Survey of the First Chapter

THE Author of this Discourse seems in this First Chapter to design the stating of the Controversie, which he intendeth to pursue and handle (as he expresseth himself pag. 11.), as also to lay down the main foundations of his ensuing superstructure. Nothing could be more regularly projected, nor more suited to the satisfaction of ingenious inquirers into the matters under debate; for those, who have any design in reading, beyond a present divertisement of their minds, or entertainment of their fancies, desire nothing more than to have the subject matter which they exercise their thoughts about, clearly and distinctly proposed, that a true judgement may be made concerning what men say, and whereof they do affirm. But I fear our Author has fallen under the misadventure of a failure in these projections; at least as to that certainty, clearness, and perspicuity in the declaration of his conceptions, and expression of his assertions and principles; without which all other ornaments of speech in matters of moment, are of no use or consideration. His language is good and proper, his periods of speech laboured, full, and even; his expressions poynant towards his adversaries, and singly taken, appearing to be very significative and expressive of his mind. But I know not how it is come to pass, that what either through his own defect, as to a due comprehension of the notions whose mannagement he has undertaken, or out of a design to cloud and obscure his sentiments, and to take the advantage of loose declamatory expressions, it is very hard, if possible, to gather from what he has written, either what is the true state of the Controversie proposed to discussion, or what is the precise determinate sense of those words wherein he proposeth the principles that he proceeds upon. Thus in the title of the Book he asserts the power of the magistrate over the consciences of men; elsewhere confines the whole work and duty of conscience to the inward thoughts and persuasions of the mind, over which the magistrate has no power at all. Conscience itself he sometimes says is every man's opinion; sometimes he calls it an imperious faculty, which surely are not the same; sometimes he pleads for the uncontrollable power of magistrates over religion and the consciences of men; sometimes asserts their ecclesiastical jurisdiction as the same thing, and seemingly all that he intends; whereas I suppose, no man ever yet defined ecclesiastical jurisdiction, to be, an uncontrollable power over religion and the consciences of men. The magistrate's power over religion he asserts frequently, and denies outward worship to be any part of religion, and at last pleads upon the matter only for his power over outward worship. Every particular virtue he affirms to be such, because it is a resemblance and imitation of some of the divine attributes; yet also teaches that there may be more virtues, or new ones that were not so, and that to be virtue in one place which is not so in another: sometimes he pleads that the magistrate has power to impose any religion on the consciences of his subjects, that does not countenance vice, or disgrace the Deity; and then anon pleads for it in indifferent things, and circumstances of outward worship only. Also that the magistrate may oblige his subjects' consciences to the performance of moral duties, and other duties in religious worship under penalties, and yet punishes none for their crime and guilt, but for the example of others. And many other instances of the like nature may be given. Now, whatever dress of words these things may be set off withal, they savour rankly of crude and undigested notions, not reduced to such a consistency in his mind, as to suffer him to speak evenly, steadily, and constantly to them. Upon the whole matter, it may not be unmeetly said of his Discourse, what Tally said of Rullus his oration about the Agrarian Law: "Concionem advocari jubet; summâ cum expectatione concurritur; Explicat Orationem sane longam & verbis valdè bonis; Unum erat quod mihi vitiosum videbatur; quòd tantâ ex frequentiâ nemo inveniri potuit qui intelligere posset quid diceret. Hoc ille utrum ins[illegible]iarum caus[illegible] fecerit, an hac genere Eloquentia delectetur, nescio; tamen siqui acutiores in concione steterant, de Lege Agraria nescio quid voluisse eum dicere suspicabantur." Many good words it is composed of, many sharp reflections are made on others, a great appearance there is of reason; but besides that, it is plain that he treats of the Nonconformists and the magistrate's power, and would have this latter exercised about the punishment or destruction of the former (which almost every page expresseth), it is very hard to gather what is the case he speaks to, or what are the principles he proceeds upon.

The entrance of his discourse is designed to give an account of the great difficulty which he intends to assoyl, of the controversie that he will handle and debate, and of the difference which he will compose. Here, if any where, accuracy, perspicuity, and a clear distinct direction of the minds of the readers to a certain just apprehension of the matter in question and difference, ought to be expected. For if the foundation of discourses of this nature, be laid in terms general, ambiguous, loose, rhetorical, and flourishing, giving no particular determinate sense of the controversie, (for so this is called by our Author) all that ensues in the pursuit of what is so laid down, must needs be of the same complexion. And such appears to be the declamatory entrance of this chapter. For instead of laying a solid foundation to erect his superstructure upon, the Author seems in it only to have built a castle in the air, that makes a goodly appearance and shew, but is of no validity or use. Can he suppose that any man is the wiser, or the more intelligent in the difference about liberty of conscience, the power and duty of magistrates in granting or denying an indulgence to the exercise of it, by reading an elegant parabolical discourse of two supream powers, the magistrate and conscience, contesting for soveraignty, in and about no man knows what? What conscience is; what liberty of conscience; what it is pleaded for to extend to, who are concerned in it; whether its plea be resolved absolutely into its own nature and constitution, or into that respect which it has to another common rule of the minds and conceptions of men in and about the worship of God, is not declared; nor is it easily discernable, what he allows and approves of in his own discourse, and what he introduceth to reflect upon, and so reject. Page 5 he tells us, that conscience is subject and accountable to God alone, that it owns no superiour but the Lord of Consciences. And page 7, that those who make it accountable to none but God alone, do in effect usurp their princes' crown, defie his authority, and acknowledge no governour but themselves. If it be pleaded that in the first place, not what is, but what is unduly pretended is declared, his words may be as well so expounded in all his ascriptions to magistrates also; namely, that it is not with them as he asserts; but only 'tis unduly pretended so to be, as to any thing that appears in the discourse. The distinct consideration of the principles of conscience, and the outward exercise of it, can alone here give any shew of relief. But as no distinction of that nature does as yet appear, and if rested on, ought to have been produced by any one who understood himself, and intended not to deceive or entangle others, so when it is brought on the stage, its inconsistency to serve the end designed shall be evinced. But that a plea for the consciences of private men, (submitting themselves freely and willingly to the supream power and government of magistrates in all things belonging to public peace and tranquility,) to have liberty to express their obedience to God in the exercise of his outward worship, should receive such a tragical description of a rival supream power set up against the magistrate to the usurpation of his crown and dignity, is a new way of stating controversies whether in divinity or policy, which this Author judgeth conducing to his design and purpose. And I shall say no more but that those who delight in such a way of writing, and do receive light and satisfaction thereby, do seem to be exercised in a logick that I was never acquainted withal, and which I shall not now enquire after.

What seems to be of real difficulty in this matter which is so rhetorically exaggerated, our blessed Savior has stated and determined in one word; Give, says he, to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's; and this he did, when he gave his disciples command not only to think, judge and believe according to what he should propose and reveal to them, but also to observe and do in outward practices whatever he should command them. As he requires all subjection to the magistrate in things of his proper cognizance, that is all things necessary to public peace and tranquility in this world the great end of his authority: so he asserts also that there are things of God which are to be observed and practised, even all and every one of his own commands; in a neglect whereof on any pretence or account, we give not to God that which is his. And he doubted not, but that these things, these distinct respects to God and man, were exceedingly well consistent, and together directive to the same end of public good. Therefore passing through the flourishes of this frontispiece with the highest inconcernment, we may enter the fabrick it self, where possibly we may find him declaring directly what it is that he asserts in this matter, and contendeth for; and this he does page 10. And therefore it is the design of this discourse by a fair and impartial debate to compose all these differences and adjust all these quarrells and contentions, and settle things upon their true and proper foundations; first by proving it to be absolutely necessary to the peace and government of the world, that the supream magistrate of every commonwealth should be vested with a power to govern and conduct the consciences of subjects in affairs of religion.

I am sure our Author will not be surprized, if after he has reported the whole Party whom he opposeth, as a Company of silly, foolish, illiterate Persons, one of them should so far acknowledge his own stupidity, as to profess that after the Consideration of this Declaration of his Intention and mind, he is yet to seek for the Direct and determinate sense of his Words, and for the Principle that he designes the Confirmation of. I doubt not but that the Magistrate has all that power which is absolutely necessary for the preservation of public Peace and Tranquility in the world. But if men may be allowed to fancy what they please to be necessary to that end, and from there to make their own measures of that power which is to be ascribed to Him, no man knows what bounds will be fixed to that Ocean wherein the Leviathans they have framed in their Imagination may sport themselves. Some will perhaps think it necessary to this purpose that the Magistrate should have power to declare, and determine whether there be a God or no; whether if there be, it be necessary He should be worshipped or no; whether any Religion be needful in, or usefull to the World; and if there be, then to determine what all subjects shall believe, and practise from first to last in the whole of it. And our Author hopes that some are of this mind. Others may confine it to lesser things, according as their own Interest does call upon them so to do; though they are not able to assign a clear distinction between what is subjected to Him, and what may plead an exemption from his Authority. He indeed who is the Fountain and Original of all Power, has both assigned its proper end, and fully suited it to the attainment thereof. And if the noise of mens Lusts, Passions, and Interests, were but a little silenced, we should quickly hear the harmonious consenting voice of Humane nature it self, declaring the just proportion that is between the Grant of power and its end; and undeniably express it in all the instances of it. For as the Principle of Rule and Subjection, is natural to us, concreated with us, and indispensably necessary to Humane Society in all the distinctions it is capable of, and Relations from where those Distinctions arise; so Nature it self duly attended to, will not fail by the Reason of things, to direct us to all that is essential to it, and necessary to its end. Arbitrary Fictions of Ends of Government, and what is necessary thereunto, influenced by present Interest, and arising from circumstances confined to one Place, Time, or Nation, are not to be imposed on the Nature of Government it self; which has nothing belonging to it but what inseparably accompanieth mankind as Sociable.

But to let this pass; The Authority here particularly asserted, is a Power in the supream Magistrate to govern and guide the Consciences of his Subjects in affairs of Religion. Let any man duly consider these expressions, and if he be satisfied by them as to the sense of the Controversie under debate, I shall acknowledge that he is wiser than I, which is very easie for any one to be. What are the Affairs of Religion here intended, all or some? Whether in Religion, or about it; what are the Consciences of men, and how exercised about these things; what it is to govern and conduct them; with what power, by what means this may be done; I am at a loss for ought that yet is here declared. There is a Guidance, Conduct, yes Government of the Consciences of men, by Instructions and Directions in a due proposal of rational and spiritual motives for those ends; such as is that which is vested in, and exercised by the Guides of the Church; and that in subjection to, and dependance on Christ alone, as has been hitherto apprehended; though some now seem to have a mind to change their Master, and to take up praesente Numine who may be of more Advantage to them. That the Magistrate has also power so to govern and conduct the Consciences of his Subjects in his way of Administration, that is by ordering them to be taught, instructed, and guided in their duty, I know none that does deny. So did Jehosophat (2 Chronicles 17:7, 8, 9). But it seems to be a Government and Guidance of another nature that is here intended. To deliver our selves therefore from the Deceit and Intanglement of these general expressions, and that we may know what to speak to, we must seek for a Declaration of their sense and Importance from what is elsewhere in their pursuit affirmed and explained by their Author.

