Part 2 — Chapter 1: Of Popular Government in the Church

There are some that call in question the warrant and authority of classicall Presbyteries, of provinciall Synods and Nationall Assemblies, as they are used and maintained in the Church of Scotland. I meane not the Praelaticall faction, whom we set aside, but even some who are as Antiepiscopall as we are. The scrupulosity of such (at least of many such) herein does (we conceive) proceed not from any perversnesse of mind, but onely from certaine mistakings, which better information may remove.

But first of all wee require those, whom we now labor to satisfie, to condescend upon another point, namely that the exercise of Ecclesiasticall power and jurisdiction in a particular Congregation, ought not to bee committed to the whole collective body thereof, but is peculiar to the Eldership representing the same; for in vaine doe wee debate the other point concerning Presbyteries and Assemblies, if this latent prejudice still occupy their minds, that the Government of the Church must needs be popular, exercised by the collective body, which happily may in some sort bee done within the bounds of a well limited Congregation, but is manifestly inconsistent with classicall Presbyteries & Synods, because the collective bodies of all particular Congregations within the bounds of a shire, of a Province, of a Nation, cannot bee ordinarily, nor at all ordinatly, assembled together, and if they could, I beleeve that the Separatists themselves would in that case allow a dependencie or subordination of particular Congregations to the more generall Congregation. So that the point of popular government being once cleared, it shall facilitate the other question concerning the subordination of particular Elderships to classicall Presbyteries & Synods. Now there are good reasons why this popular government or exercise by jurisdiction by all can not be admitted into a Congregation.

First, in every Christian Congregation, there are some Rulers, some ruled, some Governors, some governed, some that command, some that obey, as is manifest from (Hebrews 13:17; 1 Thessalonians 5:12; 1 Timothy 5:17). But if the whole Congregation have the Rule and Government, who then shall be ruled and governed? It will be answered, that in the exercise of jurisdiction, every Member is to act according to its owne condition, the head as the head, the eye as the eye, &c. that the Rulers and Governors of a Congregation are to have the principall conduct of businesse, and to bee Heads, Eares, Mouths, &c. to the Congregation.

But this simile maketh rather for us then against us, for though every member bee usefull and steadable in the body according to its owne condition, yet every member neither can nor does exercise those principall actions of seeing, hearing, tasting, &c. I say not that other members cannot see, heare, taste, as the eyes, eares, and mouth doe, but they cannot at all see, heare, nor taste. So if the Rulers of a Congregation be as the eyes, eares, mouth, &c. then other members of the Congregation cannot at all act those actions of government which they act. Hence it is that some, who make the whole Congregation the first subject of the power of spirituall Jurisdiction, doe notwithstanding hold that the whole Church does exercise the said jurisdiction as Principium quod, the Eldership alone, as Principium quo, even as the whole man seeth, as Principium quod, the eye alone, as Principium quo, and so of all the rest. Thus doe they put a difference between the power it selfe, and the exercise of it, ascribing the former to the collective body of the Church, the latter to the representative: knowing that otherwise they could not preserve the distinction of Rulers and ruled in the Church.

Secondly, it is well knowne that in Congregations the greater part are not fit to exercise Jurisdiction, for they can not examine the Doctrine and abilities of Ministers, how should they ordaine them? They can not judge of questions and controversies of faith, how shall they determine the same? They can not find out and discover Hereticks, how shall they excommunicate them? It is answered that this evill proceedeth from another, namely that there is too much sloth and oversight in the admission of such as are to be members of a Congregation, and that they would be fit enough to doe their duty, if they were all Saints, they meane appearantly, and in the judgement of charity such (Romans 1:7; 1 Corinthians 1:2; Ephesians 1:1). But say we againe, 1. Why may wee not hold that when the Apostle writeth to the Saints at Rome, at Corinth, &c. he meaneth not, that all who were in those Churches, were either truely or appearantly Saints (for some wicked ones there were among them, and manifestly vitious (Romans 16:17, 18; 1 Corinthians 5:9, 11)) but that his meaning is, to direct his Epistles to so many as were Saints at Rome, Corinth, &c. mentioning them alone; because to them, and to none but them, did God send his word for a blessing, it being sent to others that they may goe and fall backward, and be broken, and snared, and taken, as the Prophet speaketh. 2. If it should be granted that the Apostle giveth the name of Saints to all and every one that were in the Churches of Rome, Corinth, and Ephesus, yet Mr. Ainsworth himselfe answering Mr. Bernard holdeth that they are called Saints by externall calling onely, wherewith many are called who are not chosen, and who have no appearant markes of election. Others say that they were called Saints, in respect of their baptisme, wherein they were all consecrated and devoted to God. Some say that they were all Saints, in respect of their profession. 3. However it was that they were all called Saints, yes put the case they had beene all truely Saints, surely their sanctification can not import their fitnesse to exercise jurisdiction in the Church. The former is a speciall grace of the holy Spirit given to one for his owne Salvation: the other is a common gift of the Spirit, given for the benefit of the Church.

