The Third Crimination

Answere.

We say that Adams fall came to pass God not only foreknowing but also willing and decreeing it: and that without blasphemy, if you will friendly and courteously give leave to show how far forth and in what manner. The will of God is twofold, general and special. The special will (which the scripture calls, Cephets) is that by which God does both approve and effect a thing: or else it is God's good pleasure, whereby taking delight in some thing he does will it simply, both as touching the doing of it, as also in respect of approbation. The object of this will depends on the will, and follows it as the effect follows the cause. And by this will our judgment is, according to the word of God, that God wills that which is good, and wills not that which is evil as it is evil. Psalm 5:4: You are a God which wills not iniquity. And of this kind or rather manner of will are these sentences of Austin to be understood: God has foreknown, but he did not foreappoint the works of ungodliness. And, He does only foreknow, and not preordain evils. And, It is all one to say God is the author and God wills. The general will is that whereby God wills a thing not to be (for that which is not, therefore is not, because he wills it shall not be) and for certain causes also he wills not to hinder some things, and consequently wills that they shall come to pass; which things notwithstanding he does not simply approve. Or, it is the decree of God, whereby he wills some thing, not in respect of approbation and effecting of it by himself, but only in respect of suffering it to be done by others. And here the thing which is to be done does not depend upon God's will, but only upon the will of the creature which falls away: and with this will we say that God willed the fall of Adam, yet not simply but only that it should come to pass. Now it is one thing to will a thing by itself, and another thing to will it as touching the event. Moreover he wills the event of sin, not by effecting it himself: but by forsaking or not hindering when he might if he would. And if we inquire of the order of willing, it is this: first and properly God does will not to inhibit, and not to hinder sin; and by consequent only he wills the event of sin. For that which God does not hinder, does therefore come to pass, because he does not hinder it: and as no good thing can either be or come to pass, unless God make it: so no evil thing can be avoided, except God do hinder. And there is not the least thing which may be done without this will; unless we will say that God's providence is idle; which to say were wicked. The reasons of this our judgment are many. The first reason I will draw out of most evident testimonies of Scripture. Acts 2:23: Him I say being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, after you had taken, with wicked hands you have crucified and slain. Acts 4:27–28: They gathered themselves together, to do whatever your hand and your counsel had determined before to be done. Here it is to be observed, that not only Christ's passion but also the works which in respect of the Jews were wicked, do come under the decree and will of God: to wit, so far forth as God willed that they should come to pass for just ends. This very thing Augustine signifies when he says, When the father delivered the son, and Christ his body, and Judas his master: In this delivering therefore is God just and man guilty, but because in one thing which they did, there is not one cause for which they did it? And there is no reason that it should seem harsh to any, if speaking of Adam's fall we follow the holy scripture on this manner. When Adam did eat of the forbidden fruit, he did eat that which the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done. This is that very thing which we say: this is the language of the Apostles and of the Church, which therefore we may use without the least suspicion of blasphemy. But to the former testimonies I will add one place out of Peter, 1 Peter 3:17: It is better (if the will of God be so) that you suffer for well doing, than for evil doing. But to punish men for well doing, in respect of men, it is flatly to transgress the law of God. Furthermore God is said to bid Shimei to curse David, that is, to have ordained and decreed, for God bids and commands a thing two ways: first by his revealed will; and this he does by his word delivered to men. Secondly, by his secret will, which is his providence or hidden decree, by which he does so govern all things, that nothing can be done without it or against it: as in these places. Jeremiah 34:22: I will command and call back the Assyrians against this city. Lamentations 3:37: Who is he then that says, and it comes to pass, and the Lord commands it not? Job 37:6: He says to the snow, be you upon the earth: likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his power. By which it appears that it may well be said, that God decreed that Shimei should curse David: and it is the like kind of speech to say, that God did not decree Adam's fall simply, but in some respect. The second reason follows: it is the common opinion of all men that God does will to suffer sin, but to will to suffer it, is to will not to hinder it, and to will not to confer grace. Now he which foreknows some future evil, and wills not to hinder it when he might, and not to confer confirming grace, he does indeed will that the same should come to pass. Therefore we do not place that will, whereby we say that God does will that sin should come to pass and be in nature, either without or beyond the divine permission, but we do enwrap and enfold it in it. And this is that which Calvin says and no other: It often offends some men's ears to hear that God willed the fall of man. But I pray you what other thing is his permission besides will, who has authority to hinder, and in whose power the matter stands? The same affirms Beza: If any man hear that some things come to pass, which indeed are done against his will, that is, against his liking, not because he cannot, but because he will not hinder them: I answer, that it is all one as if a man should say that they come to pass he being willing they should. For those things, which he could surely hinder if he would, must needs come to pass, because by not hindering of them he wills that they should come to pass. And whatever God does not hinder, he does therefore not hinder it, either because he wills that it should be done, or because he does utterly nill that it should be done, or because he does not will it should be done, or else because he cares not: that is, he neither wills nor nills that it should come to pass. If you grant the first, I have my desire. The second is absurd; namely that God does not hinder evil, because he does utterly nill that it should be done. For this is to make God inconstant. The third, Lombard and the schoolmen affirm. For they say that God in respect of sin has no positive act, neither of willing nor of nilling, but only a negative act of not willing to hinder it. But by this means a great part of those things, which are done in the world should come to pass God being either ignorant or negligent. The very permission also is a certain will and not a pure negation: for not to will to hinder, that is, to suffer, is indeed to will not to hinder. If you will say the fourth, you do wickedly make an idle and Epicurean god, therefore we must needs retire to the first, namely that God does decree that evil should come to pass in such sort as I have declared. Yet the fault must not be for all that translated to him, because he does justly and holily decree that which men do wickedly.

