Chapter 4: The Absolute Perfection and Infinity of God

Generally all supposable perfection, asserted of this Being, where, first, a Being absolutely perfect, is endeavored to be evinced from the (already proved) necessary Being. Which is shown to import, in the general, the utmost fullness of Being. Also various things, in particular, that tend to evince that general. As that it is, at the remotest distance from no Being. Most purely actual. Most abstracted Being. The productive and conserving cause of all things else. Undiminishable. Incapable of addition. Secondly, from this is more expressly deduced the infiniteness of this Being. An inquiry whether it is possible the creature can be actually infinite. Difficulties concerning the absolute fullness, and infiniteness of God considered. 2. The oneness of his Being. The Trinity not thereby excluded.

Some account has been thus far given of that Being, to which we have been designing to assert the honor of a Temple. Each of the particulars having been severally insisted on, that concur to make up that notion of this Being, which was at first laid down. And more largely, what has been more opposed, by persons of an atheistical or irreligious temper. But, because in that aforementioned account of God, there was added to the particulars there enumerated (out of a just consciousness of human inability to comprehend every thing that may possibly belong to him) this general supplement.

[That all other supposable excellencies whatever do in the highest perfection appertain also originally, to this Being] It is requisite that somewhat be said concerning this addition. Especially in as much as it comprehends in it, or may infer, some things (not yet expressly mentioned) which may be thought necessary to the evincing the reasonableness of religion, or our self-dedication as a Temple to him.

For instance, it may possibly be alleged, that, if it were admitted there is somewhat that is eternal, uncaused, independent, necessarily existent, that is self-active, living, powerful, wise, and good. Yet all this will not infer upon us a universal obligation to religion, unless it can also be evinced.

1. That this Being is every way sufficient to supply and satisfy all our real wants and just desires.

2. And that this Being is but one, and so that all be at a certainty where their religion ought to terminate. And that the worship of every temple must concentrate and meet in the same object.

Now the eviction of an absolutely perfect Being would include each of these; and answer both the purposes which may seem hitherto not so fully satisfied. It is therefore requisite that we endeavor

First, to show that the Being hitherto described is absolutely or every way perfect.

Secondly, to deduce, from the same grounds, the absolute infinity, and the unity (or the oneness) thereof.

And for the former part of this undertaking, it must be acknowledged absolute or universal perfection, cannot be pretended to have been expressed in any or in all the works of God together. Neither in number, for ought we know (for as we cannot conceive, nor consequently speak of divine perfections, but under the notion of many, whatever their real identity may be, so we do not know, but that within the compass of universal perfection, there may be some particular ones of which there is no footstep in the creation, and of which we have never formed any thought.) Nor (more certainly) in degree; for surely the world, and the particular creatures in it, are not so perfect in correspondence to those attributes of its great Architect which we have mentioned, namely, his power, wisdom, and goodness, as he might have made them, if he had pleased. And indeed, to say the world were absolutely and universally perfect, were to make that God.

Therefore it must also be acknowledged that an absolutely perfect Being cannot be immediately demonstrated from its effects, as to which they neither do, nor is it within the capacity of created nature that they can, adequately, correspond. From which, therefore, all that can be done for the evincing of the absolute and universal perfection of God, must be in some other way or method of discourse.

And though it be acknowledged that it cannot be immediately evidenced from the creation, yet it is to be hoped that mediately it may. For from there (as we have seen) a necessary self-originate Being, such as has been described, is with the greatest certainty to be concluded; and, from there, if we attentively consider, we shall be led to an absolutely perfect one. That is, since we have the same certainty of such a necessary self-originate Being as we have that there is any thing existent at all. If we seriously weigh what kind of Being this must needs be, or what its notion must import, above what has been already evinced: we shall not be found, in this way, much to fall short of our present aim (though we have also other evidence that may be produced in its own fitter place.)

Here therefore let us a while make a stand, and more distinctly consider how far we are already advanced, that we may, with the better order and advantage, make our further progress.

These two things then are already evident.

[First, That there is a necessary Being that has been eternally of itself, without dependence upon any thing, either as a productive or conserving cause. And of itself full of activity and vital energy, so as to be a productive and sustaining cause to other things.]

Of this any the most confused and indistinct view of this world, or a mere taking notice, that there is any thing in Being, that lives and moves, and withal that alters and changes, (which it is impossible the necessary Being itself should do) cannot but put us out of doubt.

Secondly, that this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being has very vast power, admirable wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it. And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally assure us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Indeed, we find the (derived) things themselves — power, wisdom, goodness — in the creatures. And we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from anything that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain, must have them necessarily, and essentially (together with whatever else belongs to its Being) in and of itself. So that the asserting of any other necessary being that is in itself destitute of these things signifies no more towards the giving any account of how these things came to be in the world, than if no Being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case itself, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary Being, but that there is such a one as could be, and was, the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees of being and perfection that we take notice of in the world besides. Another sort of necessary Being should not only be asserted to no purpose, there being nothing to be gained by it, no imaginable use to be made of it, as a principle that can serve any valuable end. (For suppose such a thing as necessary matter, it will, as has been shown, be unalterable; and therefore another sort of matter must be supposed besides it, that may be the matter of the universe, raised up out of nothing for that purpose, to which this so unwieldy and unmanageable an entity can never serve.) But also it will be impossible to be proved. No man can be taken with any plausible show of reason to make it out. Indeed, much may be said (I conceive with convincing evidence) against it. As may perhaps be seen in the sequel of this discourse.