His general assertion is (as was observed) that the Magistrate has power over the consciences of his subjects in religion, as appears in the title of his book. Here p. 10. that power, is said to be, to govern and conduct their consciences in religious affairs; pag. 13. that religion is subject to his dominion as well as all other affairs of state, pag. 27. it is a sovereignty over mens consciences in matters of religion, and this universal, absolute, and uncontrollable; matters of religion are as uncontrollably subject to the supreme power, as all other civil concerns. He may if he please reserve the exercise of the priesthood to himself, p. 32. that is, what now in religion corresponds to the ancient priesthood, as the ordering bishops and priests, administering sacraments and the like; as the Papists in Q. Elizabeth's time did commonly report, in their usual manner, that it was done by a woman among us, by a fiction of such principles as begin it seems now to be owned. That if this power of the government of religion be not universal and unlimited it is useless, p. 35. that this power is not derived from Christ, nor any grant of his, but is antecedent to his coming, or any power given to him or granted by him, pag. 40. Magistrates have a power to make that a particular of the divine law, which God had not made so, p. 80. and to introduce new duties in the most important parts of religion. So that there is a public conscience which men are in things of a public concern (relating to the worship of God) to attend to and not to their own. And if there be any sin in the command, he that imposed it, shall answer for it, and not I whose whole duty it is to obey, p. 308. Hence the command of authority will warrant obedience, and obedience will hallow my actions, and excuse me from sin, ibid. Hence it follows, that whatever the Magistrate commands in religion, his authority does so immediately affect the consciences of men, that they are bound to observe it on the pain of the greatest sin and punishment; and he may appoint and command whatever he pleases in religion, that does not either countenance vice, or disgrace the Deity, p. 85. And many other expressions are there of the general assertion before laid down.

This therefore seems to me, and to the most impartial considerations of this discourse that I could bring to it, to be the doctrine or opinion proposed and advanced for the quieting and composing of the great tumults described in its entrance; namely, that the supreme Magistrate in every nation has power to order and appoint what religion his subjects shall profess and observe, or what he pleases in religion, as to the worship of God required in it, provided that he enjoins nothing that countenances vice, or disgraces the Deity; and thereby binds their consciences to profess and observe that which is by him so appointed (and nothing else are they to observe) making it their duty in conscience so to do; and the highest crime or sin to do any thing to the contrary; and that whatever the precise truth in these matters be, or whatever be the apprehensions of their own consciences concerning them. Now if our author can produce any law, usage, or custom of this kingdom, any statute or act of parliament, any authentic record, any acts or declarations of our kings, any publicly authorized writing, before or since the Reformation, declaring, asserting, or otherwise approving the power and authority described, to belong to, to be claimed or exercised by the kings of this nation, I will faithfully promise him never to write one word against it, although I am sure I shall never be of that mind. And if I mistake not in a transient reflection on these principles, compared with those which the Church of England has formerly pleaded against them who opposed her constitutions, they are utterly by them cast out of all consideration; and this one notion is advanced in the room of all the foundations, which for so many years her defenders, (as wise and as learned as this author) have been building upon. But this is not my concernment to examine; I shall leave it to them whose it is, and whose it will be made appear to be, if we are again necessitated to engage in this dispute.

For the present; be it granted, that it is the duty, and in the power of every supreme Magistrate, to order, and determine what religion, what way, what modes in religion shall be allowed, publicly owned, and countenanced, and by public revenue maintained in his dominions. That is, this is allowed with respect to all pretensions of other sovereigns, or of his own subjects; with respect to God, it is his truth alone, the religion by him revealed, and the worship by him appointed that he can so allow or establish. The rule that holds in private persons with respect to the public Magistrate, holds in him with respect to God. Illud possumus quod jure possumus. It is also agreed, that no men, no individual person, no order, or society of men, are either in their persons or any of their outward concerns, exempted, or may be so on the account of religion, from his power and jurisdiction; nor any causes that are liable to a legal, political disposal and determination. It is also freely acknowledged that whatever such a Magistrate does determine about the observances of religion, under what penalties soever, his subjects are bound to observe what he does so command and appoint, unless by general or especial rules, their consciences are obliged to a dissent, or contrary observation by the authority of God and his Word. In this case they are to keep their souls entire in their spiritual subjection to God, and quietly and peaceably to bear the troubles, and inconveniences which on the account thereof may befall them, without the least withdrawing of their obedience from the Magistrate. And in this state of things as there is no necessity or appearance of it, that any man should be brought into such a condition, as wherein sin on the one hand, or the other, cannot be avoided; so that state of things will probably occur in the world, as it has done in all ages hitherto, that men may be necessitated to sin, or suffer.

To wind up the state of this controversy; we say that antecedent to the consideration of the power of the magistrate, and all the influence that it has upon men or their consciences, there is a superior determination of what is true, what false in religion, what right and what wrong in the worship of God, wherein the guidance of the consciences of men does principally depend, and whereinto it is ultimately resolved. This gives an obligation, or liberty to them, antecedent to the imposition of the magistrate, of whose command and our actual obedience to them in these things, it is the rule and measure. And I think there is no principle, no common presumption of nature, nor dictate of reason more evident, known, or confessed, than this, that whatever God commands us in his worship or otherwise, that we are to do; and whatever he forbids us, that we are not to do, be the things themselves in our eye great, or small.

Neither is there any difference in these things with respect to the way or manner of the declaration of the will of God; whether it be by innate common light, or by revelation, all is one; the authority and will of God in all is to be observed. Yes, a command of God made known by revelation, (the way which is most contended about) may suspend as to any particular instance, the greatest command that we are obliged to by the law of nature in reference to one another; as it did in the precept given to Abraham for the sacrificing of his son. And we shall find our author himself setting up the supremacy of conscience in opposition to, and competition with that of the magistrate, (though with no great self-consistency) ascribing the preeminence and prevalency in obligation to that of conscience, and that in the principal and most important duties of religion and humane life. Such are all those moral virtues, which have in their nature a resemblance of the divine perfections, wherein he places the substance of religion; with respect to these, he so sets up the throne of conscience, as to affirm that if any thing be commanded by the magistrate against them, to disobey him is no sin, but a duty; and we shall find the case to be the same in matters of mere revelation. For what God commands that he commands, by what way soever that command be made known to us. And there is no consideration that can add any thing to the obligatory power and efficacy of infinite authority. So that where the will of God is the formal reason of our obedience, it is all one how or by what means it is discovered to us, whatever we are instructed in by innate reason, or by [illegible] the reason why we are [illegible] by it, is neither the one nor the other, but the authority of God in both.

But we must return to the consideration of the sentiments of our Author in this matter as before laid down. The authority ascribed to the Civil Magistrate being as has been expressed; it will be very hard for any one to distinguish between it and the sovereignty that the Lord Christ himself has in and over his Church; yes, if there be any advantage on either side, or a comparative preeminence, it will be found to be cast upon that of the Magistrate. Is the Lord Christ the Lord of the souls and consciences of men? Has he dominion over them to rule them in the things of the worship of God? It is so with the Magistrate also; he has a universal power over the consciences of his subjects. Does the Lord Christ require his disciples to do and observe in the worship of God whatever he commanded them? So also may the Magistrate, the rule and conduct of conscience in these matters belonging to him; provided that he command nothing that may countenance vice, or disgrace the Deity; which, with reverence be it spoken, our Lord Jesus Christ himself, not only on the account of the perfection and rectitude of his own nature, but also of his commission from the Father, could not do. Is the authority of Christ the formal reason making obedience necessary to his commands and precepts? So is the authority of the Magistrate in reference to what he requires. Do men therefore sin if they neglect the observance of the commands of Christ in the worship of God, because of his immediate authority so to command them binding their consciences? So do men sin if they omit or neglect to do what the Magistrate requires in the worship of God because of his authority, without any further respect. Has the Lord Christ instituted two Sacraments in the worship of God, that is outward visible signs, or symbols, of inward invisible or spiritual grace? The Magistrate if he please may institute and appoint twenty under the names of significant ceremonies; that is outward visible signs of inward spiritual grace, which alone is the significancy contended about. Has the Magistrate this his authority in and over religion and the consciences of men from Jesus Christ? No more than Christ has his authority from the Magistrate; for he holds it by the law of nature antecedent to the promise and coming of Christ. Might Christ in his own person administer the holy things of the Church of God? Not in the Church of the Jews, for he sprang of the tribe of Judah, concerning which nothing was spoken as to the Priesthood; only he might in that of the Gospel, but has judged meet to commit the actual administration of them to others. So is it with the Magistrate also. Thus far then Christ and the Magistrate seem to stand on even or equal terms; but there are two things remaining that absolutely turn the scale and cast the advantage on the Magistrate's side. For first, men may do and practise many things in the worship of God which the Lord Christ has nowhere, nor by any means required; yes, to think that his Word or the revelation of his mind and will therein, is the sole and adequate rule of religious worship, is reported as an opinion foolish, absurd, impious and destructive of all government. If this be not supposed not only the whole design of our Author in this book is defeated, but our whole controversy also is composed and at an end. But on the other hand, no man must do or practise any thing in that way, but what is prescribed, appointed and commanded by the Magistrate, upon pain of sin, schism, rebellion and all that follows thereon. To leave this unasserted is all that the Non-Conformists would desire in order to peace. Comprehension and indulgence would ensue thereon. Here I think the Magistrate has the advantage. But that which follows will make it yet more evident; for secondly, suppose the Magistrate require any thing to be done and observed in the worship of God, and the Lord Christ require the quite contrary in a man's own apprehension, so that he is as well satisfied in his apprehension of his mind as he can be of any thing that is proposed to his faith and conscience in the Word of God; in this case he is to obey the Magistrate, and not Christ, as far as I can learn; unless all confusion and disorder be admitted an entrance into the world. Yes, but this seems directly contrary to that rule of the Apostles, which has such an evidence and power of rational conviction attending it, that they refer it to the judgement of their adversaries, and those persons of as perverse corrupt minds and prejudicate engagements against them and their cause, as ever lived in the world; namely, Whether it be meet to obey God or man, judge you. But we are told, that this holds only in greater matters; the logic (by the way) of which distinction, is as strange as its divinity. For if the formal reason of the difference intimated, arise from the comparison between the authority of God and man, it holds equally as to all things small or great that they may be oppositely concerned in. Besides who shall judge what is small, or what is great in things of this nature? Cave ne titubes. Grant but the least judgement to private men themselves in this matter, and the whole fabric tumbles; if the Magistrate be judge of what is great and of what is little, we are still where we were without hopes of delivery. And this to me is a notable instance of the preeminence of the Magistrate above Christ in this matter. Some of the Old Irish have a proverbial speech among them, that if Christ had not been Christ when he was Christ, Patrick had been Christ; but it seems now that taking it for granted that he was Christ, yet we have another that is so also; that is Lord over the souls and consciences of men; and what can be said more of him, who sits in the Temple of God, and shows himself to be God.