Thirdly, it were not possible to exercise jurisdiction by a whole Congregation without great confusion and disorder: therefore this way cannot be from God, who is not the author of confusion but of order. If it be answered, that order may be kept in a Congregation exercising Jurisdiction as well as in a Nationall, at least in a Oecumenicall Synod, where there will be as great a multitude, and peradventure greater, then there is in a well-bounded Congregation. Wee reply it is not so much the multitude, which should make disorder in the exercise of Jurisdiction by a whole Congregation (though indeed in many Congregations the multitude alone would hinder order) as the rudenesse of the vulgar sort, who if they should all speake their judgement, what a monstrous and unavoidable confusion should there be? The members of Nationall and Oecumenicall Councils, are supposed to be men of knowledge and discretion, and so may be kept in good order, much more easily then a rude multitude in the Congregation.

They who are of another judgement object to us: First, our Savior's precept (Matthew 18:17), where he bids us not tell the Eldership, but tell the Church. The answer is: by the Church he means the representative body of the Church, even as that which was spoken to the Elders of Israel (Exodus 12:21) was said to be spoken by all the Congregation of Israel (ibid. verse 3), and he who was judged by the Elders was said to be judged by the Congregation (Joshua 20:6). More of this place we say elsewhere. Next they object the example of excommunication by the whole Congregation of Corinth, for the Apostle shows that it was the duty of the whole Congregation to cast out that incestuous man (1 Corinthians 5:13, 4, 9, 13). In like manner he writes to them all to receive him again when he had repented (2 Corinthians 2:6, 8, 9). Answer: Whether the power of excommunication in actu primo seu quo ad esse did belong to the collective body of the Church of Corinth or not is a question controverted, and to this day sub judice lis est; yet even those who hold the affirmative part of the question do notwithstanding say that in actu secundo seu quo ad operari the power pertained only to the [illegible] body of that Church which [illegible] Presbytery: which is also confirmed by 2 Corinthians 2:6, where the Apostle speaking of the censure of that incestuous man says not that it was inflicted by all, but by many. He was judged and sentenced by those, that is by the Pastors and Elders of Corinth, howbeit the execution and final act of that high censure was to be with the consent and in the presence of the Congregation.

Thirdly, it is objected that Matthias was chosen by the whole number of the Disciples (Acts 1), and so were the Deacons chosen (Acts 6), and Elders in every city were made by the Congregation signifying their suffrages by the lifting up or stretching forth of their hands (Acts 14:23). Therefore jurisdiction ought to be exercised by whole Congregations. Answer: this argument fails two ways. 1. Though ordination of office-bearers in the Church be an act of jurisdiction, it does not appear that the election of them is an act of jurisdiction likewise. Though the solemnizing of marriage be an act of authority, yet the choice and desire of the parties is not an act of authority. 2. Or (if you will) election of ministers is one of the rights and privileges of the Church, yet no act of jurisdiction. 3. And if election were an act of authority and jurisdiction, yet the alleged examples prove no more but that this act of jurisdiction is to be exercised by the whole body, in Ecclesia constituenda, non constituta. It may be so indeed in Churches at their first erection, but being once erected, and all necessary office-bearers therein planted, from thenceforth the election of Elders pertains to the Presbytery, to the Pastor and Elders, as Zepperus writes, though still with the consent of the Church.

Fourthly, it is objected that what concerns all ought to be done with the consent of all. Answer: we hold the same, but the consent of all is one thing, the exercise of jurisdiction by all another thing. Ainsworth in one of his Epistles to Paget condemns the Elderships sitting and judging matters apart from the Congregation. Paget answers that though the Eldership sit apart to judge, yet before any sentence be given for the cutting off of any offender, or for any other thing which concerns all, matters are first propounded to the whole Church, and their prayers and consent required.

