Chapter 2: The Existence of God and His Conversableness with Men

The two more principal grounds which a temple supposes: 1. The existence of God. 2. His conversableness with men: both argued from common consent. The former doubtful if ever wholly denied in former days. The latter also implied in the known general practice of some or other religion. Evidenced, in that some, no strangers to the world, have thought it the difference of man. The immodesty and rashness of the persons from whom any opposition can be expected. These two grounds proposed to be more strictly considered apart. And first the existence of God. Where first the notion of God is assigned. The parts of which are proposed to be evidenced severally of some existent being: 1. Eternity. 2. Self-origination. 3. Independence. 4. Necessity of existence. 5. Self-activity. The impossibility this world should be this necessary self-active being. The inconsistency of necessary alterable matter, more largely deduced in a marginal digression. 6. Life. 7. Vast and mighty power. A corollary.

Now the grounds more necessary to be laid down, and which are supposed in the most general notion of a temple, are especially these two;

- The existence of God, and - His conversableness with men,

For no notion of a temple can more easily occur to anyone's thoughts, or is more agreeable to common acceptation, than that it is a habitation wherein God is pleased to dwell among men.

Therefore to the designation and use of it, or (which is all one) to the intention and exercise of religion, the belief or persuasion is necessary of those two things (the same which we find made necessary on the same account) — that God is, and that he is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him (Hebrews 11:6); as will appear when the manner and design of that his abode with men shall be considered.

These are the grounds upon which the sacred frame of a temple ought to stand, and without which it must be acknowledged an unsupported, airy fabric. And since it were vain to discourse what a temple is, or where the notion of it may be applied, unless it be well resolved that there is, or ought to be any such thing, the strength and firmness of this its double ground should be tried and searched, and of its pretensions thereto.

And though it be not necessary in a matter that is so plain, and wherein so much is to be said otherwise, yet it will not be impertinent to consider, first, what prescription (which in clearing of titles is not wont to signify nothing) will signify in the present case.

First, for the existence of God, we need not labor much to show how constantly and generally it has been acknowledged through the whole world, it being so difficult to produce an uncontroverted instance of any that ever denied it in more ancient times. For as for them whose names have been infamous among men heretofore upon that account, there has been that said that, at least, wants not probability for the clearing them of so foul an imputation: that is, that they were maliciously represented as having denied the existence of a deity, because they impugned and derided the vulgar conceits, and poetical fictions of those days concerning the multitude, and the ridiculous attributes of their imaginary deities. Of which sort Cicero mentions not a few: their being inflamed with anger, and mad with lust, their wars, fights, wounds, their hatreds, discords, their births and deaths, etc. Who though he speak less favorably of some of these men, and mentions one as doubting whether there were any gods or no (for which cause his book in the beginning of which he had intimated that doubt, as Cotta is brought in informing us, was publicly burnt at Athens, and himself banished his country) and two others as expressly denying them; yet the more generally decried patron of atheism (as he has been accounted) he makes Velleius highly vindicate from this imputation, and say of him that he was the first that took notice that even nature itself had impressed the notion of God upon the minds of all men: who also gives us these as his words, What nation is there or sort of men that has not without teaching, a certain anticipation of the gods, which he calls a prolepsis, a certain preventive, or fore-conceived information of a thing in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, or sought, or disputed of. To which purpose the same author (as is commonly observed) elsewhere speaks: that there is no nation so barbarous, no one of all men so savage, as that some apprehension of the gods has not tinctured his mind. That many do think indeed corruptly of them, which is (says he) the effect of vicious custom. But all do believe there is a divine power and nature. Nor (as he there proceeds) has men's talking and agreeing together effected this. It is not an opinion settled in men's minds by public constitutions and sanctions. But in every matter the consent of all nations is to be reckoned a law of nature.