Thirdly, we know that Adam's revolting is now past and done; therefore we must say that God did will that it should be done, unless we shall say that his providence is not in all, and every thing. You will say that an evil work is ordained of God, that is, disposed to God's glory, the salvation of the godly, and the destruction of the wicked. I grant it, but not this only. For the providence of God is over the world and every thing therein: both in respect of the end, as also of the beginning of every action: Satan and the wicked do not only not finish, that which they would, but they do not so much as begin it, unless God wills and gives leave. It seems impious to think that any thing, though as little as may be, does either exist or come to pass besides that, which God being always holy and just has willingly from all eternity decreed.

Fourthly, let us hear the judgment of the ancient Church. Augustine, We must know that all things are either performed the Lord helping, or permitted the Lord forsaking, that you may know that nothing is at all admitted the Lord being unwilling. Again: There is nothing done but that which the Almighty wills to be done, either by suffering it to be done, or by doing it himself. Again: Sometimes a man wills a thing with a holy will, which God wills not. Again: It is possible that a man should will this with an evil will, which God wills with a good will. So much difference is there between what is fitting for man to will, and what is fitting for God to will, and to what end every one refers his will, so as that it may be allowed or disapproved. And again: Know that whatever falls out here contrary to our will, happens not but by the will of God, his providence, ordinance, appointment and decrees. Tertullian: God has foreknown all things by disposing them, and disposed them by foreknowing them. Jerome: Shall I say that any thing is done without you, and that the wicked can do so much against your will? Surely it were blasphemy so to imagine. And again: What good or evil things soever are in the world, they happen not by casual chance, and without the providence of God, but by his pleasure. Hugo says: Men may well endure the hearing of this, and it may be said without any scruple or trouble of conscience, God wills that which is good. But if it be said, God wills that which is evil, it is a thing very grievous to be heard, and a religious mind does not easily conceive of that which is goodness itself, that it wills evil: for then it seems to be said that the good loves that which is evil, and approves that which is bad, and therefore a godly mind rejects this, not because that which is said is not well said, but because that which is well said is not well understood. But after what sort it ought to be understood, he himself in the selfsame place explains. This (says he) is only said, and yet another thing is meant and understood, because God wills that evil be, and yet wills not the evil. And again: He wills that evil be, and yet he wills that therein be nothing but that which is good. And again: When he does good and suffers evil, his will appears in this, because he wills that to be which he does or permits. And again: The will of God is his good pleasure, and his will is his working, and his will is his permission. Catharinus says: We need not be afraid to confess that God wills sin, as blessed Augustine says also, not because he wills sin as it is sin and evil, but as it is good, to wit, as it is the punishment of sin and vengeance in the reprobate (for that is God's purpose, and it is good and not evil) or as sin itself is an occasion to good in his beloved and elect.

