would bespeak them. So that they who have imagined such a being, and been pleased to call it God, have at once said and unsaid the same thing. That deity was but a creature, and that, only, of their own fancy; and they have by the same breath blown up and blasted their own bubble, made it seem something, and signify nothing. Have courted it into being, and rioted it again quite out of it. In their conceit created it a God, in their practice a mere nullity. And it equally served their turn, and as much favored the design of being wicked, to acknowledge only a God they could imagine and dis-imagine at their own pleasure; as to have acknowledged none at all. It could do no prejudice to their affairs to admit of this fictitious deity that they could make be what, or where they pleased. That should affect ease and pleasure, and (lest his pleasures and theirs should interfere) that they could confine to remote territories, and oblige to keep at an obedient and untroubling distance. Nor, though no imagination could be more madly extravagant, than that of a God no way concerned in the forming and governing of the world; and, notwithstanding whom men might take their liberty to do what they liked; yet, as has been observed long ago, that no opinion was ever so monstrously absurd, as not to be owned by some of the philosophers) has not this wanted patronage, and even among them who have obtained to be esteemed (not to say idolized) under that name.

Which would be seen if it were worth the while to trouble the reader with an account of the Epicurean deity. As it can only be with this design, that the representation may render it (as it cannot but do) ridiculous, to sober men; and discover to the rest the vanity of their groundless, and self-contradicting hope (still too much fostered in the breasts of not a few) who promise themselves impunity in the most licentious course of wickedness, upon the security only of this their own idle dream. That is, that if there be a God (which they reckon it not so plausible flatly to deny) he is a being of either so dull and phlegmatic a temper that he cannot be concerned in the actions and affairs of men, or so soft and easy that he will not.

But, because his good will alone was not so safely to be relied on, it was thought the securer way not to let it be in his power, to intermeddle with their concerns. And therefore being to frame their own God to their own turn. Thus the matter was, of old, contrived.

First, great care was taken that he be set at a distance remote enough; that he be complimented out of this world, as a place too mean for his reception, and unworthy such a presence. They being indeed unconcerned where he had his residence. So it were not too near them. So that a confinement of him somewhere was thought altogether necessary.

Secondly, and then, with the same pretense of great observance and respect, it is judged too great a trouble to him, and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being, that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance, by making the world. From the care and labor of which he is with all ceremony to be excused. It being too painful and laborious an undertaking for an immortal and a happy being. Besides that he was altogether destitute of instruments, and utensils requisite to so great a performance.

From which also, thirdly, he was with the same reason to be excused of all the care and encumbrance of government (as indeed, what right or pretense could he have to the government of a world that chose him not, which is not his inheritance, and which he never made?) But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration, with magnificent eulogies of his never interrupted felicity. From which also it is made a very great crime not to free even the divine nature itself, from business. Though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean faith does, sometimes more apparently discover itself; even an impatience of the divine government, and a regret of that irksome bondage which the acknowledgment of a deity that were to be feared by men would infer upon them.

And therefore fourthly, he is further expressly asserted to be such as need not be feared; as cares not to be worshiped, as with whom neither anger nor favor has any place.

So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration, which we give to any thing, or person that we apprehend to excel us, and to be in some respect better than ourselves. An observance merely upon courtesy. But obedience and subjection to his government, fear of his displeasure, expectation of his favor and benefits have no place left them. We are not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any concern, and do owe him no more homage than to the great Mogul, or the Cham of Tartary, and indeed are less liable to his severity, or capable of his favors than theirs; for of theirs we are in some remote possibility, of his in none at all. In one word, all converse between him and man on his part by providence, and on ours by religion, is quite cut off. Which evidently appears (from what has been already collected out of his own words and theirs who pretended to speak that so adored author's mind and sense) to be the scope and sum of the Epicurean doctrine in this matter, and was indeed observed to be so long ago; by one that we may suppose to have had better opportunity and advantages to know it, than we: who discoursing that a man cannot live pleasantly, according to the principles of Epicurus. And that according to his doctrine beasts are more happy than men; plainly gives this reason why he says so, namely, that the Epicureans took away providence. And that the design of their discoursing concerning God was that we might not fear him.

To which purpose also much more may be seen in the same author elsewhere, when he more directly pleads (among diverse more philosophical subjects) on behalf of religion against the Epicurean doctrine which he says they leave to us in word and show, but, by their principles, take away in deed, as they do [reconstructed: nature], and the soul, etc.

It is then out of question that the doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man. Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration: nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive the mention of such horrid opinions, or tell the world what such a one said or thought two thousand years ago. If their grave had been faithful to its trust and had retained their filthy poisonous savor within its own unhallowed cell.

But since (against what were so much to have been desired, that their womb might have been their grave) their grave becomes their womb, where they are conceived and formed anew, and from which by a second birth they spring forth afresh to the great annoyance of the world, the debauching and endangering of mankind. And that it is necessary some remedy be endeavored of so mortal an evil, it was also convenient to run it up to its original. And contend against it as in its primitive state and vigor.

Therefore this being a true (though it be a very short) account of the Epicurean God; resulting all into this shorter sum, that he is altogether unconversable with men (and such therefore as cannot inhabit their temple, and for whom they can have no obligation or rational design to provide any) it will be requisite in reference to this, and suitable to our present scope and purpose, severally to evince these things.

1. That the existence of such a being as this were impossible ever to be proved to men, if it did exist.

2. That, being supposed, without any good ground; it is equally unimaginable that the supposition of it [reconstructed: can] intend any valuable or good end.

3. That this supposed being cannot be God, and is most abusively so called; as hereby, the true God, the cause and author of all things is intended to be excluded.

4. That it belongs to, and may be deduced from the true notion of God, which has been given (and proved by parts of a really existent Being) that he is such as can converse with men.

For the first, That there is no way to prove the existence of such a Being, is evident. For what ways of proving it can be thought of, which the supposition itself does not forbid, and reject? Is it to be proved by Revelation? But that supposes converse with men, and destroys what it should prove, that such a Being, having no converse with men does exist. And where is that Revelation? Is it written or unwritten? Or who are its vouchers? Upon what authority does it rest? Who was appointed to inform the world in this matter? Was Epicurus himself the common Oracle? Why did he never tell men so? Did he ever pretend to have seen any of these his vaunted Gods? No, they are confessed not to be liable to our sense any more than the inane itself. And what Miracles did he ever work to confirm the truth of his Doctrine in this matter? Which sure was reasonably to be expected from one who would gain credit to dictates so contrary to the common sentiments of the rest of mankind; and that were not to be proved any other way. And what other way can be devised? Can it admit of rational demonstration? What shall be the medium? Shall it be from the cause? But what cause can (or ever did) he or his followers assign of God? Or from effects? And what shall they be? When the matter of the whole universe is supposed ever to have been of itself, and the particular frame of everything made thereof to have resulted only of the casual coalition of the parts of that matter? And no real Being is supposed besides? Or shall it be that their idea which they have of God includes existence as so belonging to him that he cannot but exist. But by what right do they affix such an idea to their petty and fictitious Deities? How will they prove their idea true? Or are we bound to take their words for it? Indeed it is easily proved false and repugnant to itself, while they would have that to be necessarily existent (as they must if they will have it existent at all) to which in the mean time they deny the other perfections which necessary existence has been proved to include. But how vain and idle trifling is it, arbitrarily, and by a random fancy to imagine anything we please, and attributing of our own special grace and favor necessary existence to it, from there to conclude that it does exist, only because we have been pleased to make that belong to the notion of it? What so odd and uncouth composition can we form any conception of which we may not make exist at this rate?