As we formerly said Non-Conformists who are unacquainted with the mysteries of things of this nature, must needs desire to know whether these be the avowed principles of the Church of England, or whether they are only inventions to serve a present turn of the pursuit of some mens designs. Are all the old pleas of the Jus Divinum of Episcopacy, of example and direction Apostolical, of a parity of reason between the condition of the Church while under extraordinary officers, and while under ordinary; of the power of the Church to appoint ceremonies for decency and order, of the consistency of Christian liberty with the necessary practice of indifferent things, of the pattern of the churches of old, which (whether duly or otherwise we do not now determine) have been insisted on in this cause, swallowed all up in this abyss of magistratical omnipotency, which plainly renders them useless and unprofitable? How unhappy has it been that the Christian world was not sooner blessed with this great discovery of the only way and means of putting a final end, to all religious contests? That he should not until now appear, Qui genus humanum ingenio Superavit, & omnes Praestrinxit stellas, exortus at aetherius sol. But every age produces not a Columbus. Many indeed have been the disputes of learned men about the power of magistrates in and concerning religion. With us it is stated in the recorded actings of our sovereign princes, in the Oath of Supremacy, and the Acts of Parliament concerning it, with other authentic writings explanatory thereof. Some have denied him any concern herein; our author is none of them. But rather like the phrenetick gentleman who when he was accused in former days, for denying the corporal presence of Christ in the Sacrament, replied in his own defence, that he believed him to be present booted and spurred as he rode to Capernaum, he has brought him in booted and spurred, yes armed cap-a-pie into the Church of God, and given all power into his hands to dispose of the worship of God according to his own will and pleasure. And that not with respect to outward order only, but with direct obligation upon the consciences of men.

But doubtless it is the wisdom of sovereign princes to beware of this sort of enemies; persons who to promote their own interest make ascriptions of such things to them, as they cannot accept of, without the utmost hazard of the displeasure of God. Is it meet that to satisfy the desires of any, they should invade the prerogative of God, or set themselves down at his right hand in the throne of his only begotten Son? I confess they are no way concerned in what others for their advantage sake, as they suppose, will ascribe to them, which they may sufficiently disown by scorn and silence. Nor can their sin involve them in any guilt. It was not the vain acclamation of the multitude to Herod, the voice of God and not of man, but his own arrogant satisfaction in that blasphemous assignation of divine glory to him, that exposed him to the judgements and vengeance of God. When the princes of Israel found by the answer of the Reubenites that they had not transgressed against the law of God's worship, in adding to it or altering of it, which they knew would have been a provocation not to have been passed over without a recompense of revenge, they replied to them, Now have you delivered the Children of Israel out of the hand of the Lord; and it is to be desired that all the princes of the Israel of God in the world, all Christian potentates, would diligently watch against giving admission to any such insinuations, as would deliver them into the hand of the Lord.

For my own part, such is my ignorance, that I know not, that any magistrate from the foundation of the world, unless it were Nebuchadnezzar, Caius Caligula, Domitian and persons like to them, ever claimed or pretended to exercise the power here assigned to them. The instances of the laws and edicts of Constantine in the matters of religion and the worship of God, of Theodosius and Gratian, Arcadius, Martian and other emperors of the East remaining in the Code and Novels; the Capitular of the Western emperors, and laws of Gothish kings, the right of ecclesiastical jurisdiction inherent in the Imperial Crown of this nation, and occasionally exercised in all ages are of no concernment in this matter. For no man denies but that it is the duty of the supreme magistrate to protect and further the true religion, and right worship of God, by all ways and means suited and appointed of God thereunto. To encourage the professors thereof, to protect them from wrong and violence, to secure them in the performance of their duties, is doubtless incumbent on them. Whatever under pretence of religion brings actual disturbance to the peace of mankind, they may coerce and restrain. When religion as established in any nation by law, does or may interest the professors of it, or guides in it, in any privileges, advantages, or secular emoluments, which are subject and liable, as all human concerns, to doubts, controversies, and litigious contests in their security and disposal, all these things depend merely and solely on the power of the magistrate, by whose authority they are originally granted, and by whose jurisdictive power both the persons vested with them, and themselves are disposable. But for an absolute power over the consciences of men to bind or oblige them formally thereby, to do whatever they shall require in the worship of God, so as to make it their sin deserving eternal damnation not so to do, without any consideration whether the things are true or false, according to the mind of God or otherwise, yes though they are apprehended by them who are so obliged to practise them, to be contrary to the will of God, that this has hitherto been claimed by any magistrate, unless such as those before mentioned, I am yet to seek. And the case is the same with respect to them who are not satisfied that what is so prescribed to them will be accepted with God. For whereas in all that men do in the worship of God, they ought to be fully persuaded of its acceptableness to God in their own minds, seeing whatever is not of faith is sin, he that doubts is in a very little better capacity to serve God on such injunctions, than he who apprehends them to be directly contrary to his mind.

If an edict were drawn up for the settlement of religion and religious worship in any Christian nation, according to the principles and directions before laid down, it may be there would be no great strife in the world by whom it should be first owned and espoused. For it must be of this importance.

Whereas we have a universal and absolute power over the consciences of all our subjects in things appertaining to the worship of God; so that if we please we can introduce new duties, (never yet heard of,) in the most important parts of religion (pag. 80.) and may impose on them in the practice of religion and divine worship what we please; so that in our judgement it does not countenance vice, nor disgrace the Deity, (Pag. 85.) and whereas this power is naturally inherent in us, not given or granted to us by Jesus Christ, but belonged to us, or our predecessors before ever he was born, nor is expressed in the Scripture, but rather supposed; and this being such as that we ourselves if we would, (whether we be man or woman) (here France must be excepted by virtue of the Salic Law, though the whole project be principally calculated for that meridian) might exercise the special offices and duties of religion in our own person, especially that of the priesthood, though we are pleased to transfer the exercise of it to others; and whereas all our prescriptions, impositions, and injunctions, in these things, do immediately affect and bind the consciences of our subjects because they are ours, whether they be right or wrong, true or false, so long as in our judgement they neither (as was said) countenance vice nor disgrace the Deity, we do enact and ordain as followeth.

(Here, if you please, you may insert the scheme of religion given us by our author in his second chapter, and add to it; that because sacrifices were a way found out by honest men of old, to express their gratitude to God thereby, so great and necessary a part of our religious duty; it be enjoined that the use of them be again revived; seeing there is nothing in them that offends against the bounds prescribed to the power to be expressed; and that men in all places do offer up bulls and goats, sheep, and fowls, to God, with as many other institutions of the like nature, as shall be thought meet;) Hereunto add,

Now our express will and pleasure is, that every man may, and do think and judge what he pleases concerning the things enjoined and enacted by us; for what have we to do with their thoughts and judgements? They are under the empire and dominion of conscience, which we cannot invade if we would; they may if they please judge them inconvenient, foolish, absurd, yes contrary to the mind, will, and law of God: our only intention, will and pleasure is, to bind them to the constant observation and practice of them, and that under the penalties of hanging and damnation.

I know not any expression in such an impious and futilous edict, that may not be warranted out of the principles of this discourse; the main parts of it being composed out of the words and phrases of it, and those used, to the best of my understanding, in the sense fixed to them by our author.

Now, as was said before, I suppose Christian princes will not be earnest in their contests, who shall first own the authority intimated, and express it in a suitable exercise. And if any one of them should put forth his hand to it, he will find that — Furiarum Maxima juxta Accubat, & manibus prohibet contingere mensas. There is one who lays an antecedent claim to a sole interest in this power, and that bottomed on other manner of pretensions than any as yet have been pleaded in their behalf. For the power and authority here ascribed to princes, is none other but that which is claimed by the Pope of Rome, (with some few enlargements) and appropriated to him by his canonists and courtiers. Only here the old gentleman, (as he is called by our author) has the advantage; that beside the precedency of his claim, it being entered on record at least six or seven hundred years before any proctor or advocate appeared in the behalf of princes, he has forestalled them all in the pretence of infallibility; which doubtless is a matter of singular use in the exercise of the power contended about. For some men are so peevish as to think that thus to deal with religion and the consciences of men, belongs to none but him, who is absolutely, yes essentially so, that is infallible. For as we have now often said (as contrary to their design men in haste oftentimes speak the same things over and over) as to all ecclesiastical jurisdiction over persons and causes ecclesiastical, and the sovereign disposal of all the civil and political concernments of religion which is vested in the imperial crown of this nation, and by sundry acts of Parliament is declared so to be, I shall be always ready to plead the right of our kings, and all Christian kings whatever, against the absurd pleas and pretences of the Pope; so as to this controversy between him and such princes as shall think meet to contend with him about it, concerning the power over the consciences of men before described, I shall not interpose myself in the scuffle; as being fully satisfied they are contending about that which belongs to neither of them.

But what reason is there, why this power should not be extended to the inward thoughts and apprehensions of men about the worship of God, as well as to the expression of them in pure spiritual acts of that worship. The power asserted I presume will be acknowledged to be from God; though I can scarce meet with the communication and derivation of it from him in this Discourse. But whereas, it is granted on all hands, that the powers that be are of God, and that none can have authority over another, unless it be originally given him from above; I desire to be informed why the other part of the power mentioned, namely over the thoughts, judgements, and apprehensions of men in the things of the worship of God, should not be invested in the Magistrate also; that so he having declared what is to be believed, thought, and judged in such things, all men should be obliged so to believe, think, and judge; for this power God can give; and has given it to Jesus Christ. I presume, it will be said, that this was no way needful for the preservation of peace in humane society, which is the end for which all this power is vested in the Magistrate. For let men believe, think, and judge what they please, so long as their outward actings are, or may be over-ruled, there is no danger of any public disturbance. But this seems to be a mighty uneasy condition for mankind; namely to live continually in a contradiction between their judgements and their practices, which in this case is allowed to be incident to them. Constantly to judge one way best and most according to the mind of God in his worship, and constantly to practise another, will, it is to be feared, prove like the conflicting of vehement vapours with their contrary qualities, that at one time or other will produce an earthquake. How then if men weary of this perplexing distorting condition of things in their minds, should be provoked to run to excesses and inordinate courses for their freedom and rest, such as our Author excellently displays in all their hideous colours and appearances, and which are really pernicious to humane policy and society? Were it not much better that all these inconveniences had been prevented in the first instance, by taking care that the faith, thoughts, persuasions, and judgements of all subjects about the things of God, should be absolutely bound up to the declared conceptions of their rulers in these matters? Let it not be pretended, that this is impossible, and contrary to the natural liberty of the minds of men, as rational creatures guiding and determining themselves according to their own reason of things and understandings. For do but fix the declared will of the ruler, in the room and place of divine revelation, (which is no hard matter to do, which some actually do universally, and our Author as to a great share and proportion) and the obligation sought after to prevent all inconveniences in government, falls as full and directly upon the minds, thoughts, and judgements of men, as upon any of their outward actions. And this, for the substance of it, is now pleaded for; seeing it is pretended that in all things dubious, where men cannot satisfy themselves that it is the will of God that they should do a thing, or no, the declaration of the Magistrate determines not only their practice, but their judgement also, and gives them that full persuasion of their minds which is indispensably required to their acting in such things; and that faith which frees them from sin; for he that doubts, is damned if he eat.