But they use to object thus: To will that evil be done is proper and belonging to an evil will which is delighted with evils, or would use them to good, contrary to the rule: That no evil should be done that good might come thereof. To this I answer: That here are two grounds to be laid. The first is, that the object even of man's will is good, and therefore much more of God's will, and the object of the will cannot be evil by itself but by accident: for if the will wills evil, it wills it not as it is evil, but as it is good. The second ground is, that there is a certain summum bonum or sovereign good with which there is no evil conjoined; because there is a certain thing infinitely good, namely God: but there is not any absolute evil, because there is nothing so evil, but it has some good joined therewith, and therefore it is good that sin should be and come to pass. So says Saint Augustine: Although therefore those things which are evil, so far forth as they are evil are not good, nevertheless it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless this were good, that there should be also evils, they should [illegible] by no means be suffered by the Almighty who is goodness itself. Thus therefore I answer: That sin in the causes and circumstances thereof fully and exactly weighed, is two ways to be considered. First we consider sin not as it is sin, but so far forth as it has some respect to good with God which decrees it. And this way taking sin, although God wills it not simply and by itself, yet he decrees it and wills it as touching the event. Moreover sin has respect to God two manner of ways, first, because it is in that which is good: secondly, because it tends to that which is good. I say it is in that which is good; because every evil is in that which is good as in the subject. Now in respect of the subject, that is, as sin is a motion, an inclination, or an action, God both wills and effects the same. Moreover sin tends to that which is good, because God ordains it to good, and from there draws the good either of trial, chastisement, or punishment. And we say that God is so far forth willing that sin should come to pass, as he is able and will by his wonderful wisdom from there to draw forth that which is good.

Secondly, we consider sinne according to the property and natural being thereof, that is, sinne as it is sinne; and this way also we weigh sinne either so far forth as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of men, or as it is sinne to God. But God himself neither wills, nor approves, nor effects sinne, as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of the creatures that offend; and yet he wills as touching the event, not simply, as those things that are good in themselves, but only by willing to permit that it may be. For there is a threefold action of God's will, the first is that whereby God wills any thing by willing it, that is, when he wills it with his whole and absolute will, as Tertullian says, and this way he wills that which is good in it selfe. The second action is that, whereby he nills any thing by nilling it, as that which shall never come to passe, because God does utterly nill the being thereof. The third and last action is remisse and in the middest between both, whereby he wills some thing by nilling it slackely or remissely, that is, when he partly wills it and partly nills it, or else so far forth wills it, as that for just causes he nills it. And after this sorte we say, that God wills the event of evil, as it is evil in it selfe in respect of men; because evil as it is evil after this sorte, is not absolutely evil: and God draweth good out of evil as it is evil in the nature thereof or in it selfe: as he brought forth light out of darkenesse, even as it was darkenesse in it selfe. And if so be that evil were absolutely evil, as God is absolutely good, he would in no wise will the event of evil, neither should there be any evil existent at all. For that which God utterly nills, has not any being or existence. But sin as it is sin to God, (now that is a sinne to God which is in it selfe sinne, in his decree whereby all things are ordained as it considereth sinne) he neither wills it, nor approves it, nor works it, no in this respect he does not so much as permit it. I doe not denie but that God permits and suffers evil, as it is evil in it selfe, (otherwise there were not evil properly and naturally) but I denie that he permits it, because it is evil. For God never suffers evil for it selfe, but for the good that is therewith conjoined. And this is the meaning of that saying of Beza: The Lord never permits sins, as they are sins, yes rather he evermore forbids and hinders them. And againe: Sinnes so far forth as they are permitted by God being thereto willing, are not sinnes but the punishments of sinne. And thus using this exposition is the mind and judgement of Master Calvin of blessed memory to be understood, where as he says that all the sons of Adam did fall away by God's will: and againe, that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his owne falling away. And againe, it was the secret counsell of God, in which the fall of man was ordained. And againe: Adam did not fall away but according to God's knowledge and ordinance. In these and such like maner of speeches his purpose was, to overthrow the opinion of the Schoolemen, who would have his permission severed from his will: it were good therefore for them better to consider of the matter, who without either charity or humanity doe with the blasphemies of the Manichees slaunder and bely this holy man.

Secondly they use to object, that God wills things contrary, if he will that that should come to passe which he forbids in his law. Answer. It is true indeed, if he should will one and the same thing to come to passe and not to come to passe in one and the same respect and manner: but God forbids evil as it is evil, and wills it to come to passe as it has respect to good. Heereupon Aquinas says, That evil be and that evil bee not, are contradictorily opposed; but that God wills evil to be, and that God wills evil not to be, are not contradictorily opposed, seeing both are affirmative.