But the notion of God is not arbitrary, but is natural, proleptical, and common to men, impressed upon the minds of all: from where they say it ought not to be drawn into controversy. What? The Epicurean notion of him? We shall inquire further into that soon. And in the mean time, need not doubt to say, any man might, with as good pretense, imagine the ridiculous sort of Gods described in Cicero's ironical supposition, and affirm them to exist as they those they have thought fit to feign, and would impose upon the belief of men. And when they have fancied these to exist, is not that a mighty proof that they indeed do so?

But that, which for the present we allege, is, that, supposing their notion were never so absolutely universal and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men, they have, yet, precluded themselves of any right to argue, from its commonness, to the existence of the thing itself. Nor can they, upon their principles, form an argument from there, that shall conclude or signify anything to this purpose. None can be drawn from there, that will conclude immediately, and, itself, reach the mark; without the addition of some further thing, which so ill sorts with the rest of their Doctrine that it would subvert the whole frame. That is, it follows not, that because men generally hold that there is a God, that therefore there is one, otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof. That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement, or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men, but this only; that it must have proceeded from one common cause, namely God himself; who having made man, so prime a part of his Creation, has stamped with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship; and purposely made and framed him to the acknowledgment and adoration of his Maker.

But how shall they argue so, who while they acknowledge a God, deny man to be his creature? And will have him and all things be by chance, or without dependence on any Maker? What can an impression infer to this purpose that comes no one can tell from where or how? But is plainly denied to be from him, whose being they would argue from it?

The observation of so common an apprehension in the minds of men, might (upon their supposition) beget much wonder, but no knowledge; and may perplex men much, how such a thing should come to pass, without making them any thing the wiser, and would infer astonishment sooner than a good conclusion: or than it would solidly prove any important truth.

And do they think they have salved the business, and given us a satisfying account of this matter, by telling us, this impression is from nature (as they speak)? It were to be wished some of them had told us, or could yet tell us, what they meant by nature. Is it any intelligent principle? Or was it guided by any such? If yes, from where came this impression, but from God himself? For surely an intelligent being, that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men, is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of, that are bodies and no bodies, have blood and no blood, members and no members, are somewhere, and nowhere; or if they be anywhere, are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world; with the affairs of which, or any other, they cannot any way concern themselves without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity. If they say no, and that nature which put this stamp upon the minds of men, is an utterly unintelligent thing, nor was ever governed by anything wiser than itself. Strange! that blind and undesigning nature, should, without being prompted, become thus ignorantly officious to these idle voluptuary godlings; and should so effectually take course they might be known to the world, who no way ever obliged it; nor were ever like to do! But to regress a little, fain I would know what is this thing they call nature? Is it anything else than the course and inclination of conspiring atoms, which singly are not pretended to bear any such impression; but as they luckily club and hit together in the composition of a human soul; by the merest and strangest chance that ever happened? But would we ever regard what they say whom we believe to speak by chance? Were it to be supposed that characters and words serving to make up some proposition or other, were by some strange agitation of wind and waves impressed and figured on the sand; would we if we really believed the matter came to pass only by such an odd casualty; think that proposition any whit the truer for being there, or take this for a demonstration of its truth, any more than if we had seen it in a ballad? Because men have casually come to think so, therefore there are such beings (to be called gods) between whom, and them, there never was, or shall be any intercourse or mutual concern. It follows as well as that because the staff stands in the corner, the morrow will be a rainy day. The dictates of nature are indeed most remarkable things, taken as expressions of his mind, or emanations from him who is the Author and God of nature. But abstracted from him, they are and signify as much as a beam cut off from the body of the sun. Or a person that pretends himself an ambassador without credentials.

Indeed (as is imported in the words noted from that grave pagan a little before) the principles of these men destroy quite nature itself as well as everything of religion. And leave us the names and show of them, but take away the things themselves. In sum, though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of; yet if there were, no such thing can be inferred from it, as they would infer. Their principles taking away all connection between the argument and what they would argue by it.

2. We have also too much reason to add, that as the supposition of such a being or sort of beings can have no sufficient ground; so it is equally inconceivable that it can be intended for any good end. Not that we think the last assertion a sufficient sole proof of this. For we easily acknowledge that it is possible enough men may harmlessly and with innocent intentions attempt the building of very weighty and important truths upon weak and insufficient foundations. Hoping they have offered that as a support to truth which proves only a useless cumber. Nor were it just to impute treachery where there is ground for the more charitable judgment that the misadventure proceeded only from want of judgment and shortness of discourse. But it is neither needful, nor seemly, the charity which can willingly overlook, in some cases, should therefore be quite blind. Or that no difference should be made of well-meant mistakes, and mischief thinly hid, and covered over with specious pretenses.

And let it be soberly considered, what can the design be, after the dismissing of all solid grounds for the proving of a deity, at length to acknowledge it upon none at all? As if their acknowledgment must owe itself, not to their reason, but their courtesy. And when they have done what they can, to make the rest of men believe they have no need to own any God at all, and they can tell how all that concerns the making and governing the world, may well enough be dispatched without any. Yet at last they will be so generous as to be content there shall be one however.

What, I say, can the design of this be, that they who have contended with all imaginable obstinacy against the most plain and convincing evidences, that do even defy cavil; have quite fought themselves blind, and lost their eyes in the encounter: so that they are ready to swear the Sun is a clod of dirt, and noonday light is to them the very blackness of darkness. They cannot see a Deity encircling them with the brightest beams and shining upon them with the most conspicuous glory, through every thing that occurs, and all things that encompass them on every side. And yet when all is done, and their thunder-struck eyes make them fancy they have put out the Sun, they have won the day, have cleared the field, and are absolute victors; they have vanquished the whole power of their most dreaded enemy, the light that reveals God in his works. After all this without any inducement at all, and having triumphed over every thing that looked like an argument to prove it. They vouchsafe to say however of their own accord There is a God. Surely if this have any design at all, it must be a very bad one. And see where it tends. They have now a God of their own making. And all the being he has depends upon their grace and favor. They are not his creatures, but he is theirs. A precarious Deity, that shall be as long, and what, and where they please to have him. And if he displease them, they can think him back into nothing. Here seems the depth of the design. For see with what cautions and limitations they admit him into being. There shall be a God provided he be not meddlesome, nor concern himself in their affairs, to the crossing of any inclinations or humors which they are pleased shall command and govern their lives. Being conscious that if they admit of any at all, that shall have to do with their concernments, he cannot but be such as the ways they resolve on will displease. Their very shame will not permit them to call that God, which if he take any cognizance at all of their course will dislike it. And herein that they may be the more secure, they judge it the most prudent course not to allow him any part or interest in the affairs of the world at all.