In the meantime, that there is, however, a necessary Being, to which all the perfections, of which we have any footsteps or resemblances in the creation, do originally and essentially belong, is undeniably evident.

Now, that we may proceed, what can self-essential, underived power, wisdom, goodness be, but most perfect power, wisdom, goodness? Or such as than which there can never be more perfect?

For, since there can be no wisdom, power, or goodness, which is not either original and self-essential, or derived and participated from there — who does not see that the former must be the more perfect? Indeed, that it comprehended all the other (as what was from it) in itself. And consequently that it is simply the most perfect? And the reason will be the same, concerning any other perfection, the stamps and characters of which we find signed upon the creatures.

But that the Being to which these belong is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind, must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion and import of such a self-originate necessary Being.

Some indeed, both more anciently, and of late have inverted this course; and from the supposition of absolute perfection have gone about to infer necessity of existence, as being contained in the idea of the former. But of this latter we are otherwise assured, upon clearer and less exceptionable terms. And being so, are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose.

And in the general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary Being we have already evidenced, that it have in it (some way or other, in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter) the entire sum and utmost fullness of Being, beyond which or without the compass of which, no perfection is conceivable, or indeed (which is of the same import) nothing.

Let it be observed that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary Being, only, but from hence, that it is such, as we have found it. Though indeed, these very terms import not a little to this purpose. For that which is necessarily, of itself, without being beholden to anything, seems as good as all things, and to contain in itself an immense fullness; being indigent of nothing. Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness, or a sense of want only, in opposition to which, every good and virtuous man has or may attain, a sort of [illegible] or self-fullness and be satisfied from himself (which yet is a stamp of Divinity, and a part of the image of God, or such a participation of the Divine Nature, as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature,) but we understand by it (what is naturally before that) want itself really, and not in opinion (as the covetous is said to be poor.) On the other hand we here intend not a merely rational (much less an imaginary) but a real self-fullness. And so we say, what is of that nature, that it is, and subsists wholly, and only of itself, without depending on any other, must owe this absoluteness, to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature, as we cannot well conceive to be less, than whereby it comprehends in itself, the most boundless and unlimited fullness of Being, life, power, or whatever can be conceived under the name of a perfection. For taking notice of the existence of anything whatever, some reason must be assignable, from where it is that this particular Being does exist? And has such and such powers and properties belonging to it, as do occur to our notice therein? When we can now resolve its existence into some cause, that put it into Being, and made it what it is; we cease so much to admire the thing, how excellent soever it be, and turn our admiration upon its cause, concluding that to have all the perfection in it which we discern in the effect, whatever unknown perfection (which we may suppose is very great) it may have besides. And upon this ground we are led, when we behold the manifold excellencies that lie dispersed among particular Beings, in this universe, with the glory of the whole, resulting from there, to resolve their existence into a common cause, which we designate by the name of God. And now considering him as a wise Agent, (which has been proved) and consequently a free one, that acted not from any necessity of nature, but his mere good pleasure herein, we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him, which we find him to have displayed in so vast and glorious a work; but will readily believe him (supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what has been discoursed before) to have a most unconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and perfection in him, that is not represented to our view in this work of his. And account, that, he who could do all this which we see is done, could do unspeakably more. For though, speaking of natural and necessitated Agents, which always act to their uttermost, it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing, to their power of doing something that is much greater. Yet as to free Agents, that can choose their own act, and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein, the matter is not so: as when some great Prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person, especially that deserved nothing from him, or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour, besides his poverty and misery; we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence, and bounty, which would incline him to do much greater things, when he should see a proportionable cause.

But now, if taking notice of the excellencies that appear in caused Beings, and inquiring how they come to exist and be what they are, we resolve all into their cause; which, considering as perfectly free and arbitrary in all his communications; we do from there rationally conclude, that if he had thought fit, he could have made a much more pompous display of himself; and that there is in him, besides what appears, a vast and most abundant store of undiscovered perfection.

When next, we turn our inquiry and contemplation, more entirely, upon the cause. And bethink ourselves: But how came he to exist and be what he is? Finding this cannot be referred back upon any superior cause; and our utmost inquiry can admit of no other result, but this, that he is of himself what he is. We will surely say then, he is all in all. And that perfection, which before we judged vastly great, we will now conclude altogether absolute, and such beyond which no greater can be thought.

Adding I say to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness, from the works which we see have been done by him (for why should we lose any ground we might esteem ourselves to have gained before?) the consideration of this necessary self-subsistence: and that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is, but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own nature. Whereby he was not only able to make such a world, but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is and has: we cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal, and comprehensive of whatever can lie within the whole compass of Being.

For when we find that among all other beings (which is most certainly true not only of actual, but all possible beings also) how perfect however they are or may be in their own kinds; none of them, nor all of them together, are, or ever can be, of that perfection, as to be of themselves, without dependence on something else, as their productive, indeed and sustaining cause; we see, besides that their cause has all the perfection, some way, in it that is to be found in them all: there is also that appropriate perfection belonging to it, that it could be; and eternally is (indeed and could not but be) only of itself, by the underived and incommunicable excellency of its own being. And surely, what includes in it all the perfection of all actual and possible beings, besides its own (for there is nothing possible which some cause, indeed and even this, cannot produce) and inconceivably more; must needs be absolutely and every way perfect. Of all which perfections this is the fundamental one, that belongs to this common cause and author of all things, that he is necessarily, and only self-subsisting. For if this high prerogative in point of being had been wanting, nothing at all had ever been. Therefore we attribute to God the greatest thing that can be said or thought, (and not what is wholly different from all other perfection, but which contains all others in it) when we affirm of him that he is necessarily of himself. For, though when we have bewildered and lost ourselves (as we soon may) in the contemplation of this amazing subject, we readily indulge our wearied minds the ease and liberty of resolving this high excellency of self or necessary existence in a mere negation, and say that we mean by it nothing else, than that he was not from another: yet surely if we would take some pains with ourselves, and keep our slothful shifting thoughts to some exercise in this matter; though we can never comprehend that vast fullness of perfection which is imported in it (for it were not what we plead for, if we could comprehend it), yet we should soon see and confess, that it contains unspeakably more than a negation, even some great thing that is so much beyond our thoughts, that we shall reckon we have said but a little in saying we cannot conceive it. And that, when we have stretched our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure, though we may suppose ourselves to have conceived a great deal, there is infinitely more that we conceive not.