Thirdly, they object thus: That thing which being graunted, another thing necessarily followeth, is the cause of that selfe same thing that does follow; but this being granted that God willed the fall of Adam to come to passe, the same came to passe necessarily and infallibly. Therefore the will of God was in this respect the cause of sinne. Whereto I answere, that the first proposition of this argument is not generall, for in admitting the creation of the world, both the place and the time or continuance thereof are infallibly and without doubt also to be admitted, and yet the creation of the world is not the cause of the continuance thereof, and of the place, where it now consisteth. And that this proposition may be true, it is thus to be framed: That thing which being granted, another thing infallibly followeth (no other cause comming between) is the cause of the very same thing that followeth. And the second proposition also fitted to this former is untrue. For this being granted that God wills sin to happen, sin shall not come to passe immediatly, but by the meanes of man's free will; and although it come to passe infallibly on God's part which decrees it, yet it comes to passe freely on man's part, for it had been possible for man not to have sinned when he did sinne if he had would. As may appeare by this similitude. God forsaketh man by not conferring and bestowing on him necessary and sufficient helpe for the avoyding of sinnes; now man being forsaken by him, sinneth necessarily; and yet the fault is not to be laid on God, because that in this his forsaking him the will of man commeth between. For God forsaketh man being willing to be forsaken, and not against his will and mind.

Secondly, I answer to the aforesaid reproach of our doctrine, that we say not, that sin is from the decree, or of the decree of God, as from the efficient, material, formal, or final cause. But we do teach and affirm that sin comes to pass according to the providence, or decree of God, as the sole consequent thereof. For we assuredly think and judge that the decree of God does so go before the sin of man, as that it has no respect to any cause, unless it be of such a one, as is a failing and deficient cause. So says Augustin: Therefore truly the great works of the Lord are exquisite in all his wills, so that after a wonderful and unspeakable manner, that is not done beside his will, which notwithstanding is done contrary to his will.

Again it is objected: He that says that the decree of God is the energetical operative beginning of all things, necessarily makes the decree of God, the beginning also of sin. Whereunto I answer, That the holy Ghost himself says that the decree of God is the beginning of all things being and existent (Ephesians 1:11): God works all things after the counsel of his own will. And again in the 17th of the Acts, In him we live, we move, and have our being. Augustine says: The will of God is the very cause of all things which are. Hugo de Saint Vict. says: There is no cause of the will of God, which is the cause of all things. And this very thing common reason will teach us, because there must first some certain ground be laid, from where every thing should have or take the being and existence thereof; and this ground is even the very will of God. For a thing is not first, and then afterward God wills it to come to pass; but, because God has decreed that a thing should come to pass, or be done, therefore it is. And yet shall not God therefore be the cause of sin: because sin is not properly a thing, action, or being, but a defect only: and yet nevertheless it is not therefore nothing. For whatever has a being, is either really and positively, or else in reason only. And under those things which are in reason, are contained not only notions and relations, but also privations: because they have not a real matter and form out of the understanding. But sin has not a positive and real being, and yet it has a being in reason (as they term it). For so far forth it is in the nature of things being, as it may cause a true composition in the mind: and although it does not exist positively, that is, by matter, or form created; yet it is privatively: because that by the removal or taking away of original righteousness, that does immediately and truly follow and exist. Neither does it follow, as some other natural habit, or as a pure negation, but as a certain thing between both, that is, a want and absence of the contrary good.