Yet all this while they court him at a great rate, and all religion is taken away, under pretense of great piety: worship they believe he cares not for, because he is full and needs nothing. In this world he must not be, for it is a place unworthy of him. He must have had no hand in framing. Nor can they think it fit he should have any in the government of it.

For it would be a great disturbance to him, and interrupt his pleasures. The same thing as if certain licentious courtiers impatient of being governed should address themselves to their prince in such a form of speech, that it is beneath him to receive any homage from them, it would too much debase majesty, that his dominions afford no place fit for his residence; and therefore it would be convenient for him to betake himself into some other country that has better air and accommodation for delight. That diadems and scepters are burdensome things. Which therefore if he will quit to them, he may wholly give up himself to ease and pleasure.

Indeed, whatever would any way tend to evince his necessary existence, is with the same courtship laid aside (although if he does not exist necessarily and of himself, he cannot have any existence at all: for as they do not allow him to be the cause of any thing, so they assign nothing to be the cause of him) that is, with pretense there is no need it should be demonstrated, because all men believe it without a reason; nature having impressed this belief upon the minds of all; or (which is all one) they having agreed to believe it because they believe it. But though they have no reason to believe a Deity, they have a very good one why they would seem to do so, that they may expiate with the people their irreligion by a collusive pretending against Atheism. And because they think it less plausible plainly to deny there is a God, they therefore grant one to please the vulgar, yet take care it shall be one as good as none, lest otherwise they should displease themselves. And so their credit and their liberty are both cared for together.

But this covering is too short, and the art by which they would fit it to their design, when it should cheat others, deceives themselves. For it is most evident.

3. That the being with the pretended belief whereof they would mock the world is no God; and that consequently, while they would seem to acknowledge a Deity they really acknowledge none at all.

Our contest has not all this while been a strife about words; or concerning the name, but the thing itself. And not whether there be such a thing in being to which that name may with whatever impropriety be given, but whether there be such a Being as to which it properly belongs. Supposing and taking for granted, as a matter out of question, that (even in their own sense) if such a Being, as we have described, does exist; it is most properly God. And that they will not go about to call it by another name. Or that they will not pretend this name agrees to any other thing so fitly as to him. And because we have already proved this being does exist; and that there can be but one such, it plainly follows theirs is in propriety of speech (even though he did exist) no God. And that, much less, should he appropriate the name, and exclude the only true God. For since the high and dignifying eulogies which they are accustomed to bestow upon their feigned deity do plainly show they would have it thought they esteem him the most excellent of all existent beings; if we have proved a really existent Being to be more excellent than he, it is evident even upon their own grounds that this is God. Here the Deity must be deferred. And theirs must yield, and give out. Inasmuch as we cannot suppose them so void of common sense as to say the less excellent being is God; and the more excellent is no God. But if they should be so, whereas the controversy is not about the name, we have our main purpose in having proved there is a being actually existent that has all the real excellencies which they ascribe to their deities, and infinitely more. And as concerning the name, who made them dictators to all the world? and the sole judges of the propriety of words? Or with what right or pretense will they assume so much to themselves? so as against the rest of the world to name that God, from which they cut off the principal perfections accustomed to be signified by that name? And if we speak of such perfections as tend to infer and establish religion and providence — who but themselves did ever call that God, in the eminent sense that they supposed could not hear prayers, and thereupon dispense favors, relieve the afflicted, supply the needy, and receive suitable acknowledgments? They indeed (says a famed writer of Roman history) that exercise themselves in the atheistical sorts of philosophy (if we may call that philosophy) as they are accustomed to jeer at all appearances of the Gods, whether among the Greeks or the Barbarians, will make themselves matter of laughter of our histories, not thinking that any God takes care of any man. Let the story he there tells shift for itself, in the mean time it appears they escaped not the infamy of atheists, who (whatever deities they might imagine besides) did deny God's presence and regard to men. Which sort of persons he elsewhere often animadverts upon.

But do we need to insist that all the rest of the world acknowledged no Gods, whom they did not also worship? What meant their temples, and altars, their prayers and sacrifices? Or did they take him for God, whom they believed to take no care of them, or from whom they expected no advantage? Even the barbarous Scythians themselves understood it most inseparably to belong to a deity to be beneficent, when they upbraidingly told Alexander, that if he were a God (as they it seems had heard he claimed himself to be) he should bestow benefits upon men, and not take from them what was their own.

And by the way it is observable how contradictious and repugnant the Epicurean sentiments are, in this, even to themselves: that speaking of friendship (of which they say many generous and brave things) they (gallantly) profess (as Plutarch testifies of them) that it is a more pleasant thing to benefit others than to receive benefits oneself. They yet, while they seem so greatly concerned that their Gods be every way most perfectly happy, deny to them this highest and most excellent part of felicity. That a virtuous man may a great deal more benefit the world than they; and, consequently, have more pure and lively relishes of a genuine and refined pleasure.

Upon the whole, it is manifest they so maim the notion of God, as to make it quite another thing. And if they think to wipe off any thing of the foul and odious blot with which their avowed irreligion has stained their name and memory, by the acknowledgment of such a God — they effect the like thing by it, and gain as much to the reputation of their piety, as he should, of his loyalty, who being accused of treason against his prince, shall think to vindicate himself, by professing solemnly to own the King. Provided you only mean by it the King of Clubs; or any such painted one the pack affords.

But here it may be demanded, is every misapprehension of God to be understood as a denial of his Being? If so, whom can we undertake to acquit of atheism? or who can certainly acquit himself? For how impossible is it to be sure we have no untrue conception of a Being so infinitely, by our own confession, above all our thoughts? Or how is it to be avoided, in somewhat or other to think amiss of so unknown and incomprehensibly excellent a Being? Either by detracting somewhat that belongs to it, or attributing somewhat that belongs not? And since many, we are sure, have thought and spoken unworthily of God, besides Epicureans, are all these to go into the account of atheists? Or whereas it is commonly accustomed to be said, whatever is in God, is God: how can they who deny any thing of him, which is really in him, be excused of denying his whole being? or where will we fix the bounds of our censure?

Many things should be said (if we will speak at all) to so manifold an inquiry. But it belongs not to the design of this discourse to examine and discuss all men's sentiments of God, that have been exposed to the view of the world; or arbitrate among the dissenting parties. Much less to explain or support every school maxim that has reference to this theme. The authors or lovers of which will be sufficiently prompted by their own genius to do, at least as much as can be requisite herein. But whatever the real sameness is supposed to be, of the things attributed to God, it is acknowledged we cannot but conceive of them as diverse. And so, that our conception of any one is not adequate to the entire object (which is confessed incomprehensible). Yet any one attribute gives a true notion of the object so far as it reaches, though not a full one. As I may be said truly to see a man, when I only see his face, and view not every part and limb; or to know him, while yet I have not had opportunity to discern every quality in his temper, and what his dispositions and inclinations in all respects are. Moreover it's one thing to deny any divine perfection, another only not to know it.