And surely this form of proceeding shines forth to us in that Apostolic Synod at Jerusalem, for the Apostles and Elders met, sat, and voiced apart from the whole Church, as Calvin notes from Acts 15:6, and they alone judged and decreed (Acts 16:4). In the meantime were matters made known to the whole Church, and done with the consent of all (Acts 15:22).

If it be objected from verse 12 that the whole multitude was present in the Synod, I answer we may understand with Piscator the multitude there spoken of to be the multitude of the Apostles and Elders (v. 6), or if we should understand by the multitude the whole Church, this proves only that the whole Church heard the question disputed, not that they were all present at the judging and determining of it. If it be further objected that the Synodal Epistle came not only from the Apostles and Elders but from the brethren, that is, the whole Church, the answer is easy. The brethren are mentioned because it was done with their knowledge, consent, and applause.

To say no more, we would gladly bury this controversy about popular government, in eternal silence and oblivion, and to this end we are content it be packed up, in the words which the Separatists themselves (doubtless weighing the reasons above-mentioned) have set down in the 14. Article of the Confession of their Faith published, Anno 1616, for this they say. We judge each proper pastor, may and ought to be trusted by the congregation, with the managing of all points of their ecclesiastical affairs and government, so far, that he with his assistants doe execute and administer the same: yet so that in matters of weight, the whole congregation doe first understand thereof, before any thing be finished, and the final act be done in the presence of the whole congregation, and also that they (the said congregation) doe not manifestly dissent therefrom. We are heartily content, that congregations doe fully enjoy all the Christian liberty, which here is pleaded for in their behalf, yes and much more also; for the assistants spoken of in these words of the Confession, are other pastors and colleagues, if any there be, in the same congregation, as will be evident to any that reads that Article. But we are content that the assistants spoken of be understood to be ruling elders. Now if the authors of that Confession thought the Christian liberty of a congregation sufficiently preserved, when the pastor or pastors thereof doe manage the weighty ecclesiastical affairs and government, with the knowledge, and (at least tacite) consent of the congregation itself, then doe we not only sufficiently and abundantly preserve the liberty of the congregation, while as not the pastor or pastors thereof alone, but sundry ruling elders also, representing the congregation, doe manage the affairs aforesaid, the congregation withal understanding thereof, and consenting thereto, tacitè if not expressè. I doe not think but those of the Separation at this time, will easily assent to this resolution and reconcilement of the controversy, and so much the rather, because (I believe) they themselves doe seclude from the exercise of jurisdiction in the congregation, both children under age, because of their defect of judgment, and women, because they are forbidden to speak in the Church, and whether they seclude any other, I know not, but since according to their own tenets, some must be secluded, and the power given to the Church, must in the exercise of it be restrained to some in the Church, it is better to say with Aegidius Hunnius, that when Christ remits us to the Church (Matthew 18:17), he means the prime and chief members which represent the Church, that is pastors and elders, than to say that he sends us to the whole body of the Church.

One scruple more may peradventure remain. They will say, it is well that we require the church's consent, before any weighty matter which concerns all be finished: but what if this consent be not had? Whether may the eldership cut off an offender renitente Ecclesia? For their satisfaction is this, also we say with Zepperus, Quod si Ecclesia &c. But if the Church, says he, will not approve the sentence of excommunication, nor hold it valid, and they see many disagreeing among themselves, and schisms and greater evils in the Church to follow this sentence of excommunication: the elders shall not proceed to excommunication, but shall patiently suffer what cannot with the good leave of the Church be amended. In the mean while they shall publicly and privately admonish and exhort. So says Zanchius, that without the consent of the Church no man ought to be excommunicated.

The Bishop of Spalato, and before him, Augustine has given the reason hereof, because the end of excommunication cannot be attained, if the Church doe not consent thereto; for the end is, that the offender may be taken with fear and shame, when he finds himself abhorred and accursed by the whole Church, so that it shall be in vain to excommunicate him, from whom the multitude in the Church refuse to abstract their communion. I conclude, that in such cases, though the pastors and elders have the power of jurisdiction, it is not to exercise the same.