Therefore that is a sober and most important truth which is occasionally drawn forth (as is supposed) from the so admired Doctor Descartes, by the urgent objections of this very acute (friendly) adversary, that the inexhaustible power of God is the reason for which he needed no cause; and that since that unexhausted power, or the immensity of his essence is most highly positive, therefore he may be said to be of himself positively, that is, not as if he did ever by any positive efficiency cause himself (which is most manifestly impossible) but that the positive excellency of his own being was such, as could never need, nor admit of being caused.

And that seems highly reasonable (which is so largely insisted on by Doctor Jackson and various others) that what is without cause must also be without limit of being. Because all limitation proceeds from the cause of a thing, which imparted to it so much and no more; which argument, though it seem neglected by Descartes, and is opposed by his antagonist: yet I cannot but judge that the longer one meditates the less he shall understand, how any thing can be limited from within or from itself, etc., as the author of the Tentam. Phys. Theol. speaks.

But that we may entertain ourselves with some more particular considerations of this necessary being; which may make clear that general assertion of its absolute fullness or plenitude of essence. It appears to be such:

As is, first, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity. For what can be at a greater, than that which is necessarily? Which signifies as much as: that not to be is utterly impossible for it. Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no being, seems plainly to imply the absolute fullness of all being. And, if here it be said that, to be necessarily, and of itself, needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing has, be it never so small or minute a portion of being. I answer, without insisting upon the ambiguity of the words — to be — it seems, indeed so; if we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance. But if you consider the matter more narrowly, you will find here is also signified the nature and kind of the being possessed, as well as the manner of possession, namely that it is a being of so excellent and noble a kind, as that it can subsist alone without being beholden: which is so great an excellency as that it manifestly comprehends all other, or is the foundation of all that can be conceived besides. Which they that fondly dream of necessary matter, not considering, unwarily make one single atom a more excellent thing, than the whole frame of heaven and earth. That being supposed simply necessary, this the merest piece of hap-hazard, the strangest chance imaginable, and beyond what any but themselves could ever have imagined. And which being considered, would give us to understand, that no minute or finite being can be necessarily.

And from this we may see what it is to be nearer, or at a further distance from not-being.

For these things that came contingently into being, or at the pleasure of a free cause, have all but a finite and limited being, of which, some, having a smaller portion of being than others, approach so much the nearer to not-being. Proportionably, what has its being necessarily and of itself, is at the farthest distance from no-being, as comprehending all being in itself. Or, to borrow the expressions of an elegant writer, translated into our own language: we have much more non-essence than essence; if we have the essence of a man, yet not of the heavens, or of angels. We are confined and limited within a particular essence, but God who is what he is comprehends all possible essences.

Nor is this precariously spoken, or, as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesy. But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed, and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear. For if anything be, in this sense, remoter than other from no-Being, it must either be, what is necessarily of itself, or what is contingently at the pleasure of the other. But since nothing is, besides that self-originate necessary Being, but what was from it; and nothing from it but what was within its productive power; it's plain all that, with its own Being, was contained in it. And therefore, even in that sense, it is at the greatest distance from no-Being; as comprehending the utmost fullness of Being in itself, and consequently absolute perfection. Which will yet further appear, in what follows. We therefore add,

That necessary Being is most unmixed or purest Being. Without alloy. That is pure which is full of itself. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense (which few will think) nor in the moral; but as with Metaphysicians it signifies simplicity of essence. And in its present use is more especially intended to signify that simplicity which is opposed to the composition of act, and possibility. We say then that necessary Being imports purest actuality. Which is the ultimate and highest perfection of Being. For it signifies no remaining possibility, yet unreplete, or not filled up, and consequently the fullest exuberance and entire confluence of all Being, as in its fountain and original source. We need not here look further to evince this than the native import of the very terms themselves; necessity and possibility; the latter of which is not so fitly said to be excluded the former (as contingency is) but to be swallowed up of it; as fullness takes up all the space which were otherwise nothing but vacuity or emptiness. It is plain then that necessary Being engrosses all possible Being, both that is, and (for the same reason) that ever was so. For nothing can be or ever was in possibility to come into Being, but what either must spring, or has sprung, from the necessary self-subsisting Being.

So that to all that vast possibility, a proportionable actuality of this Being must be understood to correspond. Else the other were not possible. For nothing is possible to be produced which is not within the actual productive power of the necessary Being. I say within its actual productive power, for if its power for such production were not already actual, it could never become so, and so were none at all. Inasmuch as necessary being can never alter, and consequently can never come actually to be, what it, already, is not (upon which account it is truly said, In aeternis posse & esse sunt idem.) Therefore in it, is nothing else but pure actuality, as profound and vast, as is the utmost possibility of all created or producible Being, that is, it can be nothing other than it is, but can do all things (of which more hereafter.) It therefore stands opposed not only (more directly) to impossibility of Being (which is the most proper notion of no-Being) but some way, even to possibility also; that is the possibility of being anything but what it is; as being every way complete, and perfectly full already.