And such mere ignorance is so far from being guilty of the horrid crime of atheism, that it's not so much as culpable further than as it is obstinately persisted in against sufficient evidence: for we are not obliged to know every thing, but what is to us knowable, and what we are concerned to know. Again (and which is most considerable to our purpose) we are not concerned to know what God is in himself, otherwise than as we may thereby know what he is in relation to us, namely, as he is the author of our beings, the governor of our lives and actions, and thereupon the object of our religion. For a religious respect to him is the very end of that knowledge. Now, if any other than that sort of persons we oppose have taken up apprehensions of him, not so suitable to that end; it were to be wished they saw it, and would unthink all those thoughts. But surely, they who most professedly contend against the very notions themselves which directly influence all our practice toward God, so considered, would suggest such as are wholly inconsistent therewith, who oppose the knowledge of God to the end of that knowledge; and do not merely mistake the way to that end, while they are aiming at it, but most avowedly resist and disclaim the end itself; are to be distinguished from them who professedly intend that same end, only see not wherein their misapprehensions are prejudicial and repugnant to it: otherwise are ready to reject them. And the former are therefore most justly to be singled out and designed the objects of our most direct opposition. Nor are they so fitly to be opposed under any other notion as that of atheists. For since our knowledge of God ought chiefly to respect him in that aforementioned relative consideration, and the inquiry what is God? signifies, as it concerns us, what is the object of religion? — they denying any such thing, deny there is a God. Nor do they deny him in that relative consideration only; but (as every relation is founded in somewhat that is absolute) the very reason of their denying him, so, is that they deny in him those absolute and positive perfections that render him such, as certain of those do that have been proved to belong to him. Which is that we have next to consider, namely,

4. That it may evidently be deduced from what has been said, tending to prove those things of God which are included in the notion of him, and from that notion itself, that he is such as can converse with men.

That is, having proved [that there is an eternal self-subsisting independent necessary being of so great activity, life, power, wisdom, and goodness as to have been the maker of this world] — and by this medium [that we see this world is in being, which otherwise could never have been, much less such as we see it is] — it plainly follows that this great Creator can have influence upon the creatures he has made in a way suitable to their natures. It follows I say from the same medium [the present visible existence of this world which could not otherwise be now in being] that he can thus have influence upon his creatures: for it is hence manifest that he does; they depend on him; and are sustained by him: nor could they more subsist by themselves than they could make themselves, or of themselves have sprung out of nothing.

And if it were possible they could, being raised up into being, continue in being of themselves: yet since our present question is not concerning what they need, but what God can do — and our adversaries in the present cause, do not (as has been noted) upon any other pretense deny that he does concern himself in the affairs of the universe, but that he cannot (that is, that it consists not with his felicity, and he cannot not be happy) — is it not plain that he can with the same facility, continue the influence which he at first gave forth? And with as little prejudice to his felicity? For if it be necessary to him to be happy, or impossible not to be so; he must be ever so. His happiness was not capable of being discontinued so long as while he made the world, settled the several orders and kinds, and formed the first individuals of every kind of creatures. Therefore having done this, and without diminution to his happiness, was it a more toilsome and less tolerable labor to keep things as they were, than to make them so? If it was (which no man that understands common sense would say) surely that blind thing which they more blindly call nature (not understanding or being able to tell what they mean by it) and would have be the only cause of all things, acting at first to the uttermost, and having no way to recruit its vigor and reinforce itself, its labor and business being so much increased, had tired and grown weary; had given out, and patiently suffered all things to dissolve and relapse into the old chaos long ago. But if the labor was not greater to continue things in the state wherein they were made than to make them, surely a wise intelligent deity, which we have proved made them, could as well sustain them being made; as their brutish and (as unintelligible as) unintelligent nature do both.

So much then of intercourse, God could have with his creatures as his continual communication of his influence to be received by them amounts to. And then, man, not being excluded from their number, must share in this possible privilege according to the capacity of his nature.

And inasmuch as we have also proved (more particularly) concerning man, that he immediately owes the peculiar excellencies of his intelligent nature, as it's such to God only. It is apparently consequent, that having formed this his more excellent creature according to his own more express likeness, stamped it with the glorious characters of his living image, given it a nature suitable to his own, and thereby made it capable of rational and intelligent converse with him. He has it ever in his power to maintain a continual converse with this creature, by agreeable communications. By letting in upon it the vital beams and influences of his own light and love, and receiving back the return of its grateful acknowledgements and praises. Wherein it is manifest he should do no greater thing than he has done. For who sees not that it is a matter of no greater difficulty to converse with, than to make a reasonable creature? Or who would not be ashamed to deny that he who has been the only Author of the soul of man, and of the excellent powers and faculties belonging to it, can more easily sustain what he has made? And converse with that his creature suitably to the way wherein he has made it capable of his converse?

To this, the consideration being added of his gracious nature (manifested in this creation itself) it is further evident, that he is (as things are now ordered — whereof more hereafter) not only able, but apt and ready to converse with men in such a way as shall tend to the improving of their being to that blessedness whereof he has made them naturally capable. If their own voluntary alienation and aversion to him (yet not overcome) do not obstruct the way of that intercourse.

And even this were sufficient to give foundation to a Temple, and both afford encouragement and infer an obligation to Religion; although no other perfection had been or could be demonstrated of the Divine Being, than what is immediately to be collected from his works, and the things whereof he has been the sole and most arbitrary Author. For what if no more were possible to be proved, have we not, even by thus much, a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our homage and adoration? He that could make and sustain such a world as this, how inexpressibly does he surpass in greatness the most excellent of all mortal creatures! To some or other, of whom, upon some (merely accidental) dignifying circumstances, we justly esteem ourselves to owe a dutiful observance and subjection.

If he did not comprehend within his own Being simply all perfection: If there were many Gods, and Worlds besides; and he only the Creator and absolute Lord of our vortex, were not that enough to entitle him to all the obedience and service we could give him? And enable him sufficiently to reward it? And render his presence and cherishing influences (which he could every where diffuse within this circle and limited portion of the universe) even infinitely desirable to us?

Indeed, if he were only the entire Author of our own particular Being, how much more is that than the partial subordinate interest of a human parent? To whom (as even an Epicurean would confess) nature itself urges and exacts a duty. The refusal whereof, even barbarian ingenuity would abhor, indeed, and brutal instinct condemn? How much greater and more absolute is the right which the parentage of our whole being challenges? If every man were created by a several God, whose creative power were confined to only one such creature, and each one were the solitary product, and the charge of an appropriate Deity; whose dominion the state of things would allow to be extended so far, only, and no further, were there therefore no place left for Religion? Or no tie to love, reverence, obedience, and adoration, because the Author of my being comprehended not in himself all perfection? When as yet he comprehended so much as to be the sole cause of all that is in me? And his power over me, and his goodness to me, are hereby supposed the same, which the only one God, truly has and exercises towards all? If all that I am and have be from him, I cannot surely owe to him less than all?