Some use to object that we do teach, that God does incline to sinne and that he does positively harden the heart. Whereto I answer, that we allow not a bare permission severed utterly from his will, neither do we attribute a positive or natural action to God, as though he did infuse corruption and sinne: and yet we say that he does actively harden the heart. The action of God's Providence (as says Suidas) in the works of men is threefold. The first is according to his good pleasure, whereby God wills any work, allows it, effects it, and is therewith delighted: this action is only in good works, which have their beginning in us from the Holy Ghost. The second action of God's providence is of sustaining, whereby God upholds and maintains, the being, and all the faculties, motions, actions and passions of nature which offends. (Acts 17:28) In him we live, and move, and have our being. And although God do sustain nature offending, and the action of nature, yet is he free from fault; because he upholds the creature, only as it is a creature, not as it is evil. For the second cause, as the will of man, can by itself do evilly and corruptly: yet it can do nothing by itself, unless the effect thereof be reduced to the first cause. As may appear more plainly by this similitude: a man does halt by reason that his leg is out of joint: now here are two things to be considered, the very walking or motion itself, and his halting: the halting proceeds only from his leg out of joint, the walking both from his leg and also from the faculty of moving. In like manner a man sinning, in that he does it is of God, but in that he does evilly, it is of himself. We must therefore here know that God does uphold order as it is of nature, but furthers not the will violently breaking out against the order of the moral law. The third action of God's providence is according to concession, whereby God in the evil work of man works some things holily; and this last action is threefold. The first is permission: whereby God forsakes especially the wicked by withdrawing from them his grace, and by leaving them according to their deserts to their own wickedness, which he had before restrained, that it might not break forth to so immoderate liberty. And we use commonly to say, that he which permits, does and effects some thing: as when the rider gives the reins to his wanton and sporting horse, we say that he does move and encourage him; and we say that the hunter does put his dog on the game, when as he lets him slip. The second action (as I may so term it) is occasionall, whereby God by proffered occasions, in themselves good or indifferent, outwardly draws forth, stirs up, and brings out sinne in those who of themselves openly run into wickedness; to the intent that he may either justly punish their known impiety, or else discover it being closely shrouded. The like have we ordinarily even among ourselves: for the physician by his preservative medicine, stirs up, inflames, and draws forth the humours out of the corruption of the body. Admit a house be weakly timbered, which being almost now already fallen will ere long fall; and that I do not with any engines or instruments throw or beat down the same, but only take away the outward hindrances, and on every side as it were open a way for the downfall, to the intent, that when it falls, it may by the greater fall be broken in pieces. After this sort deals God with the wicked: and hereupon is it that the law is said to stir up and increase sinne in Paul (Romans 7:8). This action is done many manner of ways, as when the hindrances of sinne are taken away: when as the way is opened to the committing of one especial sinne, and not of another: when as objects are offered, which the ungodly use as instigations to sinne. These objects, are commandments, threatenings, exhortations, and cogitations either good or indifferent put by God in the minds of ungodly men, from the which the wicked by reason of his wickedness does greedily take an occasion to do ill. And this is the manner and way truly, whereby we say that God stirs man to evil, without infusing the least drop or jot of evil. For as in the middle region of the air the heat grows stronger by the antiperistasis or repulsion on every part, from where proceeds the thunder and lightning: and by the heat round encompassed, the clouds are condensated and made thick: even so the wicked and ungodly when they are stirred up by wholesome precepts, do grow more ungodly: and evil does so much the more begin to delight them, by how much the more they know that it is less lawful for them: according to the saying of the Poet: Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negara: We still endeavour things forbid, and covet that's denied. The third action is a disposing, whereby God through the evil work of an evil instrument, finishes his own work justly and holily. As for example: the sale of Joseph in his brethren was sinne: the just action of God in this evil work was the foresending of Joseph into Egypt for the common good and benefit of Jacob's family. And from this disposing proceeds it, that God uses the sins of men holily, that he provokes them holily, and orders them as the physician for a medicine orders poison, contrary to the nature thereof: that he orders them holily both according to the causes, and beginnings, and also according to the ends and issue: as when he disposes the work of the devil infusing corruption, either to the punishment of correction, vengeance, or trial. But concerning these let us rather give ear to ancient writers. Clemens Alexandrinus says: It belongs to God's wisdom, virtue, and power, not only to do good, which is the nature of God, but also especially to bring to some good and profitable end, that which has been invented by those which are evil, and use profitably those things which do seem evil. Augustine says: God makes and ordains just men: but he makes not sinners as they are sinners, but orders them only. And again; as God is the most excellent creator of good natures: so is he the most just disposer of evil wills. Again: God verily fulfils certain of his good wills, by the evil wills of evil men. Again: God by those men which do those things which he will not, does himself those things which he will. And again: God using well even those that are evil as being himself absolutely good: so far forth as in them lay they did that which God would not; in this very thing that they did that which was contrary to God's will, even by them his will is done. And again: Who would not tremble at these judgments of God, whereby God does in the hearts of evil men whatever he will, giving to them according to their deserts. And again: It is plain that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills whithersoever he will, either to those things that are good for mercy, or else to those things that are evil for their deserts, sometimes verily in his open judgment, sometimes in his secret judgment, but evermore in his just judgment. And again: God makes not evil wills, but uses them as he lists, because he cannot will any thing that is unjust. Fulgentius says: Although God be not the author of evil thoughts; yet he is the disposer of evil wills; and out of the evil work of every one, he does not cease to work that which is good.