And whatever the apprehensions of those few (and some others that are wont to be mentioned under the same vile character) were in this matter, yet so inconsiderable has the dissent been; that, as another most ingenious pagan author writes, In so great a contention and variety of opinions (that is concerning what God is) herein you shall see the law and reason of every country to be harmonious and one. That there is one God the King and Father of all — that the many are but the servants and co-rulers to God. That herein the Greek and the barbarian says the same thing, the islander and the inhabitant of the continent, the wise and the foolish: go to the utmost bounds of the ocean, and you find God there. But if (says he) in all time there have been two or three, an atheistical, vile, senseless sort of persons, whose own eyes and ears deceive them, and who are maimed in their very soul, an irrational and sterile sort, as monstrous creatures, as a lion without courage, an ox without horns, or a bird without wings — yet out of those you shall understand somewhat of God. For they know and confess him whether they will or no. Yea, and the use of a temple, and the exercise of religion (which suppose the second ground also as well as the first) have been so very common (though not altogether equally common with the former), that it is the observation of that famed moralist, that if one travels the world, it is possible to find cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without wealth, without coin, without schools and theaters. But a city without a temple, or that uses no worship, prayers, etc., no one ever saw. And he believes a city may more easily be built without a foundation (or ground to set it on) than any community of men have or keep a consistency without religion.

4. And it is no mean argument of the commonness of religion, that there have been some in the world (and those no idiots neither) that have accounted it the most constituent and distinguishing thing in human nature. So that Platonic Jew judges the [reconstructed: invocation] of God with hope towards him to be, if we will speak the truth, the only genuine property of man, and says that only he who is acted by such a hope is a man, and he that is destitute of this hope is no man, preferring this account to the common definition (which he says is only of the concrete of man) that he is a reasonable and mortal living creature. And yet he extends not reason further, that is, to the inferior creatures, for he had expressly said above that they who have no hope towards God, have no part or share in the rational nature.

And a noble person of our own says, that upon accurate search, religion and faith appear the only ultimate differences of man; whereof neither divine perfection is capable, nor brutal imperfection. Reason in his account descending low among the inferior creatures. But these agreeing more peculiarly to man, and so universally that he affirms, there is no man well, and entirely in his wits that does not worship some deity.

Who therefore accounted it a less absurdity to admit such a thing as a rational beast, than an irreligious man. Now if these have taken notice of any instances that seemed to claim an exemption from this notion of man; they have rather thought fit to let them pass as an anomalous sort of creatures, reducible to no certain rank or order in the creation; than that any should be admitted into the account, or be acknowledged of the society of men, that were found destitute of an inclination to worship the common author of our beings. And according to this opinion; by whatever steps any should advance in the denial of a deity; they should proceed by the same, to the abandoning their own humanity; and by saying there is no God, should proclaim themselves no men.

However it discovers (which is all that is at present intended by it) the commonness, not to say absolute universality, of religion, in the observation of these persons, whom we must suppose no strangers to the world in their own and former times. And if it afford any less ground for such an observation in our present time, we only see as the world grows older it grows worse, and sinks into a deeper oblivion of its original, as it recedes further from it.

And (notwithstanding) this so common a consent is yet not without its weight and significance to our present purpose. If we consider