Such as have either had, or supposed themselves to have, their particular tutelary Genii, (of whom there will be more occasion to take notice hereafter) though they reckoned them but a sort of deputed or vicarious Deities, underling Gods whom they never accounted the causes of their being; yet how have they desired and gloried to open their breasts, to become their Temples, and entertain the converse of those (supposed) Divine inhabitants? If they had taken one of these, to be their alone Creator, how much greater had their veneration and their homage been? This it may be hoped, will be thought sufficiently proved in this discourse (at least to have been so by some or other) that we are not of ourselves; and that our extraction is to be fetched higher than from matter, or from only human progenitors. Nothing that is earthly and mortal could be the author of such powers as we find in ourselves. We are most certainly the offspring of some or other Deity. And he that made us knows us thoroughly, can apply himself inwardly to us, receive our addresses and applications, our acknowledgments and adoration. To which we should have even upon these terms great and manifest obligation, although nothing more of the excellency and perfection of our Creator were certainly known to us.

But it has been further shown that the necessary being from where we sprang, is also an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being. That necessary Being cannot be less perfect, than to include the entire and inexhaustible fullness of all being and perfection. That therefore the God to whom this notion belongs, must, consequently, be every way sufficient to all, and be himself but one. The only source and fountain of all life and Being; the common basis and support of the universe; the absolute Lord of this great Creation, and the central object of the common concurrent trust, fear, love, and other worship of his intelligent and reasonable creatures.

And therefore there remains no greater or other difficulty in apprehending how he can, without disturbance to himself, or interruption of his own felicity, intend all the concernments of his creatures, apply himself to them according to their several exigencies, satisfy their desires and cravings, inspect and govern their actions and affairs; than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect. of which if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once, that is, though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of God in the same thought (as our eye cannot behold at one view every part of an over-large object to which however, part by part, it may be successively applied) we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect, or such to whom we are sure no perfection is wanting. And can successively contemplate this or that, as we are occasionally led to consider them. And can answer to ourselves difficulties that occur to us, with this easy, sure, and ever ready solution; that he can do all things, that nothing is too hard for him, that he is full, all-sufficient, and every way perfect. of which we are the more confirmed that we find we cannot by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts, ever reach any bound or end of that perfection which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being.

And this we have reason to take for a very sufficient answer to any doubt that can arise, concerning the possibility of his converse with us, unless we will be so unreasonable as to pretend that what is brought for solution has greater difficulty in it than the doubt. Or that because we cannot apprehend at once, infinite perfection, therefore it cannot be, which were as much as to say, that it cannot be because it is infinite; for it were not infinite if we could distinctly apprehend it. And so were to make it a reason against itself, which is most injuriously and with no pretense attempted, except we could show an inconsistency in the terms which it is plain we can never do; and should most idly attempt. And it were to make our present apprehension the measure of all reality; against our experience, which (if our indulgence to that self-magnifying conceit do not suspend our further inquiries and researches) would daily bring to our notice things we had no apprehension of before.

It were instead of that just and laudable ambition of becoming ourselves like God in his imitable perfections, to make him like ourselves. The true model of the Epicurean Deity.

Nor can anything be more easy than that wherein we pretend so great a difficulty; that is to apprehend somewhat may be more perfect than we can apprehend. What else but proud ignorance can hinder us from seeing that the more we know, the more there is that we know not? How often are we outdone by creatures of our own order in the creation! How many men are there whom we are daily constrained to admire, as unspeakably excelling us, and whom we cannot but acknowledge to be far more knowing, discerning, apprehensive of things, of more composed minds, of more penetrating judgments, of more quick and nimble wits, easily turning themselves to great variety of objects and affairs without distraction and confusion, of more equal and dispassionate tempers, less liable to commotion and disturbance than ourselves.

How absurd and senseless a pretense is it, against the thing itself, that we cannot apprehend an infinite perfection in one common fountain of all perfection; or because we cannot go through a multitude of businesses without distraction, that therefore he that made us and all things cannot. If we would make ourselves the measure, it is likely we should confess we were outstripped, when we are told that Julius Caesar could dictate letters when he was intent upon the greatest affairs to four (and if he had nothing else to divert him to seven) secretaries at once. That Cyrus could call by name all the soldiers in his numerous army. With various other strange instances of like nature. And since the perfections of some so far exceed the measure of the most, why is it then inconceivable that divine perfection should so far surpass all, as that God may intend the affairs of the world according to the several exigencies of his creatures without any unwelcome diversion to himself, or diminution to his felicity? And since they who partake of some and but a small portion of perfection only; can be concerned in many affairs with little trouble, why cannot he that comprehends all perfection be concerned in all without any? For though we have in what has been last said endeavored to represent it as not so incomprehensible as is pretended that it may be so, we take it in the meantime as formerly sufficiently proved that so it is, that God is a being absolutely perfect, or that includes eminently all perfection in himself.

Which general perfection of his Being as it modifies all his attributes, so we shall particularly take notice that it does so, as to those that have a more direct influence upon, and tend more fully to demonstrate, his conversableness with men. As first: his wisdom or knowledge (for we need not be so precise as at present to distinguish them) must be omniscience. About which, if any place were left for rational doubt, it would be obvious to them to allege it, who are of slower inclinations toward religion. And object (against all applications to, or expectations from him) that if we be not sure he knows simply all things so as wisely to consider them, and resolve fittingly about them, it will be no little difficulty to determine, which he does, and which not; or to be at a certainty that this or that concernment of theirs about which they might address themselves to him be not among the unknown things. At least, we shall the less need to be precise in distinguishing, or to consider what things may be supposed rather than other, to be without the compass of his knowledge; if it appear that it universally encompasses all things. Or that nothing can be without its reach. And because we suppose it, already, out of doubt, that the true notion of God imports a Being absolutely or every way perfect; nothing else can be doubted in this matter, but, whether the knowledge of all things be a perfection?

The greatest difficulty that has troubled some in this matter has been, how it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause. But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things, imports greater perfection, than not to know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, because we cannot show how this or that thing was performed, which manifestly is done; therefore to deny that it is done at all. So far is it that we can with any show of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown thing, and impossible to be determined, how the act of vision is performed by us: were it a wise conclusion, that therefore we neither do nor can see? How much more rash and presuming a confidence were it to reason thus concerning the Divine acts and perfections! Would we not in any such case be determined rather by that which is more evident, than by what is more obscure? As in the assigned instance: we should have but these two propositions to compare [that I do (or have such a perfection belonging to me that I can) see] and [that whatever act I do or can do, I am able to understand the course and method of nature's operation therein.] And thereupon to judge which of these two is more evident. Wherein it may be supposed there's no man in his wits to whom the determination would not be easy. Accordingly in the present case we have only these two assertions that can be in competition in point of evidence, between which we are to make a comparison and a (consequent) judgment, namely, [whatever perfection belongs to a Being absolutely perfect, enabling it to do this or that, the wit of man can comprehend the distinct way and manner of doing it] and [it imports greater perfection to know all things, than to be ignorant of some] and here surely whoever shall think the determination difficult, accounts the wit of man so exceeding great that he discovers his own to be very little. For what can the pretense of evidence be in the former assertion? Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we venture to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to ourselves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing, what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of God's knowing things? And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge more perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view, before, altogether unknown? And will not that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie concealed from the penetrating eye of God? For whatever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them when we ourselves can! And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to ourselves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things, now fallen out, all at once, we but by degrees, while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us. But why should it be thought unreasonable to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours, as well in respect of the manner of knowing, as the multitude of objects, at once, known? We will readily confess in some creatures an excellency of their visual faculty above our own; that they can see things in that darkness, wherein they are, to us, invisible. And will we not allow that to the eye of God, which is as a flame of fire, to be able to penetrate into the most abstruse darkness of futurity, though we know not the way how it is done; when yet we know that whatever belongs to the most perfect being, must belong to his? And that knowledge of all things, imports more perfection, than if it were lessened by the ignorance of any thing.