In respect of these various actions concerning sin, it comes to pass that we find it said in the Scripture, that God does harden, does make blind, does deceive, does command a work that is evil, yes and does the same, and that he delivers over to beastly affections, &c.

Thirdly I answer to the aforesaid reproach of this our doctrine, that we do utterly abhor and detest the Stoical Fate, because it appoints an inherent necessity in things themselves, which should bind even God himself, and all other things, and make them subject thereunto. For however we do believe that the very decree of God is immutable and therefore necessary, yet in God himself it was most free, for he could either not have decreed that which he did decree, or else otherwise have decreed it: and he adds to the second causes placed out of God a certain necessity, but yet so free a one, as that it is rather to be termed a liberty, than a necessity. And this shall easily appear to be as I say, if I shall first show, what sorts of necessity there be, and how far forth it is agreeable to things. First therefore, a thing is necessary two ways, absolutely and conditionally. That is absolutely necessary which cannot be otherwise, or else whose contrary is impossible, as that God is omnipotent and just. And that is conditionally necessary, which cannot be otherwise, but yet not simply, but by the granting of one or many things: and this kind of necessity is either by nature, or the commandment, or decree of God. That is necessary by nature, which comes to pass constantly and immutably by reason of that order which God has set in the nature of things: after this sort is it of necessity, that fire do burn, that the earth is carried downward, and the heaven moved. That is necessary by commandment, which is necessarily to be done because God has commanded it. After this sort it is of necessity that one undergo the office of a magistrate (Romans 13:5). That is necessary by the decree of God, which is so, because God has foreknown it, and willed either to effect it, or at the least to permit it. After this sort every thing in respect of God is necessary, and the will of God (as Augustine says) is the necessity of things. Secondly, necessity is either of compulsion or infallibility. Necessity of compulsion, is that which infers violence to things by some cause working without, and forcibly constrains that they do either this or that. And this indeed is the Stoical necessity, that a man should do any thing against his will being compelled by force and necessity. There is also such a like kind of necessity of the Manichees, condemned by the fathers, who taught that there was no violence or necessity offered to the will by God, nor that it was forced by necessity to sin. The necessity of infallibility is that whereby a thing according to the event shall certainly and immutably come to pass: yet so, as if we consider the cause of a thing by itself, it may either not come to pass, or else come otherwise to pass. Of this manner of necessity we must understand that principle: every thing that is, when it is, is of necessity. And thus is necessity distinguished: now will I show how far forth it is agreeable to several things. The events of all things have reference either to the second causes, or to God, who is the first cause. Now some things in respect of the second causes are necessary, others contingent. From causes which are necessary, must needs proceed that which is necessary, from those that are free, that which is free, from those that are natural that which is natural; and to be brief, such as are the next causes aforegoing, such also is the event of things. But in respect of God, all things whatever, are partly changeable, and partly necessary. In respect of God's liberty, which does that which it does freely, all things are contingent and mutable: however according to nature and the order of the next causes, they be necessary and immutable. In respect of God's decree, the second causes and the effects of them are all necessary, however in themselves they be uncertain and contingent. And yet they are not absolutely necessary, but by the supposition of God's decree, neither are they necessary by the necessity of compulsion, but of infallibility only, because God ordained before that those things which should come to pass should be. And this kind of necessity takes not away the contingency and liberty of second causes, but rather establishes and confirms it. For that which is free works freely, and that which is contingent, works contingently, by the necessary decree of God. Neither does liberty and necessity mutually overthrow each other, but liberty and compulsion. It is manifest therefore that God's decree causes an immutability to all things, of which notwithstanding some, in respect of the next causes, are necessary, and others contingent; but all of them in respect of God's liberty mutable. And as the mutability which things have from God's power, takes not away the necessity which they have from the second causes: so the necessity of immutability by God's decree consequently coming to pass, takes not away the contingency which they have from the next causes and God's liberty. Moreover we say, that God's decree ordains the second causes, and the very liberty itself also of man's will, not by compulsion, as if a man should violently throw a stone, but by inclining and gently bending them, by objects outwardly offered to the understanding (even as a sheep is said to be drawn, when grass is showed her being hungry) that a man may choose by his own free motion, or refuse that which God has justly decreed from all eternity.