How impossible it is to give or imagine any tolerable account of its original, if we do not confess it natural, and refer it to that common author of all nature whom we are inquiring about: (of which so much is said by divers others, that nothing more needs here to be said about it. 5. And at least so much is gained by it to a temple, that unless some very plain and ungainsayable demonstration be brought against the grounds of it (which will be time enough to consider when we see it pretended to) no opposition, fit to be regarded, can ever be made to it. That is, none at all can possibly be made; but what shall proceed from the most immodest and rash confidence, animated and born up only by a design of being most licentiously wicked, and of making the world become so. Immodest confidence it must be, for it is not a man, or a nation, or an age that such have to oppose, but mankind; upon which they shall cast, not some lighter reflection, but the vilest and most opprobrious contumely, and scorn that can be imagined. That is the imputation of so egregious folly and dotage, as all this while to have worshipped a shadow as the author of their being; and a figment for their common parent. And this not the ruder only, and uninquisitive vulgar, but the wisest and most considering persons in all times. Surely less than clear and pregnant demonstration (at least not wild incoherent self-confounding suppositions and surmises, of which more hereafter) will ever be thought sufficient to justify the boldness of an attempt that shall carry this signification with it. And it will be a confidence equally rash as immodest. For what can be the undertakers' hope, either of success or reward? Do they think it an easy enterprise? And that a few quirks of malapert wit will serve the turn to baffle the deity into nothing? And unteach the world religion? And raze out impressions renewed and transmitted through so many ages? And persuade the race of men to descend a peg lower, and believe they ought to live and shall die like the perishing beast. Or do they expect to find men indifferent in a matter that concerns their common practice and hope? And wherein their zeal has been wont to be such as that it has obtained to be proverbial, to strive as for the very altars. And what should their reward be, when the natural tendency of their undertaking is to exclude themselves from the expectation of any in another world? And what will they expect in this from them whose temples and altars they go about to subvert? Besides, that if they be not hurried by a blind impetuous rashness, they would consider their danger, and apprehend themselves concerned to strike very sure: for if there remain but the least possibility that the matter is otherwise, and that the being does exist whose honor and worship they contend against, they must understand his favor to be of some concernment to them; which they take but an ill course to entitle themselves to. Much more have they reason to be solicitous, when their horrid cause not only wants evidence; nor has hitherto pretended to more than a bare possibility of truth on their side; but has so clear (and as yet altogether unrefuted) evidence lying against it; that quite takes away that very possibility, and all ground for that miserable languishing hope, that it could ever have afforded them. Therefore is it left also wholly unimaginable, what principle can animate their design, other than a sensual humor, impatient of restraints, or of any obligation to be sober, just and honest, beyond what their own inclination, and (much mistaken) interest, or convenience would lead them to.

By all which we have a sufficient measure of the persons from whom any opposition to religion can be expected, and how much their authority, their example or their scorn ought to signify with us. And that a more valuable opposition can never be made; our experience, both that hitherto it has not been, and that it would have been if it could, might render us tolerably secure. For surely it may well be supposed, that in a world so many ages lost in wickedness, all imaginable trials would have been made to disburden it of religion; and something that had been specious, at least, to that purpose, had been hit upon; if the matter had been any way possible. And the more wicked the world has been, a so directly contrary, and so continually assaulted principle, not yet vanquished, appears the more plainly invincible: and that the assaults have been from the lusts of men, rather than their reason, shows the more evidently, that their reason has only wanted a ground to work upon; which if it could have been found, their lusts had certainly pressed it to their service in this warfare; and not have endured rather, the molestation of continual checks and rebukes from it.

Nor need we yet to let our minds hang in suspense, or be in a dubious expectation, that possibly some or other great wit may arise that shall perform some great thing in this matter, and discover the groundlessness and folly of religion by plain and undeniable reasons, that have not as yet been thought on: but betake ourselves to a stricter and closer consideration of our own grounds, which if we can once find to be certainly true, we may be sure they are of eternal truth, and no possible contrivance or device can ever make them false.

Having therefore seen what common consent may contribute to the establishing of them jointly; we may now apply ourselves to consider and search into each of them (so far as they are capable of a distinct consideration) severally and apart. Having still this mark in our eye, our own confirmation and excitation in reference to what is the proper work and business of a temple, religion and conversation with God: how little soever any endeavor in this kind may be apt to signify with the otherwise minded.

And, first for the existence of God; that we may regularly and with evidence make it out to ourselves, that he is, or does exist, and may also see what the belief of his existence will contribute towards the evincing of the reasonableness of erecting a temple to him. It is requisite that we first settle a true notion of him in our minds; or be at an agreement with ourselves, what is that we mean, or would have to be signified by the name of God: otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him.

And though we must beforehand professedly avow that we take him to be such a one as we can never comprehend in our thoughts. That this knowledge is too excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can perfectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description, or assign such certain characters of his being as will severally or together distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own name, and say this is God. Whatever his being may contain more; or whatever other properties may belong to it beyond what we can as yet compass in our present thoughts of him.