Again we might further add, that it is the most abstracted being, or is being in the very abstract. A thing much insisted on by some of the schoolmen. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue (after their manner) may carry some such sense as this (if it may throughout be called sense): that whereas no created nature is capable of any other, than mere mental abstraction, but exists always in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than itself; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which has that essence, by which concretion essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which has or possesses that essence. The necessary being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it; and exist separately by itself; not as limited to this or that thing. From where it is, in itself universal essence, containing therefore (not formally, but eminently) the being of all things in perfect simplicity. From where all its own attributes are capable of being affirmed of it in the abstract, that it is wisdom, power, goodness, and not only has these, and that, upon this account, that it is a being which is necessarily and of itself. For that which is necessarily and of itself, is not whatever it is by the accession of any thing to itself; of which necessary being is incapable. But by its own simple and invariable essence. Other being is upon such terms powerful, wise, indeed, and existent, as that it may cease to be so. Whereas to necessary being it is manifestly repugnant and impossible either simply not to be, or to be any thing else, but what and as it is. And though other things may have properties belonging to their essence not separable from it, yet they are not their very essence itself: and, whereas they are in a possibility to lose their very existence, the knot and ligament of whatever is most intimate to their actual being, all then falls from them together: here essence, properties, and existence are all one simple thing that can never cease, decay, or change, because the whole being is necessary. Now, all this being supposed, of the force of that form of speech, when we affirm any thing in the abstract of another, we may admit the common sense of men to be the interpreter. For every body can tell (though they do not know the meaning of the word abstract) what we intend when we use that phrase or manner of speaking. As when we say, by way of hyperbolical commendation, such a man is not only learned, but learning itself; or he not only has much of virtue, justice, and goodness in him, but he is virtue, justice, and goodness itself (as was once said of an excellent pagan virtuoso, that I may borrow leave to use that word in the moral sense) every one knows the phrase intends the appropriating all learning, virtue, justice, goodness to such a one. Which, because they know unappropriable to any man, they easily understand it to be, in such a case, a rhetorical strain, and form of speech. And yet could not know that, if also they did not understand its proper and native import. And so it may as well be understood what is meant by saying of God, he is being itself. With which sense may be reconciled that of (the so named Dionysius the Areopagite): that God is not so properly said to be of, or be in, or to have (or partake) of being as that it is of him, etc. Inasmuch as he is the pre-existent being to all being, that is, if we understand him to mean all besides his own. In which sense taking being, for that which is communicated and imparted, he may truly be said (as this author and the Platonists generally speak) to be super-essential or super-substantial. But how fitly being is taken in that restrained sense we may say more hereafter.

In the mean time, what has been said concerning this abstractedness of the necessary being, has in it some things so unintelligible, and is accompanied with so great (unmentioned) difficulties (which it would give us, perhaps, more labor than profit to discuss) and the absolute perfection of God appears so evidenceable otherwise, by what has been and may be further said, that we are no way concerned to lay the stress of the cause on this matter only.

Moreover, necessary being is the cause and author of all being besides. Whatever is not necessary is caused; for not having being of itself, it must be put into being by somewhat else. And inasmuch as there is no middle sort of being between necessary and not necessary, and, all that is not necessary is caused, it is plain that which is necessary must be the cause of all the rest. And surely what is the cause of all being besides its own, must needs, one way or other, contain its own and all other in itself; and is, consequently, comprehensive of the utmost fullness of being. Or is the absolutely perfect being, (as must equally, be acknowledged) unless any one would imagine himself to have got the notice of some perfection that lies without the compass of all being.

Nor is it an exception worth the mentioning, that there may be a conception of possible being or perfection, which the necessary being has not caused. For it is, manifestly, as well the possible cause of all possible being and perfection, as the actual cause of what is actual. And what it is possible to it to produce it has within its productive power, as has been said before.

And, if the matter did require it, we might say further, that the same necessary Being, which has been the productive cause, is, also the continual root and basis of all Being, which is not necessary. For what is of itself and cannot, by the special privilege of its own Being, but be, needs nothing to sustain it, or needs not trust to anything besides its own eternal stability. But what is not so seems to need a continual reproduction every moment, and to be no more capable of continuing in Being by itself, than it was by itself of coming into Being. For (as is frequently alleged by that so often mentioned author) since there is no connection between the present and future time, but what is easily capable of rupture, it is no way consequent that, because I am now, I shall therefore be the next moment further than as the free author of my Being shall be pleased to continue his own most arbitrary influence for my support. This seems highly probable to be true, whether that reason signifies anything or nothing. And that continual conservation therefore differs not from creation. Which, whether (as is said by the same author) it be one of the things that are manifest by natural light; or whether a positive act be needless to the annihilation of created things; but only the withholding of influence, let them examine that apprehend the cause to need it. And if upon inquiry they judge it at least evidenceable by natural light to be so, (as I doubt not they will) they will have this further ground upon which thus to reason, That, inasmuch as the necessary Being subsists wholly by itself, and is that on which all other does totally depend. It follows from this that it must, in some way, contain in itself all Being. We may yet further add,

That the necessary Being we have proved, though it has caused, and does continually sustain all things, yet does not, itself, in the meantime suffer any diminution. It is not possible, nor consistent with the very terms necessary Being that it can. It is true, that if such a thing as a necessary Atom were admitted, that would be also undiminishable (it were not else an atom.) But as nothing then can flow from it (as from a perfect smallness nothing can) so it can effect nothing. (And the reason is the same of many as of one.) Nor would undiminishableness, upon such terms, signify anything to magnifying the value of such a trifle.