Some who have thought the certain foreknowledge of future contingencies not attributable to God, have reckoned the matter sufficiently excused; by this that it no more detracts from the Divine omniscience, to place without the object of it, things not possible, or that imply a contradiction (as they suppose these to do) to be known, than it does from his omnipotence, that it cannot do what is impossible, or that implies a contradiction to be done.

But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike: inasmuch as the supposition of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omniscience, as the latter to omnipotence. For [all things] should not be alike the object of both. And why should not that be understood to signify the knowledge of simply all things; as well as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should all things included in these two words, signify so very differently, that is there properly all things, here some things only. And why must we so differentiate the object of omniscience and omnipotence, as to make that so much narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when so great a number of things will be left excluded? Whereas from the object of omnipotence (that we may prevent what would be replied) there will be no exclusion of any thing. Not of the things which are actually already made; for they are still momently reproduced by the same power. Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for when they become actual God does certainly perform the part of the first cause (even by common consent) in order to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is. Therefore they are in the meantime to be esteemed within the object of omnipotence, or to be of the things which God can do, namely, as the first cause virtually including the power of the second.

But more strictly; all impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and conditional. What is absolutely or naturally impossible, or repugnant in itself, is not properly any thing. Whatever simple being not yet existent we can form any conception of is producible, and so within the compass of omnipotency; for there is no repugnancy in simplicity. That wherein therefore we place natural impossibility, is the inconsistency of being this thing, whose notion is such, and another wholly and entirely; whose notion is diverse, at the same time (that which, more barbarously than insignificantly, has been wont to be called incompossibility). But surely all things are properly enough said to be naturally possible to God, while all simple beings are producible by him, of which any notion can be formed; indeed and compounded so as by their composition to result into a third thing. So that it is not an exception to say that it is naturally impossible this thing should be another thing, and yet be wholly itself still at once, that it should be and not be, or be without itself. There is not within the compass of actual or conceivable being, such a thing. Nor is it reasonable to except such actions as are naturally possible to other agents, but not to him; as to walk, for instance, or the like. Inasmuch as, though the excellency of his nature permits not they should be done by him; yet since their power of doing them proceeds wholly from him, he has it virtually and eminently in himself. As was formerly said of the infiniteness of his being. And for moral impossibility, as to lie, to do an unjust act; that God never does them proceeds not from want of power, but an eternal aversion of will. It cannot be said he is not able to do such a thing, if he would, but so is his will qualified and conditioned, by its own unchangeable rectitude, that he most certainly never will, or such things as are in themselves evil are never done by him, not through the defect of natural power, but from the permanent stability and fullness of all moral perfection. And it is not without the compass of absolute omnipotency to do what is but conditionally impossible. The absence of which restrictive condition, would rather bespeak impotency and imperfection than omnipotency. Therefore the object of omnipotence is simply all things. Why not of omniscience as well? It may be said that [all things] as it signifies the object of omniscience is only restrained by the act or faculty, signified therewith in the same word, so as to denote the formal object of that faculty or act, namely, all knowable things. But surely that act must suppose some agent, to whom that knowable has reference. Knowable — to whom? To others, or to God himself? If we say the former, it is indeed a great honor we put upon God, to say he can know as much as others: if the latter, we speak absurdly, and only say he can know all that he can know. It were fairer to deny omniscience than so interpret it.

But if it be denied, what shall the pretense be? Why, that it implies a contradiction that future contingents should be certainly known: for they are uncertain, and nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is.

And it must be acknowledged that to whom any thing is uncertain, it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known. But that such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with, in what follows in that cited author or elsewhere. All which will amount to no more than this, that such things as we cannot tell how God knows them, must needs be unknown to him. But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God (and, of them, such as, we may be also sure, he never intended to effect) we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. And for the manner of his knowing them, it is better to profess ignorance about it, than attempt the explication thereof, either unintelligibly, as some have, to no purpose, or dangerously and impiously, as others have ventured to do, to very bad purpose. And it well becomes us to suppose an infinite understanding may have ways of knowing things which we know nothing of. To my apprehension, that last mentioned author does, with ill success, attempt an explication of God's manner of knowing this sort of things, by the far less intelligible notion, of the indivisibility of eternity, comprehending (as he says) all the parts of time, not successively, but together. And though he truly says that the Scotists' way of expressing how future contingents are present to God, that is, according to their objective and intentional being, only, affords us no account why God knows them, for which cause he rejects it; and follows that of the Thomists, who will have them to be present according to their real and actual existence. I should yet prefer the deficiency of the former way, before the contradictoriness and repugnancy of the latter; and conceive those words in the Divine Dialogues, as good an explication of the manner of his knowledge, as the case can admit, (which yet is but the Scotists' sense) — that the whole evolution of times and ages, is so collectedly, and presentifickly represented to God, at once, as if all things and actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very instant, and so always really present and existent before him. Which is no wonder, the animadversion and intellectual comprehension of God, being absolutely infinite, according to the truth of his idea. I do therefore think that a sober resolution in this matter is that it seems more safe, to allow this privilege to the infinite understanding of God, than to venture at all to circumscribe his omniscience: for though it may safely be said, that he knows not any thing that really implies a contradiction to be known; yet we are not assured but that may seem a contradiction to us, that is not so really in itself.

Only, as to that instance of the commensurableness of the diagonal line of a quadrate to one of the sides; whereas, though there are great difficulties on both sides, namely, that these are commensurable, and that they are not; yet any man's judgment would rather incline to the latter as the easier part: I should therefore also think it more safe, to make choice of that, as the parallel of the present difficulty.