And such an account we shall have of what we are inquiring after; if we have the conception in our minds of an eternal uncaused, independent, necessary being that has active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection originally, in and of itself.

Such a being we would with common consent express by the name of God. Even they that would profess to deny or doubt of his existence, yet must acknowledge this to be the notion of that which they deny or doubt of. Or if they should say this is not it, or (which is all one) that they do not deny or doubt of the existence of such a being as this; they on the other hand that would argue for his existence, may conclude the cause is yielded them. This being that which they designed to contend for.

It must indeed be acknowledged, that some things belonging to the notion of God might have been more expressly named: but it was not necessary they should, being sufficiently included here, as will afterwards appear. Nor perhaps so convenient; some things, the express mention of which is omitted, being such as more captious persons might be apt at first to startle at; which yet may, possibly as they are insinuated under other expressions become by degrees more inclinable to receive them afterwards. And however if this be not a full and adequate notion (as who can ever tell when we have an express, distinct particular notion of God, which we are sure is adequate and full?) it may however suffice, that it is a true one, as far as it goes, and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else. And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose; if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and worthy object of religion; and to which a temple ought to be designed. As it will appear there is, when also we shall have added what is intended concerning his conversableness with men. The ground of which is also in great part included in this account of him; so that the consideration of it cannot be wholly severed from that of his existence: as has been intimated above. That is, that if such a being exist, to which this notion belongs; it will sufficiently appear, he is such as that he can converse with men; though it does not from there certainly follow that he will. For it were a rash and bold adventure to say he could not be God, if he did not condescend to such terms of reconciliation and converse with apostate creatures. Therefore more is to be said than the mere manifesting his existence in its own place.

And as to this, that we may proceed gradually, and in the most familiar and intelligible way that we can; we may

1. Be most assured, that there has been something or other from all eternity, or that looking backward, something of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such, as have not been used to think of anything more than what they could see with their eyes; and to whom reasoning only seems difficult, because they have not tried what they can do in it; but use their thoughts a little, and by moving them a few easy steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see or hear, or understand, or are anything.

For being sure that something now is (that you see, for instance, or are something.) You must then acknowledge that certainly either something always was, and has ever been, or been from all eternity; or else you must say, that sometime nothing was; or that all being once was not. And so, since you find that something now is, that there was a time when anything of being did begin to be, that is, that till that time there was nothing; But now at that time something first began to be. For what can be plainer than that, if all being sometime was not, and now some being is, every thing of being had a beginning? And from there it would follow that some being, that is, the first that ever began to be, did of itself start up out of nothing, or made itself to be, when before, nothing was.

But now do you not plainly see that it is altogether impossible anything should do so; that is, when it was as yet nothing, and when nothing at all as yet was, that it should make itself, or come into being of itself? For sure, making itself is doing something. But can that which is nothing do anything? To all doing there must be some doer. Therefore a thing must be before it can do anything; and therefore it would follow that it was before it was; or was and was not, was something and nothing at the same time. Indeed, and it was different from itself. For a cause must be a distinct thing from that which is caused by it. Therefore it is most apparent that some being has ever been, or did never begin to be. From which further,

2. It is also evident, that some being was uncaused, or was ever of itself, without any cause. For what never was from another had never any cause, since nothing could be its own cause. And something, as appears from what has been said, never was from another. Or it may be plainly argued thus; That either some being was uncaused, or all being was caused. But if all being were caused, then some one at least was the cause of itself: which has been already shown impossible. Therefore the expression commonly used concerning the first Being that it was of itself, is only to be taken negatively, that is, that it was not of another, not positively, as if it did sometime make itself. Or, what there is positive, signified by that form of speech, is only to be taken thus, that it was a being of that nature, as that it was impossible it should ever not have been. Not that it did ever of itself step out of not being into Being: Of which more hereafter.