But it will be said, that there will be no need hereof; for let men think and judge what they please, while they are convinced and satisfied that it is their duty not to practise any thing outwardly in religion, but what is prescribed by their rulers, it is not possible that any public evil should ensue upon their mental conceptions only. We observed before that the condition described is exceedingly uneasy; which I suppose will not be denied by men who have seriously considered, what it is either to judge or practise any thing that lies before them with reference to the judgment of God. And that which should tie men up to rest perpetually in such a restless state, is as it seems a mere conviction of their duty. They ought to be, and are supposed to be convinced that it is their duty to maintain the liberty of their minds and judgements, but to submit in their outward practice universally to the laws of men that are over them. And this sense and conviction of duty, is a sufficient security to public tranquility, in all that contrariety and opposition of sentiments to established religion and forms of worship that may be imagined; but if this be so; why will not the same conviction and sense of duty restrain them, who do peaceably exercise the worship of God according to the light and dictates of their consciences, from any actings whatever that may tend to the disturbance of the public peace? Duty, nakedly considered, is even as such, the greatest obligation on the minds of men; and the great security of others in their actings arises from the [illegible] more it is influenced and advantaged by outward considerations, the less it is assaulted and opposed by things grievous and perplexing in the way of the discharge of it, the more efficacious will be its operations on the minds of men, and the firmer will be the security to others that from there arises. Now these advantages lie absolutely on the part of them who practise, or are allowed so to do, according to their own light and persuasion in the worship of God, wherein they are at rest and full satisfaction of mind; and not on theirs who all their days are bound up to a perverse distorted posture of mind and soul, in judging one thing to be best and most pleasing to God, and practising of the contrary. Such an one, is the man that of all others, rulers have need I think to be most jealous of. For what security can be had of him, who has inured himself to a continual contradiction between his faith and his practice? For my part I should either expect no other measure from him in any other thing, nor ever judge that his profession and ways of actings are any sufficient indications of his mind, (which takes away all security from mankind) or fear that his convictions of light and knowledge, (as he apprehends) would at one time or other precipitate him into attempts of irregularity and violence for his own relief.

—Hic niger est, hunc tu Romane caveto.

It will be said, perhaps, that we need not look farther for the disturbance of public peace, from them who practise outwardly any thing in the worship of God but what is prescribed, established, and enjoyed; seeing that every such practice is such a disturbance it self. I say this pretence is miserably ridiculous and contemptible, and contrary to the common experience of mankind. If this were so, the whole world for 300 years, lived in one continual disturbance and tumult upon the account of Christian religion, whose professors constantly practised and performed that in the worship of God, which was so far from being established or approved by public authority, that it was proscribed and condemned under penalties of all sorts, pecuniary, corporal, and sanguinary or capital. But we see no such matter ensued, nor the least disquietment to the world, but what was given to it by the rage of bloody persecutors, that introduced the first convulsions into the Roman Empire, which were never well quieted, but ended in its dissolution. The experience also of the present and next preceding ages, casts this frivolous exception out of consideration. And as such a practice, even against legal prohibitions, though it be by the transgression of a penal law, is yet in it self and just consequence remote enough from any disturbance of government, (unless we should suppose that every non-observance of a penal statute invalidates the government of a nation, which were to fix it upon such a foundation, as will not afford it the steddiness of a weathercock;) so being allowed by way of exemption, it contains no invasion upon, or intrusion into the rights of others; but being accompanied with the abridgement of the privileges of none, or the neglect of any duty required to the good of the commonwealth, it is as consistent with, and may be as conducing to public good and tranquility, as any order of religious things in the world, as shall be elsewhere demonstrated.

It remains therefore that the only answer to this consideration is, that men who plead for indulgence and liberty of conscience in the worship of God according to his Word, and the light which He has given them therein, have indeed no conscience at all, and so are not to be believed as to what they profess against sinister and evil practices. This flail I know no fence against, but this only; that they have as good and better grounds to suspect him to have no conscience at all, who upon unjust surmises shall so injuriously charge them, as finding him in a direct transgression of the principal rules that conscience is to be guided and directed by, than he has to pronounce such a judgement concerning them and their sincerity in what they profess. And whether such mutual censures tend not to the utter overthrow of all peace, love, and security among mankind is easy to determine. Certainly it is the worst game in the world for the public, to have men bandying suspicions one against another; and thereon managing mutual charges of all that they do surmise, or what else they please to give the countenance of surmise to.

I acknowledge the notion insisted on, namely, that while men reserve to themselves the freedom and liberty of judging what they please, or what seems good to them in matters of religion and the worship of God, they ought to esteem it their duty to practise in all things according to the prescription of their rulers, though every may contrary to, and inconsistent with their own judgements and persuasions, unless it be in things that countenance vice, or disgrace the Deity (where of yet it may be, it will not be thought meet that they themselves should judge for themselves and their own practise, seeing they may extend their conceptions about what does so to such minute instances as would frustrate the whole design) is exceedingly accommodated to the corrupt lusts and affections of men, and suited to make provision for their security in this world, by an exemption from the indispensable command of professing the truth communicated and known to them; a sense of the obligation where of, has hitherto exposed innumerable persons in all ages to great difficulties, dangers, and sufferings, yes to death the height and sum of all. For whereas men have been persuaded that with the heart man believeth to righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made to salvation; the latter clause is in many cases hereby sufficiently superseded; and the troublesome duty seeming to be required in it, is removed out of the way. It will not, it may be, be so easy to prove that in the religion of the Mahumetans there is any thing enjoined in practise, that will directly fall under the limitations assigned to the compliance with the commands of superiors contended for. And therefore let a man but retain his own apprehensions concerning Jesus Christ and the Gospel, it may be lawful for him, yes be his duty to observe the worship enjoined by the law of Mahomet, if his lot fall to live under the power of the Grand Seignior, or any sovereign prince of the same persuasion. But the case is clear in the religion of the Papists, which is under the protection of the greatest number of supreme magistrates in Europe. It will not be pretended, I suppose by our author, that there is any thing in the confession of the Church of Rome, or imposed by it on the practices of men, that directly gives countenance to any immorality, especially as the sense of that term is by him stated; and it is no easy matter for ordinary men to prove and satisfy themselves, that there is ought in their modes of worship of such a tendency, as to cast disgrace upon the Deity; especially considering with how much learning and diligence the charge of any such miscarriage is endeavoured to be answered and removed; all which pleas ought to be satisfied, before a man can make sedately a determinate judgement of the contrary. Let then men's judgements be what they will in the matters of difference between Protestants and Papists, it is on this hypothesis, the duty of all that live under the dominion of sovereign Popish princes, outwardly to comply with and practise that religious worship that is commanded by them and enjoined. The case is the same also as to the religion of the Jews. Now as this casts a reflection of incredible folly and unexpiable guilt upon all Protestant martyrs, in casting away their own lives, and disobeying the commands of their lawful sovereigns, so it exposes all the Protestants in the world who are still in the same condition of subjection, to the severe censures of impiety and rebellion; and must needs exasperate their rulers to pursue them to destruction, under pretence of unwarrantable obstinacy in them. For if we wholly take off the protection of conscience in this matter, and its subjection to the authority of God alone, there is no plea left to excuse dissenting Protestants from the guilt of such crimes, as may make men justly cry out against them as the Jews did against Saint Paul, Away with them, away with them, it is not meet that such fellows should live; or, Frotestantes ad Leones, according to the old cry of the Pagans against the primitive Christians. But if this should prove to be a way of teaching and justifying the grossest hypocrisy and dissimulation that the nature of man is capable of, a means to cast off all regard to the authority of God over the ways and lives of men, all the rhetoric in the world shall never persuade me that God has so moulded and framed the order and state of human affairs, that it should be any way needful to the preservation of public peace and tranquility. Openness, plainness of heart, sincerity in our actions and professions, generous honesty, and an universal respect in all things to the supreme rector of all, the great possessor of heaven and earth, with an endeavour to comply with his present revealed mind, and future judgement, are far better foundations for, and ligaments of public peace and quietness. To make this the foundation of our political superstructure, that Divisum Imperium Cum Jove Caesar habet, God has immediate and sole power over the minds and inward thoughts of men; but the magistrate over the exercise of those thoughts in things especially belonging to the worship of God, and in the same instances, seems not to prognosticate a stable or durable building. The prophet was not of that mind of old, who in the name of God blamed the people for willingly walking after the commandment of their ruler, in concerns of worship not warranted by divine appointment; nor was Daniel so, who notwithstanding the severe prohibition made against his praying in his house, continued to do so three times a day.

But besides all this! I do not see how this Hypothesis is necessarily subservient to the principal design of the Author, but it may be as well improved to quite distant, yes contrary ends and purposes. His design plainly is, to have one fabric of Religion erected, one form of external worship enacted and prescribed, which all men should be compelled by penalties to the outward profession and observance of; these penalties he would have to be such as should not fail of their end; namely, of taking away all professed dissent from his religious establishment; which if it cannot be effected without the destruction and death of multitudes, they also are not to be forborn. Now how this ensues from the fore-mentioned principle I know not. For a supreme Magistrate, finding that the minds of very many of his Subjects are in their judgements and persuasions engaged in a dissent to the Religion established by him, or somewhat in it, or some part of it, especially in things of practical worship; though he should be persuaded that he has so far a power over their consciences, as to command them to practise contrary to their judgement, yet knowing their minds and persuasions to be out of his reach and exempted from his jurisdiction, why may he not think it meet and conducing to public tranquillity and all the ends of his government, even the good of the whole community committed to his charge, rather to indulge them in the quiet and peaceable exercise of the worship of God according to their own light, than always to bind them to that unavoidable disquietment which will ensue upon the conflict in their minds between their judgements and their practices, if he should oblige them as is desired. Certainly, as in truth and reality, so according to this principle, he has power so to do. For to fancy him such a power over the Religion and consciences of his Subjects, as that he should be inevitably bound on all occurrences and in all conditions of affairs, to impose upon them the necessary observation of one form of worship, is that which would quickly expose him to inextricable troubles. And instances of all sorts might be multiplied to show the ridiculous folly of such a conception. No, it implies a perfect contradiction to what is disputed before. For if he be obliged to settle and impose such a form on all, it must be because there was a necessity of somewhat antecedent to his imposition, from where his obligation to impose it did arise. And on such a supposition it is in vain to enquire after his liberty or his power in these things, seeing by his duty he is absolutely determined, and whatever that be which does so determine him and put an obligation upon him, it does indispensably do the same on his Subjects also; which as it is known utterly excludes the authority pleaded for.