These things being granted, it is manifest also what we ought to think concerning the fall of Adam. Which truly according to the event is necessary by the necessity of infallibility by reason of the foreknowledge and decree of God: yet so as that God is not guilty of any fault; because the decree of God however it was necessary in itself, yet it planted nothing in Adam, whereby he should fall into sin, but left him to his own liberty, not hindering his fall when it might; and the same fall in respect of man's will (which does that freely that it does) came to pass contingently and most freely. But, you will say, that Adam could not withstand God's will, that is, his decree; whereto I answer, that even as he could not, so also he would not. But, you will say again he could not will otherwise. Which I confess to be true, as touching the act and event, but not as touching the very power of his will, which was not compelled but of the own free motion consented to the suggestion of the devil. But to the intent that these things may more plainly be understood, we must make distinction between three times, the time going before his fall, the present time of his fall, and the time after his fall. In the first moment of time the fall of Adam was necessary in a double respect: First, by reason of the foreknowledge of God: for that which he foreknew would come to pass, must needs of necessity come to pass. Secondly, by reason of the permissive decree of God, that fall was according to the event necessary immutably. Honorius Augustodunensis says, It cannot otherwise be but that all things must come to pass, which God has predestinated and foreknown, seeing that he only either does all things or permits them to be done. Hugo de Saint Victore says: Sin follows of necessity by the withdrawing of grace. And the reason hereof is very easy, because evil permitted must come to pass, and cannot otherwise come to pass than God permits. For to permit evil, is not to stir up the will, and not to bestow on him that is tempted the act of resisting, but to leave him as it were to himself: and he whose will is not stirred up by God, and to whom the act of resisting is not conferred, however he may have power to withstand: yet can he not actually will to withstand, nor persist forever in that uprightness wherein he was created, God denying him strength. I confess truly that this kind of necessity as touching the liberty of man's will, was altogether evitable and to be avoided: and yet according to the event of the action it was inevitable. Yet I would not that any man should think that this necessity did any way proceed from the decree of God, which did only follow the decree being granted and admitted; and Adam in his temptation being destitute of the help of God, cast himself of his own accord into this same ensuing necessity of sinning. In the second time, his fall being present, there was another necessity thereof: because when it was it was of necessity. In the third time, man drew to himself by his fault, his nature being now corrupted, another necessity of sinning, insomuch that he made himself the servant of sin. Bernard says: I know not after what evil and strange manner, the will itself corrupted or changed to worse makes a necessity to sin: and yet the necessity although it be voluntary is not able to excuse the will: nor the will, although it be enticed, to exclude necessity.

If any man shall say, that by this our platform many are tied by an inevitable necessity to be damned; I would have him give ear to Augustine, who says: Hold this most stedfastly, and doubt not in any wise that any can perish whom God before the creation of the world, has of his free goodness made vessels of mercy, — or that any of them whom he has not predestinated to eternal life, can by any means be saved. And yet I say that the decree of reprobation does not cause a necessity of damnation in any man. For the first act thereof, which is a purpose not to show mercy, causes not this necessity in men, but goes before it as an antecedent: and man himself truly has brought upon himself this necessity with his own most free, yet rebelling will. Now the second act of Reprobation, which is a purpose of condemning, causes not any necessity of damnation, but by the sin of man coming between. Moreover, the necessity of damnation follows after the same manner by the foreknowledge of God: and yet this never seemed a thing strange to any one. But some will say, that the foreknowledge of God does never cause in men any necessity of damnation, although it does assuredly foresee the same. And I say also, that Reprobation does either not at all cause damnation in man, or that it does not cause it, but for sin. But it may be objected: They that are predestinated to damnation, cannot be freed by repentance, although they would. Whereto I answer with Augustine: As they did fall by their will, so by their will they are content to lie: and he that turns himself away from God, has both deprived himself of will to do that which is good, and also of power. It does not therefore follow (as they imagine which object such things) that God has taken repentance from those to whom he gave it not, and has thrown down those, whom he has not taken up.