3. And now it is hence further evident that some being is independent upon any other, that is, whereas it already appears that some being did never depend on any other, as a productive cause. Or was not beholden to any other, that it might come into Being. It is thereupon equally evident that 'tis simply independent, or cannot be beholden to any for its continued being. For what did never need a productive cause, does as little need a sustaining or conserving cause. And, to make this more plain, either some being is independent, or all being is dependent. But there is nothing without the compass of all being, whereon it may depend. Therefore to say, that all being does depend, is to say it depends on nothing, that is, that it depends not. For to depend on nothing is not to depend.

It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say that all being does depend: against which it is no relief to say, that all beings do circularly depend on one another. For so, however the whole circle or sphere of being, should depend on nothing, or one at last depend on itself; which negatively taken, as before, is true, and the thing we contend for; that one, the common support of all the rest depends not on anything without itself. From which also it is plainly consequent.

That 4. Such a Being is necessary, or does necessarily exist: that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not, or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, or any others, is necessarily. But what was not made by itself (which has been shown impossible that anything should) nor by any other (as it has been proved, something was not.) It is manifest it neither depended on its own choice, nor any others that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the necessity of its own nature. Therefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural necessity; being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being. And now having gone thus far, and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us; that is, having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused, independent necessary Being, and therefore actually, and everlastingly existing; we may advance one step further, and with equal assurance, add,

5. That this eternal, independent uncaused Being, is self-active, that is, (which is at present meant) not such as acts upon itself, but that has the power of acting upon other things in and of itself, without deriving it from any other. Or at least that there is such a Being as is eternal, uncaused, etc. having the power of action in and of itself.

For either such a Being as has been already evinced is of itself active or inactive, or either has the power of action of itself or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of itself totally inactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and highly dignifying attributes; and that import a most inconceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of itself; without being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what inconceivable myriads of little senseless Deities must we upon that supposition admit (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the Reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) But what can our reason either direct, or endure, that we should so incongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these? And ascribe the prime glory of the most excellent Being, to that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the impossibility of a self-subsisting, and self-original, inactive being, will be here unseasonable, and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing,

Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signify nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of itself? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compelled to acknowledge that something has ever been, necessarily, and of itself. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? Does it signify any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, inactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choke them if they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an inactive cause, (that is, Efficient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of all other things, by supposing an eternal, inactive Being only, than if they supposed none at all. That what can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing? Therefore by the same reason that has constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this Being to be self-active, or such as has the power of action in and of itself. Or that there is certainly such a Being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are besides existent in the world.

For what else is left us to say or think? Will we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing itself that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat nonsense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsic simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Therefore to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition.

And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchanged, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same, suppose then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and has an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which has no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction.

But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlessly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and impossible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversy of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others.

If this signify any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; and how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what has been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.

But now since we find that the present state of things is changeable, and actually changing, and that what is changeable is not necessarily, and of itself.

And since it is evident that there is some necessary being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is self-active, or that has the power of action in and of itself. For there could be no derivation of it from that which has it not, and no first derivation, but from that which has it originally of itself. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnished with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of itself. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary self-active being, the cause and author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence,

Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power does not, at least, comprehend (as upon trial we shall find that we cannot) it is consequent that this being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality, such as has life in or of itself, and from where it is propagated to every other living thing.

And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, it is also evident it took its beginning from a being essentially vital, and active, that had itself no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this being, (which now we have shown, is active, and all action implies some power) is

Of vast and mighty power (we will not say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it. To which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabric, and entering in we see not the master or any living thing (which was Cicero's observation in reference to this present purpose) besides mice or weasels, we will not think that mice or weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer reason has made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.

Corollary. And now from what has been so far discoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consequence, that this world had a cause different from the matter of which it is composed.

For otherwise matter that has been more generally taken to be of itself altogether inactive, must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole universe. Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough; not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence inquired into things of this nature, but as being in itself manifestly impossible to be true.

As would easily appear if it were needful to press farther Doctor More's reasonings to this purpose; which he has done sufficiently for himself.

And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its own constant and eternal action upon itself, while it is yet supposed to be a necessary being; with the notion of which they are notoriously inconsistent. Which therefore we taking to be most clear, may now the more securely proceed to what follows.