Upon the whole we may conclude that the knowledge of God is every way perfect; and being so, extends to all our concernments. And that nothing remains, upon that account to make us decline applying ourselves to religious conversations with him; or deny him the honor and entertainment of a temple. For which we shall yet see further cause, when we consider next, that his power is also omnipotence. Which (though the discourse of it have been occasionally somewhat mingled with that of the last) might be directly spoken of for the fuller demonstration of that his conversableness with men which religion and a temple do suppose. Nor indeed is it enough that he knows our concernments, except he can also provide effectually about them, and dispose of them to our advantage. And we cannot doubt, but he, who could create us, and such a world as this, can do so, even though he were supposed not omnipotent. But even that, itself, seems a very unreasonable supposition; that less than infinite power should suffice to the creation of anything. For however liable it may be to controversy, what a second cause might do herein; being assisted by the infinite power of the first: it seems altogether unimaginable, to us, how, though the power of all men were not in one (which we will easily suppose to be a very vast power) it could, alone, be sufficient to make the minutest atom arise into being out of nothing. And that all the matter of the universe has been so produced out of nothing, it will be no great presumption to suppose already fully proved; in that, though any such thing as necessary matter were admitted, yet its essential unalterableness would render it impossible it should be the matter of the universe. Therefore when we cannot devise what finite power can ever suffice (suppose we it never so much increased, but still finite) to the doing of that which we are sure is done, what is left us to suppose, but that the power which did it is simply infinite: much more when we consider, not only that something actually is produced out of nothing, but do also seriously contemplate the nature of the production. Which carries so much of amazing wonder in it everywhere, that even the least and most minute things might serve for sufficient instances of the unlimited greatness of that power which made them. As would be seen; if we did industriously set ourselves to compare the effects of divine power with those of human art and skill. As is the ingenious and pious observation of the most worthy Mr. Hooke, who upon his viewing with his Microscope the point of a small and very sharp needle (than which we cannot conceive a smaller thing labored by the hand of man) takes notice of sundry sorts of natural things, that have points many thousand times sharper: those of the hairs of insects, etc. That appearing broad, irregular and uneven, having marks upon it, of the rudeness and bungling of art. So inaccurate (says he) is it in all its productions, even in those that seem most neat, that, if examined truly with an organ more acute than that by which they were made, the more we see of their shape the less appearance will there be of their beauty; whereas in the works of nature the [reconstructed: deepest] discoveries show us the greatest excellencies. An evident argument that he that was the author of these things was no other than omnipotent, being able to include as great a variety of parts in the yet smallest discernible point, as in the vaster bodies (which comparatively are called also points) such as the Earth, Sun, or Planets. And I may add, when those appear but points, in comparison of his so much vaster work, how plainly does that also argue to us the same thing?

And let us strictly consider the matter. Omnipotence, as has been said, imports a power of doing all things possible to be done, or indeed, simply all things; to which passive power, an active one must necessarily correspond. That is, there is nothing in itself possible to be done, but it is also possible to some one or other to do it. If we should therefore suppose God not omnipotent, it would follow some one or other were able to do more than God. For though possibility does import a non-repugnancy in the thing to be done; yet it also connotes an ability in some agent to do it. Therefore there is nothing possible which some agent cannot do. And if so, that agent must either be God or some other. To say it is God, is what we intend. That is, there is nothing possible which God cannot do. Or he can do all things. But to say it is some other and not God, were to open the door to the above-mentioned horrid consequence; which no one that acknowledges a God (and we are not now discoursing with them who simply deny his being) would not both blush and tremble to avow.

Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsic possibility of anything, and say that things are only said to be possible because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain God's omnipotence, that is, that he can do all things which he can do. And makes a chimera no more impossible in itself to be produced than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is that what is only possible is nothing; and therefore can have nothing intrinsic to it. As if it were not sufficient to the intrinsic possibility of a thing, that its idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their ideas, as it is to say they are only possible because some agent can do them. Inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both, that there is no repugnancy in their ideas (which if there be, they are every way nothing, as has been said before) and also, that there is a sufficient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured when we consider that he is? Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most unquestionable perfection, necessarily included, in the notion of an absolutely perfect being. But here we need not further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, (as indeed he would have had a hard province who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotence.)

And now join herewith again the boundlessness of his goodness; which upon the same ground of his absolute perfection, must be infinite also, (and which it is of equal concern to us to consider, that we may understand he not only can effectually provide about our concerns, but is most graciously inclined so to do.) And then what rational inducement is wanting to religion and the dedication of a temple? If we consider the joint encouragement that arises from so unlimited power and goodness? Or what man would not become entirely devoted to him, who, by the one of these, we are assured, can do all things, and by the other, will do what is best.

Nor therefore is there anything immediately needful to our present purpose, the eviction of God's conversableness with men, more than has been already said. That is, there is nothing else to be thought on, that has any nearer influence thereon. The things that can be supposed to have such influence being none else than his power, knowledge and goodness, which have been particularly evinced from the creation of the world, both to have been in some former subject, and to have all originally met in a necessary being, that alone could be the creator of it. Which necessary being, as it is such, appearing, also, to be infinite and absolutely perfect; the influence of these cannot but the more abundantly appear to be such as can and may most sufficiently and fully correspond both in general to the several exigencies of all creatures, and more especially to all the real necessities and reasonable desires of man. So that our main purpose seems already gained.

Yet because it may be grateful when we are persuaded that things are so, to fortify (as much as we can) that persuasion. And because our persuasion concerning these attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him everywhere present. Nor can it well be conceivable, otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power, and goodness can be so universal, as will be thought necessary to infer a universal obligation to religion. It will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his omnipresence, or, because some that love to be very strictly critical will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat, one may be said present to, whereas they will say without the universe is nothing) we will rather choose to call it immensity. For though it would sufficiently answer our purpose that his presence be universal to all his creatures; yet even this is to be proved by such arguments as will conclude him simply immense. Which therefore will with the greater advantage infer the thing we intend.

This part of divine perfection we will acknowledge to have been impugned by some that have professed much devotedness to a deity and religion; we will therefore charitably suppose that opposition to have been joined with inadvertency of the ill tendency of it, that is, how unwarrantably it would maim the notion of the former and shake the foundations of the latter. Nor therefore ought that charity to be any allay to a just zeal for so great concerns.

It seems then, first, manifestly repugnant to the notion of an infinitely perfect being to suppose it less than simply immense. For, upon that supposition, it must either be limited to some certain place, or excluded out of all. The latter of these would be most openly to deny it; as has, with irrefragable evidence, been abundantly manifested by the most learned Doctor More; whereto it would be needless and vain to attempt to add anything. Nor is that the thing pretended to by the sort of persons I now chiefly intend.

And for the former, I would inquire; Is amplitude of essence no perfection? Or were the confining of this being to the very minutest space we can imagine, no detraction from the perfection of it? What if the amplitude of that glorious and ever-blessed essence were said to be only of that extent (may it be spoken with all reverence, and resentment of the unhappy necessity we have of making so mean a supposition) as to have been confined to that one temple to which of old he chose to confine his more solemn worship; that he could be essentially present only here at once and nowhere else, were this no detraction? They that think him only to replenish and be present by his essence in the highest heaven (as some are wont to speak) would they not confess it were a meaner and much lower thought to suppose that presence circumscribed within the so inconceivably narrower limits, as the walls of a house? If they would pretend to ascribe to him some perfection beyond this; by supposing his essential presence commensurable to the vaster territory of the highest heavens, even by the same supposition should they deny to him greater perfection than they ascribe. For the perfection which in this kind they should ascribe were finite only, but that which they should deny were infinite.

Again, they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect being; therefore they will grant, he can create another world (for they do not pretend to believe this infinite; and if they did, by their supposition, they should give away their cause) at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this: therefore so far his power can extend itself. But what, his power without his being? What then is his power? Something, or nothing? Nothing can do nothing; therefore not make a world. It is then some being, and whose being is it but his own? Is it a created being? That is to suppose him first impotent, and then to have created omnipotency, when he could do nothing. From where by the way, we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applied in the present case of essential and virtual contact, where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same.