This principle therefore indeed asserts his liberty to do what he judgeth meet in these matters, but contains nothing in it to oblige him to judge, that it may not be meet and most conducing to all the ends of his government to indulge to the consciences of men peaceable, (especially if complying with him in all the fundamentals of the Religion which himself professeth) the liberty of worshiping God according to what they apprehend of his own mind and will. And let an application of this principle be made to the present state of this Nation, wherein there are so great multitudes of persons peaceable and not unuseful to public good, who dissent from the present establishment of outward worship, and have it not in their power either to change their judgements or to practise contrary to them; and as it is in the power of the supreme Magistrate to indulge them in their own way, so it will prove to be his interest as he is the spring and center of public peace and prosperity.

Neither does it appear that in this discourse our Author has had any regard either to the real principles of the power of the Magistrate as stated in this Nation, or to his own which are fictitious; but yet such as ought to be obligatory to himself. His principal assertion is, that the supreme Magistrate has power to bind the consciences of men in matters of Religion, that is by laws and edicts to that purpose. Now the highest and most obligatory way of the supreme Magistrate's speaking in England, is by Acts of Parliament; it is therefore supposed that what is so declared in or about matters of Religion, should be obligatory to the conscience of this Author; but yet quite otherwise, p. 59, he sets himself to oppose and condemn a public law of the land, on no other ground than because it stood in his way, and seemed incompliant with his principles. For whereas the law of 2 and 3 Edward 6, which appointed two weekly days for abstinence from flesh, had been among other reasons prefaced with this, that the King's Subjects having now a more clear light of the Gospel through the infinite mercy of God (such canting language was then therein used) and thereby the King's Majesty perceiving that one meat of itself was not more holy than another, &c. yet considering that due abstinence, was a means to virtue, and to subdue men's bodies to their souls and spirits, &c. And it being after found (it should seem by a farther degree of light) that those expressions meeting with the inveterate opinions of some, newly brought out of Popery, had given countenance to them to teach or declare, that something of Religion was placed therein; thereon by the law made 5 Elizabeth, adding another weekly day to be kept with the former for the same purpose, the former clause was omitted, and mention only made therein of the civil and politic reasons inducing the legislators thereunto; and withal a penalty of inflicting punishment on those who should affirm and maintain that there was any concernment of conscience and Religion in that matter. This provision has so distasted our Author, that forgetting it seems his own design, he reproaches it with the title of Jejunium Cecilianum; and thinks it so far from obliging his conscience to acquiesce in the determination therein made, that he will not allow it to give law to his tongue or pen; but (vexet censura columbas) it seems they are the Phanatics only that are thus to be restrained.

Moreover on occasion hereof we might manifest how some other laws of this land do seem carefully to avoid that imposition on conscience, which against law and reason he pleads for; for instance in that of 21 Jacob. touching usury, and the restraint of it to the sum therein established, it was provided, that no words in this Act contained shall be construed or expounded to allow the practice of usury in point of religion and conscience. And why did not the supreme magistrate in that law determine and bind the consciences of men, by a declaration of their duty in a point of religion; seeing whether way soever the determination had been made, neither would immorality have been countenanced, nor the Deity disgraced? But plainly it is rather declared, that he has not cogni[illegible]ce of such things with reference to the consciences of men to oblige them, or set them at liberty, but only power to determine what may be practised in order to public profit and peace. And therefore the law would neither bind, nor set at liberty the consciences of men in such cases, which is a work for the supreme law-giver only.

Neither, as it has been before observed, do the principles here asserted and contended for, either express or represent the supremacy of the kings of this nation in matters ecclesiastical as it is stated and determined by themselves in Parliament; but rather so, as to give great offence and scandal to the religion here professed and advantage to the adversaries thereof; for after there appeared some ambiguity in those words of the oath enacted 1 Eliz. of testifying the Queen to be supreme governor as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as in temporal; and many doubts and scruples ensued thereon, as though there were assigned to her a power over the consciences of her subjects in spiritual things, or that she had a power herself to order and administer spiritual things; In quinto Elizab. it is enacted by way of explanation, that the oaths aforesaid shall be expounded in such form as is set forth in the Admonition annexed to the Queen's Injunctions, published in the first year of her reign, where disclaiming the power of the ministry of divine offices in the Church, or the power of the priesthood here by our author affixed to the supreme magistrate, her power and authority is declared to be a sovereignty over all manner of persons born within this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal, so that no foreign power has, or ought to have any superiority over them. And so is this supremacy stated in the Articles Anno 1562. namely an autho[illegible]ity to rule all estates and degrees committed to the charge of the supreme magistrate by God, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal, and to restrain the stubborn or evil-doers. Of the things contended for by our author; the authority of the priesthood, and power over the consciences of men in matters of religion there is not one word in our laws, but rather they are both of them rejected and condemned.

I have yet laid the least part of that load upon this principle, which if it be farther pressed it must expect to be burdened withal, and that from the common suffrage of Christians in all ages. But yet that I may not transgress against the design of this short and hasty discourse, I shall proceed no farther in the pursuit of it; but take a little survey of what is here pleaded in its defence. Now this is undertaken and pursued in the first Chapter, with the two next ensuing, where an end is put to this plea. For if I understand any thing of his words and expressions, our author in the beginning of his fourth Chapter, cuts down all those gourds and wild vines that he had been planting in the three preceding; for he not only grants but disputes also for an obligation on the consciences of men antecedent and superior to all humane laws and their obligation; his words are as followeth, pag. 115. "It is not because subjects are in any thing free from the authority of the supreme power on earth, but because they are subject to a superior in Heaven; and they are only then excused from the duty of obedience to their sovereign when they cannot give it without rebellion against God; so that it is not originally any right of their own that exempts them from a subjection to the sovereign power in all things; but it is purely God's right of governing his own creatures that magistrates then invade when they make edicts to violate or control his laws; and those who will take off from the consciences of men, all obligations antecedent to those of humane laws, instead of making the power of princes, supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable, they utterly enervate all their authority, and set their subjects at perfect liberty from all their commands."

I know no men that pretend to exemption from the obligation of humane laws, but only on this plea, that God by his law requires them to do otherwise; and if this be so, the authority of such laws as to the consciences of men, is superseded by the confession of this author. Allow therefore but the principles here expressed, namely, that men have a superior power over them in Heaven, whose laws, and the revelation of whose will concerning them, is the supreme rule of their duty, from where an obligation is laid upon their consciences of doing whatever is commanded, or not doing what is forbidden by him, which is superior to, and actually supersedes all humane commands and laws that interfere therewith, and I see neither use of, nor place for that power of magistrates over the consciences of men, which is so earnestly contended for. And our author also in his ensuing discourse in that Chapter, places all the security of government in the respect that the consciences of men have to the will and command of God; and which they profess to have; which in all these chapters he pleads to be a principle of all confusion. But it is the first Chapter which alone we are now taking a view of.

The only argument therein insisted on to make good the ascription to the magistrate of the power over religion and the consciences of men before described, is the absolute and indispensable necessity of it, to public tranquility, which is the principal, and most important end of government. In the pursuit of this argument, sometimes yes often, such expressions are used concerning the magistrates power, as in a tolerable construction declare it to be what no man denies nor will contend about. But it is necessary that they be interpreted according to the genius and tenor of the opinion contended for, and accordingly we will consider them. This alone I say is that which is here pleaded, or is given in as the subject of the ensuing discourse. But after all, I think that he who shall set himself seriously to find out how any thing here spoken, has a direct and rational cogency towards the establishment of the conclusion before laid down, will find himself engaged in no easy an undertaking. We were told I confess at the entrance (so as that we may not complain of a surprisal) that we must expect to have invectives twisted with arguments, and some such thing seems here to be aimed at; but if a logical chemist come, and make a separation of the elements, of this composition, he will find, if I mistake not, an heap of the drossy invective, and scarce the least appearance of any argument ore. Instead of sober rational arguing, —crimina rasis Librat in Antithetis;— great aggravations of men's miscarriages in the pursuit of the dictates of their consciences, either real or feigned, edged against, and fiercely reflected upon those whom he makes his adversaries, and these the same for substance, repeated over and over in a great variety of well placed words, take up the greatest part of his plea in this chapter; especially the beginning of it, wherein alone the controversy as by himself stated is concerned.

But if the power and authority over religion and the consciences of men here ascribed to supreme magistrates, be so indispensably necessary to the preservation of public tranquility, as is pretended, a man cannot but wonder how the world has been in any age past, kept in any tolerable peace and quietness; and how it is any where blessed with those ends of government at this day. For it will not be an easy task for our author, or any one else to demonstrate that the power mentioned, has ever been either claimed or exercised by any supreme magistrate in Christendom, or that it is so at this day. The experience of past and present ages, is therefore abundantly sufficient to defeat this pretence, which is sufficiently asserted, without the least appearance of proof or argument to give it countenance or confirmation; or they must be very charitable to him, or ignorant in themselves, who will mistake invectives for arguments. The remembrance indeed of these severities I would willingly lay aside; especially because the very mention of them seems to express an higher sense of and regret concerning them, than I am in the least subject to, or something that looks like a design of retaliation; but as these things are far from my mind, so the continual returns that almost in every page I meet with, of high and contemptuous reproaches, will not allow that they be always passed by without any notice or remark.

It is indeed indispensably necessary that public peace and tranquility be preserved; but that there is any thing in point of government necessary hereunto, but that God have all spiritual power over the consciences of men, and rulers political power over their actings wherein public peace and tranquility are concerned, the world has not hitherto esteemed, nor do I expect to find it proved by this author. If these things will not preserve the public peace, it will not be kept if one should rise from the dead to persuade men to their duty. The power of God over the consciences of men, I suppose is acknowledged by all who own any such thing as conscience or believe there is a God over all. That also in the exercise of this authority, he requires of men all that obedience to rulers that is any way needful or expedient to the preservation of the ends of their rule, is a truth standing firm on the same foundation of universal consent, derived from the law of creation; and his positive commands to that purpose, have an evidence of his will in this matter not liable to exception or control. This conscience to God our author confesses as we have observed, in his fourth chapter, to be the great preservation and security of government and governors, with respect to the ends mentioned. And if so, what becomes of all the pretences of disorder and confusion that will ensue, unless this power over men's consciences be given to the magistrate and taken as it were out of the hands of God? Nor is it to be supposed that men will be more true to their consciences supposing the regilement of them in the hand of men, than when they are granted to be in the hand and power of God; for both at present are supposed to require the same things. Certainly where conscience respects authority, as it always does, the more absolute and sovereign it apprehends the authority by which it is obliged, the greater and more firm will be the impressions of the obligation upon it. And in that capacity of preeminence, it must look upon the authority of God compared with the authority of man. Here then lies the security of public peace and tranquility, as it is backed by the authority of the magistrate, to see that all outward actions are suitable to what conscience toward God does in this matter openly and unquestionably require.