But this is none of the present case. For our eyes tell us here is a world in being, which we are sure is not itself necessarily; and was therefore made by him that is. And that, without mutation or change in him; against which the very notion of a necessary Being is most irreconcilably reluctant; and therefore without diminution, which cannot be conceived without change.

Therefore how inexhaustible a fountain of life, being, and all perfection have we here represented to our thoughts! From this vast Universe is sprung, and is continually springing, and that in the meantime, receiving no recruits or foreign supplies, yet suffers no impairment or lessening of itself! What is this but absolute all-fullness! And it is so far from arguing any deficiency or mutability, in his nature, that there is this continual issue of power and virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency that this can be without decay or mutation. For of all this, we are as certain as we can be of anything: That many things are not necessarily, That the Being must be necessary from which all things else proceed, and that with necessary Being change is inconsistent. It is therefore unreasonable to entertain any doubt that things are so, which most evidently appear to be so; only because it is beyond our measure and compass to apprehend, how they are so. And it would be to doubt (against our own eyes) whether there be any such thing as motion in the world, or composition of bodies, because we cannot give a clear account (so as to avoid all difficulties, and the entanglement of the common sophisms about them) how these things are performed. In the present case, we have no difficulty but what is to be resolved into the perfection of the Divine Nature, and the imperfection of our own. And how easily conceivable is it, that something may be more perfect than what we can conceive it. If we cannot conceive the manner of God's causation of things, or the nature of his causative influence, it only shows their high excellency, and gives us the more ground (since this is that into which both his own revelation and the reason of things most naturally lead us to resolve all) to admire the mighty efficacy of his all-creating and all-sustaining Will and Word; that in that easy, inexpensive way by his mere fiat, so great things should be performed.

We only say further, That this necessary Being is such to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect than it was before. And this not only signifies that nothing can be joined to it, so as to become a part of it, (which necessary Being, by its natural immutability manifestly refuses.) But we also intend by it, that all things else, with it, contain not more of real perfection than it does alone. Which (though it carries a difficulty with it that we intend not wholly to overlook when it shall be seasonable to consider it) is a most apparent and demonstrable truth. For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary, proceeds from that which is, as the cause of it. And that no cause could communicate anything to another which it had not in some way in itself. Therefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary, as having been wholly produced by it. And what is wholly comprehended of another (that is, within its productive power) before it is produced, can be no real addition to it, when it is.

Now what can be supposed to import fullness of Being and perfection, more than this [impossibility of addition] or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect?

And now these considerations are mentioned without solicitude, whether they be so many exactly distinct heads. For admit that they be not all distinct, but some are involved with others of them; yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation, others in another. And it suffices, that (though not severally) they do together plainly evidence, that the necessary Being includes the absolute entire fullness of all Being and perfection actual and possible within itself.

Having therefore thus dispatched that former part of this undertaking; the eviction of an every way perfect Being, we shall now need to labor little in the other, namely,

Secondly, the more express deduction of the infiniteness and onliness thereof.

For as to the former of these it is in effect the same thing that has been already proved. Since to the fullest notion infiniteness, absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond. For absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection, leaves nothing excluded. And what does most simple infiniteness import, but to have nothing for a boundary, or (which is the same) not to be bounded at all?

We intend not now, principally, infiniteness extrinsically considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense do import: But intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection without bound or limit. This is the same with absolute perfection. Which yet, if any should suspect not to be so, they might, however, easily and expressly prove it of the necessary Being upon the same grounds that have been already alleged for proof of that.

As that the necessary Being has actuality answerable to the utmost possibility of the creature; That it is the only root and cause of all other Being. The actual cause of whatever is actually; The possible cause of whatever is possible to be. Which is most apparently true. And has been evidenced to be so, by what has been said, so lately, as that it needs not be repeated. That is, in short, that nothing, that is not necessarily, and of itself, could ever have been or can be, but as it has been, or shall be put into Being by that which is necessarily and of itself. So that this is as apparent as that anything is, or can be.

But now let sober reason judge, whether there can be any bounds or limits set to the possibility of producible Being, either in respect of kinds, numbers, or degrees of perfection? Who can say or think, when there can be so many sorts of creatures produced (or at least individuals of those sorts) that there can be no more? Or that any creature is so perfect as that none can be made more perfect? Which indeed to suppose were to suppose an actual infiniteness in the creature. And then it being, however, still, but somewhat that is created or made, how can its Maker but be infinite? For surely nobody will be so absurd as to imagine an infinite effect of a finite cause.

Either therefore the creature is (or sometime may be actually made) so perfect that it cannot be more perfect, or not. If not, we have our purpose; that there is an infinite possibility on the part of the creature always unreplete; and, consequently, a proportionable infinite actuality of power on the Creators part. Infinite power, I say, otherwise there were not that (acknowledged) infinite possibility of producible being. For nothing is producible that no power can produce. And I say infinite actual power, because the Creator being what he is necessarily, what power he has not actually, he can never have, as was argued before.

But if it be said, the creature either is, or may sometime be, actually so perfect as that it cannot be more perfect. That, as was said, will suppose it actually infinite, and therefore much more that its cause is so. And therefore in this way our present purpose would be gained also.