Moreover, the selfe same necessitie followeth of their hypothesis, who affirme a bare permission. For that which God permitteth, the selfe same thing will he not hinder; and evil, if God hinder not, cannot be avoided: and that which cannot be avoided, shall come to passe infallibly. And therefore evil, permission being once graunted, of necessitie commeth to passe, although most freely on mans part. Whereupon it is plaine, that the decree of God is not more inevitable, than is the very permission separated from the decree. I doe wish that they would well weigh and consider this, who object to us either the Stoicall fate, or the dotages of the Manichees. For we differ from them as much in certaine judgement and opinion, as whoever doe differ most. For first, the Stoickes doe tie God to the second causes, so that he cannot doe otherwise, then the nature of them will suffer: we on the other side, doe hold that all second causes do depend upon and are ordered by God. Secondly, the Stoickes say, that neither God nor second causes can doe otherwise by their nature than they doe: we say that some second causes, are by Gods ordinance mutable, othersome immutable; and that God himselfe, can either not doe, that which he does, or else doe it otherwise. But now to come to the Manichees, who make two coeternall gods; we but one. They of their two Gods, make one good, and another evil: we say, that there is one absolutely good and just God. Thirdly, they wil have one of their Gods to bee the cause and worker of good things, and the other of evil: we make one true God the creatour and ruler of all things, and working nothing but that which is most good and most just. Fourthly, they say that they which are created by their good God cannot sinne: we say, that God does most freely convert whom he will, and when they are converted, they can never in this life perfectly be free from sinnes, but doe sometimes run into such sinnes, as doe grievously wound the conscience. Fiftly, they say, that they that are created by the evil God simply cannot be converted: we say, that unclean spirites and men were created both good and holy, but yet they fell by their owne will and fault, and not by any fault but the just permission of the Creatour, and brought upon themselves a necessitie of sinning. And although it be true, that man cannot withhold himselfe from sinning, unless God give him that grace, yet does he not sin of necessitie, that is, of compulsion, but willingly. And the will has sufficient libertie if by it selfe or the nature thereof it be inclinable to the contrary of that which it chooseth, and does of the owne accord choose that which it chooseth; although the same liberty bee governed and one way limited by God. Therefore I am flat of Anselmus opinion, who says: Although it bee of necessity that those things do come to passe which are foreknowne and predestinated; yet some things foreknowne and predestinated doe not come to passe by that necessitie which goeth before a thing, and causeth it, but by the same necessitie which followeth a thing. For God does not cause, although he does praedestinate them, by forcing the will, as by resisting it, but by leaving them in the power thereof. And I am also of Gaudentius his opinion; who says: The Jewes were willing to doe that evil which they did. And verily, if they had bin unwilling to doe it they had not done it. And it is a grosse sinne, but to thinke that God, who is not onely good and righteous, but also goodnesse and righteousnesse it selfe, does either command, or compel any thing to be done, which he condemneth when it is done. But that I may in a word fully deliver my opinion, if it bee demanded, how the will of God carrieth it selfe to good or evil, I answere: that in a good act God carrieth himselfe positively. For first he determineth the event of good, by willing effectually to worke it; and secondly, he inwardly inclineth the will of the creature, to doe that good which it does. Thirdly, he sometimes laieth a necessitie of immutabilitie on him that does well, but yet it is joyned with an exceeding freedome. After this sort the elect Angels doe necessarily obey God, yet not by constraint, but greatly coveting, and with all the strength of their will desiring it, not being thereunto compelled. In an evil act, I say that God carrieth himselfe privatively; not by a logical, but a natural privation foregoing the habit. For first he willeth that evil come to passe, not by doing it himselfe, but by willing not to hinder it to be done by others. Secondly, he does not inwardly incline the will to doe evil, but he forsaketh, and outwardly offereth objects which are good in themselves. Thirdly, God laieth not on us any necessitie, but a desertion, or want of grace, to which being imposed, followeth the necessitie of sinning, not as the effect does his cause, but as the defect does him that forsaketh. And this I am resolved on, that Gods decree does altogether order every event, partly by inclining and gently bending the will in all things that are good; and partly by forsaking it in things that are evil: and yet the will of the creature left to it selfe, is carried headlong of the owne accord, not of necessitie in it selfe, but contingently that way which the decree of God determined from eternitie. We therefore (thanks be given to God) doe with all our hearts renounce the doting follies of the Stoickes and the Manichees.