The pretence indeed is that the placing of this Authority over the Consciences of men in the Supream Ruler, does obviate and take away all grounds and occasions of any such Actings on the Account of Religion, as may tend to public disturbance. For suppose Conscience in things concerning Religion and the Worship of God subject to God alone, and the Magistrate require such things to be observed in the one or the other as God has not required, at least in the Judgements and Consciences of them of whom the things prescribed are required, and to forbid the things that God requires to be observed and done; in this case it is said they cannot or will not comply in Active Obedience with the Commands of the Magistrate. But what if it so fall out? Does it from there follow that such persons must needs Rebell and be Seditious and disturb the public peace, of the Society whereof they are Members? Therefore is it that they do not do or observe what is required of them by the Magistrate in Religion or the Worship of God, or that they do what he forbids? Is it not because of the Authority of God over their minds and Consciences in these things? And why should it be supposed that men will answer the Obligations laid by God on their Consciences in one thing, and not in another; in the things of his Worship and not of obedience to Civil Power, concerning which his Commands are as express and evident, as they can be pretended to be in the things which they avow their obligation to.

Experience is pretended to the contrary. It is said again and again, that men under pretence of their Consciences to God in Religion, have raised Wars and Tumults, and brought all things into confusion, in this Kingdom and Nation especially; and what will words avail against the evidence of so open an experience to the contrary? But what if this also should prove a false and futilous pretence? Fierce and long Wars have been in this Nation of old, upon the various Titles of persons pleading their Right to Supream Government in the Kingdom, against one another; so also have there been about the Civil Rights and the Priviledges of the Subjects, in the Confusions commonly called the Barons Wars. The late Troubles, Disorders, and Wars among us must bear the weight of this whole charge. But if any one will take the pains to review the public Writings, Declarations, Treaties whereby those Tumults and Wars were begun and carried on, he will easily discern that Liberty of Conscience in practice, or the exemption of it from the power of the Magistrate as to the Rule and Conduct of it now ascribed to him, in the latitude by sober persons defended or pleaded for, had neither place in, nor influence into the Beginnings of those troubles. And when such confusions are begun, no man can give assurance or conjecture where they shall end.

Authority, Laws, Priviledges, and I know not what things wherein private men of whom alone we treat have no pretence of Interest, were pleaded in those Affairs. He that would judge aright of these things, must set aside all other Considerations, and give his instance of the Tumults and Seditions that have ensued on the account of men keeping their Consciences entire for God alone, without any just Plea, or false pretence of Authority, and the interest of men in the Civil concerns of Nations.

However it cannot be pretended that Liberty of Conscience gave the least occasion to any disorders in those dayes. For indeed there was none, but only that of Opinion and Judgement, which our Author placeth out of the Magistrates cognizance and dispose; and supposeth it is as a thing wherein the public peace neither is nor can be concerned. It is well if it prove so; but this Liberty of Judgement constantly prest with a practice contrary to its own determinations, will I fear prove the most dangerous posture of the minds of men in reference to public tranquillity, that they can be well disposed into. However we may take a little nearer view of the certain Remedy provided for all these evils by our Author, and satisfie our selves in some Enquiries about it. Shall then according to this Expedient the Supream Magistrate govern, rule, and oblige to obedience the consciences of his Subjects universally in all things in Religion and the Worship of God, so that appoint what he please, forbid what he please, Subjects are bound in Concience to observe them and yield obedience accordingly? His answer as far as I can gather his meaning is, that he may and must do so in all things, taking care that what he commands shall neither countenance Vice, nor disgrace the Deity, and then the Subjects are obliged according to the Enquiry. But yet there seems another limitation to be given to this power p. 37. where he affirms, that the Lord Christ has given severe Injunctions to secure the obedience of men to all lawful Superiours, except where they run directly cross to the interest of the Gospel; and elsewhere he seems to give the same priviledge of Exemption, where a Religion is introduced that is Idolatrous or Superstitious. I would then a little farther enquire, who shall judge whether the things commanded in Religion and the Worship of God be Idolatrous or Superstitious? Whether they cross directly the Interest of the Gospel? Whether they countenance Vice, and disgrace the Deity, or no. To say that the Magistrate is to judge and determine hereof, is the highest foppery imaginable. For no Magistrate, unless he be distracted, will enjoyn such a Religion to observance, as he judgeth himself to fall under the qualifications mentioned; and when he has done declare that so they do, and yet require obedience to them. Besides, if this Judgement be solely committed to him, indeed in the issue there neither is, nor can be any Question for a Judgement to be passed upon in this matter. For his Injunction does quite render useless all disquisitions to that purpose. The judgement and determination hereof therefore is necessary to be left to the Subjects, from whom obedience is required. So it lyes in the letter of the Proposal, they must obey in all things but such; and therefore surely must judge what is such and what is not. Now who shall fix bounds to what they will judge to fall under one or other of these limitations? If they determine according to the best light they have that the Religious Observances enjoyned by the Magistrate do directly cross the Interest of the Gospel, they are absolved by our Author from any obligation in Conscience to their observation. And so we are just as before; and this great Engine for public Tranquility vanisheth into Air and Smoak.

Thus this Author himself in way of objection supposeth a case of a Magistrate enjoyning, as was said, a Religion Superstitious and Idolatrous; this he acknowledgeeth to be an Inconvenience; yet such as is far beneath the Mischiefs that ensue upon the Exemption of the Consciences of men in Religion from the power of the Magistrate, which I confess I cannot but admire at, and can give Reasons why I do so admire it; which also may be given in due season. But what then is to be done in this Case? He answers, It is to be born: True, but how? Is it to be so born as to practise and observe the things so enjoyned though Superstitious and Idolatrous? Though his words are dubious, yet I suppose he will not plainly say so; nor can he unless he will teach men to cast off all respect to the Authority of God, and open such a door to Atheism, as his rhetorical Prefatory Invective will not be able to shut. The bearing then intended must be by patient suffering in a refusal to practise what is so commanded, and observing the contrary Commands of God. But why in this Case ought they to suffer quietly for refusing a compliance with what is commanded, and for their observance of the contrary Precepts of the Gospel? Why, they must do so because of the command of God, obliging their Consciences to Obedience to the Magistrate in all things wherein the public peace is concerned, and so that is absolutely secured. Is it not evident to him that has but half an eye that we are come about again where we were before? Let this be applyed to all the concernments of Religion and Religious Worship, and there will arise with respect to them, the same security which in this case is deemed sufficient, and all that Humane Affairs are capable of. For if in greater matters men may refuse to act according to the Magistrates Command, out of a sense of the Authority of God obliging them to the contrary, and yet their Civil Peaceableness and Obedience be absolutely secured from the respect of their Consciences to the Command of God requiring it; why should it not be admitted that they may and will have the same respect to that Command, when they dissent from the Magistrates Constitution in lesser things, on the same account of the Authority of God requiring the contrary of them? Shall we suppose that they will cast off the Authority of God requiring their Obedience, on the account of their dissatisfaction in lesser things of the Magistrates appointment, when they will not do so for all the violences that may be offered to them in things of greater and higher importance? The Principle therefore asserted is as useless as it is false, and partakes sufficiently of both those properties to render it inconsiderable and contemptible. And he that can reconcile these things among themselves, or make them useful to the Authors design, will atchieve what I dare not aspire to.

I know not any thing that remains in this first Chapter deserving our farther consideration; What seems to be of real importance, or to have any aspect towards the cause in hand, may undergoe some brief Remarques, and so leave us at liberty to a farther progress. In general a supposition is laid down, and it is so vehemently asserted as is evident that it is accompanied with a desire that it should be taken for granted; namely, that if the Consciences of men be not regulated in the choice and practice of Religion by the Authority of the Magistrate over them, they will undoubtedly run into Principles and practices inconsistent with the safety of Humane Society, and such as will lead them to Seditions and Tumults; And hence, (if I understand him, a matter I am continually jealous about from the loosness of his expressions, though I am satisfied I constantly take his words in the sense which is received of them by most intelligent persons) he educeth all his reasonings, and not from a meer dissent from the Magistrates Injuctions, without the entertainment of such Principles, or an engagement into such practices. I cannot I say, find the Arguments that arise from a meer supposition that men in some things relating to the worship of God, will or do practise otherwise than the Magistrate commands, which are used to prove the inconsistency of such a posture of things with public Tranquility, which yet alone was the Province our Author ought to have managed. But there is another supposition added, that where Conscience is in any thing left to its own liberty to choose or refuse in the Worship of God, there it will embrace, sure enough, such wicked debauched and seditious principles, as shall dispose men to commotions, rebellions, and all such evils as will actually evert all rule, order and policy among men. But now this supposition will not be granted him, in reference to them who profess to take up all their Profession of Religion from the command of God, or the Revelation of his Will in the Scripture, wherein all such Principles and Practices as those mentioned are utterly condemned; and the whole Profession of Christianity being left for 300 years without the Rule, Guidance, and conduct of Conscience now contended for, did not once give the least disturbance to the Civil Governments of the World. Disturbances indeed there were, and dreadful Revolutions of Government in those dayes and places, when and where the Professors of it lived; but no concerns of Religion being then involved in or with the Civil Rights and Interests of men, as the Professors of it had no Engagements in them, so from those Alterations and Troubles no reflection could be made on their profession. And the like Peace, the like Innocency of Religion, the like freedom from all possibility of such imputations as are now cast upon it, occasioned meerly by its intertexture with the Affairs, Rights, and Laws of the Nations, and the Interests of its professours as such therein, will ensue, when it shall be separated from that Relation wherein it stands to this world, and left as the pure naked tendency of the souls of men to another, and not before.