But we have no mind to gain it this latter way, as we have no need. 'Tis in itself plain to anyone that considers that this possibility on the creatures part can never actually be filled up; That it is a bottomless abyss, in which our thoughts may still gradually go down deeper and deeper without end: that is, that still more might be produced, or more perfect creatures, and still more, everlastingly without any bound, which sufficiently infers what we aim at, that the Creators actual power is proportionable.

And indeed the supposition of the former can neither consist with the Creators perfection, nor with the imperfection of the creature, it would infer that the Creators productive power might be exhausted, that he could do no more, and so place an actual boundary to him and make him finite. It were to make the creature actually full of being, that it could receive no more, and so would make that infinite.

But it may be said, since all power is in order to act, and the very notion of possibility imports that such a thing, of which it is said, may sometime be actual; it seems very unreasonable to say that the infinite power of a cause cannot produce an infinite effect. Or that infinite possibility can never become infinite actuality. For that were to say and unsay the same thing of the same. To affirm omnipotency and impotency of the same cause, possibility and impossibility of the same effect.

How urgent soever this difficulty may seem, there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disentangle ourselves, and get through it. For if we will but allow ourselves the leisure to consider, we shall find that [power] and [possibility] must here be taken not simply and abstractly, but as each of them is in conjunction with [infinite.] And what is [infinite,] but [that which can never be traveled through] or of which no end can be ever arrived to? Now suppose infinite power had produced all that it could produce, there were an end of it, (that is, it had found limits and a boundary beyond which it could not go.) If infinite possibility were filled up there were an end of that also, and so neither were infinite.

It may then be further urged that there is therefore no such thing as infinite power or possibility. For how is that cause said to have infinite power, which can never produce its proportionable effect, or that effect have infinite possibility, which can never be produced. It would follow then that power and possibility which are said to be infinite, are neither power nor possibility; and that infinite must be rejected as a notion either repugnant to itself or to anything to which we shall go about to affix it.

I answer, it only follows, They are neither power or possibility, of which there is any bound or end; or that can ever be gone through. And how absurd is it that they shall be said (as they cannot but be) to be both very vast, if they were finite; and none at all, for no other reason but their being infinite! And for the pretended repugnancy of the very notion of infinite, it is plain, that, though it cannot be, to us, distinctly comprehensible, yet it is no more repugnant, than the notion of finiteness. Nor when we have conceived of power in the general, and in our own thoughts set bounds to it, and made it finite, is it a greater difficulty, (in fact, they that try will find it much easier) again to think away these bounds, and make it infinite. And let them that judge the notion of infiniteness inconsistent, therefore reject it if they can. They will feel it re-imposing itself upon them, whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power itself. And who was, therefore ever heard of, that did not acknowledge some or other infinite? Even the Epicureans themselves though they confined their gods, they did not the universe. Which, also, though some Peripatetic atheists made finite in respect of place, yet in duration they made it infinite. Though the notion of an eternal world is encumbered with such absurdities and impossibilities, as of which there is not the least shadow in that of an every way infinite deity.

Briefly, it consists not with the nature of a contingent being to be infinite. For what is upon such terms, only, in being, is reducible to nothing, at the will and pleasure of its maker; but it is a manifest repugnancy, that what is at the utmost distance from nothing (as infinite fullness of being cannot but be) should be reducible there.

Therefore actual infinity cannot but be the peculiar privilege of that which is necessarily.

Yet may we not say, that it is not within the compass of infinite power to make a creature that may be infinite. For it argues not want of power that this is never to be done, but a still infinitely abounding surplusage of it, that can never be drained, or drawn dry. Nor, that the thing itself is simply impossible. It may be (as is compendiously expressed by that most succinct and polite writer Doctor Boyle) in fieri, not in facto esse. That is, it might be a thing always in doing, but never done. Because it belongs to the infinite perfection of God, that his power be never actually exhausted; and to the infinite imperfection of the creature, that its possibility or capacity be never filled up. To the necessary self-subsisting being to be always full and communicative, to the communicated contingent being, to be ever empty and craving. One may be said to have that, some way, in his power, not only which he can do presently, all at once, but which he can do by degrees, and supposing he have sufficient time. So a man may be reckoned able to do that, as the uttermost adequate effect of his whole power, which it is only possible to him to have effected with the expiration of his lifetime. God's measure is eternity. What if we say then, this is a work possible to be accomplished, even as the ultimate proportionable issue of divine power (if it were his will, upon which all contingent being depends, that the creature should be ever growing in the mean while) at the expiration of eternity? If, then, you be good at suppositions, suppose that expired, and this work finished both together.

Therefore if you ask, why can the work of making created being infinite never be done? The answer will be, because eternity (in every imaginable instant of which the inexhaustible power of God can if he will be still adding either more creatures or more perfection to a creature) can never be at an end.

We might further argue the infinity of the necessary being from what has been said of its undiminishableness by all its vast communications. Its impossibility to receive any accession to itself by any its (so great productions) both which are plainly demonstrable (as we have seen) of the necessary being, even as it is such, and do clearly (as anything can) bespeak infinity. But we have from there argued its absolute perfection which so evidently includes the same thing that all this latter labor might have been spared, were it not that it is the character of some persons not to be content that they have the substance of a thing said, unless it be also said in their own terms. And that the express asserting of God's simple infiniteness, in those very terms, is, in that respect, the more requisite as it is a form of expression more known and usual.