But shall it be said, he must in order to the creating such another world, locally move there where he designs it? I ask then, but can he not at the same time create thousands of worlds at any distance from this round about it? No man can imagine this to be impossible to him that can do all things. Therefore of such extent is his power and consequently his being.

Will they therefore say he can immensely, if he please, diffuse his being but he voluntarily contracts it? It is answered that is altogether impossible to a being that is whatever it is by a simple and absolute necessity: for whatever it is necessarily, it is unalterably and eternally, or is pure act and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not. Therefore since God can every where exert his power, he is necessarily, already, every where. And hence God's immensity is the true reason of his immobility; there being no imaginable space which he does not necessarily replenish.

From where also the supposition of his being so confined (as was said) is immediately repugnant to the notion of a necessary being, as well as of an absolutely perfect, which has been argued from it.

We might moreover add that, upon the same supposition, God might truly be said to have made a creature greater than himself (for such this universe apparently were) and that he can make one (as they must confess who deny him not to be omnipotent) most inconceivably greater.

Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense; or (as we may express it) extrinsically infinite, with respect to place; as well as intrinsically, in respect to the plenitude of his being and perfection. Only it may be requisite to consider, briefly, what is said against it, by the otherwise minded, that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense. Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds, their strength, namely, of argument (for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the texts of Scripture used to be insisted on in this matter) shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them. And that shall be Curcellaeus, who gives it, as succinctly and fully, as any I have met with of that sort of men.

The doctrine itself we may take from him thus. First (on the negative part by way of denial of what we have been hitherto asserting) he says, the foundation (that is of a distinction of Maresius's to which he is replying, for so occasionally comes in the discourse) namely, the infinity of the divine essence, is not so firm as is commonly thought.

And that therefore it may be thought less firm, he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it, by making it the doctrine of the Stoics, expressed by Virgil, Jovis omnia plena (as if it must needs be false because Virgil said it, though I could tell, if it were worth the while where Virgil speaks more agreeably to this sense than ours, according to which he might as well have interpreted this passage as divers texts of Scripture — and then his authority might have been of some value) and by Lucan, who helps it seems to disgrace and spoil it, Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris (he might if he had a mind to make it thought pagan, have quoted a good many more, but then there might have been some danger it should pass for a common notion). Next he quotes some passages of Fathers that import dislike of it. About which we need not concern ourselves. For the question is not what this or that man thought.

And then for the positive account of his own judgment in the case, having recited divers texts out of the Bible that seemed as he apprehended to make against him, he would have us believe, that these all speak rather of God's providence and power by which he concerns himself in all our works, words, and thoughts, wherever we live, than of the absolute infinity of his essence.

And afterwards, that God is by his essence in the supreme heaven, where he inhabits the inaccessible light, but from there he sends out from himself a spirit or a certain force, wherever he pleases, by which he is truly present and works there.

But let us proceed to his reasons, which he says are not to be contemned. We shall therefore not contemn them so far as not to take notice of them; which trouble also the reader may please to be at; and, afterward, do, as he thinks fit.

1. That no difference can be conceived between God and creatures, if God as they commonly speak, be, wholly, in every point; or do fill all the points of the universe with his whole essence. For so whatever at all is will be God himself.

Answer. And that is most marvelous that the in-being of one thing in another must needs take away all their difference, and confound them each with other: which sure would much rather argue them distinct. For certainly it cannot, without great impropriety, be said that any thing is in itself: and is both the container and contained. How were these thoughts in his mind? And these very notions which he opposes to each other, so as not to be confounded with his mind, and consequently with one another? So that it is a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once. And how did he think his soul to be in his body, which, though substantially united with it (and that is somewhat more, as we will suppose he knew was commonly held, than to be intimately present) was not yet the same thing. However himself acknowledges the power and providence of God to be every where. And then at least every thing must it seems be the very power and providence of God. But he thought it may be only of confuting the words of Lucan, and chastising his poetic liberty. And if he would have been at the pains to turn all their strains and raptures into propositions, and so have gravely fallen to confuting them, he might perhaps have found as proper an exercise for his logic as this. As for his talk of a whole, whereof we acknowledge no parts (as if he imagined the divine essence to be compounded of such, he should have said so and have proved it) it is an absurd scheme of speech which may be left to him, and them that use it to make their best of.

2. No idolatry can be committed if there be not the least point to be found, that is not wholly full of whole God. For wherever worship shall be directed, it shall be directed to God himself, who will be no less there than in heaven.

Answ. This proceeds upon the supposition that the former would be granted as soon as it should be heard, as a self-evident principle, that whatever is in another is that in which it is. And so his consequence were most undeniable. But though we acknowledge God to be in every thing, yet so to worship him in any thing, as if his essential presence were confined thereto, while it ought to be conceived of as immense, this is Idolatry. And therefore they who so conceive of it as confined (or tied in any respect, wherein he has not so tied it himself) are concerned to beware of running upon this rock.

3. Nor can the opinion of Fanatics be solidly refuted, who call themselves spiritual, when they determine God to be all in all. To do not only good but evil things; because he is to be accounted to be essentially in all the atoms of the world, in whole; and as a common soul by which all the parts of the universe do act.

Answ. We may in time make trial whether they can be refuted or no; or whether any solid ground will be left for it. At this time it will suffice to say, that though he be present every where as a necessary Being, yet he acts as a free cause. And according as his wisdom, his good pleasure, his holiness, and justice do guide his action.

4. So God will be equally present with the wicked and with the holy and godly, with the damned in Hell and Devils, as with the blessed in Heaven or Christ himself.

Answ. So he will in respect of his essential presence. How he is otherwise (distinguishingly enough) present in his Temple, we shall have occasion hereafter to show.

5. That I say not how shameful it is to think that the most pure and holy God should be as much in the most nasty places as in heaven, etc. (I forbear to recite the rest of this uncleanly argument, which is strong in nothing but ill savour.) But for

Answ. How strange a notion was this of holiness, by which it is set in opposition to corporal filthiness! As if a holy man should lose, or very much blemish his sanctity, by a casual fall into a puddle. Indeed if sense must give us measures of God, and every thing must be reckoned an essence to him that is so to it; we shall soon frame to our selves a God altogether such a one as our selves. The Epicureans themselves would have been ashamed to reason or conceive thus of God, who tell us the Divine Being is as little capable of receiving a stroke as the inane. And surely (in proportion) of any sensible offence, we might as well suppose him in danger, as Doctor More fitly expresses it, to be hurt with a thorn, as offended with an ill smell.

We have then enough to assure us of God's absolute immensity and omnipresence, and nothing of that value against it as ought to shake our belief herein. And surely the consideration of this, added to the other of his perfections (and which tends so directly to facilitate and strengthen our persuasion concerning the rest) may render us assuredly certain, that we shall find him a conversable Being. If we seriously apply our selves to converse with him, and will but allow him the liberty of that Temple within us, of which we are hereafter (with his leave and help) to treat more distinctly and at large.