But what, sayes our Author, If for the present the minds of men happen to be tainted with such furious and boysterous conceptions of Religion as incline them to stubbornness and sedition, and make them unmanageable to the laws of Government, shall not a Prince be allowed to give check to such unruly and dangerous perswasions? I answer; That such principles which being professed and avowed, are in their own nature and just consequence destructive to public peace and humane society, are all of them directly opposite to the light of humane nature, that common reason and consent of mankind wherein and whereon all Government is founded, with the prime fundamental laws and dictates of the Scripture, and so may and ought to be restrained in the practises of the persons that profess them; and with reference to them the Magistrate beareth not the sword in vain. For humane society being inseparably consequent to, and an effect of the law of our nature, or concreated principles of it, which has subdued the whole race of mankind in all times and places to its observance, opinions, perswasions, principles, opposite to it or destructive of it, manifesting themselves by any sufficient evidence, or in overt acts, ought to be no more allowed than such as profess an enmity to the being and providence of God himself. For mens inclinations indeed, as in themselves considered, there is no competent judge of them among the sons of men; but as to all outward actions that are of the tendency described, they are under public inspection to be dealt withall according to their demerit.

I shall only add that the Mormo here made use of, is not now first composed or erected; it has for the substance of it been flourished by the Papists ever since the beginning of the Reformation. Neither did they use to please themselves more in, or to dance more merrily about any thing than this Calf; Let private men have their consciences exempted from a necessary obedience to the prescriptions of the Church, and they will quickly run into all pernicious fancies and perswasions. It is known how this Scare-crow has been cast to the ground, and this Calf stamped to powder by Divines of the Church of England. It is no pleasant thing I confess to see this plea revived now with respect to the Magistrates authority, and not the Popes; for I fear that when it shall be manifested, and that by the consent of all parties, that there is no pleadable argument to botom this pretension for the power of the Magistrate upon, some rather then forego it, will not be unwilling to recur to the fountain from where it first sprang, and admit the Popes plea as meet to be revived in this case. And indeed if we must come at length for the security of public peace, to deprive all private persons of the liberty of judging what is right and wrong in Religion in reference to their own practice, or what is their duty towards God about his worship and what is not, there are innumerable advantages attending the design of devolving the absolute determination of these things upon the Pope, above that of committing it to each supream Magistrate in his own Dominions. For besides the plea of at least better security in his determinations than in that of any Magistrates, if not his Infallibility which he has so long talked of, and so sturdily defended as to get it a great reputation in the world, the delivering up of the faith and consciences of all men to him, will produce a seeming agreement, at least of incomparably a larger extent, then the remitting of all things of this nature to the pleasure of every supream Magistrate, which may probably establish as many different religions in the world, as there are different nations, kingdoms, or commonwealths.

That which alone remains seeming to give countenance to the assertions before laid down, is our Authors assignation of the Priesthood by natural right to the supream Magistrate, which in no alteration of Religion he can be devested of, but by vertue of some positive law of God, as it was for a season in the Mosaical institution and Government. But these things seem to be of no force. For it never belonged to the Priesthood, to govern or to rule the consciences of men with an absolute uncontrollable power; but only in their name, and for them, to administer the holy things, which by common consent were admitted, and received among them. Besides, our Author by his discourse seems not to be much acquainted with the rise of the office of the Priesthood among men, as shall be demonstrated, if farther occasion be given thereunto. However by the way we may observe what is his judgement in this matter. The Magistrate we are told has not his ecclesiastical authority from Christ; and yet this is such as that the power of the Priesthood is included therein; the exercise whereof as he is pleased to transfer to others, so he may, if he please, reserve it to himself, p. 32. From where it follows, not only that it cannot be given by Christ to any other, for it is part of the Magistrates power which he has not limited, nor confined by any subsequent law, nor can there be [illegible] coordinate subject of the same power of several kinds; so that all the interest or right any man, or men, have in or to the exercise of it, is but transfer'd to them by the Magistrate; and therefore they act therein, in his name, and by his authority only; and hence the Bishops, as such, are said to be ministers of state, p. 49. Neither can it be pretended that this was indeed in the power of the Magistrate before the coming of Christ, but not since. For he has as we are told, all that he ever had, unless there be a restraint put upon him by some express prohibition of our Savior, p. 41. which will hardly be found in this matter. I cannot therefore see how in the exercise of the Christian Priesthood there is (on these principles) any the least respect to Jesus Christ, or his authority; for men have only the exercise of it transferred to them by the Magistrate, by vertue of a power inherent in him antecedent to any concessions of Christ; and therefore in his name and authority they must act in all the sacred offices of their functions. It is well if men be so far awake as to consider the tendency of these things.

At length Scripture proofs for the confirmation of these opinions are produced, p. 35, 36. And the first pleaded, is that promise, that Kings shall be nursings Fathers to the Church. It is true this is promised, and God accomplish it more and more; but yet we do not desire such Nurses, as beget the Children they nurse; the proposing, prescribing, commanding, binding Religion on the Consciences of men, is rather the begetting of it than its nursing. To take care of the Church and Religion, that it receive no detriment, by all the ways and means appointed by God, and useful thereunto, is the duty of Magistrates; but it is so also antecedently to their actings to this purpose, to discern aright which is the Church whereunto this promise is made, without which they cannot duly discharge their Trust, nor fulfill the Promise it self. The very words, by the rules of the Metaphor, do imply, that the Church, and its Religion, and the worship of God observed therein, is constituted, fixed, and regulated by God himself, antecedently to the Magistrates duty and power about it. They are to nurse that which is committed to them, and not what themselves have framed, or begotten. And we contend for no more but a rule concerning Religion, and the worship of God antecedent to the Magistrates interposing about it, whereby both his actings in his place, and those of Subjects in theirs, are to be regulated. Mistakes herein have engaged many sovereign Princes in pursuit of their Trust as nursing Fathers to the Church, to lay out their strength and power for the utter ruin of it; as may be evidenced in instances too many of those, who in a subserviency to, and by the direction of the Papal Interest, have endeavoured to extirpate true Religion out of the World. Such a nursing Mother we had sometimes in England, who in pursuit of her care burned so many Bishops and other holy men to Ashes.

He asks farther, what does the Scripture mean when it stiles our Savior the King of Kings, and makes Princes his Vicegerents here on earth? I confess, according to this Gentleman's principles, I know not what it means in so doing: Kings, he tells us, have not their Authority in and over Religion, and the Consciences of men from him, and therefore in the exercise of it cannot be his Vicegerents; for none is the Vicegerent of another in the exercise of any power or Authority, if he have not received that power and Authority from him. Otherwise the words have a proper sense, but nothing to our Author's purpose. It is his power over them, and not theirs over the Consciences of their Subjects, that is intended in the words. Of no more use in this controversy is the direction of the Apostle, that we should pray for Kings, that under them we may lead a quiet and peaceable life; for no more is intended therein, but that, under their peaceable and righteous administration of humane Affairs, we may live in that godliness, and honesty, which is required of us. Therefore then are these weak attempts made to confirm and prove what is not? Those, or the most of them, whom our Author in this Discourse treats with so much severity, do plead that it is the duty of all supreme Magistrates to find out, receive, embrace, promote the Truths of the Gospel, with the worship of God appointed therein, confirming, protecting, and defending them, and those that embrace them, by their Power and Authority. And in the discharge of this duty, they are to use the liberty of their own judgements, informed by the ways that God has appointed, independently on the dictates and determinations of any other persons whatever. They affirm also, that to this end they are entrusted with supreme power over all persons in their respective Dominions, who on no pretence can be exempted from the exercise of that power, as occasion in their judgements shall require it to be exercised; as also that all causes, wherein the profession of Religion in their Dominions is concerned, which are determinable in foro Civili by coercive Umpirage or Authority, are subject to their cognizance and power. The sovereign power over the Consciences of men to institute, appoint, and prescribe Religion, and the worship of God, they affirm to belong to him alone, who is the Author and Finisher of our Faith, who is the head over all things to the Church. The administration of things merely Spiritual in the worship of God is, they judge, derived immediately from him to the Ministers, and Administrators of the Gospel, possessed of their Offices by his Command, and according to his institution; as to the external practice of Religion, and Religious worship as such, it is, they say, in the power of the Magistrate to regulate all the outward civil concernments of it, with reference to the preservation of public peace, and Tranquillity, and the prosperity of his subjects. And herein also they judge that such respect is to be had to the Consciences of men, as the Scripture, the nature of the thing it self, and the right of the L. Christ to introduce his spiritual Kingdom into all Nations, do require.

That which seems to have imposed on the mind of this Author is, that if the Magistrate may make Laws for the regulating of the outward profession of Religion, so as public peace and tranquillity may be kept, added to what is his Duty to do in the behalf of the Truth; then he must have the power over Religion, and the Consciences of men by him ascribed to him. But there is no privity of Interest between these things; the Laws, which he makes to this purpose, are to be regulated by the Word of God, and the good of the Community, over which in the name of God he does preside; and from where he will take his Warranty to forbid men the exercise of their Consciences in the duties of spiritual Worship, while the Principles they profess, are suited to the light of nature, and the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, with the peace of mankind, and their practices absolutely confistent with public welfare, I am yet to seek; and so, as far as I can yet perceive, is the Author of the Discourse under Consideration. It will not arise from a Parity of Reason from the power that he has to restrain cursed Swearing, and Blasphemies by penal Coercions. For these things are no less against the Light of Nature, and no less condemned by the common suffrage of mankind (and the persons that contract the guilt of them may be no less effectually brought to judge and condemn themselves) than are the greatest outrages that may be committed in and against humane Society. That the Gospel will give no countenance hereunto, he seems to acknowledge, in his assignation of several reasons why the use of the power, and exercise of it in the way of compulsion by penalties, pleaded for by him, is not mentioned therein; that Christ and his Apostles behaved themselves as Subjects; that he neither took nor exercised any Sovereign power; that He gave his Laws to Private men as such, and not to the Magistrate, that the Power that then was, was in bad hands, are pleaded as excuses for the silence of the Gospel in this matter. But lest this should prove farther prejudicial to his present occasion, he adds p. 42. the only reason why the Lord Christ bound not the precepts of the Gospel upon mens Consciences by any secular compulsories, was not because Compulsion was an improper way to put his Laws in execution; for then He had never established them with more enforcing Sanctions, but only because himself was not vested with any secular power, and so could not use those methods of Government which are proper to its jurisdiction. This in plain English is, that if Christ had had power, he would have ordered the Gospel to have been propagated as Mahomet has done his Alcoran; an Assertion untrue and impious, contrary to the whole spirit and Genius of the Gospel, and of the Author of it, and the Commands and Precepts of it. And it is fondly supposed that the Lord Christ suited all the Management of the affairs of the Gospel, to that state and condition in this world, wherein he emptied Himself, and took upon Him the form of a Servant, making Himself of no reputation, that He might be obedient to Death, the death of the Cross. He lays the Foundation of the promulgation and propagation of it in the world, in the grant of all power to him in Heaven and Earth. All power, says he to his Apostles, is given to me in heaven and earth, go you therefore, and Baptize all Nations, teaching them to observe all things whatever I have commanded you (Matthew 28:19, 20). He is considered in the dispensation of the Gospel, as He who is head over all things to the Church, the Lord of Lords, and King of Kings, whom our Author acknowledges to be his Vicegerents. On this account the Gospel with all the Worship instituted therein, and required thereby, is accompanied with a Right to enter into any of the Kingdoms of the Earth, and spiritually to make the Inhabitants of them subject to Jesus Christ; and so to translate them out of the power of darkness into the Kingdom of the Son of God. And this Right is Antecedent and paramount to the Right of all earthly Kings and Princes whatever, who have no power or Authority to exclude the Gospel out of their Dominions; and what they exercise of that kind, is done at their peril.