There are yet some remaining difficulties in the matter we have been discoursing of; which partly through the weakness of our own minds we cannot but find; and which partly the subtlety of sophistical wits does create to us. It will be requisite we have some consideration of, at least, some of them, which we will labor to dispatch with all possible brevity. Leaving those that delight in the sport of tying and loosing knots, or of weaving snares, in which cunningly to entangle themselves, to be entertained by the schoolmen; among whom they may find enough upon this subject to give them exercise to weariness; and (if their minds have any relish of what is more savory,) I may venture to say to loathing.

It may possibly be here said in short; But what have we all this while been doing? We have been laboring to prove that necessary being comprehends the absolute fullness of all being: And what does this signify, but that all being is necessary? That God is all things, and so that every thing is God. That we hereby confound the being of a man, indeed, of a stone, or whatever we can think of with one another, and all with the being of God.

And again, how is it possible there should be an infinite self-subsisting being. For then how can there be any finite? Since such infinite being includes all being, and there can be nothing beyond all.

Here therefore it is requisite, having hitherto only asserted and endeavored to prove that some way necessary being does include all being, to show in what way. And it is plain it does not include all in the same way. It does not so include that which is created by it, and depends on it, as it does its own, which is uncreated and independent.

The one it includes as its own or rather as itself, the other, as what it is, and ever was, within its power to produce. If any better like the terms formally and virtually they may serve themselves of them at their own pleasure, which yet, as to many, will but more darkly speak the same sense.

We must here know, the productive power of God terminates not upon himself, as if he were by it capable of adding anything to his own appropriate being; which is (as has been evinced already) infinitely full and incapable of addition, and is therefore all pure act: But on the creature, where there is still a perpetual possibility never filled up; because Divine power can never be exhausted. And thus all that of being is virtually in him, which, either having produced, he does totally sustain, or, not being produced, he can produce.

Therefore it is easy to understand how necessary being may comprehend all being and yet all being not be necessary. It comprehends all being besides what itself is, as having had within the compass of its productive power whatever has actually sprung from it, and having within the compass of the same power whatever is still possible to be produced. Which no more confounds such produced or producible being with that necessary being which is its cause, than it confounds all the effects of human power with one another, and with the being of a man, to say that he virtually comprehended them (so far as they were producible by him) within his power. And is no wiser an inference from the former, than it would be from this latter, that a house, a book, and a child are the same thing with one another, and with the person that produced them, because so far as they were produced by him, he had it in his power to produce them. And that the effects of Divine power are produced thereby totally, whereas those of human power are produced by it but in part only, does, as to the strength and reasonableness of the argument, nothing alter the case.

And as to the next, that infinite being should seem to exclude all finite. I confess that such as are so disposed might here even wrangle continually, as they might do about anything, in which infiniteness is concerned: And yet therein show themselves (as Seneca I remember speaks in another case) not a whit the more learned, but the more troublesome. But if one would make short work of it, and barely deny that infinite being excludes finite (as Scotus does little else; besides denying the consequence of the argument by which it was before enforced, namely, [that an infinite body would exclude a finite; for where should the finite be when the infinite should fill up all space? And therefore by parity of reasons, why should not infinite being exclude finite?] showing the disparity of the two cases) it would perhaps give them some trouble also to prove it. For which way would they go to work? Infinite self-subsisting being includes all being, very true, and therefore we say it includes finite. And what then? Does it because it includes it, therefore exclude it? And let the matter be soberly considered, somewhat of finite being and power we say (and apprehend no knot or difficulty in the matter) can extend so far as to produce some proportionable effect, or can do such and such things. And what, does it seem likely then that infinite being and power can therefore do just nothing? Is it not a reason of mighty force, and confoundingly demonstrative, that an Agent can do nothing, or cannot possibly produce any the least thing, only because he is of infinite power?

For if there be a simple inconsistency, between an infinite Being and a finite, that will be the case; that, because the former is infinite, therefore it can produce nothing. For what it should produce cannot consist with it (that is, even not being finite; and then certainly if we could suppose the effect infinite, much less.) But what, therefore, is power the less for being infinite? Or can infinite power, even because it is infinite, do nothing? What can be said or thought more absurd or void of sense? Or shall it be said that the infiniteness of power is no hindrance but the infiniteness of Being? But how wild an imagination were that of a finite being that were of infinite power? And besides, is that power somewhat or nothing? Surely it will not be said it is nothing. Then it is some Being. And if some power be some being, what then is infinite power, is not that infinite being? And now therefore if this infinite can produce anything, which it were a strange madness to deny, it can at least produce some finite thing. Therefore there is no inconsistency between the infinite and finite beings? Unless we say the effect produced even by being produced must destroy, or (even infinitely) impair its cause, so as to make it cease at least to be infinite. But that also cannot possibly be said of that which is infinite and necessary, which, as has been shown, cannot, by whatever productions, suffer any diminution or decay. If here it be further urged. But here is an infinite being now supposed, let next be supposed the production of a finite. This is not the same with the other; for surely infinite and finite are distinguishable enough, and do even infinitely differ. This finite is either something or nothing; nothing it cannot be said; for it was supposed a Being, and produced; but the production of nothing is no production. It is somewhat then; here is therefore an infinite Being, and a finite now besides. The infinite it was said cannot be diminished; the finite, a real something is added. Is there therefore nothing more of existent Being than there was before this production? It is answered, nothing more than virtually was before; for when we suppose an infinite Being, and afterwards a finite. This finite is not to be looked upon as emerging or springing up of itself out of nothing, or as proceeding from some third thing as its cause, but as produced by that infinite, or springing out of that, which it could not do, but as being before virtually contained in it. For the infinite produces nothing, which it could not produce. And what it could produce was before contained in it as in the power of its cause. And to anyone that attends and is not disposed to be quarrelsome, this is as plain, and easy to be understood, as how any finite thing may produce another, or rather more plain and easy, because a finite agent does not entirely contain its effect within itself, or in its own power, as an infinite does. If yet it be again said, that which is limited is not infinite, but suppose any finite thing produced into being after a pre-existent infinite, this infinite becomes now limited; for the being of the finite is not that of the infinite, each has its own distinct Being.