The penalties that he has annexed to the final rejection of the Gospel, and disobedience thereunto, are pleaded by our Author, to justifie the Magistrates power of binding men to the Observation of his Commands in Religion on temporal penalties to be by him inflicted on them; to that is the Discourse of this chapter arrived which was designed to another end. I see neither the order, method, nor projection of this procedure; nor know, Amphora cum cepit institui, cur Vrceus exit; However the pretense it self is weak, and impertinent. Man was originally made under a law and constitution of eternal bliss, or woe. This state, with regard to his necessary dependance on God, and respect to his utmost end, was absolutely unavoidable to him. All possibility of attaining eternal happiness by himself he lost by sin, and became inevitably obnoxious to eternal misery, and the wrath to come. In this condition the Lord Jesus Christ, the supream Lord of the souls and consciences of men, interposeth his law of relief, redemption, and salvation, the great means of man's recovery, together with the profession of the way, and law hereof. He lets them know, that those by whom it is refused, shall perish under that wrath of God, which before they were obnoxious to, with a new aggravation of their sin and condemnation, from the contempt of the relief provided for them, and tendered to them. This He applyes to the souls and consciences of men, and to all the inward secret actings of them, in the first place, such as are exempted not only from the judicature of men, but from the cognizance of Angels. This he does by spiritual means in a spiritual manner, with regard to the subjection of the souls of men to God, and with reference to their bringing to Him, and enjoyment of Him, or their being eternally rejected by Him. Hence to collect, and conclude that Earthly Princes, who, (whatever is pretended) are not the Soveraign Lords of the souls and consciences of men, nor do any of them, that I know of, plead themselves so to be; who cannot interpose any thing by their absolute authority, that should have a necessary respect to mens eternal condition; who have no knowledge of, no acquaintance with, nor can judge of the principal things whereon it does depend, from whose temporal jurisdiction, and punishment the things of the Gospel, and the worship of God as purely such, are (by the nature of them, being spiritual and not of this World, though exercised in it, having their respect only to Eternity, and by their being taken into the sole disposal of the Soveraign Lord of Consciences, who has accompanied His Commands concerning them with His own promises, and threatnings,) plainly exempted; should have power over the consciences of men, so to lay their Commands upon them in these spiritual things, as to back them with temporal, corporal restraints and punishments, is a way of arguing that will not be confined to any of those rules of reasoning, which hitherto we have been instructed in. When the Magistrate has an Arm like God, and can Thunder with a Voice like Him, when he judgeth not after the sight of his eyes, nor reproveth after the hearing of his ears, when he can smile the Earth with the Rod of his Mouth, and slay the Wicked with the breath of his Lipps, when he is constituted a judge of the faith, repentance, and obedience of men, and of their efficacy in their tendency to the pleasing of God here, and the enjoyment of Him hereafter, when spiritual things in order to their eternal issues and effects are made subject to Him; in brief, when he is Christ, let him act as Christ, or rather most unlike Him, and guide the consciences of men by Rods, Axes, and Halters (whereunto alone his power can reach) who in the mean time have an express command from the Lord Christ Himself, not to have their consciences influenced in the least by the consideration of these things.

Of the like complexion is the ensuing discourse, wherein our Author, p. 43. having spoken contemptuously of the spiritual institutions of the Gospel, as altogether insufficient for the accomplishment of the ends, whereunto they are designed, forgeting that they respect only the consciences of men, and are his institutions who is the Lord of their consciences, and who will give them power, and efficacy to attain their ends, when administred in his name, and according to his mind, and that because they are His; would prove the necessity of temporal coercions, and penalties in things spiritual, from the extraordinary effects of Excommunication in the primitive times, in the vexation and punishment of persons Excommunicate by the Devil. This work the Devil now ceasing to attend to, he would have the Magistrate to take upon him to supply his place, and office, by punishments of his own appointment, and infliction; and so at last, to be sure of giving him full measure, he has ascribed two extreams to him about Religion, namely, to act the part of God, and the Devil. But as this inference is built upon a very uncertain conjecture, namely, that upon the giving up of persons to Satan in Excommunication, there did any visible, or corporal vexation of them by his power ensue, or any other effects but what may yet be justly expected from an influence of his terrour on the minds of men, who are duly and regularly cast out of the visible Kingdom of Christ by that censure; and whereas, if there be any truth in it, it was confined to the dayes of the Apostles, and is to be reckoned among the miraculous operations granted to them for the first confirmation of the Gospel; and the continuance of it, all the time the Church wanted the assistance of the Civil Magistrate, is most unduly pretended without any color of proof, or instance, beyond such as may be evidenced to continue at this day; supposing it to be true, the inference made from it, as to its consequence on this concession, is exceeding weak, and feeble. For the argument here amounteth to no more but this; God was pleased, in the dayes of the Apostles, to confirm their spiritual censures against stuborn sinners, apostates, blasphemers, and such like hainous offenders, with extraordinary spiritual punishments, (so in their own nature, or in the manner, or way of their infliction) therefore the Civil Magistrate has power to appoint things to be observed in the worship of God, and forbid other things, which the light and consciences of men, directed by the Word of God, require the observation of, upon ordinary, standing, corporal penalties to be inflicted on the outward man; quod erat demonstrandum.

To wind up this Debate; I shall commit the Vmpirage of it to the Church of England, and receive her Determination in the words of one who may be supposed to know her sense and judgement, as well as any one who lived in his dayes, or since. And this is Doctor Bilson Bishop of Winchester, a learned man, skilled in the laws of the Land, and a great adversary to all that dissented from Church Constitutions. This man therefore treating, by way of Dialogue, in answer to the Jesuites Apologie and Defence, in the Third Part p. 293. thus introduceth Theophilus a Protestant Divine, arguing with Philander a Jesuite about these matters. Theoph. As for the Supream Head of the Church; it is certain that Title was first transferred from the Pope to King Henry the eighth, by the Bishops of your side, not of ours. And though the Pastors in King Edwards time might not well dislike, much less disswade the style of the Crown, by reason the King was under years, and so remained until he dyed; yet as soon as it pleased God to place her Majesty in her Fathers Throne, the Nobles and Preachers perceiving the words, Head of the Church, (which is Christs proper and peculiar honor) to be offensive to many that had vehemently refelled the same in the Pope, besought her Highness the meaning of that word which her Father had used, might be expressed in some plainer and apter terms; And so was the Prince called Supream Governour of the Realm; that is Ruler and Bearer of the Sword, with lawful Authority to command and punish, answerable to the Word of God, in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things or Causes, as well as in Temporal. And no Forreign Prince or Prelate, to have any Jurisdiction, Superiority, Preheminence or Authority to establish, prohibit, correct, and chastise with Public Laws, or Temporal Fains, any Crimes or Causes Ecclesiastical or Spiritual within her Realm. Philand. Calvin says this is Sacriledge and Blasphemy. Look you therefore with what Consciences you take that Oath, which your own Master so mightily detesteth. Theoph. No, look you with what faces you alledge Calvin, who maketh that style to be sacrilegious and blassphemous, as well in the Pope as in the Prince; reason therefore you receive or refuse his Judgement in both. If it derogate from Christ in the Prince, so it does in the Pope. Yet we grant the sense of the word Supream, as Calvin perceived it by Stephen Gardiners Answer and behavior, is very blasphemous and injurious to Christ and his Word, whether it be Prince or Pope that so shall use it. What this sense is, he declares in the words of Calvin, which are as followeth in his Translation of them. That Jugler, which after was Chancelor, I mean the Bishop of Winchester, when he was at Rentzburge, neither would stand to reason the matter, nor greatly cared for any testimonies of the Scripture, but said it was at the Kings discretion to abrogate that which was in use, and appoint new. He said the King might forbid Priests Marriage, the King might bar the people from the Cup in the Lords Supper; the King might determine this or that in his Kingdom: And why, forsooth the King had Supream Power. This Sacriledge has taken hold on us, while Princes think they cannot reign, except they abolish all the Authority of the Church, and be themselves supream Judges as well in Doctrine as in all Spiritual Regiment. To which he subjoyns; This was the sense which Calvin affirmed to be sacrilegious and blasphemous; for Princes to profess themselves to be Supream Judges of Doctrine and Discipline; and indeed it is the blasphemy which all godly hearts reject and abomine, in the Bishop of Rome. Neither did King Henry take any such thing on him for ought that we can learn; but this was Gardiners Stratagem, to convey the reproach and shame of the Six Articles from himself and his fellows that were the Authors of them, and to cast it on the Kings Supream Power. Had Calvin been told, that Supream was first received to declare the Prince to be Superiour to the Prelates, (which exempted themselves from the Kings Authority by their Church Liberties and Immunities) as well as to the Lay men of this Realm, and not to be subject to the Pope, the Word would never have offended him. Thus far he; and if these Controversies be any farther disputed, it is probable the next defence of what is here pleaded, will be in the express words of the Principal Prelates of this Realm since the Reformation, until their Authority be peremptorily rejected.

Upon my first design to take a brief Survey of this Discourse, I had not the least intention to undertake the examination of any particular Assertions, or Reasonings, that might fall under Controversie; but meerly to examine the general Principles whereon it does proceed. But passing through these things Currente calamo, I find my self engaged beyond my thoughts and resolutions; I shall therefore here put an end to the consideration of this Chapter, although I see sundry things as yet remaining in it, that might immediately be discussed with case, and advantage, as shall be manifest, if we are called again to a review of them. I have neither desire, nor design Serram reciprocare, or to engage in any Controversial Discourses with this Author. And I presume himself will not take it amiss, that I do at present examine those Principles, whose Novelty justifies a Disquisition into them; and whose Tendency, as applyed by him, is pernicious, and destructive to so many quiet and peaceable persons, who dissent from him. And yet I will not deny, but that I have that Valuation and esteem for that sparkling of Wit, Eloquence, and sundry other Abilities of mind, which appear in his Writing, that if he would lay aside the manner of his treating those from whom he dissents, with Revilings, contemptuous Reproaches, personal Reflections, Sarcasms, and Satyrical expressions, and would candidly, and perspicuously state any matter in difference; I should think that what he has to offer, may deserve the consideration of them who have leisure for such a purpose. If he be otherwise minded, and resolve to proceed in the way, and after the manner here engaged in, as I shall in the close of this Discourse absolutely give him my Salve aeternumque vale, so I hope he will never meet with any one who shall be willing to deal with him at his own weapons.