And it cannot be said of the one, it is the other; therefore each is limited to itself. I answer, that which was infinite becomes not thereby less than it was; for it has produced nothing but what was before virtually contained in it, and still is (for it still totally sustains the other.) But whatever it actually does, it can do, or has within its power: therefore if it were infinite before, and is not now become less, it is still infinite.

Therefore the true reason why the position of a finite thing after a supposed all-comprehending infinite does no way intrench upon or detract from the others all-comprehensive infinity, is, that it was formerly contained, and still is, within the virtue and power of the other.

It is true, that if we should suppose anything besides that supposed infinite to be of itself that would infer a limitation of the former. Infer, I say, not cause it, that is, it would not make it cease to be all-comprehendingly infinite, but it would argue it not to have been so before; and that the supposition of its infinity was a false supposition, because it would then appear, that the former did not comprehend all being any way in itself. Somewhat being now found to be in Being, which has no dependence thereon: from which it would be evident neither can be so. Of which some good use may be made to a further purpose by and by.

Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shown to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting being, is infinite, and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world inasmuch as matter is not self-active, much less intelligent (as it has both been proved it cannot be, and that the Former of this world must be.) It is therefore out of question, that because both cannot be all-comprehensive, they cannot both be necessary; nor can the vastly different kinds or natures of these things salve the business; for be they of what kinds they will, they are still beings. Besides, if matter were necessary, and self-subsisting, every particle of it must be so. And then we shall have not only two, but an infinite number of such infinites, and all of the same kind. But being only of this or that sort (as is apparent where more sorts do exist than one) could not be simply infinite, except as the other depends thereon; and as this one is radically comprehensive of all the rest, that can come under the general and most common notion of being. For that there is some general notion, wherein all being agrees, and by which it differs from no being, is, I think, little to be doubted; how unequally soever, and dependently, the one upon the other, the distinct sorts do partake therein. Whereupon the expressions [super-essential] and others like it, spoken of God, must be understood, as rhetorical strains, importing more reverence, than rigid truth. Except by essence (as was formerly said) only that which is created be meant. And that only a purer and more noble kind of essence were intended to be asserted to him, which yet seems also unwarrantable and [reconstructed: injurious] that a word of that import should be so misapplied and transferred from the substance, to signify nothing but the shadow, rather, of being. And that they who would seem zealously concerned to appropriate all being to God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves, as to set him above all being, and so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is above all being is no being.

And as to the unity or onliness rather of this being (or of the Godhead) the deduction thereof seems plain and easy from what has been already proved; that is from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some do toil themselves much about this matter; and others plainly conclude that it is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by divine revelation. Yet I conceive, they that follow the method (having proved some necessary self-subsisting being, the root and original spring of all being and perfection actual and possible; which is as plain as any thing can be) of deducing from there the absolute all comprehending perfection of such necessary being will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident than that there cannot be two (much less more) such beings. Inasmuch as one comprehends in itself all being and perfection; for there can be but one all, without which is nothing. So that, one such being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to it. Indeed so far is it therefore, if we suppose one infinite and absolutely perfect being, that there can be another independent thereon (and of a depending infinity we need not say more than we have, which if any such could be, cannot possibly be a distinct God) that there cannot be the minutest finite thing imaginable, which that supposed infinity does not comprehend, or that can stand apart from it, on any distinct basis of its own. And that this matter may be left, as plain as we can make it; supposing it already most evident.

That there is actually existing an absolute entire fullness of Wisdom, Power, so of all other perfection.

That absolute entire fullness of perfection is infinite.

That this infinite perfection must have its primary seat somewhere.

That its primary original seat can be nowhere but in necessary self-subsisting being.

We hereupon add, that if we suppose multitude, or any plurality, of necessary self-originate beings concurring to make up the seat or subject of this infinite perfection. Each one must either be of finite, and partial perfection; or infinite, and absolute. Not infinite and absolute; because one self-originate infinitely and absolutely perfect being, will necessarily comprehend all perfection and leave nothing to the rest. Not finite, because many finites can never make one infinite; much less can many broken parcels or fragments of perfection, ever make infinite and absolute perfection: even though their number (if that were possible) were infinite. For the perfection of unity, would still be wanting, and their communication and concurrence to any work (even such as we see is done) be infinitely imperfect, and impossible.

We might, more at large, and with a (much more pompous) number and apparatus of arguments, have shown, that there can be no more gods than one. But to such as had rather be informed than bewildered and lost, clear proof that is shorter and more comprehensive, will be more grateful.

Nor does this proof of the uniting of the Godhead any way impugn the Trinity, which is by Christians believed therein (and whereof some heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension, however they came by it) or exclude a sufficient uncreated ground of trinal distinction. As would be seen if that great difference of beings necessary and contingent, be well stated; and what is by eternal necessary emanation of the Divine Nature, be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the Divine Will. And the matter be thoroughly examined, whether, herein, be not a sufficient distinction of that which is uncreated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a Trinity in the Godhead may be very consistently with the unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know, but by his telling us so. It being among the many things of God which are not to be known, but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them, in and according to the holy Scriptures. As the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man. And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures, even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed, may be hereafter shown.